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Abstract 
Mood, Emotive Content, and Reasoning - Daniel Zahra 
 
Theories of how individuals reason, and how they experience emotion abound in the 
psychological literature; yet, despite the common lay-theories of how emotions might 
affect a person’s reasoning,  very little empirical work has been conducted on this 
relationship. The current thesis addresses this knowledge-gap by first distilling from 
the literature two classes of emotion theory; Information, and Load; and then 
systematically testing the explanatory power of these theories.  
A dual-process framework is employed in order to define low (Type One) and 
high effort (Type Two) strategies. Information theories predict that negative emotion 
cues more analytic processing relative to positive emotion, whereas load theories 
predict both positive and negative emotion to suppress use of high-effort strategies. 
Thus the two theories are compared by varying incidental and integral emotion across 
syllogistic reasoning, conditional reasoning, and the ratio-bias task, and assessing the 
engagement of Type One and Type Two processes across positive emotion, negative 
emotion, and control conditions. 
The findings suggest that emotion effects in syllogistic reasoning do not 
consistently support either Load or Information theories (Experiments 1-4). Emotion 
effects are found to be typically larger for integral than incidental emotion (Experiment 
5), and most frequently serve as Information in verbal (Experiments 6 and 7) and visual 
conditional reasoning tasks (Experiment 8).  
Furthermore, these effects are to a large extent dependent on task properties 
such as the number of alternative antecedents (Experiments 9 and 10), and are greater 
on more difficult tasks (Experiments 11 and 12). These findings suggest that emotion 
dzahra 12 330974 
 
has a greater impact on Type Two than Type One processes. A range of methodological 
and theoretical implications which will inform future work in this area are also 
discussed in the closing chapter.  
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Chapter One 
1. Emotion 
The overall aim of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of whether and 
how our emotional experiences affect our reasoning processes. Given the broad 
range of research which has been conducted in the fields of emotion and reasoning, 
this first chapter will provide a review of the research on emotion, whilst also 
introducing and evaluating the theories of emotion which will later be of particular 
relevance to the current work. 
It is commonly accepted that emotions affect our reasoning, yet surprisingly 
little work has been conducted on these effects. There are findings in the literature, 
to be discussed in this and the following chapter, which report that emotions impair 
reasoning, and yet other studies which find emotions to be beneficial to reasoning. 
Understanding more about whether these effects are robust is an interesting an 
important area, not least because emotion and reasoning are pervasive elements of 
our lives, but because the theoretical development of both would benefit from such 
a programme. 
Whilst it is important to also discuss some of the philosophical issues 
inherent in any work on emotions, once these have been considered the remainder 
of this chapter will focus specifically on research which sheds light on whether 
emotions interact with reasoning processes, and existing explanations of how this 
may take place in relation to the findings reported. Central to this chapter is the 
consideration of emotion research in experimental psychology. Work from across 
cognitive and social psychology, as well as philosophy, bio- and neuro-psychology will 
be considered in order to establish an empirically supported framework for 
dzahra 18 330974 
 
understanding emotion. This will then be extended to consider models of cognition, 
and how emotion has been found to impact cognitive functioning in general, before 
finally moving on to consider, in Chapter  2, the work on reasoning and how emotions 
have been studied in relation to syllogistic and conditional reasoning. But first, and in 
line with the aims of the current chapter, it is important to establish how emotion 
will be conceptualised in this thesis, which will entail considering different definitions 
of emotion, their implications for potential models of emotion, and related 
philosophical issues in emotion research.  
1.1 Philosophical Issues in Emotion Research 
There are many theories of what emotions are, how they are created, and what they 
are created from. Evaluating these theories is not the purpose of this thesis, but 
along with issues such as whether or not emotions are the same for each individual 
these topics pose interesting and pertinent questions, consideration of which is 
important before embarking on any research involving emotional experiences. 
Consideration of these areas and how they serve to inform methodological as well as 
theoretical decisions later in this investigation will be the topic of this opening 
section.  
1.1.1 A Note on Ontology and Epistemology 
The main arguments in the philosophical literature surrounding emotions concern 
whether and how emotions exist. Numerous theories have been propounded over 
the years, but of those most relevant to psychology are the James-Lange and 
Cannon-Bard theories of emotion (Cannon, 1927; James, 1884). The details of these 
in relation to the current project are outlined below where they apply to models such 
as appraisal theory, but in summary, the James-Lange and Cannon-Baird theories 
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make the distinction between emotions existing of and for themselves, and emotions 
being the subjective interpretation of a range of stimuli in a given manner. Secondary 
to this is the question of whether or not emotional experiences are socially 
constructed; whether emotions are phenomena that could be experienced without 
the interpretation of society. 
If emotions are purely subjective, how can they be defined in a way which 
makes them amenable to scientific investigation? With this in mind, the studies here 
should not only be considered in terms of the effects of this or that emotion, but 
given the subjective nature of the categorisation of ‘that emotion’, they should also 
be considered at the level of the individual. Issues and perspectives such as these will 
be discussed as they arise. These points constitute an entire field in themselves, and 
although interesting and important to consider, the purpose of the current section 
was merely to introduce the topics in order that they be kept in mind throughout the 
rest of this work. 
1.1.2 Definitions of Emotion and their Implications 
I have no expectation here of succeeding where countless others have failed; what is 
required for the investigation of the relationship between emotion and reasoning is, 
at this stage, not a universal but an operational definition of emotion, and by an 
operational definition, what is meant is a definition of emotion which is meaningful 
in the current context. It may not encompass every nuance, it may not do complete 
justice to the phenomenon of emotional experience, and it may not be 
representative of all the shades of emotion, but it will serve to aid our understanding 
of the relationship between emotion (as here defined) and reasoning. 
In order to begin exploring the interplay of emotion, decision making, and 
reasoning, the nature of emotion must first be considered. But again, as with 
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arguments for and against their value, definitions of emotion abound in the 
literature, and each carries different theoretical implications. The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives the lexical definition of emotion as: 
 
Emotion n. a strong feeling such as joy, anger or sadness.  instinctive or intuitive 
feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge. 
 
Not only does this definition highlight the distinction commonly drawn between 
reasoning on the one hand and emotion on the other, but by equating reasoning 
with knowledge, it supports to some extent the implicit and common implication that 
emotions are potentially detrimental to decision making whereas ‘reasoning’ is 
beneficial. It also highlights issues which will be discussed in more depth below; 
namely, the suggestion that emotions are somehow instinctive or unconscious and 
the corollary of this that they are subsequently uncontrollable. However, in terms of 
psychological research an operational definition is necessary which takes these issues 
into account, and, along with consideration of the theoretical implications of 
different definitions, reaching such a definition will be the central focus of this 
section. 
Although definitions of emotion, and their biological basis, have been around 
since ancient times (Stokes, 2004), one of the first to appear in the psychological 
literature was the peripheric theory of William James (1884). In his paper 'What is an 
Emotion?' James argues that emotions are the internal physiological reactions to 
external events. In this view, as illustrated with the common example of seeing a 
bear, the sequence of an emotional experience follows the order; See a Bear, Run, 
and then are Frightened, as a result of the action of running. This is in contrast to 
what James refers to as the common-sense view in which we see the bear, are 
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frightened, and then run because we are frightened. In the peripheric theory, the 
physiological reactions precede the emotional experience and in large part constitute 
the emotions themselves. 
Cannon (1927) however, presented evidence to refute the peripheric theory, 
showing that emotions could still be experienced after transection of the cervical 
spinal cord. This lead to the Cannon-Bard theory (Thompson, 1988), which, contrary 
to the Jamesian approach (often referred to as the James-Lange theory following 
similar theorising by Carl Lange), posits that when presented with a stimulus, it is the 
perceptual system that processes the information, and then makes a decision 
regarding the necessary action, and it is following this judgement that signals are 
sent to various organs to instigate a physiological response. In summary, emotions 
are a combination of different thoughts about the stimulus. 
The evidence put forward by Cannon (1927), although suggesting that 
emotions are not somatovisceral responses, does not eliminate the biological basis of 
emotions, but instead moves the focus to the top of the central nervous system, 
placing the biological underpinnings in the brain. This leads us to the work of LeDoux 
and others (Andrewes, 2004; LeDoux, 1998, 2000, 2006) who propose two neural 
pathways to reaction. Following the activation of neurons in the perceptual system, 
the signal is passed both to the amygdala and the neocortex. The amygdala pathway 
provides a rapid response, but this can be overridden by the neocortical response. 
This is discussed in more detail when we come to consider models of emotion, and is 
shown in Figure  1.1 (p31). Experimental work on the fear response has led 
researchers to associate the amygdala primarily with the processing of emotional 
stimuli (Mather et al., 2004). This is supported by research showing that damage to 
the amygdala and other areas of the limbic system can lead to difficulties in both 
learning and expressing fear responses (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002) and 
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symptoms associated with psychopathy (Raine, Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997; Reidy, 
Zeichner, Hunnicutt-Ferguson, & Lilienfeld, 2008). 
In addition to the research on amygdaloid function, the classic case of 
Phineas Gage (Gazzaniga et al., 2002), who showed drastic changes in personality and 
mood states following an accident which destroyed the medial region of his 
prefrontal cortex, highlights the role of this area in emotion maintenance and 
cognitive processing of emotional stimuli. Experimental evidence also supports the 
involvement of the prefrontal cortex in emotional experiences. Beer, Knight, and 
D'Esposito (2006) have shown that the frontal cortex is heavily involved in the 
integration of cognition and emotion and that the lateral frontal cortex is involved in 
evaluating the contextual relevance of emotional information. This builds on the 
work of Tomarken and Keener (1998), who have shown that the frontal lobes are also 
involved in self-regulation, goal orientation, and inhibitory functioning. 
This work has resulted in the development of neurological explanations of 
conditions such as psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Raine et al., 1997; 
Reidy et al., 2008) and related work on neurotransmitters supported by both animal 
models (Geyer & Markou, 2000) and human research (Gazzaniga et al., 2002), and 
has underpinned significant advances in the treatment of mood disorders. This is not 
the place to provide a review and discussion of the psychopharmacological research 
(e.g. Harris, Chandran, Chakraborty, & Healy, 2003), but the effectiveness of the 
treatments that have been developed serve to highlight the role played by 
neurological systems in the generation and experience of emotion. 
Standing in contrast to the biological theories are the cognitive models of 
emotion, which define emotions purely in terms of appraisals (Lazarus, 1982). 
Cognitive appraisal theories claim that emotions are judgements made about stimuli 
presented to the individual. Returning to the bear example: when presented with a 
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bear, the individual sees the bear, feels their heart-rate increase, and then thinks 
about these stimuli, and 'decides' that they ‘should be’ afraid. Many models of the 
structure of emotion incorporate or rely solely on dimensions which are considered 
cognitive, such as judgements of pleasantness or unpleasantness as in the model of 
Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999) which will be considered when discussing models 
of emotion later. 
This definition of emotions as cognitive appraisals may at first seem to be 
refuted by research on unconscious emotions (Berridge, 2003; Winkielman & 
Berridge, 2004), and the older work on the mere exposure hypothesis (Zajonc, 1968), 
both of which show that affective states and judgements of liking can be influenced 
by factors presented outside of conscious awareness. Zajonc (1980, 1984) also argues 
against Lazarus's (1982, 1984) idea of cognitive appraisal claiming that emotions 
precede appraisals, so the appraisals cannot be the emotions. However, Lazarus 
(1984) does not claim that appraisals need necessarily be conscious, leading to much 
debate over which part or parts of the cognitive system generate these appraisals, 
and their status in consciousness. 
Damasio (1994) has argued that affect and cognition are both functionally 
and anatomically distinct, and so emotions cannot be appraisals, but must be 
separate from them; the appraisals must be of the emotions, and are not the 
emotions themselves. This is a view which seems to be supported by anecdotal 
evidence from clinicians who work with individuals suffering from emotional and 
cognitive disorders, one such example being the case of Dr.P reported by Oliver Sacks 
in his famous 'The Man who mistook his Wife for a Hat' (2007, pp.8-24). Dr.P was 
only able to identify objects through a systematic process of feature identification, 
lacking any holistic (or emotional) concept of items or people; there was never any 
feeling of ‘knowing’ or emotional connection which could be appraised.  
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Duncan and Feldman-Barrett (2007), on the other hand, argue that the 
neural circuitry involved in generating affective states is distributed throughout the 
brain, and includes systems associated with other cognitive functions, such as 
sensory processing and language. 
Other theorists have proposed a variety of alternative views, neither wholly 
biological nor cognitive. For example, Averill (1998), in reviewing Parkinson (1995), 
summarises emotions as 'fuzzy categories', 'multicomponential', 'a form of 
communication', 'on-line', 'interpersonal', and 'ineluctably infused with the beliefs, 
values, and norms of society' (pp.850-851). That is to say that there might not be one 
simple definition of 'an emotion', that emotional experiences are made up of many 
components, none of which alone constitute an emotion, and that emotions are 
essentially evolved systems of communication and so depend on contextual,  
societal, and personal variables. 
Related to this argument, as different elements might have varying effects, 
Gross (1999) raises the issue of needing to distinguish between regulation by 
emotion, and regulation of emotion in relation to both beneficial and detrimental 
effects on task performance. This also raises again the issue of conscious versus 
unconscious emotions; dimensions that need to be considered when defining what 
an emotion is and how it interacts with other systems. Cabanac (2002), building on 
his work attempting to define consciousness, suggests that an emotion is any mental 
experience which is intense and has a pleasure-displeasure dimension. This definition 
appears to limit emotions to the realm of the cognitive, in that the judgement of 
pleasure-displeasure would seem to require a cognitive appraisal, but it does 
consider the implications of the biological aspects of emotion in as much as they are 
experiences which can fall along the pleasure-displeasure dimension, or be used to 
situate an experience along this dimension. 
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Alongside biological and cognitive theories, evolutionary theories define 
emotions as evolutionarily adaptive modules (Marks & Nesse, 1994; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), which serve to increase the reproductive 
fitness of the individual by helping them avoid injury or death. There are also the 
psychoanalytic theories, which bear a strong resemblance to cognitive theories based 
on the idea that emotions are the result of stimuli which then affect behaviour 
(Forgas, 1995). 
Yet another view is championed by the embodied emotion movement, and 
suggests that when presented with a stimulus, biological and cognitive components 
interact to generate the emotion, and that later, when the stimulus is recalled as a 
mental image or cognitive representation, the biological components of the 
experience are also reactivated due to the extensive interconnectedness of the 
systems involved (Niedenthal, 2007). In this way, the relationship between emotion 
and cognition can be seen as reciprocal. However, in terms of studying emotions 
from a cognitive perspective, it raises issues for the type of manipulations used. If 
purely cognitive tasks are used, such as thinking about happy or sad events, then this 
leads to a partial reactivation of the response pattern that was experienced at the 
time, but this may not be the same as the emotion experienced in the situation. 
Arguably, this is the cognitive component of the emotional experience, and its study 
is valid, provided it is acknowledged as only one of many aspects of the complete 
emotional experience. 
Despite the differing specifics of these definitions, they all suggest that 
emotions may in fact be made up of many different aspects, cognitive, biological and 
neurological, as well as the social and cultural (Averill, 1998). As such, when 
considering a definition of emotion, there seems to be a need for an eclectic, 
biopsychosocial approach (Engel, 1977), or at least an awareness of the limitations 
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and difficulties caused by using narrow and restricted definitions of emotion. In line 
with this, the studies reported here use primarily self-reported measures of emotion, 
and thus investigate the element of emotional experience available to conscious 
perception.  
Within these definitions, it is possible to consider emotion as part of the 
cognitive representational system (Sartre, 2008), a view that is supported by the 
neurobiological literature (Duncan & Feldman-Barrett, 2007), and can accommodate 
the evidence presented in support of both biological and cognitive theories and the 
evidence that shows a bidirectional relationship between cognition and emotion 
(Niedenthal, 2007; Sigall & Johnson, 2006). Treating emotion as part of cognition 
largely overcomes problems raised by the affective-cognitive primacy debate as the 
two become almost synonymous, and can overcome the debate surrounding the 
conscious status of affect by incorporating the possibility that different stimuli are 
processed at different levels of awareness by different neurological structures. 
If emotion is considered to have at least some cognitive component, or be 
part of the cognitive system, as well as having at least some conscious components, 
then measures of emotion which rely on self-report can be used to capture this 
‘experienced’ aspect of affective states. Although there are methodological issues 
associated with self-report measures such as demand characteristics, this approach 
provides an operational definition for the study of emotion which acknowledges its 
multifaceted nature. Emotional experiences consist of both conscious cognitive and 
non-conscious non-cognitive aspects both of which have a variety of applications, but 
the former will be the focus of this research as they are the aspects most easily 
accessible to cognitive-psychological investigation. 
Furthermore, there are numerous arguments for drawing a distinction 
between mood, affect, and emotion. For example, there is little agreement in the 
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literature as to the relative definitions of affect, emotion, mood, and feeling, 
although some attempt has been made to subcategorise emotional experiences with 
these terms based on intensity, salience, focus and duration (Forgas, 1995, 2001). 
However, the experiments conducted as part of this thesis are concerned with the 
self-reported subjective experience at the time of completing the various tasks, and 
mood, emotion and affect will be used interchangeably to refer to the reported 
emotional state of participants, which gives us our operational definition of emotion. 
1.1.3 Do we have control of our emotions? 
Related to the definition of emotions and their causes is the issue of whether or not 
we have control over our emotions. It has been argued in phenomenological 
philosophy that individuals can control what they feel and when (Sartre, 2008; 
Warburton, 2008), yet this seems initially to contradict the personal experience of 
almost everyone. Research on appraisals has suggested that prior moods can affect 
judgments, and that altering judgments can alter moods, these ideas forming the 
basis of cognitive behavioural therapies. It would appear therefore that individuals 
can regulate their moods, at least to some extent. 
In terms of the impact on reasoning research, which is a central element of 
this thesis, the implications depend on the mechanism through which moods affect 
judgments, which in turn depends on the definition of mood adopted. The following 
studies will aim to investigate not only whether emotion has any effect on reasoning, 
but also to evaluate the results in light of theories which have been proposed to 
explain the interaction of emotion, cognition, and reasoning. It is hoped that the 
conclusions drawn will help to determine which reasoning tasks are affected by 
emotion, and how, in order to further our understanding of the relationship between 
emotion and reasoning. 
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If cognitive re-evaluation of thoughts associated with a task can alter mood, 
this is in line with definitions of emotion which contain a cognitive component, and 
falls within our operational definition of emotion. Furthermore, it follows that 
emotions may require cognitive resources in some way, or may influence the way 
resources are allocated. This leads to the idea that it may be possible to purposely 
alter how the limited cognitive resources are used, allowing mood to be brought 
under volitional control. This has to some extent been supported by the work of Van 
Dillen and Koole (2007), who have shown that depleting cognitive resources with 
additional tasks alters the emotions experienced by their participants. This supports 
the basis of cognitive behavioural therapies mentioned above, and is suggestive of a 
bidirectional relationship between emotion and cognition which needs to be kept in 
mind when reviewing the experimental work in this thesis. In addition, why moods 
may need to be, or benefit from, being under volitional control raises the question of 
whether emotional experiences are useful to an individual, or whether and in what 
circumstances they may be detrimental, and some of the issues surrounding this 
debate will be discussed next.   
1.1.4 Whether Emotion is Beneficial or Detrimental 
Whether emotion is beneficial or detrimental to individuals and society has been a 
source of much debate. Many philosophers have argued that emotions should be 
suppressed. Plato's Republic (Warburton, 2008), for example, includes much 
discussion of the three parts of the soul: Reason, which involves the love of truth, 
Spirit, which provides emotional motivation, and Desire, which encompasses a 
person’s wants and their basic needs. Following this, Plato goes on to describe an 
ideal state, in which the ruling classes are those who have Reason in command. This 
is paralleled in the Freudian psychic apparatus, which comprises the Id, Ego
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Super-Ego (Freud, 1997; Schultz & Schultz, 2000); The Id being an animalistic drive 
seeking immediate gratification, the Super-Ego being the ethical and moral ideals, 
and the Ego moderating between the two forces and guiding interaction with the 
world. 
Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics (Warburton, 2008), also attempted to 
answer the question of how we should live. His answer is that the overall goal of life 
is 'eudaimonia', a happy life, and his prescription for achieving this, is to act rationally 
and live a life of rational virtue. And, as a final example from the many available, 
Boethius betrays a negative view of the emotions in his Consolation of Philosophy 
(Warburton, 2008) by having the embodied figure of Philosophy soothe his despair 
with reason. 
Why Reason should be the primary part of the soul is unclear, and Aristotle's 
prescription assumes that human nature is rational, yet the very concept of any type 
of human nature is debateable (Warburton, 2008), let alone a logical one (the 
common reading of ‘rational’). This is particularly questionable given the research 
showing an apparent inability to behave in accordance with the dictates of formal 
logical rules, even on relatively basic reasoning tasks (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 
1993). 
Hume, in contrast, argued that emotions should play a central role in 
deciding how to act, and questioned the absolute power of reason (Craig, 2002; 
Warburton, 2008). Indeed, as de Beauvoir argues, although whilst making a slightly 
different point, "A syllogism is of no help in making the perfect mayonnaise, nor in 
quieting a child in tears" (1997, pp. 610-611). In addition to reason and emotion, 
Hume, like Mill (2006) after him, also realised the importance of social customs in 
determining behaviour, and both proposed that reason, emotion, and society were 
important, with none being superior to the others. 
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Working from a largely evolutionary perspective and touched on above, 
Rossano (2002) proposes that emotions are evolutionarily adaptive rather than 
destructive. The fear response when a potential threat is encountered, for example, 
leads to physiological preparedness, and the exhibition of avoidance behaviours 
toward potentially harmful situations. 
Taking these arguments into account, the benefit or otherwise of emotions 
seems to be relative to the task at hand. Although the central aim of this thesis is to 
investigate the relationship between emotion and reasoning, it is important to keep 
in mind that emotions can be both beneficial and detrimental, and so when deriving 
testable hypotheses regarding emotions, or considering how the results might 
generalise, the specific demands of the task need to be considered. More 
importantly, on a larger scale, how emotions affect cognitive processes and 
reasoning in a single situation should not be used to make judgements about the 
overall beneficial or detrimental nature of emotions. Having now defined emotion, 
and highlighted how it is valued within philosophy and society in general, the 
following sections will examine how it is conceptualised in scientific research. 
1.2 Models of Emotion 
As the components that a model of emotion must explain are determined by how 
emotion is conceptualised, the various models of emotion that have been advanced 
in the literature are typically based on the dimensions discussed above, focussing on 
levels of activation, positivity, or conscious awareness. This section will therefore 
elaborate a selection of models of emotion that use biological, cognitive, and bio-
cognitive definitions of emotion as these are most likely to be of use in the current 
investigation. 
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Biological and neuropsychological models of emotion have tended to focus 
on the autonomic nervous system, its activation when stimuli are presented, and the 
neurological basis of emotional experience. These tend to pay particular attention to 
the limbic system; the amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex, areas alluded to 
above. LeDoux's work on fear conditioning for example (summarised in Gazzaniga et 
al., 2002) has led to a model of fear which focuses on the subnuclei of the amygdala, 
with stimuli first being directed through the sensory thalamus, and processing 
following one of two routes (see Figure  1.1). The first route processes the stimulus 
based on features, and is directed through the lateral nucleus of the amygdala 
providing a rapid, reflex-like response via the central nucleus which controls 
behavioural, autonomic, and endocrine responses. This requires little or no higher-
cognitive involvement (Goleman, 2004a, 2004b). The second route is through the 
neocortex, which allows higher-cognitive processing of the stimuli before a response 
is initiated. This pathway is slower, but the processing is based on concepts and 
context as well as the features of the stimuli.  
 
 
Figure  1.1 Amygdala Sub-nuclei, based on LeDoux (1995) 
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The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex, as well as the hypothalamus, anterior 
thalamus, cingulated gyrus and hippocampus have been collectively termed the 
limbic system, and in conjunction with parts of the basal ganglia, are generally 
considered the neural basis of emotional processing and responding. Although this 
system appears to provide a relatively clear neurological model of emotional 
experience, the structures involved are also related to other areas of cognitive 
functioning and behaviour (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). The hippocampus and amygdala 
play a role in memory, and may provide the link between memories and their 
emotional quality. The cingulate gyrus, as well as being involved in the processing of 
emotional stimuli, is involved in inhibitory functioning, and the thalamus has been 
implicated in a wide range of functions, from regulation of circadian rhythms to 
control of the motor systems (Andrewes, 2004). 
Although these considerations may at first seem to undermine the limbic 
model of emotion, the multiple functions of the system’s structures allow it to 
accommodate a vast range of data from psychological studies of emotion, such as 
mood congruency in memory (Lewis, Critchley, Smith, & Dolan, 2005) and the work 
on attentional theories which suggests emotional disorders are caused by deficient 
inhibitory functioning (Langens & Stucke, 2005; Verbruggen & DeHouwer, 2007). This 
latter line of thought has driven extensive work on conditions such as attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder (Barkley, 2005) and obsessive compulsive disorder 
(Krikorian, Zimmerman, & Fleck, 2004). 
In relation to the biological systems that are associated with the experience 
of emotion, whether they cause the experience of emotion, whether their activation 
is the emotion, or whether emotions cause their activation in unclear, although the 
various systems are relatively well specified and their involvement in the complete 
emotional experience supported by growing evidence. However, in terms of the 
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structure of emotion - that is, the relationships between different emotional states, 
and their constituent parts - biological models say much less, and the only clear 
dimension that seems to be presented is the level of activation. That is to say that 
the system involved in fear for example is either active, and the individual in a state 
of fear, inactive, and the individual is in a state of relaxation, or its level of activation 
and the accompanying level of fear are somewhere between these two extremes. 
Different emotions each involve slightly different systems, or different clusters of 
neurons that are activated, and so the structures of different emotions can be 
thought of as combinations of different levels of activation across these systems. 
In terms of the different dimensions or structure of emotion, the cognitive 
models that have been published have adopted graphical analogues, defined by a 
given number of dimensions. Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999) review a range of 
these models, and conclude that the number of dimensions necessary for capturing 
the full range of emotions is two, based on the observation that many studies across 
cultures have utilised two-dimensional scales for the self-reporting of emotions. 
Russell (1980) for example uses the dimensions of arousal-sleep and misery-
pleasure, whereas Watson and Tellegen (1985) used High-Low and Positive-Negative 
dimensions, and Thayer (1991) utilised the dimensions of Tension-Calmness and 
Tiredness-Energy. Using the various models they review as evidence, Feldman-
Barrett and Russell (1999) present the dimensions of activation-deactivation and 
pleasantness-unpleasantness as the two dimensions necessary for capturing all 
emotional experience (see Figure  1.2). These dimensions relate to the hedonic aspect 
of cognitive appraisals (often referred to as ‘valence’), and the intensity with which 
they are experienced. 
Although structural equation modelling has been used to support geometric 
representations such as those presented in Feldman-Barrett and Russell's (1999) 
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review, other models that are three dimensional have also been proposed, such as 
Plutchik's (1980) model, in which all emotional experience is captured in a conical 
space, with positive and negative dimensions accompanied by intensity and 
distinctness dimensions (see Figure  1.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1.2 The Two-dimensional model of emotion of Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999)  
with clustered emotion terms from Russell (1980) indicated in italics. 
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Figure  1.3 Three-dimensional model of emotion based on Plutchik (1980) 
 
Regardless of the number of dimensions proposed, there appears to be a consensus 
with respect to the inclusion of a positive-negative dimension. However, there is 
debate over whether the positive-negative dimension is one bipolar dimension, or 
whether it is two independent dimensions. This latter opinion has received some 
empirical support from factor analytic studies discussed by Watson, Clark and 
Tellegen (1988), and resulted in the development of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS, and an extended form by Watson & Clark, 1994). The PANAS 
provides a measure of independent positive- and negative-affect factors. However, 
many other researchers continue to use bipolar scales representing positive and 
negative moods as opposites. Although 'Happy' and 'Sad' may be opposites on both 
types of scale, the partial or total independence of positive and negative factors 
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should be kept in mind when trying to synthesise findings from the range of 
experiments in the literature. 
Evolutionary models of psychology, as discussed above, considering 
emotions’ adaptive functions, say little about the structure of emotion. That is, other 
than to offer a structure similar to that of the biologists: that different emotions are 
caused by the level of activation of a particular emotion module or evolved structure. 
The definition of emotion adopted by James, and theorists favouring the 
affective primacy model of emotion (e.g. Zajonc, 1968, 1980), does not provide a 
structure of emotion either, other than that it precedes cognition, and is likely to be 
biological. This again reduces largely to an activation dimension. Advocates of 
cognitive appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Lazarus, 1982) provide more in the way 
of a structure of emotions by outlining the cognitive processes which they claim are 
involved in generating the appraisals of stimuli. In these cases the structure of 
emotion can be reduced to the dimensions of activation and pleasantness outlined 
by Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999), with the location of the emotion along each 
dimension being determined by the appraisal. 
Embodied theories of emotion (Niedenthal, 2007) provide a link between the 
biological and the cognitive aspects of emotions. Much like work in embodied 
cognition which has shown that the perceived objects can cue associated actions 
(Symes, Tucker, Ellis, Vainio, & Ottoboni, 2008), embodied emotion research has 
shown that different postures or expressions can cue associated emotions 
(Parzuchowski & Szymkow-Sudziarska, 2008). These theories provide models of 
emotion which take into account biological aspects, via sensory feedback, but still 
accommodate the cognitive ones. Although they do not make predictions regarding 
the primacy of affect in relation to cognition, they provide a model of emotion which 
can accommodate the data on the reciprocal effects of emotion and cognition as well 
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as being able to accommodate both areas of research if emotion is considered part of 
the cognitive system or vice versa (Ciompi, 1997). 
Of the models discussed above, this research will make most use of the 
circumplex model developed by Watson and colleagues (1988), which underlies the 
PANAS (discussed in more detail below), initially proposed by Watson and Tellegen 
(1985). This scale is associated with the model of emotion shown in Figure  1.4, which 
can incorporate situations where positive and negative affect are both high (Segment 
A), both low (Segment B), or one high and one low (Segments C and D) through the 
independent nature of the positive and negative dimensions, as indicated by the 
crossing of the High-Low Positive Affect and High-Low Negative Affect axes. 
Discussion of the findings reported in this thesis will not be restricted to this one 
model, despite its theoretical strength in treating positive and negative affect as 
semi-independent dimensions. It will be used instead as a starting point for the 
measurement of emotion as defined earlier. 
  
 
Figure  1.4 Circumplex model of emotion developed by Watson and Tellegen (1985) 
 
dzahra 38 330974 
 
In addition to accommodating the independence of positive and negative affective 
dimensions it can easily accommodate the existing research from a range of areas, 
including the different psychological and biological systems involved in approach and 
avoidance behaviours. It also has a number of methodological advantages, which will 
be discussed in the later experimental chapters. Furthermore, it accommodates the 
few instances when positive and negative emotions are experienced simultaneously 
(Bentall, 2004), which improves the scope and generalisability of the emotion aspect 
of the current thesis. With this distinction between positive and negative emotions in 
mind, the following section considers the validity of the general ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ mood classifications, before moving on to consider how emotions can be 
manipulated experimentally. A central part of this review is exploring how the 
literature on specific emotions is related to these positive and negative categories, 
and to what extent the findings in relation to specific emotions can be used to inform 
predictions about the effects of general positive and negative classes of emotion.   
1.3 Positive and Negative Emotions 
Much of the existing research on emotion-cognition interaction has focused on 
negative mood states. This may be due to the fact that it is negative moods which 
tend to have the most detrimental effects on everyday quality of life, and so demand 
more immediate attention. Depression, social anxiety, dysphoria, phobias, and many 
other emotional disorders prevent people from living their lives in the ways they 
want, and so seem to require treatments, which rely on the development of a more 
thorough understanding of the disorders (e.g. Barlow, 1991; Bodkin et al., 2011). 
Excessive happiness, or eternal optimism in comparison do not seem to be 
considered disorders (with all the associated negative connotations of the term), as is 
apparent from the difficulty faced by someone trying to list emotional disorders 
dzahra 39 330974 
 
resulting from positive emotions. However, the difference between an emotion and 
an emotional disorder is to a large extent a difference in degree, intensity, and 
duration, as indicated by clinical cut-off criteria for disorders (e.g. Kroenke, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 2001); such that chronic depression might be considered an extended 
period of feeling upset or pessimistic, and social phobia could reasonably be 
considered extreme nervousness in a specific setting. Other authors may argue that 
depression and feeling sad are qualitatively different, and that anxiety disorders are 
experienced as something totally different from nervous apprehension, but then we 
come full circle to the arguments surrounding the subjective nature of emotional 
experience. Physiologically, emotional experiences and emotional disorders have 
been shown to rest along a continuum, and it thus seems reasonable to treat happy 
and sad moods as at least in part operating on the same mechanisms as euphoria and 
depression – though it must be kept in mind that the relationship between measures 
of subjective experience and physiological responses may not be simply linear. 
It could also be argued that generalising any findings from specific positive 
and negative emotions (be they effects on cognitive, physiological, or any other 
measures) to general positive and negative emotion may raise issues of validity 
because ‘positive mood’ may not necessarily behave in the same way as any specific 
positive mood (euphoria, joy, or contentment for example), and ‘negative mood’ may 
not necessarily behave in the same way as any given specific negative mood (anxiety, 
anger, or shame for example). However, considering the research on models of 
emotion, all emotions that can be grouped into 'positive' and 'negative' fall at similar 
locations on shared dimensions. If these dimensions are considered factors of 
emotional experience, then there also appears to be shared components between 
positive and negative emotions. This is shown nicely in Russell’s (1980) paper, which 
presents a precursor to the model of Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999). Based on 
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dimensional scaling of various affective words, it can be seen that terms such as sad, 
gloomy and depressed are clustered together, as are emotions such as pleased, glad, 
happy and delighted (Figure  1.2). As such, results from studies on anxiety might be 
expected to generalise to emotions which are clustered close to anxiety, an 
assumption supported at least in part by the similarity in the diagnostic symptoms of 
anxiety and depression-related disorders (APA, 1994) and neuropsychological 
research (Heller & Nitschke, 1998). Similarly, results from research on relaxation 
might be expected to generalise to other positive mood states such as happiness and 
contentment. Finally, as an example of data which supports the points made above 
with respect to similar effects being found for related but phenomenologically 
distinct emotions, Bugman and Schnall (2008) have shown that disgust and sadness, 
both negative affective states, have the same influence on cognitive judgements of 
distance even though the experiences of each state are often reported as very 
different. 
1.4 Manipulating and Measuring Emotion 
Researchers in the area of emotion typically adopt one of the definitions discussed in 
Section  1.1.2, and as a result focus on manipulating specific aspects of the whole 
emotional experience. Regardless of the definitions used, a range of manipulations 
have been developed to alter and measure participants’ moods. 
Emotional images, video (Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2007) or pieces of music 
(Allwood, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2002), or combinations of manipulations (Mayer, 
Allen, & Beauregard, 1995) are common in the literature. Reading or writing about 
emotional events (Brand, Reimer, & Opwis, 2007; Tamir & Robinson, 2007) as well as 
completing emotional sentences (Ikegami, 2002) have also been commonly used as 
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direct mood manipulations, whereas others have manipulated mood indirectly by 
varying task difficulty (Kitamura, 2005; Sakaki, 2004). 
Although these manipulations are largely effective as shown by the reported 
manipulation checks, the duration of the mood states that they elicit has not been 
reported by the authors cited above, and the manipulations have often been 
criticised on the grounds that the mood states they create do not last for the 
duration of the subsequent tasks (Eich & Macaulay, 2001). Very little work has 
investigated directly the duration of induced emotive states and experiences 
(Salovey, 1992). This is important to consider as it may lead to problems when 
interpreting the results with respect to the mood that participants were in during 
task completion. To overcome this, a technique known as the continuous music 
technique (CMT) has been adopted by some researchers (Eich & Macaulay, 2001), 
which requires participants to listen to music whilst contemplating emotive thoughts, 
and at various intervals record their mood on a nine-by-nine grid which has the two 
dimensions labelled unpleasant to pleasant and low arousal to high arousal. 
Participants are not allowed to begin the experimental task until their mood reaches 
a pre-specified point. 
This method, although it has been shown to generate strong and lasting 
moods (Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994), is based on a two-dimensional model of 
mood similar to those reviewed by Feldman-Barrett and Russell (1999), and so may 
not be suited to the investigation of moods that cannot easily be defined along 
intensity and pleasantness dimensions. In addition, the subjective interpretation of 
the terms 'pleasant' and 'arousal' may result in different participants indicating 
different moods with the same squares; this is aside from the potential practical and 
time constraints introduced by setting a threshold which may in some cases never be 
reached. The current work will evaluate the extent to which emotions are 
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experienced during the experimental procedures by adopting a technique similar to 
that outlined by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989), which embedded Likert-type mood 
rating tasks within their experimental procedures. 
In a meta-analysis of published mood manipulations Westermann and 
colleagues (1996) concluded that of the manipulations they compared, film or story 
based manipulations were the most effective; that effects were larger when 
participants were explicitly instructed to enter a given mood; and that effects 
covaried with study characteristics such as setting, controlling for demand 
characteristics, and the overall purpose of the study. However, overall, effect sizes 
appear to fall within the medium to large categories, suggesting that all mood 
manipulations can be effective if administered carefully. In addition, induction into 
negative mood seemed to elicit larger effect sizes. This may be due to negative 
affective states being more distinct and clearly defined (in a socio-cultural sense, as 
discussed in Section  1.3) than positive states, which lends some support to the idea 
that the positive and negative dimensions of mood are distinct; the negative 
dimension being easier to manipulate. However, this may also be due to average pre-
manipulation moods being positive, resulting in less scope to make moods still more 
positive. 
An additional concern when using manipulations based on the presentation 
of pre-selected materials, in whatever modality, is the issue of subjectivity. The 
materials selected by the experimenter, even if pretested, may not be rated similarly 
by every participant. One way around this is to use manipulations which allow the 
individuals to choose their own materials. This has been achieved by researchers 
such as Brand and colleagues (2007), and Tamir and Robinson (2007), who used 
written mood manipulations asking participants to recall and write about a life event 
which made them feel a certain way thus overcoming the issue of experimenter 
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subjectivity in the selection of materials. As a result of these considerations, the self-
guided writing task used by Brand and colleagues (2007) will be adopted for 
experiments reported here which include a manipulation of mood, and is discussed 
in more detail in the appropriate methodology sections.  
In relation to measuring emotions, given the importance of considerations of 
the strength, stability, and sincerity of generated moods in experimental 
manipulations (Forgas, 2001), some measures may be preferable to others. Assessing 
the strength and the stability of the mood requires measures which can capture the 
full range of emotions, or at least are based on dimensions to which the emotions of 
interest can be reduced. As for the sincerity of the emotions generated, it seems 
reasonable that the use of manipulations which allow the individual to choose their 
own materials will result in more ‘genuine’ emotions. Although the current work 
begins with a consideration of how mood states affect an individual’s reasoning 
(Chapter  3, later revisited in Chapters  6,  8, and  9), the impact of emotive content is 
also of interest, and presents its own challenges. These will be discussed as they arise 
(in relation to reasoning in Chapter  2, and specific experiments in Chapters  4,  5, 
and  7). 
Biological and physiological measures such as diastolic blood pressure, 
galvanic skin response, and heart rate, as well as adrenalin, cortisone, and 
catecholamine responses (Hamer, Tanaka, Okamura, Tsuda, & Steptoe, 2007) have 
been used in a number of studies investigating both the biological responses to 
emotional stimuli and their relationship to cognitive factors (Averill, 1969; Simeon et 
al., 1992). More commonly used in the psychological literature are self-report 
measures of mood based on a range of response scales. One example already 
mentioned is the continuous music technique, whilst others are variations on 
analogue responses. Examples of these include those such as are used by Mayer and 
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Gaschke (1988) and Mayer (2008), which require participants to rate their overall 
mood along an axis ranging from very unpleasant to very pleasant, or the scale used 
by Allwood et al (2002) which required participants to rate their mood along 
activation and pleasantness dimensions. 
Studies comparing various biological and psychological measures in emotion 
research and other fields have found mixed results, with wide variation in reported 
correlations of different physiological and psychological factors (Craig, Tran, 
Wijesuriya, & Boord, 2006; Gevins & Smith, 2000; Hand, Phillips, & Dudgeon, 2006; 
Simeon et al., 1992) but this may be due to the variability in the measures used, the 
different types of tasks participants had to engage in, and the myriad individual 
differences that can affect the measures. It may also be the case that the biological 
measures lack the discriminative power of cognitive measures designed to assess 
specific constructs, or it may be due to differences in the constructs that are 
measured, given that psychological measures are typically highly correlated with 
other measures of the same theoretical construct, and biological measures of the 
same systems are highly correlated. 
However, given the focus of this thesis is on the cognitive components of 
emotion, and the impact of emotion on cognitively based reasoning tasks, self-report 
measures such as the PANAS, which was introduced earlier, are justified as measures 
of mood. Developed by Watson and colleagues (1988) the PANAS provides an easy to 
administer and easy to score scale. The scale requires participants to rate the extent 
to which they are experiencing a series of thirty emotion words in order to measure 
both the positive (PA) and negative affective dimensions (NA). In line with the 
discussion of models of emotion earlier, this allows all possible emotional states to 
be captured, including those which comprise apparently contradictory emotions, and 
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allows for the possibility that the positive and negative factors of mood are different 
in nature, and potentially therefore affect cognitive processes differently. 
In addition, the instructions can be re-worded to capture state or trait 
emotionality, and the data collected on the scale to date shows that it is correlated 
with longer measures of mood, supporting the construct validity of positive and 
negative factors of mood, and the convergent validity of the PANAS as a mood scale. 
Although open to the argument of subjective definitions of emotional states 
and interpretation of the words that are to be rated, the flexibility, both practically 
and theoretically of the PANAS make it well suited to investigating the relationship 
between cognition and emotion. These properties further support the use of the 
PANAS as a measure of mood state where one is required, and as mentioned above, 
details of its administration will be discussed further in the experimental chapters. 
Where alternative methods are used to assess emotional experiences, these will 
provide an opportunity to cross-validate the PANAS in a reasoning-focussed setting, 
and details will be discussed in more depth where appropriate. 
1.5 Cognition and Emotion 
Having now considered definitions of emotion and how they can be manipulated and 
measured, the current section develops the ideas of positive and negative emotion to 
consider their impact on cognitive processes. What follows is a review of models of 
emotion and cognition and the implications of each in relation to understanding how 
emotion might affect cognitive processes. That is, the elements which comprise 
emotion in relation to cognitive abilities, and the theories which have been 
developed to account for their interaction in a range of domains, though with a focus 
on the cognitive and social-psychological literature as this is where most of the work 
has been conducted.  
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1.5.1 Inappropriate Activation, Networks, and Priming 
Barlow (1991) and Alloy (1991) both propose models of emotional disorders where 
the disorder arises from an inappropriate activation of an emotion, which is stored in 
memory, and is subsequently thought of as uncontrollable. This perception of 
uncontrollability then leads to a focusing of the individual's attention on the emotion, 
which in turn intensifies the emotion, and a feedback loop is created which is difficult 
to break (see Figure  1.5)  
 
 
Figure  1.5 Barlow's process of negative apprehension, adapted from Barlow (1991, p61) 
 
In terms of how these models predict mood would affect behaviour, they suggest 
that emotion has a cognitive basis, and that the experience of emotion requires some 
cognitive involvement as it is retrieved from memory. This process then focuses 
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attention on the emotional experience, which would reduce attentional and other 
resources available for processing of task-relevant information (as working memory 
has a finite capacity), thus emotions may impair task performance if sufficient 
resources are not possessed to process the emotion in parallel with other 
information. 
However, other research suggests that individuals suffering from obsessive 
compulsive disorder show improved inhibitory control relative to those not suffering 
from the disorder, and increased activity inhibition in people suffering from negative 
mood (Krikorian et al., 2004; Langens & Stucke, 2005). These findings suggest that 
negative mood states would increase the individual's ability to ignore the negative 
mood and avoid the feedback loop, which seems somewhat paradoxical, yet it should 
be noted that this is an increase in ability to reduce the focus on negative mood after 
it has been acknowledged. However, as Langens and Stucke (2005) comment, there 
may be ironic effects of mood suppression (Bushman, 2002), similar to those found in 
thought suppression (Matlin, 2003). 
Although these and other early models focus on the effects of negative 
mood, recent studies on the effects of positive moods on attention have shown that 
they direct attention to positive stimuli in the same way (Tamir & Robinson, 2007). 
This provides further support for the idea that such models developed initially in light 
of negative moods can reasonably be applied to positive moods as well, a claim 
which is also partly supported by work on mood-congruent attentional bias (Forgas, 
2001). 
Bower's (1981) affect priming model on the other hand focuses on the 
informational value of emotions. Affect is seen as a feature of mental 
representations of the world, and will thus prime related ideas in much the same way 
as spreading-activation in network models of cognitive processes. Most work on the 
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affective-priming model seems to have been directed towards explaining mood 
congruency effects in memory (Forgas, 2001), and might serve as an explanation for 
any content effects in thematic reasoning tasks when they are encountered in later 
chapters. 
Though mood-congruency might explain some content effects in reasoning, 
such as that individuals with certain emotional disorders reason more accurately 
when the material relates to their condition (Johnson-Laird, Mancini, & Gangemi, 
2006), it seems unlikely as an explanation of the increased bottom-up processing 
claimed to be caused by negative mood (Schwarz & Clore, 2003), or as an explanation 
of mood effects found with neutral material (e.g. Forgas, 2001). 
Blanchette (2006) also makes the interesting point that emotions may prime 
associations which subsequently load working memory. Although standing apart 
from other network models, and unallied to any one particular theoretical position, 
this observation is of relevance when evaluating the possibility that emotions can 
interfere with cognitive processes by acting as cognitive load. 
1.5.2 Affect-as-Load 
In the discussion above, the relationship between cognition and emotion was 
thought of in terms of network models and activation models. This led to the idea of 
emotion acting as cognitive load. How emotions generate this load was presented as 
being the result of inappropriate activation. A related concept is that rather than 
explicitly activating irrelevant information in memory or irrelevant nodes in a 
cognitive network, emotion might load the attentional system, or alternatively 
redirect resources to emotion-related processes. These ideas are considered in the 
following sections. 
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Attentional Bias and Cognitive Appraisals 
A meta-analysis by Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg and van 
Ijzendoorn (2007) found that the bias for processing threat-related stimuli exhibited 
by anxious individuals, both with stimuli that required conscious perception and with 
stimuli presented outside of conscious awareness was reliable across studies. They 
also found that the bias is similar across clinical and non-clinical anxiety groups, but is 
not present in non-anxious individuals. Whether this bias is the result of the threat, is 
cued by anxiety, or is a different phenomenon, Bar-Haim and team (2007) provide a 
model of threat evaluation in which on-going processes may be halted by threat, 
depicted in Figure  1.6, which is applicable to the current discussion. In terms of a 
range of cognitive theories, the initial goal in a given task would be to deploy 
appropriate strategies to reach a decision or conclusion. The presence of threat or 
anxiety would deplete the cognitive resources available to these goals, and thus lead 
to the abandoning of more carefully considered strategies in favour of faster, lower 
effort strategies. 
Öhman, Flykt and Esteves (2001) as well as Poliakoff and colleagues (2007) 
provide evolutionary accounts of emotion directing and thus facilitating attention to 
threatening stimuli, and Derryberry and Reed (1998) discuss this effect in terms of 
global and local processing, with anxious participants showing improved processing 
at a local level. This is supposedly due to increased attention to component features, 
and reduced attention to the global environment; similar to the findings of Schnall 
and colleagues (2008) who, using the embedded figures task, found  that positive 
mood reduced attention to detail relative to negative mood. This difference in global 
and local processing is incorporated in Eysenck and colleagues’ (2007) attentional 
control theory, in which it is explained in terms of anxiety impairing efficient 
functioning of the goal directed attentional system, and promoting instead stimulus-
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driven processing. As such, anxiety decreases attentional control, which leads to 
increased attention to threat related stimuli in anxious individuals. The impact of 
anxiety on cognitive processing, then, seems to depend on central executive 
functioning, specifically in the form of inhibitory control and shifting (either inhibiting 
attention to or directing it away from the irrelevant aspects), and in addition, the 
extent to which anxiety may lead indirectly to the use of compensatory strategies so 
as not to lead to decreases in efficiency or effectiveness. 
 
  
Figure  1.6 A cognitive model of threat evaluation processes,  
adapted from Bar-Haim et al (2007, p17) 
 
If the effects of emotion are caused by the allocation of limited attentional resources 
in such cases to anxiety related content, combined with evidence of differences in 
attention allocation in syllogistic reasoning (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006) and 
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between creative and analytic thinkers in other tasks (Ansburg & Hill, 2003), there 
would seem to be a large individual differences factor involved in the role of 
attention in emotion-cognition interaction. This in turn may be related to individual 
differences in coping strategies which require controlled attention and cognitive 
resources to function (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; Gross, 1999). In support of the 
limited attentional resources being depleted or reallocated by anxiety is the study 
reported by Lavric et al (2003), which showed that anxiety selectively disrupted 
visuospatial working memory. This was explained by the shared use of the 
attentional system by anxiety and visuospatial working memory.  
Hyper-Emotion Theory (Johnson-Laird et al., 2006) is one of the more recent 
theories presented to explain emotion-cognition interaction with recourse to 
attentional processes. Originating from three epidemiological case studies, and 
supported by three empirical studies, the theory argues that individuals suffering 
from emotional disorders reason more accurately about topics relevant to their 
conditions due to a tendency of the individuals to focus on the situations in which 
they experience the effects of their disorders. Johnson-Laird and colleagues (2006) 
argue that this heightened attention to the situations surrounding their disorder 
leads them to develop accurate inference patterns in these areas, which then lead to 
the facilitation in reasoning and decision making about related topics. However, this 
pattern of results might also be explained by the attentional theories discussed 
above. Furthermore given that these effects on reasoning can be mediated by self-
esteem and personality variables (Rusting, 1998; Smith & Petty, 1995), it may be that 
specific personality traits such as extroversion, need-for-cognition, or  reward 
responsiveness (to take just a few possible examples) are comorbid with the 
emotional disorders investigated by Johnson-Laird and colleagues (2006), and thus 
lead to the effects found by directing attention or encouraging perseverance. 
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In relation to cognitive appraisals as the basis for a model of the relationship 
between emotion and reasoning, appraisal theory argues that the emotions 
experienced by individuals are determined by their appraisals of given stimuli 
(Lazarus, 1982). However, appraisal theorists do not generally try and explain the 
cognition-emotion relationship, although a cognitive basis of emotions would 
constitute the starting point. It seems reasonable to assume that the experience of 
any emotion would therefore require processing, and this processing would draw on 
cognitive resources. The appraisal process then provides one possible mechanism of 
how this loading effect is generated.  
Resource Allocation and Processing Efficiency Theory 
The ideas of limited cognitive resources and emotion serving as cognitive load form 
the basis of another group of theories which are concerned with resource allocation, 
including that by Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), which claims that  induced mood states 
reduce performance on concurrent tasks by depleting central executive resources. 
Tohill and Holyoak (2000) provide empirical support for this, showing that anxious 
individuals are less able to complete complex tasks than non-anxious individuals, an 
impairment which they attributed to the depletion of cognitive resources.  
Developing these ideas, Eysenck and Calvo (1992), and Eysenck, Payne, and 
Derakshan (2005) have proposed their processing efficiency theory, which draws a 
distinction between efficiency (accuracy divided by time or effort) and effectiveness 
(raw accuracy). Anxious thoughts are thought to deplete the resources of working 
memory (WM), and so impair its functioning. Furthermore, anxiety motivates the 
avoidance of the task, which is achieved by implementing alternative strategies 
which are less cognitively demanding; a claim supported by Steinhauser, Maier and 
Hübner (2007), and which is consistent with the research on attention and anxiety 
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already discussed. Richards, French, Keogh and Carter (2000) also provide support for 
the processing efficiency theory using an inferential reasoning task, showing that 
anxiety reduces speed and accuracy on both verification tasks and when processing 
unnecessary inferences. If anxiety can be accepted as related to other negative 
emotions as argued above, these results might be expected to generalise across 
different mood states. 
Further support for the idea of mood depleting cognitive resources comes 
from a study by Dutke and Stöber (2001) which found that not only is anxiety 
associated with poorer performance on complex tasks, but that the negative effects 
are reduced when individuals have the opportunity to update working memory; such 
that the load increase caused by the anxiety is balanced by a reduction in the WM-
demands of the task. Anxiety has also been associated with deficiencies in 
interference resolution in WM (Levens & Phelps, 2008), and the implication of WM in 
relation to mood-as-cognitive-load is supported by the findings of Van Dillen and 
Koole (2007) who showed that increasing cognitive load reduced negative mood, 
suggesting that mood generation and maintenance involves working memory 
resources. 
Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996) also provide strong evidence 
in support of the idea in their first experiment by showing that both positive and 
negative moods decreased performance on the Wason selection task. Similarly, in 
their second experiment, a concurrent distracter task which loaded WM generated 
the same pattern of responses. Finally, in their third experiment however, the results 
showed only positive mood to deplete central executive ability as measured by the 
Tower of Hanoi task. This final result suggests that there is the possibility that 
positive and negative mood do not affect reasoning in the same direct way via the 
central executive, despite still supporting the conceptualisation of emotion as 
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cognitive load, and subsequently emphasises the necessity of including both positive 
and negative conditions, rather than focussing solely on the more heavily researched 
negative emotions (as discussed in section  1.3). 
McNally (1998), in his review of the effects of anxiety on different tasks 
draws a distinction between content dependent and content independent effects of 
emotion on cognitive functioning; selective processing of anxiety stimuli versus 
general detriments in task performance caused by anxiety, and discusses the 
evidence to support each type of effect, focussing on attention and memory, but also 
drawing links to neurobiology. 
The cognitive component of the causes for processing abnormalities in 
anxiety disorders that McNally (1998) addresses are supported by studies such as 
that by Eysenck, MacLeod, and Mathews (1987) which showed that processing 
differences are a function of trait anxiety. Their results, although supporting the idea 
of processing abnormalities caused by anxiety, found that the effects were context 
dependent, only occurring when threatening and non-threatening stimuli are 
presented concurrently.  
Eysenck and colleagues (1987) concluded that the anxiety was interfering 
with processing through the pre-attentive, attentional, and interpretative stages, by 
acting as a form of bias for interpreting stimuli as threatening because the anxiety 
primed the negative interpretations of stimuli, similarly to how priming models 
explain mood congruency, and similarly to pre-attentive and selective processing 
theories. This study does however have limited use in terms of explaining or 
predicting how anxiety would affect processing of neutral content, other than that its 
effects may be reduced if neutral content is present without any equivalent anxiety 
content to compare it to. However, that anxiety appears to have an effect from the 
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pre-attentive stages of processing supports the idea that emotion is meta-cognitive, 
or at least has an influence prior to central executive allocation of resources.  
In summary, there is some support for conceiving of emotion as a form of 
cognitive load, and there is considerable experimental data which can be interpreted 
in this way. However, as will be considered next, treating emotion as cognitive load is 
not the only possible way of accounting for mood effects. 
1.5.3 Affect-as-Information 
Rather than treating emotion as a source of cognitive load, affective-priming models 
are based around the informational value of emotion in stimulus processing. This 
informative aspect of emotions is made explicit in the affect-as-information model of 
Schwarz and Clore (2003), in which affect influences judgements by serving as a cue 
for which type of cognitive processing to utilise. Positive mood serves as a cue to top-
down heuristic processing, whereas negative mood serves as a cue to bottom-up 
processing (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). This mechanism could be conceptualised as 
affect acting as a 'switch', redirecting cognitive resources to different processing 
systems, rather than as cognitive load models, in which emotion might be 
conceptualised as an additional process which draws on the cognitive resources and 
forces one or another type of processing, depending on how many resources remain 
and the task demands. 
This particular cognitive model, affect-as-information, is supported by a large 
amount of empirical evidence, and much more exists supporting the particular 
mechanisms that the model implicates in emotion-cognition interaction. One such 
example is provided by Kitamura (2005), who showed that individuals in positive 
moods relied on a feeling of familiarity in judging whether or not particular company 
names were famous, and thus made more errors than did those in the negative 
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condition; a result which was attributed to positive mood cueing lower-effort 
strategies such as reliance on the initial familiarity of the names, and negative mood 
cueing the use more demanding deliberative processing, considering factors beyond 
the immediate familiarity of the name. This builds on the work of Zajonc (1968) 
which has shown that familiarity with arbitrary stimuli increased ratings of liking, and 
Monin (2003), who has shown that liking a stimulus increases ratings of familiarity 
(see also Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 2004 for similar 
findings). Interestingly, the combined results of Zajonc (1968) and Monin (2003) 
provide evidence for the cognitive appraisal view of emotions by supporting the 
bidirectionality of the emotion-cognition relationship, and provide support for the 
validity of manipulations of mood based on cognitive tasks. 
Affect-as-information models are further supported by studies of the 
discounting effect first discussed by Schwarz and Clore (1983). Discounting is when 
the effects of mood are reduced if the source of the mood is made salient. Initially, 
when asked to make a judgement, people may use mood as an additional source of 
information, and thus show the biases discussed above – relying on the mood as an 
anchor or valid factor on which to make various judgements. However, when the 
person making the judgement is made aware of the source of their mood, even 
simply by a passing reference which cues them to attend to this alternative source of 
affective state (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), they correct for the informational influence 
of their mood on their subsequent judgment of unrelated variables (Forgas, Bower, & 
Moylan, 1990; Sechrist, Swim, & Melvin, 2003).  
This applies not only to positive moods leading to higher ratings of, as in 
Schwarz and Clore’s original paper, life satisfaction, but also to negative moods. 
When in an environment likely to cause less positive, or more negative moods, 
people rated their life satisfaction as lower. Rather cleverly, Schwarz and Clore had 
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used local weather conditions as their happy-sad manipulation, finding that 
individuals asked about life satisfaction in places where the weather was nice 
reported higher satisfaction than those in locations suffering from bad weather 
conditions. As the questions were asked via telephone, a casual reference to the 
weather such as asking how it was provided a subtle way of drawing attention to a 
possible source of the individuals’ current mood state, which is when the discounting 
effect was found to occur. 
Overall, these findings suggest that emotion may affect cognitive processes 
by acting as a meta- or extra-cognitive cue, similarly to how perceived time distortion 
has been shown to affect judgements about enjoyment of a task (Sackett, Meyvis, 
Nelson, Converse, & Sackett, 2008). This implicates mechanisms such as source 
monitoring (Matlin, 2003) in mediating the effect that emotions may have on 
cognitive tasks generally and reasoning tasks specifically.  
1.6 Summary: Emotion 
Before considering the literature on reasoning, it is worth summarising the key points 
from the current chapter on emotion. Ultimately, the emotional life of homo sapiens 
sapiens is multifaceted and diverse, and each individual emotion comprises a number 
of elements, from the neurological to the experiential. As the focus of the current 
research is on how emotions affect reasoning, and reasoning is primarily a cognitive 
process, the cognitive components of emotion will be taken as the basis for an 
operational definition of emotional experience; specifically emotional experience will 
be defined as the self-reported, conscious and subjective ratings of emotion. Treating 
emotion in this way overcomes a number of methodological issues, such as those 
concerned with measuring unconscious or physiological elements of emotions, whilst 
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still allowing clear predictions to be made, and models based on the cognitively 
based ideas of emotion as information and as cognitive load to be tested.  
Furthermore, although not committing to any one model of emotion, the 
adoption of the PANAS and similar cognitively based measures of mood allows a 
consideration of positive and negative dimensions as separate factors. This in turn 
relates to the fact that although most of the research reviewed has focussed on 
specific, mostly negative, emotions such as anxiety or depression, a case can be 
made for considering these as comprising similar dimensions, such that work on 
specific emotional states may reasonably be used to formulate hypotheses 
concerning more general ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotional states.  
Finally, discussion of the nature of emotional states and their positive or 
negative valence led to a discussion of how they can be manipulated. Many different 
manipulations have been used, but to overcome issues of subjectivity, a self-directed 
writing task will primarily be used where mood is manipulated externally to the other 
tasks being performed by the individuals.  
Having now considered how emotion will be conceptualised, measured, and 
manipulated, we turn to a consideration of reasoning tasks and how people reason. 
This is followed by a discussion of how emotions may affect reasoning processes 
specifically, and the models which will be tested in the subsequent experimental 
work.  
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Chapter Two 
2. Reasoning 
Chapter  1 has outlined definitions and models of emotion, and begun to suggest how 
emotion impacts upon cognitive functioning. Some consideration was given to its 
effects on reasoning, although that is the focus of the current chapter, and will be 
covered in more detail below.  
The field of reasoning is well established, and it is the consideration of 
emotion which is the main focus of the current work, and the inclusion of which 
constitutes the novel contribution of this thesis. In order to achieve this aim, as with 
emotion, a number of issues first need to be considered with respect to reasoning. As 
such, the current chapter will define what is meant by reasoning, and then review 
theories of reasoning such as mental models and dual process theory (DPT; DeNeys, 
2006a, 2006b; Evans, 2002b; Evans, 2003); the latter will be made much use of in the 
following chapters. Syllogistic and conditional reasoning will be described alongside 
key phenomena in the literature as these will be the focal paradigms of the 
experimental chapters. Once the paradigms and theoretical models which explain 
robust findings have been described, it is possible to move towards an integration of 
emotion and reasoning theories, and this will form the concluding sections of this 
chapter.  
Specifically, the focus will be on positive and negative emotions, effects of 
problem content versus the effects of mood states, and how these patterns vary 
across different reasoning domains in order to develop our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between emotion and reasoning. Developing 
a better understanding of these mechanisms is important in that it will help us better 
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understand human behaviour in a more holistic, less restricted manner than has so 
far been done in the reasoning and emotion domains independently.  
The majority of emotion-cognition research, as will be seen, has focused on 
social reasoning and social interaction (Forgas, 2001), with relatively little research 
looking at the interrelationships between emotion and non-social reasoning. A better 
understanding of this will provide the grounding for understanding how emotions 
affect everyday decisions and understanding how people might act in different 
emotive situations; but first, a definition of reasoning is required.  
2.1 What is Reasoning? 
Having outlined a working definition of emotion for the purposes of this 
investigation, this section aims to consider what is meant by 'reasoning' in the 
psychological literature, and the following sections aim to deal briefly with the 
implications of the different possible definitions in relation to how they allow 
reasoning to be incorporated into models of emotion. Taking the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition of reasoning as a starting point again: 
 
Reason. n. 1 a cause, explanation, or justification.  good or obvious reason to do 
something  Logic a premise or argument in support of a belief, especially a minor 
premise given after the conclusion. 2 the power of the mind to think, understand and 
form judgements logically. (one’s reason) one’s sanity. 3 what is right, practical, or 
possible. v. 1 think, understand, and form judgements logically. (reasoning 
something out) find a solution to a problem by considering possible options. 2 
(reason with) persuade with rational argument. 
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Leaving aside ‘reason’ as used to refer to justifications or explanations, the everyday 
definitions of reasoning focus around the manipulation of information towards the 
goal of a solution or persuasive argument. It is the definitions centring on logic which 
will form the basis of ‘reasoning’ as it is used in this thesis, particularly in terms of 
forming judgements logically. However, the OED merely provides a common-sense or 
lexical definition, and does not do justice to technical definitions which abound in the 
literature, and these will be considered below.  
Though there is much work on judgement and decision-making, the current 
research project will focus on reasoning towards judgments of logical properties, 
such as evaluating the logical validity of conclusions. However, the term ‘logical’, and 
what is meant by it raises a number of issues. Before discussing them further and in 
more detail, it is important to understand that performance on reasoning tasks is 
usually, though not always, assessed against formal logic. This is often referred to as 
the normative standard, or normatively logical responding. 
Subsequently, the judgements of logical validity are derived from this 
normative logic. Taking the OED definition concerning the integration of premises; 
premises are individual statements, such as “All men are mortal” and “Socrates is a 
man”. A conclusion might follow these premise statements, such as “Therefore, 
Socrates is mortal”. In much work on reasoning, individuals are asked to judge 
whether the conclusion is (logically) valid or not, assuming the truth of the premises. 
So, assuming that all men are mortal, and that Socrates is indeed a man, the 
conclusion, that Socrates is mortal must be true (valid). There are some conclusions, 
such as the one presented here which must be true if the premises are true; that is, 
they necessarily follow. Others may only represent one possible conclusion that can 
be drawn, and yet other conclusions are impossible to draw logically; but more on 
necessity and possibility later (Chapter  3). 
dzahra 62 330974 
 
Assessing judgements against normatively logical criteria allows the use of a 
generally accepted measure of logical accuracy. This is not to say that normative 
standards of logic are the correct ones to apply to everyday decision making and 
judgments, or that normative responses are more, or less, rational than standards 
based on, for example, ecological or pragmatic factors (e.g. Marewski, Gaissmaier, & 
Gigerenzer, 2010). However, as logic provides a clear, objective, and unambiguous 
means of defining problem and conclusions types, it will be adopted as the standard 
in this thesis.  
Related to how reasoning accuracy is defined is the rationality debate. In the 
same way as reasoning may be assessed against normative or pragmatic criteria, 
decisions may be assessed in terms of rationality. The topic of whether or not 
humans are rational, and what standards should be used to measure rationality is an 
interesting one, but only one key point will be raised here. It is important, given how 
emotionally driven responses are commonly framed as irrational, to highlight the fact 
that logical accuracy as used in the experimental work reported here is not 
necessarily indicative of rational behaviour. Many have argued that normative 
theories don't provide a valid measure of rationality, not least because logical 
responding is not necessarily 'rational' as it doesn't typically account for situational 
variables. Alternative pragmatic theories, which take into account situational and 
social variables have been proposed by many researchers to account for the patterns 
of non-logical responding in a range of reasoning tasks, most notably thematic 
versions of the Wason Selection Task (Evans et al., 1993; Manktelow, 2000; Rossano, 
2002). 
A nice example, because of how its visual representation instantly illustrates 
its complexity, can be found in the Nash Equilibria, discussed by Bentall (2004, p112), 
and others (Sugden, 2008; Walliser, 1998; Young, 1998). This equation which aims to 
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provide a model of rational behaviour where rational is equated with logical 
decisions in economics, and can be stated as: 
 
),(),(:,,, **** iiiiiiiiiii xxfxxfxxSx ≥≠∈∀ −  
 
In summary, the statement above is used to determine the action of one individual 
(∀), when choosing one strategy (∗) from a set of possible strategies ( =
	
	… 	) and a set of possible pay-offs ( = 	
	… 	), taking into 
account the strategies available to the -other individuals involved (). 
‘Equilibrium’ is reached when no change in strategy made by the individual results in 
an increased payoff. This would predict that for systems in equilibrium, no individuals 
would change strategy. Although this applies reasonably well to mathematical 
models of economics, how well it applies to people is doubtful, not least because it 
fails to consider the possibility that a player might be willing to suffer a loss if it 
harms another player’s payoff as well. 
To return to the relationship between reasoning and emotion, one case 
where this logical-rational contrast is especially obvious is in pathological indecision. 
This is where normative rules are applied excessively to everyday decisions to which 
they are not suited (Lehrer, 2009; Zahra, 2012), and arguably, where the usual 
weighting influence of emotion is not included in the calculations, leaving two or 
more options equally viable candidates. This leaves the individual with no way of 
deciding logically between the two. Applying formal logic to psychological reasoning 
processes assumes that people have an infinite processing capacity, and, as the Nash 
Equilibria hopefully demonstrates, this is unlikely to be the case. However, the 
concept of bounded rationality provides some scope to account for processing 
limitations in psychological models of reasoning and decision making (Hanoch, 
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2002a, 2002b). These theories might also be compatible with models of emotion 
effects in reasoning which treat emotion as impacting the amount of available 
cognitive resources. In summary, although there is room to develop this discussion in 
the reasoning literature, the current thesis does not aim to determine the rationality 
or otherwise of decisions under different emotional states but will adopt formal logic 
as a means of categorising responses to reasoning problems. 
2.1.1 Working Memory 
Given its importance to the following models of reasoning, it is worth considering the 
Working Memory (WM) construct. Central to almost all cognitive theories of 
reasoning, WM is a replacement for the older ‘short term memory’ construct 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Although the working memory  system has been outlined 
in different ways (Miyake & Shah, 1999), the most widely adopted and empirically 
supported is Baddeley's multi-component  model (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974) with its central executive system, and visuospatial sketchpad, primary acoustic 
store, and phonological loop subsystems, later combined with an episodic buffer to 
link the WM system more closely to long-term memory (Baddeley, 2000; Repovš & 
Baddeley, 2006). WM is thought to be a limited capacity system in which the central 
executive allocates cognitive resources to the subsystems. It is this limited nature of 
working memory and cognitive resources which has led to much research and 
theorising on individual differences in reasoning. For example, Barrouillet and Lecas 
(1999), Gilhhooly, Logie, and Wynn (2002), as well as García-Madruga, Gutiérrez, 
Carriedo, Luzón, and Vila (2007), to select just a few examples, have shown WM 
capacity to be predictive of reasoning responses on syllogistic and conditional 
reasoning tasks, the two main paradigms used in this thesis.  This limited capacity has 
led some researchers to equate reasoning ability with WM itself  (Kyllonen & Christal, 
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1990; Suβ, Oberauer, Wittman, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). This view has been 
contended (Garlick & Sejnowski, 2006; Ruff, Knauff, Fangmeier, & Spreer, 2003), and 
Evans and colleagues (1993), for example, point out that true logical competence, 
measured by normative rules, may be masked by other factors that affect task 
performance; such as the type of processing adopted or the load exerted by 
concurrent tasks. Despite this, the finding that WM performance correlates with 
reasoning performance suggests that the two are related and that the cognitive 
models of reasoning based on the WM construct are not seriously undermined by the 
possibility that additional factors contribute to reasoning ability.  
From a neuropsychological perspective, working memory, central executive 
functions, and higher cognitive functioning in general have been considered the role 
of structures within the neocortex (Andrewes, 2004), the brain systems which are 
youngest in evolutionary terms (Rossano, 2002). This relatively recent development 
of ‘reasoning’ provides evolutionary support for the notion that reasoning and 
emotion are distinct systems, with the amygdala and basal ganglia responsible for 
emotional responses developing much, much earlier on the evolutionary timeline 
(Gazzaniga et al., 2002). 
Reasoning tasks undoubtedly involve many systems in the brain, from 
perceptual processing in the primary visual cortex, through the evaluation of 
potential threat in the limbic system, to the use of memory structures such as the 
hippocampus in finding similar cases. Recent research has attempted to isolate the 
areas and systems involved in the reasoning aspect of this process; specifically those 
centres which evaluate the options constructed from this flood of information and 
decide on a response. Although the biological underpinnings of interactions between 
these aspects are outside the focus of the current research, and will not be directly 
investigated, the work on the underlying neurology of reasoning serves to emphasise 
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the importance of WM and cognitive resources in reasoning, and provides a 
counterpoint to neurological models of emotion discussed earlier.   
As such, WM as a construct provides the basis for theories of reasoning 
which refer to cognitive load, capacity, or processing limitations, and the literature in 
support of the construct very briefly touched on here provides one way of linking the 
reasoning literature with the emotion literature from the previous chapter, namely 
that emotion may affect reasoning by acting as additional cognitive load and thus 
reducing the availability of WM resources which are central to logical reasoning. 
Stanovich and West (2000) argue that the discrepancy between normative 
responding and how people actually respond is accounted for by performance and 
computational error. In a response to this Bucciarelli (2000) makes the case that 
there is greater variability in performance errors on complex problems than simple 
problems, citing data collected by herself and Johnson-Laird (1999). However, she 
also raises the issue of variability in working memory capacity as a predictor of both 
performance and computational limitations. The control of working memory capacity 
and related constructs such as IQ therefore become important in the design of 
studies aiming to investigate factors affecting reasoning performance.  These studies 
are also related to work such as that by Newstead, Thompson, and Handley (2002) 
which has shown that performance on syllogistic reasoning tasks is related to an 
individual’s ability to generate alternative interpretations of the information 
presented in the problem. That is, when reasoning, most theorists suggest that 
individuals form mental representations of each statement which are then 
manipulated in working memory in such a way as to allow the evaluation of a 
conclusion. Given that information in reasoning tasks can be combined in different 
ways, the number of these mental representations that are created is thought to 
determine an individual’s success (normatively defined) on reasoning tasks. Such 
dzahra 67 330974 
 
work shows the importance of considering a range of individual differences variables 
as potential predictors, mediators, or moderators of emotion and reasoning 
interaction.  Having defined reasoning and how it will be measured, the following 
section will review theories of reasoning, elaborating on this idea of mental 
representations and what people do with them after they are created. This in turn 
will provide a basis for combining theories of emotion and reasoning. 
2.2 Theories of Reasoning 
Evans (1991) outlines four types of theory relating to reasoning; those based on 
inference rules, context-dependent rules or schemas, mental models, and those 
based on heuristics. This section will broadly follow these categories, although more 
recent integrative theories which transcend these groupings will also be considered. 
In addition, selected neuropsychological evidence will be introduced where it is 
relevant to the theories under discussion, where it describes the physical basis of the 
cognitive processes, and where it relates to the models of emotion presented 
previously. 
2.2.1 Mental-Logic and Mental-Rules 
The following section is concerned with those theories which fall under the general 
headings of mental logic, inference rules, or rule-based theories (Manktelow, 2000). 
Mental-logic theories propose that people reason by following logical rules, built 
around the functions of the logical operators and for conjunction, not for negation 
and if… then for conditional relationships. Generally speaking, rule-theories envisage 
reasoning as the progression through a series of steps determined by sets of rules. 
Consequently, they predict that the difficulty of reasoning problems will be 
determined by the number of steps required to reach a conclusion, and that errors in 
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reasoning can be explained by either the limitations of the cognitive system, by the 
application of incorrect rules, or the misapplication of the correct rules. Largely, rule-
based models propose three stages to this process; encoding, reasoning, and 
decoding (Rijmen & De Boeck, 2001). Encoding involves representing the logical 
structure of the problem in working memory, reasoning involves applying one or 
more basic rules to the problem, and decoding involves transforming the resulting 
conclusions back into whichever format is required. 
Although rule-theories may take an axiomatic form, whereby every step 
through the stages is determined entirely by specified rules (such as ‘IF Elimination’, 
see Table  2.1), the more recent and more fully developed psychological theories are 
based on natural deduction, whereby the aim is to provide a psychological model of 
reasoning as it occurs naturally (Manktelow, 2000). 
 
Table  2.1 Example of IF Elimination 
IF Elimination (Modus Ponens) 
If the statement If P then Q is given, and P holds in the given situation, 
Then Q can be taken as being the case via modus ponens, thus eliminating the IF. 
 
 
Some of the most elaborated mental logic theories are those of Rips (1994) and 
Braine and O'Brien (1998), and these will be outlined as a basis for contrast in the 
following section on the model-based alternatives (See Evans et al., 1993 for a more 
detailed discussion). PSYCOP, the theory presented by Rips (1994), builds on natural 
deduction with the aim of accounting for how ‘ordinary people’, those ‘who have no 
training in formal logic’ (p103) reason, acknowledging that strict axiomatic 
representations are not likely to be employed by the average human being. In short, 
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PSYCOP proposes that when presented with premises and conclusions to evaluate, 
people reason sententially, using their existing set of inference rules to justify the 
links they make. Errors, as in other rule theories, are accounted for by either the 
misapplication of or lack of knowledge of the correct inference rules. Braine and 
O'Brien’s (1998) model also takes a similar approach, agreeing with Rips (1994) and 
other theorists that reasoning proceeds according to a set of inference rules, and 
that it is related to natural language, much as Rips suggests reasoning proceeds 
through a series of linking sentences. 
To summarise, rule theories argue that reasoning is accomplished by 
applying a set of clearly defined logical rules to a problem, that problem difficulty is 
thus determined by the number of rules required to reach a solution, and that errors 
occur from either the use of inappropriate rules, misapplication of those rules, or 
insufficient cognitive capacity to apply those rules.  
Related to the previously outlined rational-logical distinction and difference 
between ‘mathematical’ (the Nash Equilibrium being an extreme example) and 
‘human’ processing of reasoning tasks, Stanovich (1999) argues that the strict logical 
rules on which rule theories are based are an inappropriate norm against which to 
compare, or to try to model, human reasoning. The reliance on mathematical models 
means that these theories have yet to be fully developed in terms of psychological 
processes, as discussed by Oberauer (2006) when fitting the probabilistic model of 
Oaksford and Chater (2001) to data on conditional reasoning. There is also the issue, 
raised by Braine (1978), amongst others, that terms with one meaning in logic have 
another in everyday language. For example, ‘some’, strictly speaking, means ‘at least 
one, possibly all’ in logic, whereas in natural language ‘some’ is very rarely used to 
imply ‘at least one, but anything up to every instance’, instead being commonly used 
to suggest more than one, but not all. 
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Although rule theories provide a useful framework for computer 
programmers and researchers in artificial intelligence working with programs that 
function solely on a logical basis, the limited processing capabilities and subjective 
factors involved in human reasoning make such strict procedures seem unlikely to 
provide a complete account of human reasoning. Furthermore, rule-theories cannot 
account for the poor use of logical rules on abstract tasks, which is reversed if the 
content is made pragmatic (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). These facilitation effects 
found with thematic content may be to some extent accounted for by the contextual 
information cueing an individual to the linguistic implications of the operators or 
logical terms in the problem, mentioned above. 
Countering some of these criticisms to some extent, theories focussed on the 
ideas of rational analysis and information gain have also been developed 
(Manktelow, 2000), which claim that people proceed in reasoning tasks based on the 
perceived informational value of each action, following logical rules (though not 
necessarily explicitly), but with recourse to heuristic processes where necessary. This 
theory largely explains errors in a similar way to rule theories, with individuals 
working through different stages of reasoning in a pre-determined way (the 
heuristics and biases will be discussed in more detail below). Ultimately, despite the 
attempts at addressing them, this range of criticisms has led to the favouring by 
some researchers of model based theories. 
2.2.2 Mental Models 
Model theories, from the early Euler Circles and Venn Diagrams (Garnham & Oakhill, 
1994) to the later Mental Models theory of Johnson-Laird (1983) propose, as the title 
suggests, that people reason by constructing models of the information in reasoning 
problems in order to evaluate conclusions. More specifically, they propose three 
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stages to the reasoning process. First, people read the initial information, or 
‘premises’, and make sense of them, constructing models representing the 
information presented (Comprehension). They then combine the models of the 
premise information (Description), and then attempt to validate the combined model 
by searching for alternative models (Validation), looking for those that are able to 
represent the same information but in different ways (Manktelow, 2000). For 
example, take the syllogism “(1) No Postgraduates are Undergraduates; (2) All PhD 
Students are Postgraduates; (3) Therefore No PhD Students are Undergraduates”. 
The first premises (1) can be thought of in terms of independent sets, as represented 
at the top of Figure  2.1.  
 
 
Figure  2.1 Representations of premises and conclusions 
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The second premise (2) can be thought of as PhD Students being a subset falling 
entirely within the larger set ‘Postgraduates’. Finally, these two premises can be 
combined to create the model shown at the bottom of Figure  2.1, which can then be 
used to evaluate the conclusion (3) as valid; in this model, there is no overlap 
between PhD Students and Undergraduates. 
These models are more commonly written using notation derived from 
mental models theorists (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1983), with a, b and c representing 
Postgraduates, Undergraduates, and PhD Students respectively, and closed brackets 
represent completely contained sets, such that (1), (2), and (3) above would be 
rendered as:  
 
 
(1)  [a]  
        [b] 
(2)  a   [c] 
(3)  [a  [c]]  
[b] 
... 
 
Model theories explain the difficulty of reasoning problems in terms of the number 
of models required to represent the information in the premises (Ford, 1994; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1992). If the information in the premises can be combined in 
a number of different ways, more models need to be constructed, remembered, and 
compared in order to evaluate any given conclusion. To demonstrate, if we changed 
the quantifier in the first premise to ‘some’ in the example above, the information 
contained in that premise (1.1) can now be represented in either of the two ways 
shown in Figure  2.2. 
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Figure  2.2 Alternative Models 
 
At least one (1.1A) but possibly all (1.1B) Postgraduates are also Undergraduates. 
This then leads to a number of models for the conclusion which are consistent with 
both premises, and given that in at least one of them there is overlap between PhD 
Students and Undergraduates, the conclusion is now invalid. If only the first of these 
models was constructed, this decision could not have been reached, thus more 
models need to be considered at the cost of more cognitive effort.  
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Again, in terms of mental models notation, these might be rendered as; 
 
1.1A   a   b 
1.1B      [a   b] 
3A   a     [c] 
   a    b 
 ... 
3B   a   b 
   a   c  
   ... 
3C  [a   [c]]   
[a   b] 
... 
 
The models in Figure  2.1 and Figure  2.2 can also be used to describe the difference 
between logical necessity and logical possibility, two ideas which are central to the 
paradigms employed in Chapters  3 and  4. The syllogism shown in Figure  2.1 leads to 
only one model of the conclusion (3). In such a case, where all models (albeit only the 
one in this case) lead to the conclusion following, that conclusion is said to be 
necessary. The conclusion must follow if the premises (1 and 2) are true. In Figure  2.2 
however, it can be seen that the premises (1.1, and 2 from earlier) can be combined 
in at least three ways (3A, 3B, and 3C). Of the three models presented, the conclusion 
holds in only one of them. There are alternative models in which it does not hold. 
The conclusions is therefore possible, because the premises can be combined in such 
a way as for the conclusion to hold, but it is not necessary; there are ways of 
combining the premises in which the conclusion does not hold. This distinction will 
be discussed further in Chapter  3. 
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In relation to syllogistic reasoning, which will be the focus of the first 
experimental chapters, the mental models theory of Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1992) also argues that the order in which terms are presented in a 
syllogism (it’s ‘figure’; discussed below) will affect its difficulty. This is because it is 
assumed that the terms are preferred when they appear in the problem in the order 
A, B, C. If the terms do not appear in this order, then, it is argued, people transform 
the premises before beginning the construction of the models, and the 
transformation requires additional cognitive effort and resources, thus influencing 
the difficulty of the problem (Ford, 1994). 
The most widely applied theory of reasoning, and arguably the most 
empirically supported, is the above mentioned mental models theory of Johnson-
Laird (1983), which is the most fully specified of the model based theories, and 
possibly the most specified of the reasoning theories in general. The process of 
model construction and combination outlined by Johnson-Laird (1983) has been used 
to explain empirical findings relating to both syllogistic reasoning (Bucciarelli & 
Johnson-Laird, 1999; Manktelow, 2000) and conditional reasoning (Barrouillet & 
Lecas, 1999; García-Madruga et al., 2007; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), providing a 
theoretical framework which has been investigated in relation to the tasks used in 
this thesis. This in turn provides a more empirically supported model of reasoning 
than rule theories which can be developed through the addition of emotion as a 
variable. 
The main strength of the mental models theory over the various rule theories 
lies in its comparatively parsimonious account of reasoning across tasks. The number 
of models which need to be evaluated can account for error rates on different types 
of inferences, as opposed to rule theories which often require post-hoc additions to 
the sets of rules to account for experimental findings (Manktelow, 2000).  
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Although on the face of it ‘more models’ as an explanation for difficulty would 
appear to be very similar to ‘more rules’ (e.g. Evans & Over, 2004), the number of 
models required to solve a problem does not directly map onto a problems difficulty 
or success rates (Rijmen & De Boeck, 2001). Yet mental models theory more closely 
predicts experimental results than alternative rule-based theories, and is more 
flexible in that it also allows a range of other factors to be taken into account more 
easily than rule-based theories, such as preferred models and reasoning styles 
(Oberaurer, 2006). 
Expanding on the difference between ‘more models’ and ‘more rules’, under 
rule theories, where the difficulty of a problem is solely a function of the number of 
rules, all problems that require one basic rule to be employed should be equally 
difficult, yet this is not found to be the case (Rijmen & De Boeck, 2001). This is one of 
the main areas where the model theory excels relative to the rule theory: in 
providing an account of why different basic rules, which should, in rule theories, be 
of equal difficulty, appear to vary in their actual difficulty. As Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(2002) point out, models are not based solely on logical rules, but take into account 
the individual’s understanding of the premises within a given context – for example, 
whether an individual understands ‘some’ in the logical sense or in the everyday 
sense. Thus models can represent a range of possibilities, rather than being restricted 
to the certainties of inference rules.  
However, mental models theory in its original or even in its revised 
formulations by no means provides a perfect account of all forms of reasoning. For 
example, Evans, Over and Handley (2005) provide a critique of Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne’s (2002) explanation of conditional reasoning, pointing out that suppositional 
theory provides a better account of a range of conditional instances (e.g. Evans & 
Over, 2004; Handley, Evans, & Thompson, 2006).  
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Suppositional theory suggests that when people reason about relationships of the ‘if 
p then q’ variety; that is, conditional relationships, they suppose that p is the case, 
and assess the probability that q follows. Evans and Over (2004) make the case that 
typically reasoning research instructs people to assume that the premises are true, 
and to draw only logically necessary conclusions. They point out that this ignores the 
distinction between what follows from beliefs or probabilistic statements and what 
follows from true, or assumed-to-be-true premises. In the Socrates example 
presented earlier; “All men are mortal”, “Socrates is a man”, “Therefore, Socrates is 
mortal”; whether or not you decide that the conclusion is valid will vary depending 
on whether you have to assume the premises are true, or if you can assign a 
likelihood or probability to them being true. If there is a chance that not all men are 
mortal, or that Socrates is not a man, then you may be less likely to agree that the 
conclusion is valid. As Evans and colleagues (2007) summarise the situation, 
according to suppositional theory, people reason by simulating cases where the 
premises are true, and then evaluating their belief that the conclusion follows. 
Barrouillet and colleagues (2008) acknowledge criticism of mental model 
theory (e.g. Evans et al., 2005), but suggest that there are two kinds of reasoning; 
reasoning about probabilities given assertions, and about assertions given 
probabilities. They argue that suppositional theory tries to reconcile these issues but 
fails, and offer a revised model theory, so the debate goes on. 
Setting aside for now the arguments against accepting completely the 
extension of mental-models theory from syllogistic to conditional reasoning, model-
based theories of reasoning are more generally supported by recent empirical 
research, with rule-based theories having largely fallen out of favour. This body of 
work which continues to grow thus provides a strong basis on which to build the 
current work, and provides a basis for the predictions of chapters on syllogistic 
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reasoning. The issues with the mental models treatment of conditionals that are 
raised by suppositional theory will be considered again in the chapters which 
investigate the effects of emotion on conditional reasoning, and both syllogistic 
reasoning and conditional reasoning will be discussed in detail after considering next 
heuristic and then dual-process theories of reasoning. 
2.2.3 Heuristics 
Whereas formal logic provides one mechanism which people may rely on to reach 
conclusions when reasoning, heuristics provide an alternative. Heuristic ‘reasoning’ 
processes are often referred to in textbooks as ‘mental shortcuts’, but more 
specifically, they are in one sense ‘rules’ (although distinct from the logically derived 
rules of rule-based theories) which have, according to some accounts, been deduced 
or inferred from repeated exposure during and since the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness so as to be evolutionarily adaptive (Stanovich, 1999). 
Although other heuristic systems based on frequency and probability detection have 
to some extent become biologically ingrained, such as foveal (versus peripheral) 
detail and other elements of our perceptual processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996), ‘heuristics’ as used here will refer to decision processes based on prior 
experience or elements of the problem which are not logically relevant. In the 
reasoning tasks used in the experimental chapters believability would be one 
example of these salient but logically irrelevant features. Given the statement ‘all 
cats are mammals’, and ‘all mammals have live young’, you are more likely to accept 
the conclusion ‘therefore, all cats have live young’ than you would be to accept the 
conclusion “all cats lay eggs” given the statements “all cats are mammals” and “all 
mammals lay eggs”, even when instructed to assume the truth of each premise 
statement. The believability of the conclusion is irrelevant to an evaluation of its 
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logical validity, yet it can still be used as a heuristic means of reaching a judgement 
about the conclusion. This has been used to explain the findings in the literature that 
suggest people are more likely to endorse believable conclusions than unbelievable 
ones across a range of reasoning tasks (e.g. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), and the 
believability of a conclusion or the extent to which an individual agrees with a 
conclusion may be used as heuristic strategies for problem evaluation. This will be 
discussed in detail when the heuristic approaches are contrasted with logical 
approaches in relation to the specific tasks employed to investigate the effect of 
emotion on reasoning (e.g. Chapter  5). 
Other commonly used examples of heuristics include availability, 
representativeness, and anchoring. These broadly correspond to using the number of 
examples easily accessible to memory, the similarity between cases, and a particular 
starting point as the basis for evaluating decision options (see Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002 for details). These are not the only heuristics, though they are 
possibly the most frequently studied. In the same way that any biological adaptation 
that is in any way useful to the organism can be acted on by natural or sexual 
selection (Darwin, 1998), it is feasible that any variable which is correlated in any 
degree with a correct or useful decision may be developed into a more clearly 
defined heuristic tool.  
Another way in which heuristics may be used to investigate the relationship 
between emotion and reasoning is by utilising paradigms based on heuristics rather 
than logical rules. Rather than using syllogistic or conditional reasoning, assuming a 
logical approach, and then explaining differences in terms of ‘incorrect’ reliance on 
heuristics, problems can be devised which cue the use of heuristics but in which such 
reliance can be overcome by thinking in terms of normative logic. One example of 
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this is the Ratio-Bias Task (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), and forms the third type of task, 
alongside syllogistic and conditional reasoning, which will be used in this thesis. 
In the Ratio-Bias Task, individuals are presented with two boxes; whether 
these are two-dimensional on a screen, described in a short instructional paragraph, 
or physical boxes in a laboratory is irrelevant; let’s call them A and B. Boxes A and B 
each contain a number of white balls and a number of black balls. The quantities of 
each are varied depending on the particular variable under investigation, but for this 
example, let us assume Box A contains seven white balls, and three black balls. Box B 
on the other hand contains forty white balls, and ten black balls. Your task is to 
decide from which box you have more chance of drawing a black ball if you were to 
reach in without looking and remove one ball at random. 
There are two main ways people make their choice. The first is by choosing 
the box which contains the most black balls. This is a heuristic response and is based 
on frequency. Using such a strategy leads to the selection of Box B; it has ten black 
balls versus Box A’s three. The second, and normative, strategy is to consider the 
probabilities of drawing a black ball. This leads to the selection of Box A; there is a 
30% chance versus the 20% chance of drawing a black ball from Box B. 
  Reliance on heuristics has often been used as a case to illustrate the 
irrationality of human reasoning, though having discussed the difference between 
logic and rationality, it will be clear that the use of heuristics, if they have evolved to 
allow humans to deal with their everyday environment, at the very most can show 
that our behaviours do not typically conform to formal logic, and cannot say anything 
about the rationality or otherwise of our behaviour. Many researchers have made 
this point repeatedly (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 2009). Regardless, it is apparent that 
although some individuals may use formal logic, others rely on these non-logical 
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heuristics, and they therefore need to be considered when explaining reasoning 
processes.   
The Probability Heuristic Model presented by Chater and Oaksford (1999) is 
one example of an attempt at this, and is based on the idea that reasoning is 
probabilistic rather than absolute as it is in the inference rules found in mental logic 
theories or the logical rules that supposedly guide the construction of mental 
models. The probability heuristic model is based on the idea that when people 
reason, they accept conclusions based on the prior probability of that conclusion 
given the initial (minor) premise (Oberaurer, 2006), and in addition, these 
probabilities are based on everyday experience (Oaksford & Chater, 2001). Much like 
the evolutionary development of heuristics outlined above; when one relationship is 
consistently seen, although not logically justified, it may provide a useful, adaptive, 
problem solving strategy. 
Given that people can use logical rules, but that they also frequently use 
heuristic strategies, models which can account for both of these approaches have 
gained ground over recent decades in the field of thinking and reasoning. Often 
referred to as dual-process theories to reflect the logical and heuristic processes they 
seek to explain, these will be discussed next. 
2.2.4 Dual-Process Theories 
In light of the research on logical rules versus heuristics and the theories which have 
been advanced to explain them, models of reasoning obviously need to be able to 
accommodate both elaborated reasoning processes such as model construction, 
combination, and validation as well as heuristic response patterns. 
To this end, many researchers have adopted approaches that maintain a set 
of two or more reasoning systems or broad types of reasoning processes. Ferreira, 
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Garcia-Marques, Sherman, and Sherman (2006) for example, use the process 
dissociation procedure to provide empirical evidence for what they term 'automatic' 
and 'controlled' processes. Ameel, Verschueren, and Schaeken (2007) adopt a similar 
framework for interpreting their results on transitive inference tasks, and Evans and 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) use the concepts of analytic and heuristic processes to account 
for different patterns of reasoning under speeded and non-speeded responding 
conditions.  
Given the agreement between researchers on the potential properties of 
each of the two systems, many authors have developed dual-process theories of 
reasoning, which aim to combine the previous research (DeNeys, 2006b; Ferreira et 
al., 2006; Rips, 2001). Of these theories, the dual-process theory (DPT) of Evans 
(2003, 2008) provides a framework which synthesises the work in the area and is 
based on numerous reviews of the theoretical and empirical work on dual processes 
in reasoning, and much empirical research from both the cognitive and biological 
domains (Evans, 2008; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Masicampo & Baumeister, 
2008). As an example of this empirical work, and related to the distinction between 
heuristic and logical or analytic processing outlined above, is the work on the belief 
bias effect. Belief-bias in relation to reasoning and emotion will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter  3, but for the purpose of this discussion, the key features are that 
problems are presented to individuals which can be responded to based on logic, or 
based on believability. The case of egg-laying cats above is an example of this. Both 
conclusions are logically valid, based on the structure of the argument, but the 
believable conclusion is accepted more frequently (Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 
1999). As the logical approach is considered more cognitively demanding (Quayle & 
Ball, 2000), additional load and speeded responses would be expected to impair 
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logical responses, and result in use of a  lower-effort ‘belief’ heuristic, and this is 
what has been found in the literature (e.g. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). 
To elaborate on the distinction between logical-analytic and heuristic 
responses; DPT proposes two systems of reasoning, which are generically named 
Type One and Type Two, although these labels have evolved with the theory to refer 
to Type One and Type Two processes. These can be considered representative of the 
heuristic-analytic divide espoused in the research on dual processing. The properties 
of each are shown in Table  2.2, adapted from Evans (2008, p257). Although the labels 
'Heuristic' and 'Analytic' connote a limited subset of the properties of each system, 
they will be used here to represent Type One and Type Two processes respectively in 
order to aid fluency and understanding. 
 
Table  2.2 Properties of Type One and Type Two (adapted from Evans, 2008) 
 Type One (Heuristic) Type Two (Analytic) 
Consciousness 
Unconscious/Preconscious 
Implicit 
Automatic 
Low Effort 
Rapid 
High Capacity 
Heuristic 
Conscious 
Explicit 
Controlled 
High Effort 
Slow 
Low Capacity 
Analytic 
Evolutionary 
Characteristics 
Evolutionarily Old 
Pragmatic Rationality 
Shared with Animals 
Non-Verbal 
Subcortical 
Evolutionarily Recent 
Logical Rationality 
Unique to Humans 
Language Based 
Neocortical 
Functional 
Characteristics 
Associative 
Domain Specific 
Contextualised 
Pragmatic 
Parallel 
Rule-Based 
Domain General 
Abstract 
Logical 
Sequential 
Individual 
Differences 
Universal 
Independent of Intelligence 
Independent of WM 
Heritable 
Related to Intelligence 
Related to WM 
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The interaction between the two types of processes has been the source of much 
debate in the literature. Three possibilities have been identified and discussed by 
Evans (2007b). The two types of processes may interact in a pre-emptive fashion, in 
which the type that will be used is decided before any processing has taken place. 
Alternatively, the two types may be engaged in a parallel-competitive fashion, 
whereby both types are used for processing the problem at the same time, and the 
responses of each are decided between or integrated. Finally, the two types may 
process information in a default-interventionist fashion, which suggests that the 
heuristic system is engaged first, and will provide the solution unless analytic 
processes intervene. It may also be possible that different patterns of interaction 
between the two types of processes are found under different task demands. In 
relation to the interpretation of results, the different possibilities should be 
considered in so far as they may lead to different mechanisms of cognition-emotion 
interaction, though discussion of this will have to wait until the presentation of 
experimental data. 
Research which has aimed to evaluate the DPT has generally been 
supportive. The initial work by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) showing a 
dissociation between belief-based (Type One) and logic-based (Type Two) responses, 
and the later work briefly outlined above supporting the differentiating effect of 
time-pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) are good examples of supportive work. 
There is also the work of Quayle and Ball (2000) who show reliance on beliefs is 
increased when greater demands are placed on working memory.  
Although there is much support for DPT, alternative accounts of the different 
patterns of responding have been presented. For example, Osman (2004) argues that 
the different response patterns are not due to separate systems or types of 
processing, but that one system applies different processes to the information in 
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reasoning tasks depending on how it is encoded. However, there is as yet little 
support for these alternative explanations of the findings in the literature; though the 
different processes could still be conceptualised as distinct to all intents and 
purposes with respect to differing resource requirements. 
There is recent work which presents results challenging the acceptance of 
belief-based responses as heuristic, which in turn begins to challenge the use of the 
above mentioned studies as support for dual-process theories. Dube, Rotello, and 
Heit (2010) for example, present an analysis of belief-bias based on response-
operator curves, and make the case that apparent belief-bias effects are a response 
bias rather than an accuracy bias. Their argument is that traditional analyses which 
compare the effects of validity and believability are flawed, though this doesn’t 
necessarily destroy the distinction between two types of processing and the 
properties associated with each.  
Given the work by Oberaurer (2006) for example, whose analyses suggest 
that the mental-model theory and DPTs provide some of the best fits to the data in 
the reasoning literature, DPT would appear to provide a good starting point, at the 
very least, in terms of a framework under which different types of processing can be 
incorporated; although the recent debate over the nature of some processes 
previously designated ‘heuristic’ needs to be taken into account. Furthermore, 
Oberaurer (2006) comments that both mental-models and DPT’s use non-normative 
parameters to improve their fit to the data. In the case of mental models, it is a 
directionality parameter, in the case of DPT, it is the use of heuristic processes. Given 
that it is these aspects, use of alternative strategies and the interaction between the 
systems, which are likely to be affected by emotion because they are dependent on 
cognitive resources, the use of a DPT is doubly justified. The following chapter will 
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detail exactly how emotion is expected to affect the interaction of the two types of 
processing in outlining the experimental hypotheses. 
The neuropsychological literature also supports the proposal of separate 
neural systems for heuristic processes, conflict resolution, reasoning under certainty 
and uncertainty as well as with familiar and unfamiliar material (e.g. Goel, 2007), but 
all of the areas activated appear to be within the frontal regions of the brain, around 
the frontal lobe and prefrontal cortex (Kane & Engle, 2002). 
The idea that reasoning and central executive functioning are situated in the 
prefrontal cortex is further supported by the vast body of research on attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder and its treatment with methylphenidate, which has 
been shown to improve performance on tests of central executive functioning by 
increasing catecholamine neurotransmission in the prefrontal cortex (Arnsten & 
Dudley, 2005; Barnett et al., 2001; Berridge et al., 2006; Kempton et al., 1999). This 
link to research on catecholamines, which have been heavily implicated in mood 
disorders such as schizophrenia and depression (Gazzaniga et al., 2002), provides a 
possible link to a biological mechanism of action that could underlie the interaction 
between cognition and emotion.  
However, following the definitions of emotion and reasoning adopted in this 
thesis, the focus will be on the cognitive work and how it relates to emotion. The 
following section will detail the two most prevalent paradigms used in the cognitive 
literature on thinking and reasoning, and outline the key phenomena in order to 
provide a basis for discussing how these tasks will be combined with emotion, and 
how the models of reasoning discussed here will be combined with the models of 
emotion described earlier.  
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2.3 Reasoning Paradigms 
Although a range of tasks have been alluded to above, this section will outline the 
two main paradigms to be utilised in the current investigations; syllogistic and 
conditional reasoning. Whereas previous sections have introduced these terms 
briefly and in order to illustrate theories of reasoning, the current section treats them 
in more detail, describing the structure of the tasks used and common phenomena 
reported. 
2.3.1 Syllogistic Reasoning 
The Nature of Syllogistic Reasoning 
Of the many reasoning tasks in the literature, the first to be encountered in this 
thesis are syllogistic. Syllogisms have been used as examples earlier, but in short, 
they are reasoning tasks that require the individual to combine information in 
premise statements to derive or evaluate a conclusion.  
As outlined above in relation to Socrates’ mortality, premises are statements, 
typically assumed to be true, which are then combined to form or evaluate a 
conclusion. The terms in the problem can be either concrete; Socrates, men, and 
mortality; or abstract – “All A are B. All B are C. Therefore all A are C” (Evans et al., 
1993). The structure may be relatively simple, such as “All cats have tails. Suki is a 
cat. Therefore Suki has a tail”, or they may be more complex and comprise more 
terms “All A are B. Some B are C. No C are D. All D are E. Therefore, all A are E”. 
Typically, however, syllogistic reasoning problems consist of two premise 
statements, and a conclusion which combines them. Because no new information 
can be gained from the process of combining the premises, the process is deductive; 
moving from general information in the premises to specific information about a 
certain case in the conclusion, as a result of which, if the premises are true, and the 
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conclusion necessarily follows, then the argument is valid. This is in contrast to 
inductive reasoning, in which specific cases may be used to support general rules, 
where the conclusions follow with a degree of probability rather than with certainty. 
Each premise and conclusion can be in one of four 'moods', which are determined by 
the quantifiers in the statements. These are shown in Table  2.3, along with their 
notation and names. 
 
Table  2.3 Syllogism Moods 
Mood Denoted by Referred to as 
All A are B A Universal Affirmative 
Some A are B I Particular Affirmative 
No A are B E Universal Negative 
Some A are Not B O Particular Negative 
 
 
Syllogisms are also classified by their figure. That is, the order in which the terms 
appear. There are four ways in which the terms of the premises can be set out, 
independently of the mood of each premise or the conclusion (Garnham & Oakhill, 
1994). These are shown in Table  2.4. 
 
Table  2.4 Syllogism Figures 
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
A-B B-A A-B B-A 
C-A C-A A-C A-C 
 
 
Each of the statements in the figures can be presented in any of the four moods. 
Furthermore, each figure can be accompanied by a conclusion which can take any 
mood, and either the order A-C or C-A. Given these various combinations, Johnson-
Laird (1983) proposes 512 possible syllogisms, although most of these combinations 
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generate syllogisms that do not have logically valid conclusions. Relatively few 
studies have used the complete set of 512 syllogisms in their experiments (Evans, 
Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999), with researchers more commonly selecting 
a subset of theoretical interest and manipulating content, figure, and task 
instructions to test their hypotheses. 
Syllogisms thus provide a flexible means of investigating reasoning, and have 
been employed to investigate the use of verbal and visual strategies in reasoning 
(Bacon, Handley, & Newstead, 2003), the effects of beliefs (Moutier, Plagne-Cayeux, 
Melot, & Houdé, 2006; Quayle & Ball, 2000), time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003), and how concurrent 
load affects performance, as well as a means of investigating factors that affect 
reasoning, such as the involvement of the working memory central executive and 
subsystems (Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 1999; Gilhooly et al., 2002), so that the 
reasoning processes underlying responding are comparatively well understood. Using 
a task which has been extensively studied in the reasoning field provides a solid basis 
for comparison of the response patterns generated when emotion is included as a 
variable. 
Key Phenomena in Syllogistic Reasoning 
Another of the main reasons syllogistic reasoning has been adopted in the current 
work is that there are a selection of key phenomena which can serve as indicators of 
the impact of emotion on reasoning. The first finding encountered in most reviews of 
syllogistic reasoning is the figural effect. This is the finding that the figure of a 
syllogism affects how easily the premises can be processed and combined, and thus 
the ease or difficulty of generating or evaluating conclusions. Figure 1 syllogisms 
(Table  2.4) are found to be easiest, figure 4 syllogisms the hardest, and figures 2 and 
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3 somewhere in between. This is thought to be because the terms in figure 1 
syllogisms appear in an order similar to the natural order of processing (Evans et al., 
1993). 
Atmosphere and Matching are two other common ideas encountered in 
reviews of syllogistic reasoning. The atmosphere hypothesis suggests that individuals 
prefer conclusions which have a similar mood (in the syllogistic sense; see Table  2.3) 
to the premises. If one or more premises are negative, negative premises will be 
preferred, and if one or more premise is particular, then particular premises will be 
preferred. Although these simple guidelines appear to predict much empirical 
evidence well, as summarised by Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993), the atmosphere 
hypothesis does not really explain why such guidelines are apparently applied. The 
Matching Hypothesis is quite similar in its outline. This theory suggests that people 
choose conclusions in which the quantifiers are the same as in the premises, though 
preferring more conservative quantifiers. Again, however, this provides little in the 
way of explaining why this behaviour should be the case (Evans et al., 1993).   
Another robust finding is the effect of conclusion validity. Syllogisms can be 
constructed so that their conclusions are either logically valid or logically invalid, and 
what is typically found is that people endorse valid conclusions more frequently than 
invalid conclusions (e.g.  Evans, 2003). That is, they agree that the conclusion follows 
more frequently when it is valid than when it is invalid. In addition, problem 
complexity can be manipulated. For example, the information in some syllogism 
premises can only be represented by one (mental) model, whereas others can be 
represented in a number of different ways. The examples given above to illustrate 
mental-models theory highlight this. As might be expected, those which are more 
complex, and can be represented by multiple models, lead to poorer performance on 
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tasks such as conclusion validation or lower endorsement rates (Garnham & Oakhill, 
1994). 
Not only can the problem complexity and validity be manipulated, but the 
believability of the conclusions can also be manipulated by altering the terms. For 
example, the simple syllogism “All A are B. All B are C. Therefore all A are C” can be 
given a believable conclusion if the terms are changed to “All cats are mammals. All 
mammals are warm-blooded. Therefore all cats are warm-blooded”. It could equally 
as easily be given an unbelievable conclusion; “All cats are dogs. All dogs can fly. 
Therefore all cats can fly”. Both are logically valid, and of the same form, but 
conclusion believability now varies. It is typically the case that believable conclusions 
are endorsed more than unbelievable ones. 
Furthermore, validity could also be varied alongside believability by altering 
the form or order of terms in the conclusion. This enables a comparison of how logic 
and belief affect reasoning, and will be detailed later in Chapter  4, and also in 
Chapter  5 where the belief-bias paradigm which exploits these effects is utilised. 
However, by way of explanation and in order to provide a basis for later discussion in 
the current chapter, the belief bias paradigm involves participants being presented 
with syllogisms whose validity is crossed with their believability. The results which 
are commonly found and have been replicated on numerous occasions are that not 
only do validity and believability show the effects outlined above; that valid 
conclusions are endorsed more frequently than invalid ones, and believable 
conclusions are endorsed more frequently than unbelievable ones, but the two 
factors, validity and believability also interact. This interaction is manifest as an 
increase in the difference in endorsements between valid and invalid conclusions 
being larger for unbelievable than believable conclusions. 
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One final reason for utilising syllogistic reasoning in the current thesis is that 
although some work has been conducted on emotions and conditional reasoning 
(Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Richards, 2004), little research has yet investigated 
the potential effects of emotion specifically on syllogistic reasoning, or in relation to 
how emotions may affect reasoning. 
2.3.2 Conditional Reasoning 
The Nature of Conditional Reasoning 
Whereas syllogistic reasoning involves the combination of premises in order to 
construct or evaluate a conclusion, conditional reasoning is typically concerned with 
how people process statements of the form “If… then”. In the literature the terms in 
these conditionals are, like in syllogistic reasoning, often denoted by letters; If p then 
q. They are also broken down into their constituent parts. The If part, represented by 
p, is called the antecedent, and the then, q, part, the consequent. Negation is also an 
important part of the research on conditional reasoning. If a term is negated, as for 
example p in the following “If not-p then q”, this can be denoted as ¬p. Although the 
work presented in this thesis does not include work on negated terms, familiarity 
with the terminology and notation will serve to make the examples in this section 
more accessible.  
Given the conditional statement, If p then q, a number of premise and 
inference pairings can be constructed (Evans & Over, 2004). Those most commonly 
studied in the reasoning literature are: 
 
Modus Ponens (MP; Affirming the Antecedent) 
If p then q. Given p, then q. 
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Modus Tollens (MT; Denying the Consequent) 
If p then q. Given ¬q, then ¬p 
 
Affirming the Consequent (AC) 
If p then q. Given q, then p 
 
Denying the Antecedent (DA) 
If p then q. Given ¬p, then ¬q 
 
Of these four inferences, MP and MT are logically valid. For MP, if the conditional is 
assumed true, and you have p, then you must have q. For MT, if you do not have q, 
you cannot have had p. AC and DA on the other hand, are not logically valid 
inferences. If the conditional is true, knowing that you have q, and inferring that you 
must also have p (AC), is not valid as the rule says nothing about the state of p given 
q, only about the state of q given p. Similarly, under DA, the rule says nothing about 
the state of q (or not-q), if you do not have p.  
This discussion is assuming that If p then q (p→q) is not interpreted as a 
biconditional. In the biconditional interpretation, the direction of implication, for 
want of a better term, in If p then q is read as reversible; not only does p imply q, but 
q also implies p (p↔q). Biconditional interpretations have been proposed as possible 
explanations for some findings in the literature, with critics claiming that the content 
or context in which the statements are presented allow or even encourage 
biconditional readings of the conditionals; this issue will be returned to where 
relevant in the experimental chapters. 
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Key Phenomena in Conditional Reasoning 
One of the most famous conditional reasoning tasks is undoubtedly the abstract 
version of the Wason selection task. In this task, participants are presented with four 
cards and a rule, for example, A, D, 3, 7, and 'If there is an A on one side of the card, 
then there is a 3 on the other'. They are then asked which of the cards needs to be 
turned over to check that the rule is true or false. This format corresponds to the 
logical rule if p then q, with the options being p, ¬p, q, and ¬q, and given that the rule 
can be proved or disproved only by MP or MT (Priest, 2000), the correct choice of 
cards is p and ¬q; only finding an A without a 3 would disprove the rule. 
However, as few as 10% of people select the correct cards on this form of the 
task (Evans & Over, 2004), which has led many researchers to claim that people are 
irrational (See Garnham & Oakhill, 1994 and; Stanovich, 1999 for discussions), and a 
wide range of research trying to explain this very robust finding. However, on 
thematic versions of the task, that is, when the rule and cards contain real world 
content such as drinking age laws, the age of people at a bar and the drinks they have 
(Manktelow, 2000), people show much higher rates of accuracy. The theorists in 
favour of pragmatic or ecological rationality (Gilovich et al., 2002) argue that when 
the content relates to real-life tasks, people can engage rules that are evolutionarily 
adaptive or that they have learnt in everyday life, and these rules, although not 
rational by the standards of formal logic, are reasonable and rational on a day-to-day 
basis. They just so happen to coincide with logic in the thematic versions of the 
selection task. 
Beller and Spada (2003) also report some interesting results using thematic 
versions of the Wason selection task in which the task was framed in terms of 
promises. These can be treated either in terms of assessing whether a promise was 
kept, or whether a promise was broken. The results suggest that taking these 
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different perspectives alters the most common responses to those which test the 
rule in a way most beneficial to the perspective. Bella and Spada conclude that 
content is important in conditional reasoning as it serves as a source of information 
which cues relationships between the content. As with pragmatic-reasoning 
explanations of content effects, these results further show the importance of content 
in conditional reasoning tasks.   
In the literature, besides the abstract selection task, there have also been 
many deontic versions of the task. Deontic versions relate to rules and regulations, 
and deontic conditionals are possibly those most frequently encountered in everyday 
life; If you drink, you shouldn’t drive; If you handle chemicals, you should wear 
gloves; If you park here, you must have a ticket. However, the interpretation of 
connectives such as ‘should’, ‘ought’, and ‘must’ in these types of conditionals is the 
subject of much debate, and the current work will therefore focus on simple 
implicative conditionals; those which take the form of If p then q, where the 
interpretation is (universally) that p leads to q. 
Other content effects involve the presence or absence of disablers and 
alternative causes. Disablers are conditions which would prohibit the p→q 
relationship, and alternatives are other possible causes of q. Using alternatives as an 
example; given If p then q, the number of alternatives that can cause q is likely to 
affect the extent to which people draw AC and DA inferences. With AC inferences, 
given if p then q, and q, it is unlikely that p also occurs as the presence of q may be 
the result of other causes. It may be the case that l, m, n, or o have occurred to 
produce q instead. Similarly, with DA, given if p then q, and ¬p, one of these other 
causes may have generated q, thus concluding ¬q would be misguided. Indeed, 
Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) present data showing these types of effects 
being due to the number of alternative causes. The impact of alternatives is 
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considered in detail in Chapter  8 where their effect on the probabilities of p→q and 
q→p are discussed as possible mediators of the effects of emotive content in 
conditional reasoning.   
Given that the content in thematic versions of the selection task, and the 
manipulation of the believability of content in syllogistic reasoning, can have such 
dramatic effects, this is one way in which the effect of emotion will be investigated in 
the current thesis; through the use of emotive content. The purpose of this section 
was to outline the key paradigms of syllogistic and conditional reasoning, and the 
phenomena most commonly found within the literature on each; specific effects of 
emotive content will be considered in the introduction to experimental chapters 
which manipulate problem content, and the current review now considers how 
reasoning and emotion will be brought together in the following chapters. 
2.4 Combining theories of Reasoning and Emotion 
The vast majority of research into the effects of emotion on cognitive functioning 
have focussed on social judgements, such as how group membership can determine 
inter- and intra-group behaviour (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Brewer, 2005), and how social 
stereotype activation can affect judgements (Forgas, 2001; Kunda, 1994). Relatively 
little work however has been conducted on how emotions affect non-social 
reasoning, although some, considered in Chapter  1, has investigated the impact of 
emotions on related functions such as attention (Eysenck et al., 2007), working 
memory (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; Dutke & Stöber, 2001; Phillips, Channon, 
Tunstall, Hedenstrom, & Lyons, 2008), and spatial processing (Lavric et al., 2003; 
Poliakoff et al., 2007). The current section returns to these areas of cognition which 
have been studied in relation to emotion, and provides a review focussing on work 
which has investigated reasoning specifically. The aim in this section therefore is to 
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consider the effects of both mood and emotive content on reasoning before 
presenting the few theoretical models that exist which propose explanations of how 
emotion may affect reasoning.  
Finally, although there are many models of reasoning, the dual process 
theory of Evans (e.g. 2010) will provide a central theory from which to work as it 
provides a flexible framework which has much empirical support. The concepts of 
Type One (Heuristic) and Type Two (Analytic) processes provide an account of logical 
and non-logical performance, and explanations of response patterns across a range 
of reasoning tasks, and these can be developed in relation to emotion. The 
theoretical consistency which DPT provides at the interface of reasoning and emotion 
makes DPT a valuable tool for the current project, and how it relates to models of 
emotion and reasoning will be discussed next.  
2.4.1 Cognition and Emotion Revisited 
As mentioned above, the majority of work on mood effects in reasoning has been in 
the social domain. This is understandable given the applicability of such work to 
everyday societal issues such as stereotyping and other judgments. For example 
Estrada, Isen, and Young  (1997) show that physicians in a positive mood consider 
and integrate relevant information earlier than those in a neutral mood, but that 
they do not differ in instances of premature closure. As another example, Sechrist, 
Swim, and Melvin (2003) found that women in a negative mood reported more 
instances of discrimination than those in positive moods. However, this effect was 
only found when the women were unaware of the source of their moods. When 
explanations of their mood states were provided by the experimenters, no 
differences in reported discrimination were found between women in positive and 
negative moods; this is the phenomenon referred to as ‘discounting’, introduced 
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earlier (Section  1.5.3) whereby mood only affects judgments when it is not attributed 
to another source. 
By turning the focus to the effects of mood on non-social reasoning tasks, we can 
develop our understanding of how emotions affect reasoning, and potentially gain 
some knowledge of how these effects are generated. One interesting study which 
specifically investigated mood effects on non-social reasoning was conducted by 
Schnall, Jaswal, and Rowe (2008) who show that positive moods, relative to negative, 
reduce children’s attention to detail, as measured by their performance on the 
embedded figures task. They explain this in terms of positive mood cueing top-down 
processing strategies. This determination of strategy by mood is an important one, 
related to attentional bias as discussed earlier, and also relevant to mood states 
determining use of Type One or Type Two processing. 
Although not typically considered under attentional factors, work on eye-
tracking in syllogistic reasoning has provided support for the selective processing 
theory of belief-bias. Ball, Phillips, Wade, and Quayle (2006), using such techniques, 
show that the time-course and fixation of participants’ gaze during a belief-bias task 
supports the theory’s claim that attending to different problem features (e.g. the 
believability of the conclusion) influences which processing strategies are employed. 
This is in line with other theorising on the topic by Evans and Over (2004) which 
suggests that believability does not necessarily alter the reasoning process, but that 
prior knowledge is factored in before reasoning-proper commences, dictating which 
strategies are used. How emotional content might impact this attentional bias has 
not been investigated, but may provide one possible answer to how emotion affects 
reasoning if it is found to have an impact; selective processing theory will be returned 
to later (Chapter  5).  
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Furthermore, in relation to reasoning, in which attention to structure is 
typically required over attention to content, considering that a large number of 
people adopt spatial strategies (Handley, Capon, Copp, & Harper, 2002), anxiety 
would be expected to reduce logical accuracy given that the attention of anxious 
individuals will be drawn to anxiety related stimuli and possibly anxiety related 
thoughts. This would also be predicted if attentional effects of negative mood were 
considered independently of working memory, with anxiety causing a local, content 
focused view of the problem, which would then impair perception of the structure 
(Schnall et al., 2008). Similarly, positive emotional states might be expected to lead to 
increased attention to emotion-congruent stimuli, either internal or external, and 
thus lead to poorer reasoning performance given the limited availability of attention. 
Another viewpoint, discussed in Section  1.5,  which provides a strong model 
of how emotions affect judgements is the affect-as-information model of Schwarz 
and Clore (1983). The majority of research reviewed so far on affect-as-information 
models has come from social psychology, with little investigating the informative 
effect of emotion on reasoning. However, Chang and Wilson (2004) have shown that 
on cheater detection and altruism variants of the Wason selection task, negative 
mood seems to improve performance relative to positive moods. They also found 
mood congruent facilitation across groups, supporting elements of the network 
model conceptualisation of emotion, in that mood cues relevant related concepts 
which then serve to facilitate task performance. These findings provide support for 
the affect-as-information model as an explanation of the emotion-reasoning 
relationship when the activation of these related ideas – be they content 
relationships or previous experiences of processing similar tasks in particular ways - is 
seen as additional information, and is similar to the findings of Beller and Spada 
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(2003)  discussed briefly above. Emotions may therefore determine or adjust which 
types of processing are engaged. 
These effects of mood might be expected to generalise to other tasks if the 
factor determining accuracy is which processing strategy is adopted. That is, if the 
use of heuristic processing leads to lower accuracy on a given task than analytic 
processing, then mood, serving as information, would influence accuracy rates on 
that task. This is the basis of the work presented here, and will be discussed in more 
detail over the following chapters and in relation to the specific tasks employed. The 
studies which show mood altering strategy choice can be collectively considered 
affect-as-information theories (Information Theories), and they suggest that emotion 
affects cognition by serving as a cue to either heuristic or analytic processing, 
irrespective of the cognitive demands of the task. 
Another model which includes the informational value of mood states is the 
Affect Infusion Model (AIM) proposed by Forgas (1995) which attempts to provide a 
model that can account for how a range of factors determine which processing 
strategies are adopted (Figure  2.3). In the AIM, four strategies are outlined, each 
prone to varying degrees of affective influence. The direct access and motivated 
strategies are least prone to the influences of emotion, whereas substantive and 
heuristic strategies are more prone to the influences of emotion as they are 
generative and thus provide more opportunity for additional factors to be integrated 
in problem solutions. Overall, processing which is constructive is influenced more 
than processing which relies on the retrieval and application of existing knowledge. 
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Figure  2.3 The influence of various factors on judgments within the AIM model,  
adapted from Forgas (1995, p. 49) 
 
The model includes the ability to account for differences in processing caused by 
limitations of working memory by considering cognitive capacity, as in the load 
theories, and it also accommodates information and load theories by allowing 
emotional state to determine between what are essentially heuristic and analytic 
processing strategies. Although the AIM says little about how tasks should be 
categorised, what would count as a goal or motivation in determining which type of 
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strategy would be selected, or how emotion and cognitive load might interact in 
determining strategy, it is a useful model for beginning to bring together empirical 
findings and may help in interpreting the results of the current research programme. 
It also provides a link between the classes of theory which can broadly be defined as 
information and load based, lying as it does at the intersection of the two.  
Consideration of emotion as cognitive load was introduced above under 
discussion of Processing Efficiency Theory, and the equation of emotion with load 
was supported by the work of Richards, French, Keogh and Carter (2000) which 
shows that anxiety reduces speed and accuracy on reasoning tasks. As suggested 
above, if anxiety can be considered similar to other negative emotions, the results of 
Richards and colleagues might be expected to generalise across different mood 
states. 
Furthermore, the findings of Eysenck and colleagues (2005) show that it is 
the central executive that is impaired rather than the visual or phonological 
components of working memory. This is in contrast to the selective impairment of 
the visuospatial components shown by Lavric et al (2003; Shackman et al., 2006). It 
would therefore seem that anxiety can impair all components of working memory, 
and thus would be expected to impair reasoning in those using both verbal and visual 
strategies. This discrepancy also suggests that when investigating the effects of 
emotion on reasoning, there may be an interaction between emotion and reasoning 
style, and as such, a measure of both may be informative in terms of more clearly 
specifying the underlying mechanisms (Chapters  4 and  6 for example consider 
attention to emotions and approach-avoidance behaviour). Furthermore, given the 
distinction between efficiency and effectiveness highlighted in the previous chapter, 
a measure of effort or time seems likely to be a useful extension of previous work on 
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reasoning and emotion (Chapter  3, for example will consider response latencies in 
reasoning). 
The majority of the work which has combined emotion and reasoning to date 
is concerned with reasoning about emotive content; that is, when the problems 
people are presented with include emotive terms. Although the current thesis is 
interested in both the effects of an individual’s mood state, and the effect of content, 
the following sections will provide a more detailed review of historical and 
contemporary research on content effects in reasoning. The review will focus 
primarily, though not exclusively, on syllogistic reasoning, as this is the paradigm 
adopted in the first experimental chapters. These review sections are presented 
separately from the preceding discussion of reasoning paradigms as the findings can 
be used to inform and develop predictions about how emotion, be it in the form of 
content or individual mood, may affect reasoning across the paradigms. These 
implications will be discussed after reviewing the findings. 
Historical and Research on Content Effects 
Conducting research around the middle of the Second World War, in the spring of 
1941, Janis and Frick (1943) investigated syllogistic reasoning, but varied the terms 
such that they represented social and cultural groups, for example, “No Bolsheviks 
are idealists and all Bolsheviks are Russians. Therefore, some Russians are Idealists” 
(p. 74). Their aim was to investigate whether an individual’s ‘attitude’ towards the 
conclusion affected logical accuracy. They found that people made more errors in 
judging the logical validity of a syllogism when they agreed with the conclusion (when 
people felt the conclusions were believable), than when they disagreed with the 
conclusions. These results are directly relevant to research on the belief-bias effect in 
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syllogistic reasoning, touched on above, and so will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter  5 which adopts this paradigm.  
Morgan and Morton (1944), conducting their research around the same time 
as Janis and Frick (1943), in the winter of 1942, also investigated the effects of 
content and attitudes (‘convictions’) on syllogistic reasoning. They replicate the 
conclusions of the earlier work, stating that individuals are much more likely to 
endorse conclusions that are consistent with their existing beliefs regardless of the 
logical accuracy of those conclusions.  
In the summer of 1944, and now specifically investigating the effects of 
emotional content on syllogistic reasoning, Lefford (1946) reports the results of an 
early study based around content designed to elicit an emotional response. Adopting 
a paradigm in which logical structure and validity were controlled, and only the 
emotionality of the content was varied between neutral and emotional, Lefford 
(1946) reports results which show that whilst logical accuracy on non-emotional 
stimuli was normally distributed, logical accuracy on emotional stimuli was skewed 
such that emotional content was found to drastically reduce logical accuracy. Lefford 
(1946) explains this decrease in logical accuracy by suggesting that although the 
normal distribution results from a combination of factors, the skewed distribution is 
the result of a particularly potent factor which is used in orienting an individual’s 
strategy on the task, in this case, the emotional content. He goes on to elaborate an 
approach-withdrawal element, in which the extent to which an individual agrees or 
disagrees with a conclusion is inversely proportional to the endorsement rate, but 
only when reasoning about emotional content.  
Later work, following the aftermath of the Second World War, and taking 
place during the Cold War, continued to investigate the effects of attitudes on 
syllogistic reasoning, possibly driven by the political climate of the era. Studies 
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reported by Gorden (1953) and Henle and Michael (1956) have a distinctly anti-
Russian feel. Both studies show that the content which is, by virtue of being related 
to contentious issues of the time, ‘emotional’, resulted in lower rates of logical 
accuracy. 
Across these studies, the ‘emotional’ content is largely negative, or related to 
negative cultural events. However, it is important to consider the possibility that 
positive emotions leads to different patterns, and questions related to this point 
form the basis of this thesis. 
Contemporary Research on Content Effects 
Although there is a relatively extensive literature on the effects of thematic versus 
abstract content in reasoning tasks, such as in investigating pragmatic interpretations 
of the Wason selection task, or in investigating belief-bias, very little recent work has 
investigated the effects of emotional content on syllogistic reasoning.  
In one of the only papers discussing the effects of emotional content on 
syllogistic reasoning, Blanchette and Campbell (2005) present data from a sample of 
British war veterans who were asked to judge the logical validity of conclusions to a 
series of syllogisms with either neutral or emotive content. The results revealed an 
interesting effect of problem content. They found that items with emotional content 
were responded to more accurately than those with neutral content. Having opened 
their paper by making the claim that detrimental effects of emotions on reasoning 
have been shown across a range of studies, it is interesting that they then report data 
which appears to show beneficial effects of emotive content. 
Unfortunately, Blanchette and Campbell (2005) do not elaborate on why 
they may have found these apparently anomalous results. They do however include a 
note that the more intense the combat experience of the veteran, the less 
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advantageous emotive content was, although exactly how this may fit with theories 
of emotion and reasoning is unclear. The beneficial effects of the emotional content 
could be accounted for under an affect-as-information model (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 
1983), which broadly summarised (though discussed in detail above), states that 
positive mood cues rapid, shallow responding because the positivity of the affect is 
taken to indicate that the default ‘heuristic’ responding is ‘ok’, whereas negative 
emotions cue more careful, analytic, logical processing because the negativity is 
interpreted as an indicator that ‘something more is needed’. In this case, the 
‘emotional’ content was largely negative, and as such, might be expected to cue 
more careful processing of the reasoning problems. 
Following this work Blanchette et al (2007) report a study in which the 
content of syllogisms was varied between neutral, negative, and terrorist-related. 
They found that individuals recently affected by a terrorist attack showed increased 
logical performance on the terror-related syllogisms, and were less likely to respond 
based on prior belief, that is, using a heuristic processing style. 
Blanchette et al (2007) conclude by suggesting that emotionally relevant 
material improves logicality, a suggestion which is consistent with earlier related 
work on conditionals (Oaksford et al., 1996). It is also possible to consider these 
results in light of the affect-as-information model. Under this account, the terror 
related content may serve as a cue to more careful processing.  However, the 
mechanism which may underlie this improved logicality is not elaborated by the 
authors, and there are potential confounds between the logical validity of the 
responses and the syllogism structures used. 
These explanations which focus on the informational value of emotions are 
supported by more recent work presented by Goel and Vartanian (2011). In their 
study, they present data which suggests negative emotions can moderate the belief-
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bias effect found in syllogistic reasoning, which essentially summarises as negative 
content reduces reliance on heuristics. Their work develops the belief-bias paradigm 
to include emotional content, an approach which is taken in Chapter  5, and controls 
for confounds introduced by Blanchette et al (2007, discussed later). By presenting 
individuals with syllogisms whose conclusions varied in validity, believability, and 
between neutral and negative content, Goel and Vartanian (2011) show that 
although the typical belief-bias effect is found with neutral content, in terms of what 
is relevant to the current paradigm, that is a higher reliance on prior beliefs, they 
found that this was reduced when the content of the problems was negative. They 
explain these findings with reference to the Affect Infusion Model (detailed in 
section  2.4.1), suggesting that the negative content leads to ‘more vigilant, 
systematic scrutiny of beliefs’ (p. 121). However, the picture becomes somewhat 
more complicated when the results of these three studies are more carefully 
compared. Blanchette and Campbell (2005) divided their emotional content into 
specific and general categories, and only found higher rates of logical responding on 
the specific-emotional problems. The general and neutral conditions did not differ in 
their level of logical accuracy. 
Blanchette et al (2007) also included a positive content condition, and found 
that in general, positive and negative content led to worse logical performance than 
neutral content. The improvement in accuracy was specific to individuals who had 
experienced the impact of a terrorist attack when they reasoned about terrorist 
related content. 
Only the work of Goel and Vartanian (2011) presented a reasonably clear 
result. However, it is unfortunate that neither they, nor Blanchette and Campbell 
(2005) include positively valenced content. By focusing only on negative stimuli, the 
finding that this leads to improved logical performance relative to neutral stimuli, 
dzahra 108 330974 
 
although interesting, is less informative in relation to distinguishing between 
different models of how emotion and reasoning interact. This relates back to the 
proposition that positive and negative emotions may have different effects, and thus 
both cases need to be included in any studies on mood effects.  
In this limited selection of studies, negative content has been shown to both 
increase and decrease relative rates of logical responding on syllogistic reasoning, a 
conclusion which was also reached by Blanchette and Richards (2010) in a recent 
review of the wider literature. This provides little consistent support for the effects of 
emotional content on reasoning tasks. Although some evidence appears to be in 
favour of emotional states driving one or another type of reasoning strategy, its 
benefit or otherwise depending on the task at hand, other evidence seems to suggest 
that any emotional state or emotional content reduces reasoning performance. 
Although these two ideas can potentially be combined, as outlined by Schwarz and 
Clore (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003; Storbeck & Clore, 
2005, 2008), or the more recent affect infusion model of Forgas (1995), alluded to by 
Goel and Vartanian (2011), very few theorists or researchers have thus far directly 
tested predictions with respect to different classes of emotion-reasoning theories. 
Another issue related to the lack of direct predictions about content, is that 
although emotive content may be expected to moderate responses by inducing 
mood states, this has not been empirically tested, and at present, the leap from 
content to emotion to mood-based theories is not supported by empirical evidence. 
This is understandable, given the nebulous nature of subjective emotional experience 
and the debate over what constitutes an ‘emotion’, yet this is one of the additional 
aims of this thesis: to investigate mood effects as well as content effects; that is, the 
effects of a person being in a positive or negative mood state whilst reasoning about 
neutral content, and the effects of a person in a neutral mood state reasoning about 
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positive and negative content. Having now defined emotion, reasoning, models of 
emotion, models of reasoning, methods of investigating the two, and having 
provided a brief summary of how emotional content and emotional states may affect 
some of the reasoning tasks outlined above, the following sections outline a selection 
of models which combine both emotion and reasoning. The aim is to take into 
account the findings reviewed above and consider further how they may apply to 
reasoning when emotion is varied by altering the problem content, and the 
individuals’ concurrent mood.  
2.4.2 Load and Information Theories 
Although the preceding sections have aimed to discuss work which supports one or 
another specific theory of the relationships between emotions and reasoning 
processes, two themes have repeatedly appeared. These are the ideas of emotion 
serving as a source of information in reasoning, judgements, and decision making, 
and emotion acting as a source of cognitive load and thus altering the processing 
strategies that can be engaged in such tasks. 
Some of these theories have made these mechanisms explicit. In others, they 
have become apparent when discussion moves beyond the data and tries to answer 
the question of why particular effects are seen. Both cases have been discussed in 
light of empirical evidence and keeping in mind issues in emotion research discussed 
in the previous chapter. For the purposes of developing testable hypotheses and 
developing our understanding of whether and how emotions impact on reasoning, 
the two classes of theory will, in this thesis, be referred to broadly as Information 
Theories and Load Theories. This distinction, although it simplifies the specifics of 
each individual model discussed, utilises the similarities within those categorised as 
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Load Theories, and those categorised as Information Theories. This in turn will aid 
discussion of the hypotheses outlined and the results presented.  
Theories which treat affect as information largely argue that the effects they 
explain are due to emotion serving as a metacognitive cue. Load theories are more 
varied in their explanations, ranging from appraisals which require cognitive 
engagement, to redirected attention, to cueing related but irrelevant associations, 
but the wide range of mechanisms have been discussed in the above review. 
2.5 Summary: Emotion and Reasoning 
To summarise, emotion is usually seen as the opposite of reasoning, but there are 
times that emotions can be of benefit. Emotions are typically considered irrational, 
but formal logic isn't always a rational approach, so, although this research adopts 
formal normative responding as a measure of accuracy, it does so only in order to 
evaluate relative performance on the given tasks, and does not intend to make 
judgements about what the 'best' approach to everyday problems may be. 
As with emotion, many different definitions and models of reasoning have 
been proposed, which vary in how they explain common phenomena found in 
reasoning tasks. Different brain structures have been investigated with respect to 
both emotion and reasoning, and a number of different psychological constructs 
have evolved to aid definition and support theories, such as working memory and the 
different types of processing. This research will aim to focus on the cognitive 
component of emotion as it relates to reasoning, as this commonality allows theories 
from both the emotion and reasoning domain to be combined and tested. 
Furthermore, this work will adopt cognitive means of manipulating emotions, and so 
limit its claims to the cognitive realm and those aspects of emotion which overlap 
with it.   
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With respect to models of cognition and reasoning, the dual process 
framework provides specifications of reasoning systems which correspond to those 
that have been researched in relation to emotion, and the different types of 
strategies that have been variously named in the literature can be equated with the 
analytic and heuristic processes. In relation to this, mental models theory provides an 
explanation of how the cognitive systems are engaged and has been applied to a 
range of reasoning tasks, specifically those of syllogistic and conditional reasoning 
used in current work. This affords a detailed model of what patterns of responding 
are typically expected under certain conditions, and why, which allows for any 
deviation from these caused by emotion to be detectable, and provides the basis for 
beginning to understand why any variations that are found have occurred. 
The models of how emotion and cognition interact which have been 
proposed largely fall under two types; Load Theories and Information Theories. Both 
of these, in relation mainly to social judgements, are supported by empirical 
evidence, but little research has investigated their relative explanatory power in 
relation to non-social reasoning such as syllogisms. This is where the current work 
adds a novel contribution. 
It would be expected that if emotions required cognitive resources for 
generation and maintenance, and led to depletion of other cognitive resources 
through reallocation of attention, as suggested by the load theories, then both 
positive and negative mood would deplete cognitive resources. Given that analytic 
processing required to respond logically to reasoning tasks is cognitively demanding, 
then both positive and negative emotions would likely lead to reduced logical 
accuracy. 
Information theories on the other hand suggest that emotions alter 
processing by acting as cues to either analytic or heuristic responding, rather than by 
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limiting the available resources. This leads to the expectation that negative moods, 
which cue bottom-up processing, will encourage processes such as searching for 
additional mental models in order to generate logical solutions to problems. Positive 
mood however, would be expected to cue heuristic responding, such as less fully 
developed model searches or reliance on properties such as believability, leading to 
lower rates of logical responding when these are in conflict with the logically correct 
answer. The aims of this thesis are therefore to compare the explanatory power of 
load and information theories in relation to non-social reasoning, and develop a 
better understanding of whether and how emotions affect reasoning. 
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Chapter Three 
3. Necessity, Possibility, and Mood 
Effects 
3.1 Introduction (Experiment 1) 
One interesting distinction that is drawn within the thinking and reasoning literature 
is that between conclusions which are necessary, and those which are possible. 
Necessary conclusions are conclusions which must follow if the premises are true. 
Possible conclusions are those which may follow, but which do not always follow 
from a set of premises. This distinction has been drawn in syllogistic reasoning by 
many, but of particular relevance to the current work because of its implications, is 
the work of Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999) and Evans, Handley, 
and Harper (2001). 
In their work with syllogistic reasoning, they first distinguish between 
syllogisms which are necessary and those which are impossible. Necessary syllogisms 
are those in which the conclusions follow (are ‘true’) in every possible representation 
of the premises that can be constructed. Impossible syllogisms are the opposite; 
syllogisms whose conclusions do not follow (are ‘not true’) in any of the possible 
models. Evans et al. (2001; 1999) then go on to draw a distinction between two kinds 
of possible syllogism, which they term possible-strong (PS) and possible-weak (PW). 
This is a distinction which can be used to investigate the effects of emotion on 
reasoning and how any such effects might occur, but first requires a clear 
understanding of the difference between PS and PW syllogisms. 
Possible-strong syllogisms are those for which people generate an initial, first 
model of the premises in which the conclusion follows. However, given the time, 
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effort, or inclination to generate them, alternative models of the premises can be 
constructed in which the conclusion does not follow. Possible-weak syllogisms on the 
other hand are those for which the conclusion does not follow in the first model 
generated, but for which alternative models can be generated in which the 
conclusion does hold. Given these properties of possible-strong and possible-weak 
syllogisms, it can be seen that if an individual were presented with a multi-model 
possible-strong syllogism and asked to evaluate the necessity of its conclusion, they 
would respond differently if they had constructed only one model as opposed to 
testing a range of alternatives.  
Testing different representations of sets of premises is cognitively 
demanding. The differential cognitive load coupled with the different outcomes 
generated by single or multiple model testing allows the responses to be used as a 
proxy for level of reasoning engaged in. Testing only the first model and accepting its 
result can be considered a cognitively undemanding, relatively automatic (Type One) 
process. Testing multiple models is cognitively demanding, and requires the initial 
linguistically cued model to be questioned, and processed in a more effortful, 
analytic, and systematic way (Type Two processes). In summary, when reasoning 
about possible-strong and possible-weak syllogisms, and asked to evaluate their 
necessity and possibility, endorsements might be considered by dual process 
theorists as measures of the engagement of ‘Type One’ and ‘Type Two’ processes, or 
at least as indicative of different amounts of cognitive effort expended on the task. 
This is valuable given the distinction drawn between load and information theories of 
how emotion may impact reasoning, and the information different patterns of 
response types (type one and type two processing, or high and low effort) will 
provide for distinguishing between the two theories.  
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This chapter first discusses the PS-PW further in relation to how the 
properties of possible-strong syllogisms can be combined with theories of emotion to 
investigate whether and how emotion and reasoning interact. The exploitation of 
these properties within the current studies and syllogistic reasoning tasks with 
different instructional sets is then considered in order to provide a rationale for the 
following experiments.  
3.1.1 The Necessity-Possibility Paradigm and Comparing 
the Effects of Emotions on Reasoning 
Chapter  2 introduced the idea that, when reasoning, individuals may respond based 
on relatively low-effort strategies, be they simple rules or heuristics. Alternatively, 
people may engage in elaborated, higher-effort strategies, either in the form of 
searching for alternative models or applying more complex logical rules. In order to 
compare the effects of positive and negative moods on the relative use of these two 
types of strategy it is necessary to use a paradigm which can differentiate between 
them. 
Many tasks, such as those used in the belief-bias paradigm (Evans et al., 
1983), those used to investigate effects such as base-rate neglect (Manktelow, 2000), 
and the many others used to investigate dual-process theories assume dichotomous 
response options, and operate on the assumption that each type of processing will 
result in a different kind of response. For example, in the belief-bias paradigm, 
participants are presented with a series of valid and invalid syllogisms whose content 
is varied to create conclusions which are valid-believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-
believable, and invalid-unbelievable. 
The endorsement rate, that is, the number of conclusions participants 
respond to as being valid irrespective of logical accuracy, of each class of syllogism is 
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then compared and the results typically show that believable conclusions are 
endorsed more than unbelievable conclusions. This effect also interacts with the 
logical validity of the conclusions. Valid and believable conclusions are endorsed 
more frequently than valid-unbelievable ones, followed by invalid-believable 
conclusions, and finally, endorsed least frequently, are invalid-unbelievable 
conclusions. An interaction is also commonly found between validity and 
believability, such that the effect of validity is larger for unbelievable than believable 
conclusions. Although this paradigm will be discussed in detail when it is revisited in 
Chapter  5, it provides here a clear example of the distinction between the two 
response types. At the simplest level, participants can be thought of as either 
responding based on the believability of the conclusion, or based on the logical form 
of the syllogism. The former is a heuristic response, based on the believability 
heuristic (Type One), the latter an analytic one (Type Two), based on an effortful 
attempt at applying logical rules. 
The paradigm used in this and the following chapter is that of necessity-
possibility and is derived from the work of Evans and colleagues (1999). They 
presented students with all 512 syllogisms, and asked them to either evaluate the 
necessity or possibility of the conclusions; that is, whether the conclusion must 
follow, and follows in all possible combinations of the premises, or might follow, 
holding in at least one of the possible models, but not necessarily all of them. Under 
necessity instructions, individuals were asked whether the conclusion to each 
syllogism was necessary or not necessary. Under possibility instructions, the 
individuals were asked whether the conclusion was possible or not possible. The 
syllogisms were divided into those whose conclusions must follow logically from the 
premises (Necessary), those whose conclusions never followed logically from the 
premises (Impossible), and those whose conclusions could follow, but were not 
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necessitated by the premises (Possible). They found that overall, people endorsed 
more conclusions when asked if those conclusions were possible than when they 
were asked if they were necessary. They also found a significant difference in the rate 
of endorsement between necessary, possible, and impossible conclusions, with 
endorsement rates dropping in that order. 
Interestingly, they found a bimodal distribution of endorsement within the 
possible conclusions under necessity instructions, with some being endorsed almost 
always, and others rarely ever. In order to investigate this effect further Evans and 
colleagues (1999) conducted two further studies which seem to suggest that some 
‘possible’ conclusions lead people to construct a first mental model which leads to a 
‘valid’ response, which in turn leads to a 'necessary' response, whereas other 
‘possible’ conclusions lead individuals to construct first a model which is inconsistent 
with the conclusion, and the 'Not Necessary' response. The first set, Evans and 
colleagues (1999) classify as possible-strong, the second set, they classify as possible-
weak; the properties of which were outlined in the introduction to this chapter. 
The use of possible-strong and possible-weak syllogisms can be extended to 
investigate the effect of emotion on processes underlying an individual’s responding, 
and provide an opportunity to investigate the relative merits of load and information 
theories by including emotion in the design. If participants are asked to evaluate the 
necessity or possibility of a conclusion, and mood serves as a source of information, 
altering the extent to which individuals search for alternative models, we would 
expect different patterns of responding for each of the four syllogism types; 
Necessary (N), Possible-Strong (PS), Possible-Weak (PW), and Impossible (I). 
Firstly, when reasoning about a necessary syllogism, the first model will 
typically lead to the conclusion being seen as necessary. If the individual is in a 
positive mood, and mood serves as information, they may be cued to accept this first 
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response, and indicate the conclusion is necessary. If however, they are in a negative 
mood, they may be cued to search for alternative models. In the necessary syllogism 
case, all subsequent models lead to the same finding; that the conclusion follows, 
and so the response remains ‘necessary’. There is therefore no difference between 
positive and negative moods because whether only the first model or all possible 
alternatives are constructed and evaluated, the conclusion holds. Figure  3.1 
illustrates this process and the two outcomes.  
 
 
Figure  3.1 Reasoning about a necessary syllogism under necessity  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
 
As an example, consider the syllogism “(1) All cats are mammals, (2) All mammals 
have fur, (3) Therefore all cats have fur”. Imagine each set (Cats, Mammals, and 
things with Fur) represented as a circle of variable size like the example used earlier 
in Chapter  2. These circles can be overlapped in a number of ways to represent the 
premises and conclusion. You might initially think of three circles of the same size 
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layered one on top of the other such that all cats, mammals and things with fur 
occupy the same space. In this model, the conclusion holds as all cats are within the 
same space as is covered by the ‘things with fur’ set (Model 3A in Figure  3.2). 
Alternatively, you might imagine a small circle for cats inside a larger circle for 
mammals, inside a still larger circle for things with fur (3B). In this case, there are 
some things with fur that are not mammals, and some mammals that are not cats, 
yet the conclusions still holds as all cats are within the same area as the ‘things with 
fur’ set. If all possible models of a conclusion hold, then regardless of whether all or 
just one model is evaluated, and regardless of in which order this is done, the same 
judgement is reached. 
 
 
Figure  3.2 Models of Necessity 
 
A similar process occurs when presented with an impossible conclusion. Both positive 
and negative mood would be expected to lead to the same response, although this 
time, a ‘not necessary’ response (Figure  3.3). 
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 Figure  3.3 Reasoning about an impossible syllogism under necessity  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
 
Possible-weak and possible-strong syllogisms lead to slightly different processes 
(shown in Figure  3.4 and Figure  3.5). In possible-weak syllogisms, the subsequent 
models lead to different deductions, but the final response remains the same under 
necessity instructions. If the conclusion is not true in the first model, the response 
made is that the conclusion is not necessary, as it does not follow in all models. If the 
conclusion is true in subsequent models, it has still been not true in one (the first) 
model, and so is still not deemed to be necessary. However, under necessity 
instructions, the interesting case is the possible-strong syllogisms. As can be seen 
from Figure  3.5, positive and negative moods lead to different responses if negative 
mood, relative to positive mood, results in more deliberative processing as suggested 
by information theories. 
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Figure  3.4 Reasoning about a possible-weak syllogism under necessity  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
 
 
Figure  3.5 Reasoning about a possible-strong syllogism under necessity  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
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With possible-strong syllogisms, the initial model leads to a ‘necessary’ response. 
However, testing alternative models leads to a ‘not necessary’ response. Taking a 
possible strong example from the materials which will be introduced later, “(1) All 
Journalists are Bus-Drivers; (2) Some Bus-Drivers are not Professors; (3) Therefore 
some Journalists are not Professors”, the first model constructed is typically one in 
which the conclusion holds, such as model 3C in Figure  3.6.  
 
 
Figure  3.6 Possible-Strong Conclusions 
 
Positive mood, cueing acceptance and low-effort strategies, would lead to this model 
being the only one evaluated, and thus, when asked if the conclusion was necessary, 
participants in a positive mood would be expected to respond, incorrectly, that it was 
necessary; based on this one model holding. Those in a negative mood however, 
being cued by the emotion to engage in more careful, effortful processing, might 
then construct one of the alternative models in which the conclusion does not hold, 
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for example, model 3D. Based on consideration of these two models, participants 
should respond that the conclusion was ‘not-necessary’. Other models may exist in 
which the conclusion holds, such as models 3E and 3F. Whether these are 
constructed, and in what order, current theorising on the necessity-possibility 
paradigm does not comment on. It may be that even in a negative mood an 
individual who is trying to search for alternatives only finds 3C, 3E and 3F. As such, 
the paradigm does not provide a perfect measure of engagement in elaborated 
higher-effort processing, and these additional models may add noise to the data. 
However, for the purposes of understanding how emotions interact with reasoning, 
and combined with measures of response time and confidence which to some extent 
provide proxy measures of effort, the paradigm provides a useful tool. 
As positive and negative mood, if acting as a source of information, cue these 
one versus multiple model approaches, rates of necessary and not-necessary 
responses provide a means of testing information theories as an explanation of how 
emotion affects syllogistic reasoning. The diagrams above show what would be 
expected if mood served as information; where the decision to accept the first model 
or search for alternatives is required, mood is included as the determining factor. If 
the individual is in a positive mood, this may cue acceptance of the first model. If the 
individual is in a negative mood, this may cue a search for alternatives.  
However, mood might also act as cognitive load. In this case, both positive 
and negative mood would lead to acceptance of the first model, as checking one 
model is cognitively less demanding than checking multiple models, and due to the 
emotion, the individual only has limited resources available. Only individuals in 
neutral moods would have the resources necessary to search for alternative models. 
To summarise, when reasoning about possible-strong syllogisms under necessity 
instructions, if mood served as information, positive and negative moods would lead 
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to different rates of necessary responses; if mood served as load however, both 
positive and negative moods would lead to higher rates of ‘necessary’ responses than 
neutral moods as not enough cognitive resources are available to efficiently and 
effectively search for alternative models. 
Similar patterns, based on the mental models explanation of the differences 
in endorsement rates between conclusion types (Evans et al., 2001; Evans et al., 
1999), would be expected to appear under the possible-weak conclusion type when 
the instructions are changed to require judgements of possibility rather than 
necessity. This allows a second way to investigate mood effects on deliberative 
versus shallower, lower effort strategies. The cases for processing possible-strong 
and possible-weak syllogisms under possibility instructions are shown in Figure  3.7 
and Figure  3.8. 
 
 
Figure  3.7 Reasoning about a possible-strong syllogism under possibility  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
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Figure  3.8 Reasoning about a possible-weak syllogism under possibility  
instructions if emotion serves as information 
  
The same distinction between mood-as-load and mood-as-information can be 
included in these models as well. To summarise what would be expected: under 
necessity instructions, if mood served as information, positive mood should lead to 
higher rates of ‘necessary’ responses than negative moods on possible-strong 
syllogisms. If mood serves as load, then both positive and negative emotion should 
lead to higher rates of ‘necessary’ responses on possible-strong syllogisms, relative to 
a neutral condition. Under possibility instructions, if mood served as load, positive 
moods should lead to higher rates of ‘not possible’ responses than negative mood on 
possible-weak syllogisms. If mood served as load, positive and negative mood should 
lead to higher rates of not-possible responses than neutral moods on possible-weak 
syllogisms. As such, the studies reported in this chapter aim to investigate mood 
effects on syllogistic reasoning under both necessity and possibility instructions. The 
hypotheses outlined above are elaborated on in the following section. 
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3.1.2 Expected Endorsement Rates under Necessity and 
Possibility Instructions  
Based on previous findings relating to the effects of necessity and possibility 
instructions (Evans, 2002a; Evans et al., 2001; Evans et al., 1999), high rates of 
endorsement are expected for necessary syllogism conclusions under both necessity 
and possibility instructions across all mood conditions. In such cases, as outlined 
above, no matter how many or few models are constructed, the conclusions will 
always be judged as necessary (under necessity instructions) or possible (under 
possibility instructions). The inverse applies for impossible syllogism types. 
Regardless of how many models are tested under either instructional set, all of the 
models will lead to not-necessary or not-possible responses. 
Under necessity instructions, different patterns of responding between mood 
conditions on possible-strong problems will provide an indication of whether or not 
mood serves as information or cognitive load. Similarly, under possibility instructions, 
it is response patterns on possible-weak problems which will provide this 
discrimination. If mood serves as information, negative mood would be expected to 
cue more deliberative processing, leading to lower rates of ‘necessary’ responses on 
possible-strong problems than positive mood, under necessity instructions. On 
possible-weak problems, negative mood would be expected to lead to higher rates of 
possible responses, than positive mood, under possibility instructions. 
If however mood states, both positive and negative, serve as cognitive load, 
reducing the resources available to a search for alternatives, both positive and 
negative mood would be expected to result in higher rates of necessary responses to 
possible-strong conclusions (under necessity instructions) and lower rates of possible 
responses to possible-weak conclusions (under possibility instructions). The patterns 
expected under each eventuality are shown in Table  3.1. Where no direct predictions 
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are made, dashes have been entered. The comparisons of interest have been shaded. 
They form four ‘boxes’ of values, within which the patterns will be examined to 
assess any differences in endorsement rates between mood conditions, and within 
which interactive effects of mood and syllogism type will provide information 
regarding the relative merits of load and information theories. These comparisons 
will inform the structure of the analyses conducted, which will be outlined in more 
detail in the methods section.  
 
Table  3.1 Expected Endorsement Rates Under Different Theories 
   Endorsement by Syllogism Type 
Theory Instruction Mood N PS PW I 
Information Necessity Positive High High - Low 
  Control High Mid - Low 
  Negative High Low - Low 
 Possibility Positive High - Low Low 
  Control High - Mid Low 
  Negative High - High Low 
Load Necessity Positive High High - Low 
  Control High Med - Low 
  Negative High High - Low 
 Possibility Positive High - Low Low 
  Control High - Med Low 
  Negative High - Low Low 
 
 
In terms of testable hypotheses, shaded cells in (A) predict that under necessity 
instructions, PS syllogisms will be endorsed less by those in a negative mood than by 
those in a positive mood. The shaded cells of (B) represent PW syllogisms being 
endorsed more by those in negative moods than those in positive moods under 
possibility instructions. 
The cells in (C) reflect higher rates of necessary responses to PS syllogisms by 
those in both positive and negative moods, relative to those in control moods under 
necessity instructions. Finally, the cells in (D) represent lower rates of possible 
A 
B 
D 
C 
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responses for PW syllogisms for participants in positive and negative moods, relative 
to control, under possibility instructions. 
In terms of assessing whether Load or Information theories provide a better 
explanation of the relationship between emotion and reasoning, if the data shows 
patterns similar to (A) and (B), this supports Information theories, whereas if the data 
show patterns resembling the patterns in (C) and (D), then Load theories would be 
more supported  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
The participants in this study were 168 (27 Male, 141 Female) psychology students 
from Plymouth University. Participants were aged from 18 to 49 years (M = 20 years, 
SD = 5 years).  
3.2.2 Materials 
Each section of the experiment described below was programmed into a locally 
downloadable executable file using Microsoft Visual Basic. The program was installed 
onto the PCs in the laboratory, and the experimental conditions were set by the 
experimenter prior to the arrival of the participants. Each section required 
participants to respond using either a keyboard or mouse to make selections from 
drop-down menus or radio button arrays. The different sections were progressed 
through using the mouse to click 'continue' buttons after completion of each task. 
Copies of all materials referred to in this chapter can be found in Appendix  A. 
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Mood Manipulation 
The mood manipulation task used in this study was a shortened version of that used 
by Brand and colleagues (2007), and required participants to type for ten minutes 
about either a particularly happy or sad life event (Tamir & Robinson, 2007). In 
addition to positive and negative mood conditions, a control condition was included 
in order to provide a baseline against which to compare any change in mood, 
reasoning, response times and confidence ratings. 
The inclusion of a control condition also allows for an analysis of any changes 
caused by positive and negative mood to be conducted not only relative to the other 
mood condition, but relative to a baseline, allowing for assessments of differences 
between moods and differences 'from normal', which enables this experiment to 
assess whether positive and negative mood alter performance in the same way, in 
different ways, or not at all. This is an element typically overlooked in the emotion 
literature, as discussed previously. 
The instructions given to participants in each of the mood conditions were 
kept as similar in structure as possible, with only the key happy-sad words and 
examples being changed. Each set of instructions had the same opening paragraphs 
explaining that as part of a future study, short descriptions of life events would be 
used, and that the purpose of this section was to provide materials for the future 
study. This cover story was included following research which has suggested that the 
manipulation is more effective when participants are less aware of the true purpose 
of the task (Brand et al., 2007). The true reason for the writing task was explained to 
participants during debriefing.  
The same paragraph asking participants to write for ten minutes was also 
used, and the closing paragraph asking participants to contact the experimenter with 
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any questions before beginning was also kept identical across conditions. The key 
differences in the mood related sections of the instructions are shown below. 
 
Positive Instructions 
Please try to recall a particularly happy event in your life. It may be, for example, 
receiving good results on a difficult test, an unusually fun and memorable night out 
with friends, or a joyful family occasion such as a birthday or wedding that made you 
happy. When you have decided on a memory, please write in the box below 
everything you can remember about the event, describing the event briefly, and 
then focusing on your thoughts, feelings, and reactions 
 
Control Instructions 
Please try to recall an occasion on which you used one of the library services; for 
example, book loaning, computing and printing facilities, or room booking. When 
you have decided on a memory, please write in the box below everything you can 
remember about the event, describing the event briefly, and then focusing on what 
you noticed about your surroundings 
 
Negative Instructions 
Please try to recall a particularly sad event in your life. It may be, for example, failing 
an important test, the death of a loved relative or pet, or the break-up of a 
relationship that made you sad. When you have decided on a memory, please write 
in the box below everything you can remember about the event, describing the 
event briefly, and then focusing on your thoughts, feelings, and reactions 
 
The mood of participants was measured before and after the manipulation. This 
provided a pre-manipulation measure for use as a base-line to control for starting 
mood, and provides information regarding mood change. The post-manipulation 
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measure of mood allows for a manipulation check, and both pre-manipulation, post-
manipulation, and change in mood ratings may be used in correlational analyses 
comparing mood and endorsement rates. 
In order to measure mood, participants were asked to complete the PANAS, 
which was presented with instructions designed to measure state rather than trait 
affect. That is, participants were asked to what extent they were experiencing each 
emotion presently, as opposed to recently or over the previous days or weeks. As 
discussed above in Section  1.4, this scale provides a measure of both positive (PA) 
and negative affect (NA), which has theoretical advantages over analogue measures 
of mood state. Firstly, it does not assume that the positive and negative factors are 
opposites, and allows an investigation of the structure of the moods generated by 
the manipulation. Secondly, it allows for the separation of the effects of positive and 
negative affective factors on syllogistic reasoning. In order to prevent participants 
leaving the study in a negative mood, the study included as its final section a series of 
jokes which participants were asked to rate before they left the laboratory. Ratings 
for each joke were made along a seven-point Likert-scale anchored at 'Not funny at 
all' and 'Extremely Funny'. 
For both PANAS sections of the study (pre- and post-manipulation), 
participants were presented with all twenty emotion words, and for each word had 
to make a mouse click response to a series of labelled radio buttons. The options 
were labelled, from left to right on screen, as 'Slightly or not at all', 'A little', 
'Moderately', 'Quite a bit', and 'Extremely'. PA scores were calculated as the sum of 
ratings across positive items, and NA scores were calculated as the sum of ratings 
across negative items. 
To allow a comparison of the effectiveness of the manipulation in the current 
study with similar manipulations used elsewhere, 'Happy' and 'Sad' items were 
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embedded in the PANAS items to be rated as analogue scales of mood. Furthermore, 
if these are highly correlated with PA and NA measures, they may provide a mood 
manipulation check which is shorter than the PANAS for subsequent studies. 
Syllogisms 
The syllogisms used in the current study are taken from those used by Evans and 
colleagues (1999). In order to maximise differences between possible-strong and 
possible-weak syllogism conclusions, the possible-strong syllogism structures with 
the highest endorsement rates were chosen, and the possible-weak syllogism 
structures with the lowest endorsement rates were chosen. The endorsement rates 
for the chosen syllogisms recorded by Evans and colleagues (1999), along with their 
content are shown in Table  3.2.  
 Overall, participants were presented with sixteen three-term syllogisms with 
arbitrary content; four with necessary conclusions, four with possible-strong, four 
with possible-weak, and four with impossible conclusions. 
Each syllogism was presented separately. For each syllogism, the two 
premises and the conclusion were each on a separate line, but all three lines were 
presented simultaneously. Providing a conclusion for evaluation overcomes problems 
of interpretation and individual differences in ability to generate conclusions, 
discussed by Ford (1994) in relation to conclusion-generation paradigms. This also 
allows close control of the conclusion type and structure, which is a critical part of 
the design given its interest in evaluating logical accuracy across content types. 
Participants in the necessity condition were required to indicate whether 
they thought that the conclusion was necessary or not-necessary. Participants in the 
possibility condition were required to indicate whether they thought the conclusion 
was possible or not-possible. 
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Table  3.2 Syllogism Details 
Conclusion 
 
A-B 
B-C 
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Necessary 
All Architects are Bankers 
All Bankers are Cooks 
All Architects are Cooks 
A1.1 AAa 73 
All Accountants are Builders 
No Builders are Cleaners 
No Accountants are Cleaners 
A1.2 AEe 83 
Some Taxi-drivers are Engineers 
All Engineers are Climbers 
Some Taxi-drivers are Climbers 
A1.3 IAi 87 
Some Lawyers are Priests 
No Priests are Students 
Some Lawyers are not Students 
A1.4 IEo 83 
Impossible 
All Nurses are Runners 
No Runners are Lecturers 
All Nurses are Lecturers 
B1.1 AEa 3 
All Musicians are Babysitters 
No Babysitters are Surgeons 
Some Musicians are Surgeons 
B1.2 AEi 7 
Some Astronauts are Scientists 
All Scientists are Carpenters 
No Astronauts are Carpenters 
B1.3 IAe 10 
Some Chemists are Surfers 
No Surfers are Teachers 
All Chemists are Teachers 
B1.4 IEa 0 
Possible-Strong 
All Journalists are Bus-drivers 
Some Bus-drivers are not Professors 
Some Journalists are not Professors 
C1.1 AOo 90 
Some Canoeists are Zoo-keepers 
Some Zoo-keepers are Policemen 
Some Canoeists are Policemen 
C1.2 IIi 80 
Some Clowns are not Sailors 
All Sailors are Judges 
Some Clowns are not Judges 
C1.3 OAo 83 
Some Soldiers are not Magicians 
Some Magicians are not Electricians 
Some Soldiers are not Electricians 
C1.4 OOo 87 
Possible-Weak 
Some Waiters are Managers 
Some Managers are Caterers 
No Waiters are Caterers 
D1.1 IIe 3 
Some Pilots are not Divers 
Some Divers are Painters 
No Pilots are Painters 
D1.2 OIe 3 
Some Plumbers are not Writers 
No Writers are Bikers 
All Plumbers are Bikers 
D1.3 OEa 3 
Some Artists are not Salesmen 
Some Salesmen are Cobblers 
All Artists are Cobblers 
D1.4 OO 7 
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Response times in milliseconds for these choices were recorded for each syllogism. 
This measure was included to allow an analysis of the effects of emotion on 
reasoning by comparison of reasoning time as well as by logical accuracy. Although 
response time measures in computer programs can be affected by network 
connection speeds and network load, the program for the current study overcomes 
this limitation by running the program locally. Data was saved locally and to a server 
upon completion of the study. Although other DirectX-based programs, such as Slide 
Generator (Tucker, 2007) specifically designed for high-precision response time 
recording may provide slightly more accurate measures of response times, given that 
reasoning times are typically in the order of seconds rather than milliseconds for 
syllogistic reasoning tasks (Thompson et al., 2003), and that in this case, there will be 
variability introduced by differences in reading time, the level of accuracy obtained 
using milliseconds and the current program was deemed acceptable.  
After making these judgements about possibility and necessity, a seven-point 
Likert-scale was presented anchored at 'Not confident at all' and 'Extremely 
confident', on which participants indicated their level of confidence in their answer. 
This measure was included to investigate the possibility that differences found 
between mood conditions may be due to differences in confidence.  
3.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The current study adopted a 3 Mood (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Instruction 
(Necessity, Possibility) x 4 Syllogism Type (N, PS, PW, I) mixed ANOVA design. 
Although this analysis is broken down into smaller analyses in order to assess each of 
the individual hypotheses, this initial structure allows for checks of the materials by 
replicating those of previous work, albeit with the addition of a mood condition. 
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At the recruitment stage participants could select a preferred time slot to 
participate. Upon arrival, participants were seated at a computer, on which the test 
program had been installed and set to a particular experimental condition 
(Instructional Set and Mood Condition). Participant ID numbers were entered by the 
experimenter, and the fields for age and gender were completed by participants. 
Participants were then presented with a paper copy of the brief, which they were 
asked to read. Following this if they consented to participate in the study they were 
asked to click 'consent' on the screen and sign a paper consent form. 
Upon clicking consent, participants were presented with instructions for the 
first PANAS task. They were asked to read these and click continue when they were 
ready. The program then presented the list of PANAS items with a rating scale next to 
each which participants were asked to complete and then click continue. 
The next screen presented the instructions for the mood manipulation task, 
which was followed, upon clicking continue, by a blank text box into which 
participants were required to type for ten minutes about a particularly happy or sad 
life event. Participants in the control condition were asked to type about the last 
time they visited the university library. After ten minutes, the instructions to the 
second PANAS task were presented, again followed by the list of words to be rated. 
After completing this task and clicking continue, participants were presented 
with the instructions for the reasoning task, which were followed by the reasoning 
problems. Participants had to indicate their response to each problem as described 
above, followed by their confidence in that response. The program moved on to the 
next reasoning problem automatically after each confidence rating. 
Following the final reasoning problem, instructions for the joke-rating task 
were presented, and participants worked through each of the jokes reading them 
and providing ratings of how funny they found them. 
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Upon rating the final joke, participants were presented with an on-screen 
and paper copy of the debrief, which contained the experimenter's details, the 
project supervisor's details, and the contact details of the student counselling 
services. Clicking finish on this screen wrote the data to the spreadsheet and server. 
Participants were then asked if they had any further questions, thanked for their 
time, and told they could leave when ready. 
3.3 Mood Data Results 
As can be seen from Figure  3.9 and Figure  3.10, A 2 Rating (‘Happy’, ‘Sad’) by 3 
Condition (Positive, Control, Negative) ANOVA on post-manipulation mood ratings 
shows the patterns that might be expected (Happy: [F(2,117) = 15.46, p < .001, 
 = 
.20], Sad: [F(2,117) = 24.43, p < .001, 
 = .30]). Participants in the positive condition 
reported higher levels of happiness than those in the control (p < .01) and negative 
conditions (p < .001), and those in the control condition reported higher levels of 
happiness than those in the negative condition (p = .03). Similarly, participants in the 
negative conditions report higher levels of sadness than those in either the positive 
(p < .001) or control conditions (p < .001). Participants in the positive and control 
conditions showed no difference in their ratings of sadness. This pattern is also 
present in the PA [F(2,117) = 10.73, p < .001, 
 = .16] and NA ratings [F(2,117) = 
7.52, p = .001, 
 = .12], although the differences between the control and negative 
conditions were less pronounced. Participants in the positive condition reported 
higher levels of PA than those in the control (p = .01) and negative conditions (p < 
.001), and those in the control condition reported higher levels of PA than those in 
the negative condition, though this did not reach statistical significance (p = .12). 
Similarly, participants in the negative conditions report higher levels of NA than those 
in the positive condition (p < .001) and those in the control condition, though this 
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latter comparison did not quite reach statistical significance (p = .07). Participants in 
the positive and control conditions showed no significant difference in their ratings of 
NA, though NA was lower for the positive than the control group. 
Given that no significant differences were found between conditions on pre-
test ratings of any of these measures, the mood manipulation task appears to have 
been successful in causing the groups to diverge in their ratings. 
 
 
Figure  3.9 'Happy' and 'Sad' post-manipulation ratings 
 
Figure  3.10 PA and NA post-manipulation ratings 
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As can be seen from Figure  3.9 and Figure  3.10, the patterns of PA and Happy, and 
NA and Sad scores are very similar. To provide some indication of the level of 
association, the correlations between post-manipulation Happy, Sad, PA and NA 
ratings are shown below in Table  3.3. 
 
Table  3.3 Correlations between Post-Manipulation Mood Measures  
 Correlation Coefficients 
Measures Happy-Post NA-Post Sad-Post 
PA-Post .65** -.16 -.26** 
Happy-Post  -.33** -.38** 
NA-Post   .76** 
** p<.001 
 
3.4 Reasoning Results 
Table  3.4 shows the mean endorsement rates, as percentages, by instructional set, 
mood condition, and syllogism type. Under necessity instructions, these represent 
the percentage of ‘necessary’ responses, as opposed to ‘not-necessary’. Under 
possibility instructions, these represent the percentage of ‘possible’ responses as 
opposed to ‘not-possible’ responses. 
 
Table  3.4 Endorsement Rates by Instructional Set and Syllogism type (SD parenthesised)  
  Endorsement Rate (%) 
Instruction Mood (N) N PS PW I 
Necessity Positive (31) 79.0 (28.2) 62.9 (30.9) 0.8 (4.5) 2.4 (9.9) 
 Control (25) 81.0 (25.3) 65.0 (31.5) 7.0 21.1) 5.0 (10.2) 
 Negative (31) 74.2 (27.0) 64.5 (32.1) 2.4 (7.5.) 2.4 (9.9) 
Possibility Positive (31) 90.3 (15.4) 93.5 (12.9) 16.1 (22.9) 6.5 (11.1) 
 Control (20) 88.8 (25.0) 85.0 (17.0) 10.0 (18.8) 6.3 (17.9) 
 Negative (30) 94.2 (12.6) 87.5 (18.3) 26.7 (27.8) 8.3 (15.2) 
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From the shaded cells in the top half of the table, it would appear that positive and 
negative moods lead to consistently lower endorsement rates than control mood, 
and that negative mood leads to lower endorsement rates than positive mood on 
necessary syllogisms. Under possibility instructions, positive and negative moods 
would appear to lead to higher endorsement rates than control moods, with negative 
mood leading to higher endorsement rates than positive moods. These patterns are 
analysed statistically in the following sections. 
3.4.1 Endorsement Rates 
As can be seen from Figure  3.11, a 2 Instruction (Necessity, Possibility) x 3 Mood 
(Positive, Control, Negative) x 4 Syllogism Type (N, PS, PW, I) ANOVA reveals the 
patterns of endorsement rate to be similar for each type of syllogism across the two 
instructional conditions. These patterns replicate the findings of Evans and colleagues 
(1999). The main effect of syllogism type [F(3,486) = 734.00, p < .001, 
 = .82] shows 
that individuals can differentiate the types of syllogism conclusion, and can be taken 
as evidence that the materials largely behave as would be expected. All pairwise 
comparisons are statistically significant (p < .001). There was also a main effect of 
instructional set [F(1,162) = 65.01, p < .001, 
 = .29], possibly driven by the fact that 
more conclusions are endorsed under possibility than necessity instructions, 
replicating the previous work of Evans and colleagues (1999), amongst others. 
Syllogism type and instructional set show a small statistically significant interaction, 
suggesting different response patterns across syllogism types between the two sets 
of instruction [F(3,486) = 7.49, p < .001, 
 = .04], as would be expected given the 
anticipated differences between PS and PW within each condition. Finally, 
endorsement rates in this combined analysis show no effect of mood [F(2,162) = .28, 
p = .76, 
 < .01], nor does mood interact significantly with syllogism type or 
dzahra 140 330974 
 
instructional set. The three-way interaction between mood, instructional set and 
syllogism type was also non-significant. Having established the general behaviour of 
the materials, the differences between mood conditions within each instructional set 
can be considered. 
 
 
Figure  3.11 Mean endorsement rates across instructional  
sets by syllogism type and mood 
  
In order to assess the patterns across the groups of interest (See Table  3.1, p127), the 
analysis was separated by instructional set. Figure  3.12 and Figure  3.13 show 
graphical representations of the output from two ANOVAs, one 2 Problem Type (N, 
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PS) x 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Instruction (Necessity, Possibility), 
and the other 2 Problem Type (PW, I) x 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 
Instruction (Necessity, Possibility).The main differences of interest under necessity 
instruction, those between mood conditions on PS syllogisms did not approach 
statistical significance, and showed a negligible effect size [F(2,84) = .04, p = .97, 
 < 
.01]; compare the bars labelled A, B, and C in Figure  3.12. 
 
 
Figure  3.12 Endorsement rates for N and PS  
by instructional set and content type 
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Comparing across mood conditions within each syllogism type for possibility 
instructions reveals no effect of mood on N or PS conclusion endorsement rates. 
However, of particular interest to the hypotheses outlined earlier are the differences 
in endorsement rates between mood conditions on the PW conclusions under 
possibility instructions; compare bars D, E, and F in Figure  3.13.  
  
 
Figure  3.13 Endorsement rates for I and PW  
by instructional set and content type 
 
On PW conclusions, a statistically significant effect of mood is found [F(2,78) = 3.15, p 
= .05, 
 = .075]. Pairwise comparisons show this effect is primarily driven by those in 
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the control condition endorsing fewer conclusions than those in the negative 
condition (E versus F; p = .02), although the difference between positive and negative 
conditions also begins to approach significance (D versus F; p = .09). Positive and 
control groups show little difference in their mean endorsement rates (D versus E, p 
= .38).  
In terms of effect size, the difference between control and positive content is 
small (d = .30), the difference between positive and negative content is on the 
borderline between small and medium (d = .41), and the difference between control 
and negative content is medium to large (d = .70).    
3.4.2 Confidence Rates and Response Times 
Mean confidence ratings by instructional set, mood condition, and syllogism type are 
shown in Table  3.5 along with standard deviations.  
 
Table  3.5 Confidence Ratings (%) by Instructional  
Set and Syllogism type (SD paranthesised) 
  Confidence Ratings (%) 
Instruction Mood (N) N PS PW I 
Necessity Positive (31) 70.7 (21.4) 65.8 (19.1) 69.8 (21.5) 71.8 (22.3) 
 Control (25) 74.4 (17.7) 65.6 (17.4) 69.1 (18.0) 73.9 (18.3) 
 Negative (31) 79.7 (14.7) 73.8 (14.5) 78.8 (14.5) 83.5 (18.9) 
Possibility Positive (31) 78.7 (11.9) 66.9 (13.9) 65.7 (15.5) 79.4 13.0.) 
 Control (20) 79.1 (14.7) 70.2 (13.8) 66.1 (14.2) 79.5 (14.9) 
 Negative (30) 82.1 (11.3) 72.0 (17.1) 68.0 (16.6) 80.5 (14.1) 
 
 
Overall, the results of a 2 Instruction (Necessity, Possibility) x 3 Mood (Positive, 
Control, Negative) x 4 Syllogism Type (N, PS, PW, I) show a main effect of syllogism 
type [F(3,486) = 57.96, p < .001, 
 = .26], which seems to reflect the higher 
confidence for N and I conclusion types than for PS and PW types. Pairwise 
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comparisons showed no significant differences between N-I and PS-PW, but all other 
comparisons between these sets are significant at p < .001. As with endorsement 
rates, this main effect of syllogism type is indicative of participants’ ability to draw a 
distinction between the syllogism categories. It also seems to suggest that N and I 
conclusions are subjectively easier to evaluate. This pattern broadly holds across 
instructional set. No main effect of instruction was found, although syllogism type 
and instructional set showed a small significant interaction [F(1,162) = 4.89, p = .03, 

 = .03]. This is possibly driven by confidence ratings for PW and PS changing across 
instructional sets, and the higher confidence reported for N and I syllogism types 
when reasoning under possibility instructions. A 2 Syllogism Type (PW, PS) by 
Instructional Set (Necessity, Possibility) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
supportive of the first possibility [F(1,166) = 15.98, p < .001, 
 = .09]. Furthermore, 
post-hoc comparisons of the significant syllogism type main effect under possibility 
instructions [F(3,240) = 52.52, p < .001, 
 = .40] support the second possibility; 
significance values for each pair are shown in Table  3.6. 
 
Table  3.6 P-values for pairwise comparisons of confidence  
ratings across Syllogism type (under possibility instructions)  
 p-values 
 PS PW I 
N <.001 <.001 .83 
PS  .031 <.001 
PW   <.001 
 
  
Across instructional sets, a main effect of mood was found, [F(2,162) = 3.05, p = .05, 

 = .04]. Pairwise comparisons showed the main difference to be that individuals in 
the negative condition were significantly more confident in their responses than 
those in the positive condition (p = .020), and that those in the control condition 
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were less confident in their responses than those in the negative condition to an 
extent which approached significance (p = .08). Participants in the positive and 
control conditions did not differ in their confidence ratings (p = .70). This main effect 
of mood overall reduces when assessed separately for necessity and possibility 
[F(2,84) = .88, p = .06, 
 = .06 and F(2,78) = .47, p = .63, 
 = .01 respectively], only 
holding marginally for necessity instructions with participants in the negative 
condition (M = 79.0, SD = 15.7) being more confident in their responses than those in 
the positive (M = 69.5, SD = 21.1, p = .03) and control conditions (M = 70.8, SD =17.9, 
p = .07). Mood and instructional set did not interact with respect to confidence rates 
[F(2,162) = .92, p = .40, 
 = .01]. 
After LOG-transforming the response time data for each syllogism, means 
and standard deviations were derived, shown in Table  3.7, which were then subject 
to comparisons across mood conditions and syllogism type as in the above 
consideration of confidence ratings. 
 
Table  3.7 Response Times (LOG(MeanRT)) by Instructional  
Set and Syllogism type (SD paranthesised) 
  Response Times (LOG(MeanRT)) 
Instruction Mood (N) N PS PW I 
Necessity Positive (31) 3.94 (.18) 4.01 (.23) 4.00 (.22) 3.93 (.23) 
 Control (25) 3.97 (.14) 4.09 (.19) 4.01 (.17) 4.00 (.17) 
 Negative (31) 3.96 (.15) 4.08 (.12) 4.04 (.18) 3.96 (.15) 
Possibility Positive (31) 3.97 (.17) 4.08 (.18) 4.12 (.16) 3.96 (.16) 
 Control (20) 3.94 (.11) 4.08 (.16) 4.08 (.16) 4.02 (.17) 
 Negative (30) 3.97 (.14) 4.06 (.17) 4.13 (.18) 3.97 (.15) 
 
 
Conducting the same initial three-way ANOVA on response time data reveals few 
significant effects. The most pronounced is a main effect of syllogism type [F(3,486) = 
52.90, p < .001, 
 = .25]. This appears to be driven by N and I (determinate) 
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problems being responded to faster than PS and PW (indeterminate) problems. This 
is supported by planned comparisons which show participants under necessity 
instructions responded faster to determinate (M = 10624ms, SD = 3653ms) than 
indeterminate problems, (M = 13330ms, SD = 5558ms), [t(86) = -7.09, p < .001, d = 
.58]. This pattern also holds for possibility instructions, in which determinate 
problems (M = 10802ms, SD = 3498ms) are responded to faster than indeterminate 
ones (M = 14773ms, SD = 5617ms), [t(80) = -9.00, p < .001, d = .85]. 
There was also an interaction between syllogism type and instructional set 
[F(3,486) = 3.06, p < .028, 
 = .019], based on the 4 Syllogism Type x 3 Mood x 2 
Instructional Set ANOVA detailed above, which reflects an increased difference in 
responses times between determinate and indeterminate problems under possibility 
instructions relative to necessity instructions.  
The comparison of PS response times across mood conditions under 
necessity instructions shows that there is no statistically significant effect of mood on 
response times [F(2,84) = 1.77, p = .18, 
 = .04]. Similarly, PW response times under 
possibility instruction showed no effect of mood [F(2,78) = .12, p = .89, 
 < .01]. 
Finally, no pairwise comparisons reached statistical significance. 
3.4.3 Reliable Change Index 
An alternative way of assessing the effectiveness of the mood manipulation is to 
calculate reliable change index (RCI; Jacobson & Truax, 1991) scores for each 
individual. What the RCI essentially does is provide a measure of the direction in 
which an individual’s score changes, and whether that change is over and above what 
would be expected given the test-retest reliability of the measure being used (Zahra 
& Hedge, 2010). This allows for a person-by-person analysis of the effect of the 
manipulation, and enables those for whom the manipulation had no effect to be 
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removed. This not only allows some indication of the effectiveness of the mood 
manipulation in terms of the proportion of people who showed a ‘true’ change in 
mood, which is interesting in itself, but also means that any subsequent analysis will 
utilise only those individuals for whom the manipulation was effective outside the 
measurement error of the mood scale. The results of the RCI analysis on the 
complete dataset for Experiment 1 are shown in Table  3.8 (See Appendix  F for 
equations).  
 
Table  3.8: Reliable Change Index Analyses 
     
Change 
(%) 
Reliable Change (%) 
#RC in 
desired 
direction Condition Instr. α* SD** N Up Down None Up Down None 
Positive 
N
e
c.
 
 
0.90 6.11 31 71 16 13 29 0 71 9 
Control 0.90 6.11 25 28 56 16 4 24 72 17 
Negative 0.90 6.11 31 16 71 13 0 29 71 9 
Positive 
P
o
ss
. 
 
0.83 6.11 31 48 35 16 10 3 87 7 
Control 0.83 6.11 20 15 70 15 0 10 90 18 
Negative 0.83 6.11 30 20 77 3 0 30 70 9 
* PA-Pre and PA-Post in the control condition for Necessity Instructions, and PA-Pre and PA-
Post in the control condition for Possibility Instructions 
** SD from control participants within control condition, combined necessity and possibility 
 
 
Running the analyses outlined above with only those individuals whose mood 
changed in the expected direction yields the following results. These participants are 
those who fall into the shaded cells in the table. Prior to analysis, participants 
showing no reliable change (RCI < |1.96|) or in an unintended direction were 
excluded. The number of participants remaining in each of the conditions is shown in 
the final #RC in desired direction column of the table. 
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Figure  3.14 Mean Endorsement Rates by Instruction, Mood, and Syllogism Type based on only 
those individuals whose moods showed reliable change in the expected directions 
 
By comparing Figure  3.14 with Figure  3.11 presented earlier, the general pattern is 
still visible. As with the analyses above, of particular interest is the difference 
between mood conditions on possible-strong syllogisms under necessity instructions, 
and the difference between mood conditions on possible-weak syllogisms under 
possibility instructions. 
Univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc comparisons across mood conditions for 
these two cases reveals that although mood appears to have some effect on 
endorsement rates, none of these differences reached statistical significance. 
However, it should be noted that the analyses reported in this section were based on 
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relatively small samples. Considering again the effect size for these differences, using 
Hedge’s ĝ which corrects d for the small sample sizes, and g* which estimates the 
population effect size (Appendix  F), the values shown in Table  3.9 were found. These 
can be interpreted in the same way as d-values. 
 
Table  3.9: Hedge’s ĝ (and g*) effect size measures for comparisons between  
mood conditions based on only those individuals who showed reliable mood change. 
  Hedge’s ĝ (and g*) 
Condition Mood Negative Control 
Necessity, PS Positive .304 (.290) .479 (.463) 
 Negative - .135 (.131) 
Possibility, PW Positive .321 (.303) .315 (.306) 
 Negative - .022 (.021) 
 
  
Despite this lack of statistically significant findings and relatively small effect sizes, it 
is promising that when more stringent criteria are used to assess membership of 
each mood category, the patterns revealed are similar to those in the full sample. 
This suggests that although some of the variation in the PANAS measured between 
mood groups may be due to variation in the measure, and that not all changes in 
mood caused by the induction are necessarily reliable, it is promising that the general 
pattern of results reported in the main analyses still remain.  
3.5 Discussion 
Patterns of Endorsement 
In relation to the predicted patterns shown in Table  3.1, the findings from 
Experiment 1 (Table  3.4) do not show clear support for either the Load or 
Information theories outlined previously. However it appears that the manipulation 
of instructional set was successful, given the replication of patterns found in previous 
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research. In addition, individuals seem capable of discriminating between the 
different problem types based on their responses to critical items under each 
instructional set. Overall, participants typically endorse necessary and possible-
strong conclusions at high rates, and only rarely endorse possible-weak and 
impossible conclusions. 
Although little support was found for load or information theories in the 
study as a whole, closer inspection of the data when considered across instruction 
type reveals some patterns suggestive of support for information as a potential 
explanation of the interaction between emotion and reasoning. Under necessity 
instructions, positive and negative moods lead to lower endorsement rates than the 
control condition, whereas under possibility instructions, positive and negative 
moods lead to higher endorsement rates than the control condition. When 
considering the problem types of interest, mood condition shows no effect on the 
endorsement rates of PS syllogisms under necessity instructions. However, under 
possibility instructions, mood appears to impact endorsement rates of PW syllogisms. 
Participants in the control condition showed significantly lower endorsement rates 
than the negative condition, and, although not statistically significant, the positive 
condition showed lower endorsement rates than the negative condition, with an 
effect size bordering on medium. This pattern of Positive < Negative is more 
supportive of the information theories than load theories   
Despite the relative weakness of this support for information theories, 
performance on PS items after excluding individuals who did not show reliable mood 
changes (Section  3.4.3) shows that after removing the variability of the mood 
measure and focussing the analyses on only those individuals who can be said to 
have shown reliable change on the mood manipulation check, the difference in 
endorsement rates between mood conditions is increased, though these differences 
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still do not reach statistical significance. This is the case for both PS syllogisms under 
necessity instructions, and PW syllogisms under possibility instructions, and suggests 
that more careful analysis and consideration of ‘noise’ in the data is important when 
investigating the effects of emotion. 
To summarise, there is some support for information theories from the 
finding that negative mood increases confidence ratings and the rate of PW 
endorsement under possibility instructions relative to positive mood, this will be 
revisited below. However, it would seem that mood has only a small impact on 
syllogistic reasoning in this paradigm, though it provides a tool which can be 
developed, as will be done in the following chapter through altering how emotion is 
included as a variable. 
Response Time and Confidence 
From the response time and confidence-rating data, it seems that determinate 
problems are responded to faster than indeterminate ones, and that people are 
more confident about their responses to determinate problems. This pattern of 
faster and more confident responding to determinate problems is found across both 
instructional sets and all mood conditions, which suggests reasoning time and 
confidence are unlikely to be the cause behind the effects of instruction and mood. 
Although response times show some difference between mood conditions, 
they do not show the negative > control > positive pattern that might be expected if 
negative mood cued more careful processing than control or positive moods. Mood 
also seems to be only marginally relevant when making judgements about 
confidence. It would appear that negative moods lead to higher confidence ratings 
when individuals are asked to evaluate their responses. This may be due to 
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participants being aware that having been in a negative mood, they have reasoned 
more carefully, and are thus more confident in their responses. 
Considering response times, confidence and endorsement rates together, 
although moods have little effect on these measures, it is interesting that individuals 
spend longer thinking about the indeterminate problems. This provides some 
evidence that people are aware of potential alternative models, even if this extra 
effort does not necessarily result in higher logical accuracy or confidence rates, and if 
confidence ratings are unrelated to accuracy (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006).   
Mood 
The mood manipulation used in the study appears to have been effective, based on 
the analysis of the PANAS scores. Although on occasion the differences in reported 
mood between the conditions did not quite reach statistical significance, that broadly 
similar patterns in reasoning were found on the problem types of interest after 
applying the more stringent RCI-based inclusion criteria is promising. Also of interest 
is the finding that PA and NA scales are highly correlated with the individual ‘Happy’ 
and ‘Sad’ ratings. This suggests that in future studies, or where a shorter measure of 
mood is needed, these two items can be used in place of the full PANAS.  
Information and Load Theories 
In relation to the previous literature discussed at the start of this chapter, the 
patterns bear some resemblance to previous findings. Namely, that there is a 
difference between control and negative moods, and that there is a difference, 
although not quite reaching statistical significance, between positive and negative, 
provides some support some for the idea that mood acts as information in syllogistic 
reasoning. That is, under possibility instructions with PW syllogisms, negative mood 
increases endorsement rates relative to positive and control conditions. Increased 
dzahra 153 330974 
 
endorsement of PW conclusions is equivalent to an increase in logical responding, 
possibly due to increased engagement of type two processes; negative mood serving 
to increase logical responding, possibly by cueing more careful processing and a 
search for alternative models. 
However, as discussed above, the size of the effect is relatively small and the 
effects of concurrent moods on syllogistic reasoning are fragile, as evidenced by 
them not appearing in all analyses. One possible explanation for the small effect size 
under possibility instructions is that participants were aware of the purpose of the 
writing task. If information theories are correct, then knowing that the writing task 
was intended to alter mood may lead to a discounting effect, whereby participants 
are aware of, but remove, emotion as a source of information when reasoning (Clore 
& Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003). Although the inclusion of a 
manipulation check may have alerted participants to the purpose of the writing task, 
its value in assessing the effectiveness of the manipulation outweighs this potential 
cost, and provides support for the use of the manipulation task in future studies 
without the need for the manipulation check. 
Although reducing this discounting effect was the purpose of removing 
references to emotion in the brief and instructions, no explicit measures of the 
effectiveness of these precautions were included, nor indeed would this be easy to 
implement without drawing attention to the white bear. Future studies might include 
a simple ‘What did you think the study was about?’ question, or alternatively, 
subconscious emotional primes might be adopted as a means of inducing mood 
without incurring any risk of discounting effects, although the efficacy of 
subconscious priming is more debateable than that of writing tasks. 
In relation to the particular mood states that are induced, and the effects 
that positive and negative mood were predicted to show under the load and 
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information hypotheses, it is worth noting the comment by Westermann and 
colleagues (1996) that mood manipulations are unlikely to elicit specific moods, but 
will rather induce a diffuse mood state which might be classified by the individual as 
any one of a range of emotions if they are asked to label it. Arguably though, diffuse 
positive and diffuse negative moods are roughly comparable to specific positive and 
specific negative states, and the effects of the two are unlikely to overlap. After a 
more thorough investigation of the effects of these general ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
effects which is the aim of this thesis, more targeted and specific induction of 
narrower moods such as anxiety, anger, joy or a feeling of success might be 
developed to differentiate more clearly the effects of emotion on reasoning. This will 
be returned to in Chapter  10, after consideration of the results from the remaining 
experimental chapters, but is of particular importance as different, though both 
broadly ‘negative’ moods might lead to different effects that could mask the 
differences between emotions in primarily positive-negative paradigms such as this 
one. 
Having established some small effects of mood using the necessity-possibility 
paradigm, but obtained promising results with alternative ways of analysing the data 
generated, it will be a useful next step to investigate whether these patterns are 
similar when emotion is introduced through manipulation of the problem content, as 
opposed to the manipulation of the participants’ mood state. This is based on the 
broad divide in the literature between mood effects found across different problem 
content types and differences found between individuals induced into different 
mood states, and provides the starting point for the following chapter. In addition, it 
is hoped that by investigating integral mood in comparison to incidental mood, if the 
effects found were small because of discounting cued by any aspect of the task, this 
should be minimised by using a manipulation of integral emotion. 
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Furthermore, factors which may influence the impact of emotion on 
reasoning which were omitted from the current chapter will be introduced. These 
include the extent to which individuals attend to their emotions, the clarity with 
which emotions are perceived, and their ability to repair negative emotions. 
Including measures of these variables along with a manipulation of integral mood will 
hopefully provide a better understanding of any relationship, however small, 
between confidence ratings, logical accuracy, and emotion which build on the 
findings of the current chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
4. Emotional Content, Necessity, and 
Possibility in Syllogistic Reasoning 
4.1 Introduction (Experiment 2) 
Chapter  3 investigated the effects of a written mood manipulation on syllogistic 
reasoning. The results provided some support for information theories as an 
explanation of how emotions affect reasoning, though the effects found were small. 
The current chapter builds on these findings and adopts a similar paradigm, though 
rather than investigating emotion by manipulating it with a writing task, the current 
experiment varies the emotional valence of the terms in the syllogisms people are 
asked to reason about. This will provide data to investigate whether and how 
emotive content affects syllogistic reasoning, as well as allowing a comparison of 
valence effects across written manipulations of emotion and manipulations of 
problem content.  
Although recent research on the effects of emotions has relied on mood 
manipulations which are separate from and external to the reasoning tasks 
employed, there is a body of interesting research which has investigated the effects 
of problem content on reasoning, and recently, the work of Isabelle Blanchette has 
brought some of these methods and ideas to the fore again. The existing literature 
suggests that content can both improve and impair reasoning in terms of logical 
accuracy. This is demonstrated nicely by Blanchette and Campbell’s (2005) study on 
war veterans, in which war-related content led to greater logical accuracy, when it is 
contrasted with the work of Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk, and Lavda (2007) on 
terrorist-related content, which found that general emotional and terrorist-related 
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content impaired logical performance. However, comparisons between positive, 
negative, and control materials are important in understanding these effects; an 
aspect which is not always included (e.g. Blanchette et al., 2007). This makes work 
comparing changes in reasoning due to emotion difficult to interpret in relation to 
‘normal’ reasoning.  
In cases where content is manipulated, the emotion element originates from 
the materials, rather than from the person. That is, rather than the emotional states 
being generated by internal reflective processes such as recalling and describing 
emotional life events, factors internal to the stimuli provide the emotional 
component. Whether these responses to content valence are automatic, controlled, 
conscious, unconscious, or somewhere in between is a contentious issue, yet it is still 
worthwhile considering the possibility that the two types of emotion have different 
effects on reasoning processes. Related to this is the distinction between mood 
states being directly created and manipulated by the use of an external task, and 
whether or not emotive stimuli have an effect by creating similar emotional 
experiences or altering how the material is processed. 
In order to clarify the discussion of results across studies which manipulate 
mood states and those which manipulate content, it will be useful to introduce terms 
to distinguish between the two. Following the example of Blanchette and Richards 
(2010), where mood states are created externally to the task, these moods will be 
referred to as ‘incidental’, in that the mood state is not directly related to the task. 
Where the content of a reasoning task has been manipulated to elicit an emotional 
state or reaction, these states will be referred to as ‘integral’. The terms incidental 
and integral are intended as neutral with respect to any philosophical debate about 
the nature of subjective emotional experiences, and speak only to whether mood is 
manipulated by a separate procedure, or the emotional valence of the content.  
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As mentioned above, whether emotive content (integral emotion) has an 
effect on reasoning by generating a mood state that is similar in nature to the mood 
states created by incidental emotion (as in Chapter  3) or not is open to debate. 
However, as this is not the main focus of the current experiment, reference to 
integral mood, integral emotion, or the effects thereof should be taken to mean any 
effect of integral content manipulations, and not be read as implying anything about 
the nature of the emotions generated in the individual. If integral content 
manipulations have an effect, these effects of integral mood may be a result of an 
emotional state having been created in the individual, or they may be the result of 
the valence of the content altering processing styles without altering the subjectively 
experienced mood state. In either case, the results will shed light on the relationship 
between content valence and reasoning, and serve to inform future research. 
In summary, the current chapter aims to develop the necessity-possibility 
paradigm used in Chapter  3 which looked at the effect of incidental mood on 
reasoning. This will be achieved by manipulating the emotional valence of the 
problem content, shifting the focus to integral mood effects. Before discussing how 
emotional content can affect reasoning however, it is informative to review the 
literature so far. Much of this has already been introduced, but key findings and how 
they relate to the current experiment will be considered in more detail next. 
4.1.1 Necessity, Possibility, and Emotive Content 
From the few studies which have looked explicitly at emotive content in syllogistic 
reasoning, a number of issues can be identified which the current experiment will 
aim to address whilst building on the work of the previous chapter. Firstly there is the 
issue of a lack of comparison between positive, negative, and control content. This is 
important because in order to evaluate the relative merits of existing theories, it is 
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necessary to devise tests for which the different emotions would be expected to 
have different results relative to control (Chapter  3). The load and information 
theories, which are the main targets for the current work, differ in their expected 
patterns of results for positive and negative emotions. These different expected 
patterns have been outlined in relation to incidental mood manipulations previously, 
but can be extended to include integral emotion, and as such, positive, negative, and 
control content will be included in the current study. The inclusion of a control group 
is important as it provides a base-line against which the impact of positive and 
negative content can be compared. 
Although the predictions of load and information theories might be expected 
to generalise from incidental to integral mood, the idea has not yet been explicitly 
tested in the literature. As discussed previously, little work has been conducted on 
the effects of integral emotion relative to incidental emotion. By building on the work 
in the previous chapter which utilised the necessity-possibility paradigm with an 
incidental mood manipulation, comparison of patterns across studies will go some 
way towards supporting or refuting the generalisation from incidental to integral 
emotion. By extending the paradigm of the previous study to investigate integral 
emotion, if the patterns are similar to those found using other paradigms, a stronger 
case can be made for the robustness of the effects of emotion on reasoning. This in 
turn would provide a replicable set of results on which to develop theories about the 
relationship between emotion, content, and reasoning. The literature of interest in a 
comparative sense here is the seemingly contradictory work of Blanchette and 
colleagues outlined above. Their work has found improvements in logical accuracy as 
a result of war-related negative emotive content, as well as reduced logical 
responding as a result of terrorism-related and generally emotive content. However, 
limitations of the materials used in this latter study (Blanchette et al., 2007) have 
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been outlined earlier (Section  2.4.1) and there is also the fact that the structure of 
the problems varies across the validity conditions. All valid syllogisms are of the form 
AAa, all invalid syllogisms are of the form AIa (See Table  2.3).  This is controlled for in 
the current chapter. Although Blanchette et al. (2007), when manipulating the 
content valence of syllogisms, found negative content to lead to more logically 
accurate responses in personally relevant cases, as did Blanchette and Campbell 
(2005) when investigating reasoning in veterans; Blanchette and Richards (2004), 
when investigating conditional reasoning, found that both positive and negative 
emotional content reduced logical accuracy relative to neutral content. These 
contradictory findings may be explained by the lack of control in the syllogism 
structures of Blanchette and colleagues (2007). Although the majority of their 
analyses focus on an ‘overall’ logical accuracy, in which an average is taken across 
valid and invalid syllogisms (which as noted above, differ in their structure), 
controlling the structure of valid and invalid syllogisms would allow a clearer 
comparison of valid and invalid arguments without this confound. Blanchette and 
Campbell (2005) provide no list of their materials, so their design may suffer from the 
same confounded structure which again highlights the need for tight control of 
experimental materials in order to make claims about the effects of emotive content 
on reasoning.  
In relation to drawing testable predictions, it is possible to relate the aims of 
the previous chapter to the current use of integral emotion. By aiming to investigate 
the same elements as were considered with incidental emotion, the relationship 
between mood and content effects can be assessed, whilst simultaneously 
investigating any effect of integral emotions. There is some support in the literature 
for both the load and information models as outlined in Chapter  2, and the necessity-
possibility paradigm allows an assessment of the extent to which content alters 
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engagement on the task, namely, the search for alternative models. By presenting 
individuals with syllogisms with necessary, possible-strong, possible-weak, and 
impossible conclusions, and varying both the content and instructional set, the 
extent to which alternative models are searched for can be assessed in the same way 
as in Chapter  3. 
To give an overview (though see section  3.1.1 for full details), necessary 
problems are those in which all possible models of the premises support the 
conclusions. In possible-strong problems, the conclusion holds in the first model, but 
in subsequent models the conclusion does not hold. Possible-weak problems are the 
opposite, in that their conclusion holds in the first model, but not subsequent 
models. Finally, impossible problems are those in which the conclusion never holds in 
any possible model of the premises. 
When asked to evaluate whether a conclusion is necessary or not-necessary, 
that is, reasoning under necessity instructions, the problems of interest are the 
possible-strong set. Responding based on only the formulation of the first model will 
lead to more ‘necessary’ responses, as the first model returns a valid conclusion. If 
this is the only model assessed, it would be assumed that the conclusion is valid and 
therefore necessary. However, if alternative models are sought, the conclusion will 
be seen to be valid in only some cases, and invalid in others, and hence only possible, 
not necessary. When responding on the basis of necessity instructions, this search for 
alternative models would be expected to reduce the number of ‘necessary’ 
responses. 
Adding integral mood effects to this prediction, and in line with the 
predictions of Chapter  3, if content serves as information, negative content would be 
expected to cue a more considered analysis of the problem, and thus the search for 
alternative models, which in turn would be expected to lead to lower endorsement 
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rates (fewer ‘necessary’ responses) on possible-strong problems. Positive mood on 
the other hand would be expected to cue acceptance of the first solution, and hence 
higher rates of endorsement as necessary. This is relative to negative content, and 
highlights the need for positive-negative comparisons in emotions research. 
If, however, emotive content loaded the cognitive system, in both positive 
and negative cases there would be a reduction in resources available to search for 
alternative models, and hence both would be expected to show increased rates of 
endorsement of PS problems relative to control problems. This is where the 
importance of including a control group for comparison to positive and negative 
content becomes most important. 
Under possibility instructions, the problems of interest are those with 
possible-weak conclusions. With this instructional set, people are asked whether the 
conclusions are possible, as opposed to necessary. Possible-weak problems would be 
expected to be responded to as ‘not-possible’ if only the first models are considered, 
as the conclusions in the first models don’t hold. If extra effort is expended by the 
individual to search for alternative models, conclusions which are valid will be found, 
and hence the responses made should be ‘possible’. Therefore, searching for 
alternative models will lead to higher rates of ‘possible’ endorsements than relying 
on only the first model. 
With respect to mood-as-information, negative content would again be 
associated with more careful analysis and use of alternative models, leading to higher 
‘possible’ endorsement rates. Positive content on the other hand might be expected 
to cue acceptance of the first model, which has an invalid conclusion, and thus 
reduce endorsement rates as the majority of individuals should respond ‘not 
possible’. The justification for the load and information theories is dealt with in the 
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previous chapters following a review of the relevant literature, but a summary of the 
predicted patterns is shown in Table  4.1. 
 
Table  4.1: Expected Endorsement Rates Under Load and Information Theories 
  Predicted Problem Type Endorsement 
Theory Content PS under Necessity PW under Possibility 
Load Positive High Low 
Control Mid Mid 
Negative High Low 
Information Positive High Low 
Control Mid Mid 
Negative Low High 
 
In addition to these proposed patterns of endorsement rate, given the interesting 
findings in the previous experiment that confidence ratings are higher for 
determinate problems, a measure of the participants’ confidence in their responses 
will also be included in the current experiment. This will allow the replicability of the 
effects of problem type and instructional set to be evaluated, as well as provide data 
for a comparison of integral and incidental mood effects on confidence.  
4.1.2 Trait Meta-Mood 
The possibility that individuals may differ in their attention to emotions was raised 
when discussing the previous findings (Section  3.5). In order to address this issue the 
experimental design in the current chapter is supplemented by the inclusion of a 
measure of ‘attention to emotions’. How people’s emotions guide their responses to 
situations is embodied in the concept of factors related to emotional intelligence, 
largely irrespective of which conceptualisation of emotional intelligence is considered 
(Fitness & Curtis, 2005; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 
2004). These include, but are not limited to, factors such as meta-cognitive 
processing of emotional experience, source monitoring, and an appreciation of 
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affective forecasting and its limitations (Goleman, 2004b; Song et al., 2010). One 
dimension of particular interest that may vary between individuals and affect the 
experimental results is emotion regulation (Fitness & Curtis, 2005; Salovey, Mayer, 
Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). More specifically, the extent to which people 
attend to their emotions and the strategies they deploy in response to them (e.g. 
Extremera, Durán, & Rey, 2007). 
The Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) is a 48-item questionnaire designed to 
measure three factors of emotional experience: attention to emotions (Attention), 
clarity of emotions (Clarity), and mood repair (Repair), which make up three 
subscales of the TMMS. A shortened 30-item version also exists, but the discussion 
that follows applies to both (Salovey et al., 1995), and the scale is correlated with 
longer measures of mood which have been validated in clinical and non-clinical 
samples such as the Hopkins Symptom Checklist, PA r = .74, NA r = -.19; Beck 
Depression Inventory, PA r = .74, NA r = -.19 and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, PA 
r = .74, NA r = -.19 (Watson et al., 1988).  
The Attention factor provides a measure of the extent to which individuals 
notice and respond to their emotions. Clarity provides a measure of how clearly 
distinct an individual finds each of their emotions; their ability to distinguish between 
different feelings. Finally, Repair provides a measure of how well the individual 
recovers from negative emotions and maintains positive emotions. Each item is 
responded to using a five point Likert scale, with the options defined as agree, 
somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, and disagree (all 
items, scoring order, and subscale memberships can be found in Appendix  B). 
Including the TMMS in the current study allows an investigation of how the 
three factors might moderate the relationship between emotion and reasoning. If 
different emotionally valenced stimuli can attract different levels of attention, and 
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emotional cues have been shown to be used as a source of information on 
judgement tasks, then some measure of the extent to which individuals attend to 
emotions may be useful for understanding the results. For example, individuals who 
show higher levels of attention to their emotions might be expected to show larger 
effects of emotionally valenced content. Additionally, the subscales of the TMMS 
might be related to differential use of reasoning strategies. Specifically, TMMS scores 
might shed light on how the three components of emotional experience moderate 
the effects of emotion on reasoning through altering the use of shallower or more 
elaborated processes.  
4.1.3 Aims and Hypotheses 
To summarise the preceding section the current study aims to investigate the effect 
of emotive content in syllogistic reasoning, and the relationship between attention to 
emotions, clarity of emotions, and ability to repair emotions. With respect to specific 
hypotheses, these are outlined in Table  4.1, and are in line with those of Chapter  3 
and the findings in the literature discussed previously in this and earlier chapters. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants for this study were recruited through various online mailing lists 
dedicated to different areas of psychological and non-psychological research, links 
posted on social-networking and research websites, and Plymouth University mailing 
lists. The study was kept live for two months, after which time the links were 
removed from the websites used and made inactive. At the close of the study, 161 
people had participated (78 male, 83 female), with ages ranging from 16 to 60 years 
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(M = 33.60, SD = 11.88). Overall, this was a response rate of 5% (based on the scope 
of recruitment being approximately 3,000 people, as of 29th June 2009).  
4.2.2 Materials 
Syllogisms 
The syllogisms from Chapter  3 were used to provide the control materials for the 
current study. In addition, a positive and a negative set of syllogisms were created by 
replacing the neutral terms with emotionally positive and negative terms which have 
been used in other studies of emotional content outside of reasoning. These 
permutations create three sets of syllogisms (control, as well as positively and 
negatively valenced) each with subsets whose conclusions are necessary (N), 
possible-strong (PS), possible-weak (PW) and impossible (I). Emotive content was 
varied as a between-participants factor. A full set of the syllogisms used for each 
content condition can be found in Appendix  B, though examples are provided below; 
 
Positive Content 
All puppies are fluffy 
All fluffy things are cute 
All puppies are cute 
 
Control Content 
All Architects are Bankers 
All Bankers are Cooks 
All Architects are Cooks 
 
Negative Content 
All cancers are terrifying 
All terrifying things are deadly 
All cancers are deadly 
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Piloting 
In order to avoid confounding believability or validity with content, the positive and 
negative syllogism sets were pre-tested. This was achieved by presenting individuals 
with the conclusions for each syllogism in a random order, and asking them to rate 
either the positivity of the conclusion, or its believability, on a Likert scale. Positivity 
was defined as the score on a seven point scale anchored at ‘extremely negative’ to 
‘extremely positive’, whereas believability was defined as the score on a seven point 
scale anchored at ‘extremely unbelievable’ and ‘extremely believable’. The results of 
two 4 Syllogism Type (N, PS, PW, I) ANOVAs found no differences in believability [F 
(3,31) = 1.22, p = .32] or positivity ratings, [F (3,31) = .04, p = .99], between the 
syllogism types, within content types.  
Furthermore, the content manipulation was found to be effective by a 2 
Content Type (Positive, Negative) ANOVA on the positivity ratings, [F (1,31) = 
3523.41, p < .001]; with positive content being rated as more positive than negative 
content; but the same ANOVA run using believability ratings showed no difference in 
believability between positive and negative syllogisms [F (1,31) = .04, p = .85]. The 
interaction effects between syllogism type and content type on both believability and 
positivity ratings were found to be non-significant in a 2 Content Type (Positive, 
negative) x 4 Syllogism Type (N, PS, PW, I) ANOVA. The syllogisms used in the current 
study thus control for structure, syllogism type, and believability across content 
conditions. 
Properties of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
The 30-item short form of the TMMS was used in the current experiment. The 
psychometric properties of the 30-item version are comparable to those of the 
longer 48-item version (Salovey et al., 1995). The internal reliability of each subscale 
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of the 30-item version has been repeatedly shown to be high. Fitness and Curtis 
(2005) report Cronbach’s alphas’ of α = .78, α = .85, and α = .78 for the Attention, 
Clarity, and Repair subscales respectively, which compare well with the results of 
Salovey and colleagues (1995) who reported  α = .86, α = .86, and α = .82, and Palmer 
and colleagues (2003) who reported α = .84, α = .87, and α = .71. These figures also 
accord well with the results of a large scale online study to assess the psychometric 
properties of the TMMS in the student population conducted by Zahra, Bailey, 
Hedge, Wyles, and Sanders (2012 in press); α = .85, α = .85, and α = .71. Convergent 
and discriminant validity have also been shown to be acceptable, and the scale has 
been relatively widely adopted in emotion research (Salovey et al., 1995).  
4.2.3 Procedure 
Individuals clicking on links to the study were randomly allocated to a content and 
instruction condition, and taken to a page containing the text of the brief and option 
to indicate consent. This was followed by the reasoning task.  
Each syllogism was displayed on a separate page, and for each problem 
participants were required to judge either the conclusion’s necessity or possibility 
(depending on instruction condition), and their confidence in their decision. 
Confidence ratings were made on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored at ‘Not Very 
Confident’ and ‘Very Confident’. Scores have been converted to percentage 
confidence ratings to facilitate comparisons across studies.  
Following the final reasoning problem, participants were taken to a page 
containing instructions for the TMMS, to which they were required to respond using 
the Likert scale options described above. Upon completion, a series of jokes were 
presented to normalise participants’ moods, followed by the debrief. 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Comparisons across Instruction Type 
Mean endorsement rates by instructional set, syllogism type, and content type are 
shown in Table  4.2. Effects were analysed using two mixed-ANOVAs, the first a 2 
Problem Type (N, PS) x 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Instruction 
(Necessity, Possibility), and the second a 2 Problem Type (PW, I) x 3 Content 
(Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Instruction (Necessity, Possibility).   
The ANOVA concerned with N and PS problem types revealed a significant 
main effect of syllogism type [F (1,155) = 33.00, p < .001, 
 = .18], with N problems 
(M = 92%, SD = 17%) being endorsed more frequently than PS syllogisms (M = 76%, 
SD = 27%). Instructional set and problem type interacted significantly [F (1,155) = 
15.51, p < .001, 
 = .10], representing a larger difference in endorsement rates 
between N and PS problems under necessity than possibility instructions. There was 
also a main effect of instructional set [F (1,155) = 14.71, p < .001, 
 = .09], with more 
problems being endorsed under possibility (M = 89%, SD = 19%) than necessity 
instructions (M = 79%, SD = 25%). Content showed no main effect, or interaction 
effects with instructional set or problem type. 
To investigate the extent to which content may alter the reasoning strategies 
adopted by individuals, PS endorsement rates between content conditions were 
analysed for the necessity instructions using a 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) 
univariate ANOVA. This is following the reasoning that PS syllogisms are those where 
differences in positive, control, and negative content will be found under necessity 
instructions (See Chapter  3 for a full discussion). No main effect of content was 
revealed between PS endorsement rates across content categories [F(2,75) = .75, p = 
.47, 
 = .02], and no pair-wise comparisons were statistically significant.  
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Table  4.2 Mean Endorsement Rates (%) by Instructional Set,  
Syllogism Type and Content Type 
  Endorsement Rate (%) 
Instruction Content (N) N PS PW I 
Necessity Positive (20) 91.3 60.0 15.0 15.0 
  (23.3) (32.8) (22.1) (26.2) 
 Control (28) 95.5 67.9 22.3 12.5 
  (9.8) (30.3) (28.3) (21.0) 
 Negative (30) 89.2 70.8 20.8 9.2 
  (22.4) (30.1) (22.8) (19.1) 
Possibility Positive (23) 88.0 87.0 26.1 21.7 
  (16.6) (21.1) (38.0) (28.5) 
 Control (30) 89.2 90.0 40.0 6.7 
  (21.5) (23.3) (34.5) (17.3) 
 Negative (30) 96.7 82.5 36.7 8.3 
  (8.6) (25.6) (32.0) (21.1) 
 
 
The analysis of variance conducted focussing on PW and I conclusions revealed a 
main effect of syllogism type [F (1,155) = 6.89, p = .01, 
 = .04], with PW conclusions 
(M = 27%, SD = 30%) being endorsed more frequently than I conclusions (M = 12%, 
SD = 22%). There was also a main effect of instructional set [F (1,155) = 23.172, p = 
.02, 
 = .04], with possibility instructions (M = 23%, SD = 29%) leading to more 
endorsements than necessity instructions (M = 16%, SD = 23%). There was also a 
statistically significant interaction between problem type and instructional set 
[F(1,155) = 26.59, p < .001, 
 = .15]. In this case, the interaction reflects the larger 
difference between the PW and I conclusions under possibility instructions than 
under necessity instructions. Content type did not show any main effects or 
interaction effects with instructional set or problem type. 
Similarly, a 3 Content (Positive, Content, Negative) univariate ANOVA showed 
no difference in endorsement rate across content types for PW problems under 
possibility instructions, [F(1,80) = 1.11, p = .34, 
 = .03]; the main area of interest for 
possibility instructions (See Chapter  3 for a full discussion of why differences would 
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be expected in PW conclusions under possibility instructions). No post-hoc 
comparisons reached statistical significance. 
4.3.2 TMMS findings 
In order to assess any impact of Attention, Repair, and Clarity on the problem types 
of interest, TMMS subscale scores were correlated with PS endorsement rates under 
necessity instructions (PS-Necessity), and PW endorsement rates under possibility 
instructions (PW-Possibility). As can be seen from Table  4.3, there are no statistically 
significant relationships between the extent to which people attend to their 
emotions, the clarity of their emotions, or their ability to repair and maintain 
emotions and the rates at which they endorse the conclusions of interest. None of 
the TMMS subscales were found to correlate with the effects of content type on PS-
Necessity or PW-Possibility problems. Given the limited relationships between the 
TMMS subscales and performance on the reasoning task, the scores were not 
subjected to any further analyses. 
 
Table  4.3 Correlation coefficients for the relationship between TMMS subscale scores and 
endorsement rates of PS-Necessity and PW-Possibility problem types 
 Correlation Coefficients [r (p) N] 
TMMS Content PS-Necessity PW-Possibility 
Attention Negative .07 (.72) 29 -.24 (.21) 28 
 Neutral .07 (.73) 26 -.07 (.72) 28 
 Positive -.38 (.10) 20 .23 (.32) 22 
 Overall .010 (.90) 75 -.07 (.56) 78 
Repair Negative -.14 (.47) 29 <-.01 (.99) 28 
 Neutral .13 (.52) 26 .21 (.28) 28 
 Positive -.09 (.70) 20 .10 (.64) 22 
 Overall -.02 (.84) 75 .09 (.44) 78 
Clarity Negative -.20 (.30) 29 -.10 (.62) 28 
 Neutral .30 (.13) 26 .24 (.23) 28 
 Positive -.28 (.24) 20 .31 (.16) 22 
 Overall -.02 (.86) 75 .15 (.20) 78 
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4.3.3 Confidence Ratings 
Confidence rates were subject to two 4 Problem Type (N, PS, PW, I) by 3 Content 
Type (Positive, Control, Negative) ANOVAs; with data from the two instructional sets 
being analysed separately. Cell means for these designs are shown in Table  4.4. 
 
Table  4.4 Confidence Ratings (%) by Instructional  
Set and Syllogism type (SD paranthesised) 
  Confidence Ratings (%) 
Instruction Mood (N) N PS PW I 
Necessity Positive (20) 83.39 79.46 83.04 86.61 
  (15.16) (17.53) (13.51) (12.09) 
 Control (28) 84.57 81.25 78.19 82.65 
  (19.59) (19.55) (20.47) (19.34) 
 Negative (30) 81.79 76.79 75.83 81.07 
  (15.82) (19.19) (18.61) (18.21) 
Possibility Positive (23) 86.96 79.50 86.96 87.73 
  (10.96) (14.69) (11.07) (12.78) 
 Control (30) 84.29 75.83 83.21 89.29 
  (19.46) (22.54) (14.86) (15.72) 
 Negative (30) 83.21 75.12 83.69 83.57 
  (21.94) (22.40) (18.47) (20.65) 
 
 
Under necessity instructions, confidence ratings showed a main effect of syllogism 
type [F (3,225) = 9.74, p < .001, 
 = .12], but no main effect of content type or any 
syllogism-content interaction. Pair-wise comparisons revealed a general pattern of 
higher confidence for N and I conclusions relative to PS and PW; N-PS (p=.003), N-PW 
(p<.001), N-I (p=.82), I-PS (p=.003), I-PW (p<.001), and PS-PW (p=.59).  
Under possibility instructions, confidence ratings also showed a main effect 
of syllogism type [F (3,240) = 21.96, p<.001, 
 = .22], but no main effect of content 
or any interaction effects. Pair-wise comparisons revealed broadly the same pattern 
as under necessity instructions; of higher confidence for N and I conclusions relative 
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to PS and PW; N-PS (p=.003), N-PW (p<.001), N-I (p=.17), I-PS (p=.14), I-PW (p<.001), 
and PS-PW (p<.001) 
Across all mood conditions, under necessity instructions, confidence ratings 
were correlated with endorsement rates for necessary problems, [r (78) = .47, p < 
.001], PS [r (78) = -.27, p = .02], and PW problems, [r (78) = -.30, p = .008]. This is 
similar to the confidence-endorsement correlations found under possibility 
instructions, which also showed confidence to be correlated with endorsement rate 
for necessary [r (83) = .23, p = .04], and PW syllogisms [r (83) = .22, p = .05]. 
In addition, controlling for individual confidence in each response in the 
previously outlined analysis of endorsement data by including confidence ratings as a 
covariate does not change the patterns or the levels of statistical significance 
reached. This suggests that confidence does not explain the effects of instructional 
set or problem type on endorsement rates. 
Overall, these results suggest that under both instructional sets, higher 
confidence is to some extent associated with higher rates of endorsement (higher 
logical accuracy) on necessary problems, and with lower rates of endorsement 
(higher logical accuracy) on possible-strong and possible-weak problems under 
necessity instructions. Similarly, under possibility instructions, higher confidence 
ratings are associated with higher rates of endorsement (higher logical accuracy) on 
necessary and possible-weak syllogisms. 
4.4 Discussion 
The current chapter builds on the work of Chapter  3 by adapting the necessity-
possibility paradigm to incorporate integral mood, manipulated by varying the 
emotional valence of the terms in each syllogism. Typical effects of problem type 
were replicated, with necessary problems being endorsed as necessary more than 
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possible-strong, possible-strong more than possible-weak, and possible-weak more 
than impossible. This pattern also held under possibility instructions when the task 
was to judge the possibility of each conclusion. 
The small effect of mood found previously (Section  3.4.1), whereby negative 
mood lead to higher endorsement rates on PW problems under possibility 
instructions, was not found in the current data. There were also no differences in 
confidence ratings across content types. However, participants were more confident 
in their responses to necessary and impossible problems in both instructional sets 
than they were in their responses to possible-strong and possible-weak problem 
types. This replicates the earlier findings that people are more confident in responses 
to determinate than indeterminate problems, and along with the main effects of 
syllogism type on endorsement rates, supports the argument that individuals can 
differentiate the four problem types to some extent. This highlights the need to 
consider the different syllogism types when interpreting the results reported in 
previous research as it is often overlooked; PS and PW, if responded to differently 
depending on the content valence, may obscure interesting results in syllogistic 
reasoning if they are treated as a single group. 
The existing literature suggests that positive and negative emotive content 
can both improve reasoning as was shown by Blanchette and Campbell’s (2005) 
study on war veterans or impair reasoning, as shown by Blanchette and colleagues 
work on terrorist-related content (2007), potentially by focussing attention on 
logically irrelevant aspects (Janis & Frick, 1943 to take just one example). Yet neither 
of these effects was found with the current data. 
In Experiment 1, the effect of incidental negative emotion was found to be 
larger than the effect of incidental positive emotion or control conditions. This was 
seen in higher rates of PW-Possibility endorsement. In the current experiment, with 
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integral emotion, no differences between content types were found for PW-
Possibility problems, although increased endorsement for negative content relative 
to positive and control was found on N-Possibility problems. This provides some 
further, although weak, support for the idea that negative mood, as well as 
negatively valenced stimuli, cues more careful and thus logically accurate processing 
of reasoning problems. Comparison of the predicted patterns for Load and 
Information theories against the obtained results (Table  4.1 and Table  4.2), however, 
shows very weak evidence of the expected patterns in the data, and at marginal (at 
best) levels of statistical significance.  
Returning to confidence ratings, similar patterns are found across incidental 
(Chapter  3) and integral (current chapter) manipulations. In both cases, people are 
more confident in their responses on necessary and impossible items than they are in 
their responses to both classes of possible items. However, the differences in 
confidence ratings in earlier studies have shown that negative mood leads to higher 
confidence ratings (Section  3.4.2); this pattern is not replicated here. Content valence 
does not appear to affect confidence judgments when the emotional element is 
integral to the problem. However, contrary to the relationships found by Shynkaruk 
and Thompson (2006), confidence is related to some extent to accuracy. This was 
most pronounced in the correlations between accuracy and confidence under 
necessity instructions, with the relationships being smaller or in the opposite 
directions under possibility instructions. Unfortunately, due to the design of the 
study and the software used, it was not possible to collect response latencies which 
may shed further light on the relationships between syllogism type and confidence 
ratings by allowing us to control for thinking time, which may be related to 
confidence ratings. 
dzahra 177 330974 
 
The effects found previously with incidental emotion were not found when 
manipulating integral affect. This may be a result of the salience of the affective cues 
in the current experiment. Although it was thought that using an integral 
manipulation should reduce demand characteristics potentially caused by a written 
mood manipulation, it may be that by moving the affective element to within the 
reasoning task, any weight it may have had as a source of information may have been 
discounted. Whereas in the incidental manipulation individuals reasoned about 
neutral problems after they had supposedly stopped being asked to think about their 
emotions, in the integral task, reading the emotive terms may make the valence of 
the items more salient; though the effects in the current study were still small. It is 
likely that participants in a ‘reasoning’ study, especially undergraduate psychology 
students, will have some notion that they are meant to try and ignore any content, 
not just emotive content, and thus any emotional cues may have been more severely 
suppressed than they might have been. Other work in the literature which has found 
effects of integral emotion may not suffer from such a discounting effect because of 
how they were advertised to participants. It is difficult to tell from the published 
reports of these studies whether participants were told the studies were 
investigating reasoning, emotion, or both. Details such as this may aid future 
researchers by allowing explanations such as this to be supported or ruled out, and in 
the interests of transparency, all studies reported in this thesis were advertised using 
variations on ‘A study to investigate factors affecting reasoning’.  
It could be argued that this discounting would require the expenditure of 
additional cognitive effort, and that the results would be expected to show the 
pattern of effects predicted by load theories. It may be that the additional load is of 
little consequence given the already demanding nature of the task. This explanation 
of the findings suggests that the paradigm adopted may not be sufficiently sensitive 
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to discover any differences caused by either the content or the additional load. It 
would therefore be profitable in future work to develop more sensitive measures of 
reasoning. With respect to theories of whether and how emotion and reasoning 
interact, and in particular the load and information theories, the current data do not 
show any clear support for either account, and are not consistent with the findings of 
Blanchette and colleagues, outlined above, or Goel and Vartanian (2011), outlined in 
Chapter  2 which support information theories. Taking into consideration the points 
raised above, this may be due to the nature of the task and its relative difficulty. The 
high rates of endorsement for PS under necessity instructions, and low rates of 
endorsement of PW conclusions under possibility instructions provide little evidence 
that people search for alternative models. If only few people search for alternatives, 
then the potential for observing differences as a result of the emotional content may 
be limited.  
Summary 
Experiment 2 replicates the typical effects of problem type and instructional set (e.g. 
Evans et al., 1999) but fails to find any statistically significant differences between 
content types on the critical problems. Positive, Control, and Negative content lead 
to rates of endorsement on PS problems under necessity instruction and PW 
problems under possibility instruction which were statistically similar. For PS-
Necessity problems, there is some suggestion that positive content led to lower 
endorsement rates, so possibly more effortful processing and assessment of more 
possible models. Similarly, for PW-Possibility problems negative mood seems to lead 
to more effortful processing; though these differences did not reach statistical 
significance, and are not reliable enough to make a strong case for emotion effects, 
the reduction in endorsement may be indicative of the search for alternative models.  
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However, this evidence is limited. Endorsement rates for PS-Necessity 
problems were high across content types, and endorsement rates for PW-Possibility 
problems were low across content types. It is possible that the difficulty of these 
problems and the resultant ceiling and floor effects – that is, necessity problems 
being perhaps too easy, and the search for alternative models in the key conditions 
being too difficult - make any effects of content difficult to detect in the current 
paradigm which seeks differences in the levels of analytic processing. That is, the 
hypothesised differences between content types on the critical problems would be 
due to different amounts of ‘searching for alternative models’. Whereas Experiments 
1 and 2 have been seeking differences in levels of this type of effortful processing, an 
alternative approach would be to consider differences in the relative use of high- and 
low-effort strategies; differences in the relative use of analytic processing and 
heuristics. Experiments 3 and 4 in the following chapter make use of the belief-bias 
paradigm in order to do this. 
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Chapter Five 
5. Belief Bias and Affective Content 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiments 1 and 2 utilised the Necessity-Possibility paradigm to investigate the 
effect of incidental and integral mood on syllogistic reasoning. The results from these 
experiments suggest that the effects of emotion are small or non-existent. A number 
of possible explanations, such as the paradigm’s complexity and sensitivity have been 
discussed at the end of Chapter  4, and the current chapter aims to address the issue 
of which reasoning processes are measured by adopting the belief-bias paradigm. As 
previously outlined, the Necessity-Possibility paradigm is designed to measure the 
extent to which effortful, analytic responding is used, and the previous findings 
would appear to suggest that there is little difference in performance as a function of 
the emotional content of the conclusions and limited influence of induced emotion. 
The Belief-Bias paradigm however allows an investigation of differences in the 
relative use of these analytic processes, and lower-effort heuristic processes. 
In the Necessity-Possibility paradigm the distinction between cursory and 
more extensive processing was based on the assumption that responses can be made 
based on either single initial mental models or by these and an additional search for 
alternative models. This might be considered different amounts of analytic 
processing. The belief-bias paradigm however considers both analytical responses 
based on problem structure, and lower effort strategies such as reliance on belief, 
typically considered more akin to heuristic processing. Belief-Bias therefore provides 
a means of assessing the relative use of analytic versus heuristic processing by relying 
on problem properties to determine response strategies. This paradigm takes 
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advantage of the ability to cross logical validity with believability in syllogisms, such 
that by orthogonally rotating validity and believability, four problem types can be 
created; those with logically valid and believable conclusions (VB), those with 
logically valid but unbelievable conclusions (VU), those with logically invalid but 
believable conclusions (IB), and finally, those with logically invalid but unbelievable 
conclusions (IU). Examples of each are shown below. 
 
Table  5.1 Examples of Syllogism Conclusion Types  
created by crossing Validity and Believability 
 Believability 
Believable Unbelievable 
V
a
li
d
it
y
 V
a
li
d
 No silver things are mechanical 
Some mechanical things are cars 
Some cars are not silver 
No vehicles are blue 
Some blue things are cars 
Some cars are not vehicles 
In
va
li
d
 No trains are planes 
Some planes are owned by Virgin 
Some trains are not owned by Virgin 
No cats are dogs 
Some dogs are mammals 
Some cats are not mammals 
 
 
Presenting individuals with a series of syllogisms which are drawn from each of these 
four categories and asking them to indicate whether they think the conclusions 
follow allows a comparison of endorsement rates across the four types of conclusion. 
This in turn enables us to determine whether individuals accept conclusions on the 
basis of their logical validity, on the basis of their believability, or are influenced by 
both. 
Typically, what is found is that both validity and believability have a main 
effect on endorsement rates; valid conclusions are endorsed more than invalid ones, 
and believable conclusions are endorsed more than unbelievable ones. Furthermore, 
validity and believability are typically found to interact such that VB conclusions are 
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endorsed more frequently than VU conclusions, which are in turn endorsed more 
frequently than IB conclusions, which are endorsed more frequently than IU 
conclusions, furthermore the difference between IB and IU problems types is 
typically found to be larger than the difference between VB and VU types (e.g. Evans 
et al., 1983).   
The validity by believability interaction found using the Belief-Bias Paradigm 
(Chapter  2), has been widely replicated, and researchers have used the paradigm to 
measure the relative use of logic and belief when reasoning about a syllogism’s 
conclusions, as well as to investigate factors besides emotion which they propose 
affect the relative engagement of each reasoning system. For example Evans and 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) used the paradigm to investigate the effects of a speeded task, 
and found that reducing the time in which a response had to be made increased 
reliance on prior beliefs, and Quayle and Ball (2000) adopt the paradigm to 
investigate the impact of working memory on belief-bias, showing that increasing 
WM load increases belief-bias. There are other researchers however who have 
argued that the belief-logic interaction, often considered evidence of motivated 
reasoning; more engaged reasoning when the conclusion is unbelievable; is merely a 
response bias (Dube et al., 2010), and does not reflect differential analytic and 
heuristic processing, and others who explain the interaction in terms of selective 
processing theory (Ball et al., 2006; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). However, the 
underlying theory is less important than the fact that the logic-belief distinction still 
provides a useful tool for investigating the interaction of emotion and reasoning.  
Although little work has used the belief-bias paradigm to investigate the 
effects of integral mood on reasoning specifically, as discussed in earlier sections on 
historical and contemporary research on content effects (Section  2.4.1), Zahra (2008) 
reports a small-scale study in which participants were presented VB, VU, IB and IU 
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syllogisms in which content was varied to be either neutral or anxiety-related. The 
results reflected the standard main and interaction effects, as well as main and 
interaction effects of content type which showed that anxiety content exaggerated 
the believability by validity interaction relative to neutral content. That is, the 
difference between endorsement rates of believable and unbelievable syllogisms 
being greater in valid than invalid conclusions with anxiety content than the 
difference between these syllogisms found with neutral content. These patterns 
were considered in terms of anxiety-related content reducing the availability of 
central executive resources, and the nature of the content leading attention to be 
directed away from the structure of the syllogisms towards the believability of the 
thematic content. However, the study was conducted as part of a larger research 
project investigating the effects of eating-disorder related content and assessment 
anxiety. These conditions were collapsed to form the anxiety-related content items, 
so whether the effects were specific to any sub-type of anxiety related content is 
unclear.  
More recently, Goel and Vartanian (2011) have utilised a similar approach to 
investigating the effects of control and affective content on syllogistic reasoning. 
They found that the standard belief-bias effects were present with neutral content, 
but that negatively valenced content lead to less reliance on prior beliefs. They use 
the AIM (Section  2.4.1) to explain this pattern in terms of negatively valenced 
content cueing more careful processing of the problem. In explaining the increase in 
logical accuracy found with negative content, they argue that the negative content 
cues a more careful and systematic processing style, which they support with 
response time data. However, they did not consider positively valenced content. As 
discussed earlier, although emotion-specific content should provide the basis of 
future work in this area, at this stage, general affective classes may prove more 
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informative when other variables such as form and believability are controlled. This is 
especially the case given the subjectivity of ‘specific’ emotional content (Section  1.3). 
That is, generally positive and negative content classes have been used in previous 
work, and the comparison of positive to negative is important, but as Goel and 
Vartanian’s study shows, direct comparison is often omitted.  
Given these findings, and those of Blanchette and Campbell (2005), 
Blanchette and colleagues (2007), and the other studies using emotive content 
outlined in the introduction to Chapter  4 which have found both improved and 
impaired logical responding with emotive content, the Belief-Bias paradigm provides 
an opportunity to extend the literature beyond more commonly used tasks such as 
the Iowa gambling task (e.g. Blanchette, 2006; Ikegami, 2002; Shackman et al., 2006), 
and provide a more detailed investigation of whether and how emotion affects 
reasoning. This is achieved by the careful control of syllogism properties in the Belief-
Bias paradigm in order to assess the relative use of analytic and heuristic processes, 
and the comparison of incidental and integral affect. Although a sizeable body of 
work has investigated the effects of incidental and integral mood in situations such as 
gambling and generally found negative emotions to impair performance (Miu, 
Heilman, & Houser, 2008), quite possibly due to their more apparent practical 
applications in the clinical domain, understanding how affect alters reasoning on 
syllogistic tasks within the Belief-Bias paradigm provides a much clearer test of the 
load and information theories. This is achieved by allowing much more control of 
problem structure whilst also allowing the use of established effects to be used as 
measures of analytic versus heuristic processing. In the case of belief-bias effects, 
these are the main effects of validity and believability, and the interaction between 
the two, as well as indices of logic versus belief, which can be computed using 
equations derived from the early work on these effects (discussed below, but see 
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also Lefford, 1946). These provide a measure of an individuals’ reliance on logical 
structure and their reliance on the believability of the conclusions when responding, 
and can be thought of as measures of analytic versus heuristic responding 
(Chapter  2).  
This experiment aims to investigate the effects of syllogism content on the 
relative reliance on logical structure and prior beliefs by developing the Belief-Bias 
paradigm to include an additional factor, emotive content, as a way of manipulating 
integral affect. Based on previous findings from research on integral emotion, the 
results reported here focus broadly on replicating the standard belief-bias effects, 
and analysing the extent to which they differ as a function of content valence. 
Although previous research has shown limited effects of integral emotion the Belief-
Bias paradigm provides a more direct measure of the two reasoning systems 
proposed by dual process theories. This chapter will begin by using a web-based 
approach to increase sample size and statistical power, followed by a smaller scale 
laboratory follow-up to assess the replicability of any effects found. In relation to the 
information and load theories which have so far provided a framework for 
investigating the impact of emotion, the following hypotheses can be outlined. If 
integral emotion serves as information then individuals would be expected to show 
higher reliance on beliefs when the problem content is positive, and higher reliance 
on logic when the content is negative relative to control content. If, however, affect 
serves as cognitive load, both positive and negative content would be expected to 
increase belief-based but reduce logic-based responding relative to control content.  
5.2 Online Experiment (Experiment 3) 
Having established the Belief-Bias paradigm as a useful tool for investigating the 
impact of integral emotion on reasoning, the next considerations concern its 
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implementation. The paradigm, as discussed above, and as will be outlined in more 
detail below, provides a measure of the relative use of logic- and belief-based 
processing, or more specifically, indices of the reliance on logical form and conclusion 
believability when responding to syllogisms. This is a more direct measure of which 
type of reasoning process is engaged than the Necessity-Possibility paradigm. As 
such, although the primary aim of the online version of this study is to investigate the 
impact of integral emotion on the belief-bias effect, it also aims to investigate 
differences in the reliance on logical form versus prior beliefs when content valence 
is varied. This second objective addresses the issues raised in the discussions of 
previous chapters and those outlined at the beginning of the current chapter 
regarding the need to measure the relative use of low and high effort processing 
rather than just differing levels of high-effort processing.  
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Materials 
Syllogisms 
The syllogisms constructed for this study were matched for mood, structure, form, 
and difficulty (three models) based on figures provided by Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1992). This avoids the possible confounds caused by figural effects and difficulty 
(e.g. Garnham & Oakhill, 1994).  Content was chosen based on previous work in the 
area of emotion, with terms appearing in the literature as positive and negative being 
used to create emotive syllogism sets. Subsets of these emotive-content syllogisms 
were then selected for use based on pilot data. The believability categories were also 
validated by piloting as described below.  
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Piloting of Materials 
In order to validate the believability and mood categories, two small-scale pre-tests 
(Believability: N = 14, 3 male; Mood Categories: N = 12, 3 male) were conducted. 
Participants asked to assess believability were shown the syllogism conclusions in a 
random order and asked to rate how believable they thought each one was. 
Participants asked to assess the mood categories were shown the syllogisms in a 
random order and asked to rate each on how positive, overall, they thought the 
content was. Responses for each task were made on a seven-point scale, anchored at 
Negative and Positive for the positivity rating task, and Unbelievable and Believable 
for the believability rating task.  
A 2 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) by 2 Believability (Believable, 
Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA on believability ratings showed a main 
effect of believability [F(1,13) = 151.30, p < .001, 
	= .92], in which ‘believable’ 
conclusions (M = 6.33, SD = .46) were rated as much more believable than 
‘unbelievable’ ones (M = 3.16, SD = 1.01). No main effect of content type was found 
on believability ratings, nor did content type and believability interact.  
The same repeated measures ANOVA conducted on positivity ratings showed 
a main effect of content type [F(2,22) = 49.36, p < .001, 
	= .81]. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed this to be due to significant differences in ratings between 
control (M = 4.23, SD = .65) and negative items (M = 2.12, SD = .61, p < .001); control 
and positive items (M = 5.41, SD = 1.18, p < .001), and positive and negative items (p 
< .001). No main effect of believability was found on positivity ratings, nor did 
content type and believability interact.   
The intraclass correlation for believability ratings across the fourteen 
participants’ ratings, after applying the Spearman-Brown correction formula (See 
Appendix  F) was α = .99, which provides an estimate of the reliability of the 
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believability ratings averaged across participants. The corresponding value for 
positivity ratings across the twelve participants who rated each syllogism was also α = 
.99. These values suggest positivity and believability are consistent across individuals. 
The final set of materials can be found in Appendix  C, but examples are provided 
below. 
Positive, Valid, Believable  
 
Some bright things are presents,  
No surprises are bright,  
Therefore some presents are not surprises 
 
Control, Invalid, Believable  
 
Some orange things are metal,  
No metal things are vegetables,  
Therefore some vegetables are not orange 
 
Negative, Valid, Unbelievable  
 
Some types of nuclear radiation are deadly,  
No deadly things are dangerous,  
Therefore some types of nuclear radiation are not dangerous 
 
 
Questionnaire 
The data in this study was collected using an online form created using Google 
Documents beta©. Different forms were created, with the content of the syllogisms 
and the order of presentation varying randomly between participants. Each form 
consisted of the title of the study, the text of the brief and instructions, followed by 
the first item which asked participants to check a tick-box after having read the brief 
and instructions if they gave their consent to participate. 
Following this, an open text box was provided for participants to enter a 
memorable date, and it was explained that this was so that their data could be 
identified and withdrawn if they wished at a later date whilst allowing them to 
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remain anonymous. Participants’ right-to-withdraw was explained, and they were 
informed that they could do so by closing the browser window. To allow participants 
the chance to ask questions, the experimenter’s contact details were provided, along 
with instructions to contact them if they had any questions before completing the 
experiment. 
The memorable date question was followed by the sixteen syllogisms 
presented in a random order. For each item, participants had to select one of two 
radio-buttons, labelled 'Valid' and 'Invalid'. Upon completion of the study and clicking 
a 'submit' button all responses were saved along with a time-stamp so that time of 
completion could be monitored and multiple successive submissions could be 
detected. 
Design 
The design of this study was a standard Belief-Bias paradigm with an additional 
content factor, resulting in a mixed 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability 
(Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) ANOVA design, 
with content being a between-participants factor. 
To provide measures of the relative reliance on logical structure and prior 
beliefs, indices of logic and belief were also computed based on endorsement rates 
as follows (subscripted 'end' denotes endorsement);  
 
 
Logic Index = (VBend+VUend)-(IBend+IUend) 
Belief Index = (VBend+IBend)-(VUend+IUend) 
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These measures allow the use of logic and beliefs to be compared across the levels of 
the content factor in two 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) univariate ANOVAs. 
5.3.2 Participants and Procedure 
Potential participants were contacted by email and social networking websites, and 
those wishing to participate were emailed hyperlinks to a randomly allocated test 
form. The procedure was structured as outlined above. The final sample for the study 
consisted of 159 participants. Age, gender, and other demographic information was 
not recorded. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 ANOVAs 
Mean endorsement rates (%) by syllogism type and content valence are shown in 
Table  5.2. The 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 
Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) mixed-ANOVA found a main effect of 
validity, with more valid (M = 67.29, SD = 30.06) than invalid (M = 46.60, SD = 32.69) 
conclusions being endorsed [F (1,155) = 64.16, p < .001, 
 = .29]. The analyses also 
found a main effect for believability, with more believable (M = 63.77, SD = 29.33) 
than unbelievable (M = 50.13, SD = 33.41) conclusions being endorsed [F (1,155) = 
24.52, p < .001, 
 = .14]. 
In addition, a main effect of content type was found [F (1,155) = 5.58, p = .01, 

 = .07], where positive (M = 59.66, SD = 29.41) and negative (M = 61.18, SD = 
30.80) conclusions are generally endorsed more frequently than control conclusions 
(M = 50.00, SD = 33.91; p = .02, d = .53 and p = .008, d =.59 respectively). 
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Table  5.2 Mean Endorsement Rates (%) by Syllogism Type and Content Valence 
for the Belief-Bias paradigm with emotive content (Online Setting) 
Syllogism 
Type 
 
Content Valence (N)  
Positive (55) Control (52) Negative (52) Total (159) 
VB 
M 71.36 59.31 86.54 72.41 
SD 25.19 26.91 20.69 24.26 
VU 
M 63.18 63.24 60.10 62.17 
SD 30.37 42.43 34.75 35.88 
IB 
M 57.73 48.04 59.61 55.13 
SD 31.87 37.70 33.63 34.40 
IU 
M 46.36 29.41 38.46 38.08 
SD 30.21 28.59 34.11 30.97 
 
 
Believability and content type interacted significantly [F (2,155) = 3.43, p = .04, 
 = 
.04], whereby believability increases endorsement rates across all conditions, but 
particularly so when the content is negative. Validity and Believability also showed a 
significant interaction [F (1,155) = 4.21, p = .04, 
 = .03], in the directions that would 
be expected based on previous research; valid conclusions being endorsed more than 
invalid ones, believable ones being endorsed more than unbelievable ones, and the 
difference between believable and unbelievable being larger for invalid conclusions 
(Means for each category are included in Table Table  5.2). The results also indicated a 
highly significant three-way interaction between validity, believability, and content 
type [F (2,155) = 6.03, p = .003, 
 = .07]. This is shown in Figure  5.1, and partly 
extends the findings of Goel and Vartanian (2011); their reduced validity-believability 
interaction with negative content is also found with positive content. 
Univariate ANOVAs entering belief and logic indices as dependent variables 
and content type as the independent variable found no significant effect of content 
type on use of logic [F (2,155) = 1.18, p = .31, 
 = .02], but did find a significant 
effect of content type on the belief index [F (2,155) = 3.43, p = .04, 
 = .04]. Post-hoc 
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comparisons show that the negative (M = 23.80, SD = 34.50) content significantly 
increased reliance on belief relative to positive (M = 9.77, SD = 26.86, p = .04, d = .46) 
and control content (M = 7.35, SD = 41.85, p = .02, d = .43), but that there was no 
significant difference between the control and positive content. Plots of indices by 
content type are shown in Figure  5.6, p207, and are returned to later. 
 
 
Figure  5.1 Validity by Believability interactions by Content Type; Online Data 
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5.4.2 Correlations  
To obtain a general overview of patterns within the data, Logic and Belief Indices 
were correlated with each other and with problem content, with the three conditions 
sequentially ordered Positive-Control-Negative, to provide a valence continuum.  
Content type was positively correlated with the belief index, indicating that negative 
content increases reliance on belief as a cue in responding [r (158) = .16, p = .04, d = 
.33]. In addition, the logic and belief indices were negatively correlated [r (158) = -
.35, p < .001, d = .75], suggesting a tendency for participants to rely on either logic or 
belief as a basis for their responses as opposed to trying to integrate the two. 
5.5 Discussion of Experiment 3 
The main effect of content type suggests that problems with positive and negative 
content are endorsed more than control problems. This suggests that regardless of 
problem validity or believability, those which have emotive content are more likely to 
be rated as valid than those whose content is neutral. Although interesting, it is in 
combination with validity and believability that the effects of content are most 
relevant to evaluating the strength of the load and information explanations of how 
emotion impacts reasoning. When these additional factors are considered, it can be 
seen that believability and content interact in such a way that believability increases 
endorsement rates across all types of content. Furthermore, this believability-driven 
increase in endorsement is greater for problems with negative than positive or 
control content. This suggests that believability is consistently used as a cue to 
endorsement regardless of content, but that it is relied on more heavily when the 
content is negative. One possible explanation of this is that negative content loads 
WM more severely than positive or control content, forcing a reliance on heuristic 
processes.  
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Differential WM load across content types is also interesting in relation to 
the validity by believability by content interaction, which seems to show that the 
validity by believability interaction component is reduced to a large extent when the 
content is emotive. If both types of content load WM, under a dual process 
interpretation, it would be attention to logical structure that suffered first, and a 
reduction in the effect of logic would be expected with positive and negative content. 
This is because if WM were reduced to the extent that responses were made solely 
on believability, little difference would be expected in endorsement rates between 
valid and invalid syllogisms.  
However, that there was no validity by content interaction appears to rule 
out this explanation. However, it might be possible that enough resources remain for 
an individual to adopt a logical approach to the problems, or a belief based strategy, 
yet not have enough resources to integrate the information. Limited WM may 
prevent individuals from detecting and resolving conflict between logic and belief 
based responses, leading them to adopt one or the other approach. This would 
explain the reduced interaction between validity and believability found with 
emotive content. Alternatively, the reduced interaction with emotive content may be 
indicative of a reduction in motivated reasoning. Emotive content, be it positive or 
negative, leads individuals to either use logic, or use belief, and integrate the two 
less; possibly because of increased load or reduced motivation to reason accurately 
based on all available information.  
An alternative explanation of these findings would be from an individual 
differences perspective, whereby some individuals, when faced with emotive 
content, choose to adopt a logical strategy, maybe because the content cues them to 
the structure, and thus ignore the believability of the conclusion; whereas others 
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adopt a belief-based strategy, ignoring structure altogether, possibly because of 
reduced cognitive resources or a misapplied focus on content. 
Alongside the novel results outlined above, the results of Experiment 3 show 
that the current materials and procedures behave in a similar fashion to those used 
previously in the literature. This is evidenced by the broad replication of validity and 
believability main and interaction effects. In relation to the aims of the current thesis, 
this shows that the paradigm is working as expected, and provides a basis from which 
the effects of content can be considered. 
When considering the index scores, it is interesting that content has no effect 
on reliance on logic, whereas reliance on belief is increased on problems with 
negative, but not positive or control, content. This would seem to support the 
independence of the two reasoning systems, but is difficult to reconcile with load or 
information theories. One possible explanation is that affective content serves as 
cognitive load, but that negative content loads WM more severely than positive 
emotion. However, neither load nor information theories are clearly supported. 
Having used an online study to generate a larger sample to improve the design, and 
having considered the effects under such circumstances, the following Experiment 4 
aims to replicate these findings under laboratory conditions.  
5.6 Laboratory Experiment (Experiment 4) 
In order to validate the findings of Experiment 3, the same design, materials, and 
procedure were used in a laboratory based version of the study. This also enables an 
investigation of the reliability and validity of online versus laboratory methodologies. 
The hypotheses are therefore the same as in Experiment 3. 
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5.7 Method 
5.7.1 Materials 
The materials for Experiment 4 were identical to those used in Experiment 3. 
Participants in the laboratory were seated at personal desktop computers with 
internet access, on which one of the forms (positive, negative, or control conditions) 
was displayed. 
5.7.2 Design 
This study utilised the same mixed 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability 
(Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) ANOVA design as 
Experiment 3. Indices of logic and belief were also computed as in Experiment 3. 
5.7.3 Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 56 Psychology undergraduate students at Plymouth University. 
Age, gender, and other demographic details were not recorded. Upon entering the 
laboratory, each participant was seated at a computer terminal and asked to read the 
on-screen instructions and sign a consent form if they agreed to participate. They 
were then asked to work through the questions as per the instructions in their own 
time, and told that they were free to leave when they had finished. Paper copies of 
the debrief were made available to all participants. 
5.8 Results 
5.8.1 ANOVAs 
Mean endorsement rates (%) by syllogism type and content valence are shown in 
Table  5.3. The 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 
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Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) mixed-ANOVA found a main effect of 
validity, with more valid (M = 71.62, SD = 21.77) than invalid (M = 37.40, SD = 29.83) 
conclusions being endorsed [F (1,53) = 80.66, p < .001, 
 = .60]. No effect of 
believability was found, although the general pattern of believable conclusions being 
endorsed more frequently than unbelievable conclusions is replicated. However, the 
VB and VU cell means for control content show the opposite pattern; VU conclusions 
are endorsed more frequently than VB conclusions..  
 
Table  5.3 Mean Endorsement Rates (%) by Syllogism Type and Content Valence 
for the Belief-Bias paradigm with emotive content (Laboratory Setting) 
Syllogism 
Type 
 
Content Valence (N) 
Positive (20) Control (16) Negative (20) 
VB 
M 68.75 50.00 88.75 
SD 25.49 18.26 15.12 
VU 
M 65.00 73.44 83.75 
SD 26.16 30.91 14.68 
IB 
M 35.00 40.63 40.63 
SD 31.83 31.83 30.10 
IU 
M 42.50 34.38 31.25 
SD 24.47 34.00 26.75 
 
There was also a main effect of content type [F (2,53) = 3.23, p = .05, 
 = .11], with 
negative content (M = 61.10, SD = 21.66) leading to more endorsements than 
positive (M = 52.83, SD = 27.00, approaching significance at p = .07, d = .65) or 
control content (M = 49.61, SD = 28.75, p = .02, d = .79), but no significant difference 
in endorsement rates between positive and control content. These results replicate 
the previous experiment. 
Validity and content interacted significantly [F (2,53) = 4.21, p = .02, 
 = .14], 
showing that valid conclusions are endorsed more frequently across all content 
types, but that valid conclusions are endorsed at still higher rates when the content is 
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negative than when it is positive or control. There was no interaction effect found 
between validity and believability, unlike in Experiment 3 (See Figure  5.2). As in 
Experiment 3, there was also a significant three-way interaction between validity, 
believability, and content type [F (2,53) = 4.01, p = .02, 
 = .13]. This interaction is 
shown in Figure  5.3. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.2 Validity by Believability interactions for On-line and Laboratory Data 
 
 
Univariate ANOVAs identical to those conducted for the logic and belief indices in 
experiment one this time show a significant effect of content type on the logic index 
[F (2,53) = 4.21, p = .02, 
 = .14]. Post-hoc comparisons show that only the 
difference between negative (M = 48.75, SD = 32.16) and control content (M = 24.22, 
SD = 27.94) reached statistical significance (p = .05, d = .73), with negative content 
increasing use of logic. No effect of content type on use of belief was found. 
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Figure  5.3 Validity by Believability interactions by Content Type; Laboratory Data 
 
5.8.2 Correlations 
Correlational analyses conducted as in Experiment 3 show a significant positive 
correlation between content type and use of logic [r (56) = .30, p = .03, d = .62], 
indicating that negative content increases reliance on logic. No other significant 
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correlations were found, although, as with the online data, content and belief show 
some positive relationship [r (56) = .18, p = .20], and logic and belief show a negative 
relationship [r (56) = -.17, p = .21]. 
5.9 Discussion of Experiment 4 
In the laboratory data, the most notable point is that only the main effect of validity 
was found to be consistent with typical belief-bias findings. However, although the 
believability main effect and validity-by-believability interactions did not reach 
statistical significance, they were in the directions that would be predicted by the 
previous work. The three-way validity by believability by content interaction still 
reached statistical significance, though comparison of Figure  5.3 with Figure  5.1 
shows that although there is a reduction in the validity by believability interaction for 
positive and negative content, the interaction within the laboratory control 
condition, and online control condition are very different. Control VB and VU items 
are endorsed comparably in the online data, but VU items are endorsed more 
frequently than VB items in the laboratory data. This might be suggestive of a general 
reduction in validity-by-believability interaction caused by emotive content, or the 
laboratory setting reducing the motivated reasoning which might underlie such an 
interaction. 
Interestingly, validity showed a similar interaction with content as did belief 
in the online data, and furthermore, the logic index showed an interaction with 
content in the current dataset which is similar to that for the belief index and content 
in the online dataset. This suggests it is possible that the laboratory setting cues 
people to apply their knowledge of logic when engaging in the reasoning task; yet 
without these environmental cues, people default to belief; possibly because in more 
natural online settings, beliefs have served them well – consider the discussion of 
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pragmatic reasoning in Chapter  2 – whereas in the less natural laboratory setting 
people have certain perceived expectations. One of these may be the need to try and 
reason logically. In relation to the data, this supports an explanation of the results 
based on the content valence modifying the dominant strategy and the data thus 
appears to fit an information model of emotion and reasoning interaction better than 
a load model, though the mixed effects discussed earlier should also be kept in mind; 
Negative content leads to higher reliance on logic than positive or control content. 
The explanations outlined in this and the previous discussion section 
regarding content potentially serving as load may be reconciled by considering the 
interaction of reasoning strategy with the environment in which reasoning takes 
place, or it may be a product of different mechanisms operating under different 
settings. However, the same general patterns in relation to validity and believability 
main effects are found in the laboratory and online data, with only the points of 
statistical significance differing. The interaction, however, differs as outlined above. 
5.10 Combining Online and Laboratory Data 
In order to compare the laboratory and online data directly, a 2 Validity (Valid, 
Invalid) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 Content Type (Positive, 
Control, Negative) x 2 Location (Laboratory, Online) mixed-ANOVA was conducted to 
assess the impact of location. Although no significant main effect of location was 
found, location did interact significantly with validity, F(1,208)=7.06, p<.01, and with 
believability, F(1,53)=7.83, p<.01. As depicted in Figure  5.4, the laboratory setting 
appears to increase the effect of validity and decrease the effect of belief. This 
provides some support for the idea that reliance on logical structure is primed by the 
laboratory environment. However, as the effect sizes of these interactions are 
relatively small, 
 = .03 and 
 = .04 respectively, the online and laboratory data 
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were combined to explore the overall effects with a larger data set. The results of 
analyses of variance on this combined data set are reported in the following section. 
 
 
Figure  5.4 Validity and Believability by Location Interaction Effects 
 
5.10.1 ANOVAs 
The following results from the combined sample should be interpreted in light of the 
above mentioned validity-location and believability-location interactions. A main 
effect of validity was found, showing valid (M = 68.49, SD = 28.52) conclusions to be 
endorsed more frequently than invalid (M = 44.26, SD = 32.32) conclusions, [F (1,211) 
= 122.69, p < .001, 
 = .37]. Mean endorsement rates by syllogism type and content 
valence are shown in Table  5.4. A main effect of believability was also found, showing 
that believable conclusions (M = 61.34, SD = 28.82) were endorsed more frequently 
than unbelievable ones (M = 51.40, SD = 32.02) [F (1,211) = 19.50, p < .001, 
 = .09]. 
Believability and content type interacted significantly [F (2,211) = 4.75, p = .01, 
 = 
.04], indicating that believability increases endorsement rates across all content 
conditions, but especially when the content is negatively valenced (Table  5.4). 
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Table  5.4 Mean Endorsement Rates by Syllogism Type and Content Valence 
for the Belief-Bias paradigm with emotive content (Combined Data) 
Syllogism 
Type 
 
Content Valence (N) 
Positive (75) Control (68) Negative (72) 
VB 
M 70.67 57.09 87.15 
SD 25.13 25.30 19.22 
VU 
M 63.67 65.67 66.67 
SD 29.15 40.08 32.23 
IB 
M 51.67 46.27 55.21 
SD 33.22 35.95 34.07 
IU 
M 45.33 30.60 36.46 
SD 28.68 29.78 32.21 
 
 
Validity interacted significantly with believability, in the directions that would be 
expected and that are typical of the belief-bias paradigm, namely that he difference 
between believable and unbelievable problems is larger when the conclusion is also 
invalid than when it is valid [F (1,211) = 6.39, p = .01, 
 = .03]. There was also a 
significant three-way interaction between validity, believability, and content type [F 
(2,211) = 8.42, p < .001, 
 = .07], the effects of which are shown in Figure  5.5. This 
again shows, as in Experiments 3 and 4 treated individually, that the validity by 
believability interaction is different, and reduced, for positive and negative content 
relative to control content. 
A main effect of content type was found [F (2,211) = 7.64, p = .001, 
 = .07], 
whereby positive (M=57.84, SD=29.05) and negative (M=61.37, SD=32.78) content 
lead to higher rates of endorsement than control content (M=49.91, SD=29.43, 
p=.008 and p<.001 respectively). No difference was found between endorsement 
rates on positive and negative conclusions. 
Comparing logic and belief index scores of the combined data across 
conditions in a 3 Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) univariate ANOVA shows 
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no effect of content type on use of logic, but does show a significant effect of content 
on the use of beliefs [F (2,211) = 4.75, p = .01, 
 = .04]. Post-hoc comparisons again 
show that negative content (M = 19.61, SD = 30.96) increases use of belief relative to 
positive (M=6.67, SD = 27.82, p = .02, d = .44) and control content (M = 3.54, SD = 
39.52, p = .004, d = .45), but there is no statistically significant difference between 
positive and control content.   
 
 
Figure  5.5 Validity by Believability by Content Interaction (Combined Data) 
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5.10.2 Linear Trends Analysis 
In order to further investigate the effects of content type on logic and belief, mean 
scores on the logic and belief indices for each condition were plotted against content. 
These are shown for the combined data, as well as for the laboratory and online data 
separately, in Figure  5.6. Line graphs have been used to clarify general overall 
directions of change, though it should be kept in mind that the x-axis is categorical 
and technically non-interval, though spanning the positive-negative continuum. 
In addition to the logic and belief indices described above, Figure  5.6 shows 
an interaction index, which is a measure of the extent to which belief affects logic. 
Higher interaction scores indicate a greater effect of belief on logic, lower scores, a 
reduced effect of belief on logic. This index is computed as shown below, and allows 
an investigation of the hypothesis that positive and negative content reduce the 
interaction of validity and believability by indexing the impact of beliefs on the use of 
logical validity. 
 
Interaction Index = (IBend+IUend)-(VBend+VUend) 
 
ANOVA linear contrasts indicate a statistically significant linear component in the 
logic index trend for both the combined [F (1,213) = 5.54, p = .02], and laboratory 
data [F (1,55) = 5.46, p = .02]. The belief index trend showed a significant linear 
component in the combined [F (1,213) = 5.69, p = .02], and online data [F (1,157) = 
4.39, p = .04]. The linear components for the interaction index were non-significant 
across all data sets. However, the interaction index showed a statistically significant 
quadratic component in all data sets; Combined [F (1,213) = 16.82, p < .001], Online 
[F (1,157) = 11.06, p = .001], and Laboratory [F (1,55) = 6.13, p = .017]. These results 
indicate a belief by validity interaction in the control condition, but not in the positive 
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or negative conditions. A linear components analysis of the belief and logic indices 
using the formulae in Appendix  E revealed no statistical differences between the 
linear components of the belief index and logic index trends across datasets, 
suggesting that both linear trends are the same across datasets.  
 
 
Figure  5.6 Logic, Belief, and Interaction Indices across content types and location 
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5.11 General Discussion 
Experiments 3 and 4 compared the relative use of Type One and Type Two processing 
as a function of integral emotion, building on the work in Experiments 1 and 2 which 
assessed the extent to which Type Two processes are utilised as a function of 
incidental and integral emotion respectively. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show 
that valid conclusions are endorsed consistently more frequently than invalid ones, 
and with the exception of valid-control items, and invalid-positive items in 
Experiments 4, believable conclusions are endorsed more than unbelievable ones. 
Furthermore, the difference between believable and unbelievable endorsement 
rates is, on the whole, larger for invalid than valid syllogism conclusions. What is 
novel in these findings is that the inclusion of emotive content reveals that 
conclusions of syllogisms with negative and positive content are endorsed more 
frequently than those of syllogisms with control content; a finding which replicates 
clearly across both experiments. Furthermore, the validity by believability interaction 
also changes depending on content type. Positive and negative content in both 
experiments show less pronounced validity-by-believability interactions than control 
content. The combination of the two samples, as well as linear trends analysis across 
the groups appears to reveal consistent trends: both reliance on logic and reliance on 
belief increases across positive, to control, to negative content, and the interaction 
between belief and logic is reduced for positive and negative content. 
The increases in both reliance on logic and belief with negative relative to 
positive content neither completely agree with nor conflict with previous work, 
discussed in Chapter  2, which has shown negative content to increase logical 
accuracy, or related work which has shown emotive content can decrease logical 
accuracy (Blanchette et al., 2007). One possible explanation of this is the relevance of 
the content. Blanchette and colleagues found that when the emotive content was 
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particularly relevant to the individual, logical performance improved relative to 
neutral content. This highlights the need to consider subjectivity in the use of 
emotional stimuli, and might be used as an argument for using self-selected stimuli in 
studies where pre-tests or self-directed incidental manipulations are not possible. 
The current results have more in common with the work of Goel and Vartanian 
(2011), who report that with neutral content, the belief-bias effect is present, but 
that then the content is negative, beliefs have less impact on responses. The current 
study also finds the belief-bias effect with control content, though less clearly than 
Goel and Vartanian, and the current data also show a reduction in the impact of 
belief on logic when the content of the problems is negative. Experiments 3 and 4 
also extend the work of Goel and Vartanian by including a positive condition, and 
finds that the impact of beliefs on logic is also reduced when reasoning about 
positive content. 
With respect to the differences in results found between the current 
experiments and Experiments 1 and 2, the larger, more consistent effects in the 
current chapter may be due to the nature of the paradigm. Whereas Experiments 1 
and 2 use the Necessity-Possibility paradigm to assess the extent to which Type Two 
processes are engaged in a search for alternative models, the Belief-Bias paradigm 
compares the relative use of Type One and Type Two processing. This difference 
suggests that emotion may impact reasoning by altering the relative use of logic and 
belief, rather than the extent to which more complex reasoning processes are 
engaged; it is this latter difference which Experiments 1 and 2 would have been most 
sensitive to. 
In relation to Load and Information, were mood to act as load, belief index 
scores would be expected to be higher for positive and negative content than for 
control content as both content types would be expected to reduce the availability of 
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WM resources necessary for employing logic-based strategies. In addition, logic index 
scores would be expected to be lower for positive and negative content than for 
control content. The belief index scores show this pattern; higher for emotive 
content types than control, albeit not reaching statistical significance. However, the 
logic indices do not. 
The alternative hypothesis set up at the start of this chapter was that integral 
mood may act as a source of information. Under this model, belief index scores 
would be expected to be highest for positive content, intermediate for control 
content, and lowest for negative content. Logic index scores would be expected to 
show the reverse pattern; being lowest for positive content, intermediate for control, 
and highest for negative content. The logic scores show some trend towards this 
pattern; higher for negative content, but the belief index scores do not. 
Individual strategy differences might account for these patterns, with 
emotion acting as load to some individuals and as information to others. This 
explanation is given some support by the significant quadratic trend in the 
interaction indices across experiments. Less effect of belief on logic when people 
reason about emotive content, be it positive or negative, may indicate that people 
are choosing one or the other strategy to rely on, and this may be driven by whether 
people incorporate emotion into their reasoning as load or information. However, it 
seems more likely that the interactions between content type and reasoning system 
are more complex than can be captured by thinking solely in terms for Load and 
Information, or Type One and Type Two processes, and moving towards a simpler 
paradigm may be a useful way of reducing this complexity in order to aid our 
understanding.  
In summary, across the four experiments to this point, it can be seen that 
incidental emotion has a limited impact on syllogistic reasoning, although negative 
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mood shows some suggestion of increasing the use of Type Two processing. This was 
explained in terms of negative mood leading to greater engagement, more motivated 
reasoning, and a greater search for alternative models. This was however only found 
in very specific conditions, such as on PW-syllogisms under possibility instructions 
(Experiment 1). These effects were small with incidental emotion (also Experiment 1), 
and did not reach statistical significance with integral emotion (Experiment 2). 
Clearer effects were found in the current chapter, with negative mood leading to a 
consistent increase in use of logic and belief when making judgements about the 
validity of syllogism conclusions, both in an online (Experiment 3) and laboratory 
setting (Experiment 4). These results provide some broad support for Information 
theories, though where the results contradict the patterns expected by Information 
theories such as increased reliance on belief with negative content, highlight the 
need to explore the generalisability and robustness of the findings. 
As syllogistic reasoning is considered one of the more complex types of 
reasoning, incorporating further measures of attention to emotions or thinking styles 
to understand when these apparent contradictions occur would tend to lead to a 
combinatorial explosion in the numbers of possible interactions. This would, far from 
clarifying the relationship between emotion and reasoning, only serve to confuse the 
picture by increasing the number of potential interactions to tease apart. However, 
some of the simplest arguably even ‘innate’ reasoning such as drawing Modus 
Ponens, can be found in conditional reasoning paradigms. Such paradigms are 
simpler in terms of the processes underlying the logical judgements being made than 
syllogistic reasoning, especially when focussing on the four main inference types, 
modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, and denying the 
antecedent, which will be discussed shortly. Furthermore, there is a range of work 
which has considered the impact of searching for counter-examples in conditional 
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reasoning; that is, considering alternative causes and consequences of assuming 
certain premises, and this links well to the ideas discussed in this and the previous 
chapter of searching for alternative models in syllogistic reasoning. It is thus to 
conditional reasoning that the following chapter turns, in order to compare the 
effects of emotion across syllogistic and conditional reasoning, and to investigate 
these effects in a conceptually simpler task.  
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Chapter Six 
6. Conditional Reasoning and Mood 
6.1 Introduction (Experiment 5) 
Up to this point, the focus of this thesis has been primarily on syllogistic reasoning. 
This is largely because syllogisms allow, through the use of the belief-bias and 
necessity-possibility paradigms, a way of providing measures of analytic versus 
heuristic processing. Thus they provide a good platform from which to investigate the 
relative effects of positive and negative integral and incidental emotion on the two 
types of reasoning outlined by DPT, or the extent to which individuals process the 
problems based on logical structure versus lower-effort strategies. 
Syllogistic reasoning is, however, only one group of reasoning tasks, and 
many everyday examples of reasoning are centred on conditional statements such as 
rules and precautions, cause and effect relationships, and social contracts. The 
current and following chapters extend the work on syllogistic reasoning to consider 
conditional reasoning, but utilise many of the same manipulations and properties of 
reasoning tasks discussed previously, such as validity and believability. This allows 
common metrics of reasoning performance and type of processing to be utilised 
across the experiments reported in this chapter and the remainder of the thesis. 
6.1.1 Conditional Reasoning 
Thus far the work reported has focussed on investigating the impact of integral and 
incidental emotion on syllogistic reasoning. As discussed previously, the absence of 
strong findings may be due to the complexity of three-term syllogistic reasoning 
tasks, or their relative difficulty; which leaves little scope for detecting smaller 
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differences in reasoning as a function of emotion. To overcome these issues, the 
current chapter will investigate conditional reasoning. As outlined in Section  2.3.2, 
conditional reasoning is primarily concerned with how people process statements 
such as ‘If p then q’. 
Research in this area mainly focuses on four possible inferences that can be 
drawn in such cases (Evans & Over, 2004). The logically valid inferences are modus 
ponens (MP), and modus tollens (MT). Given the above rule, if p then q, these are 
equivalent to being given p, and inferring q (MP); and being given ¬q, and inferring ¬p 
(MT). The two invalid inferences are denial of the antecedent (DA) and affirmation of 
the consequent (AC). These are equivalent to being given ¬p and inferring ¬q; and 
being given q and inferring p. To use a concrete example, consider the statement “If 
it rains, then the road will be wet”. If it has rained (p), you can validly infer that the 
roads will be wet (q) via MP. If the roads are not wet (¬q), you can validly infer that it 
did not rain (¬p) through modus tollens. If, however, it has not rained (¬p; denying 
the antecedent), you cannot make any inference about whether the roads will be 
wet or not because the statement says nothing about the condition of the roads in 
the event of ‘not rain’.  Similarly, if the roads are wet (q, affirming the consequent), 
you cannot infer anything about whether it has rained or not because the statement 
says nothing about the state of the weather given the condition of the roads. 
Past psychological research has investigated a number of variables which 
affect the rates at which each of these inferences are drawn, generated, or endorsed. 
The empirical work has also used rates of endorsement to support different theories 
regarding how people interpret conditional statements. For example, a range of 
work, concisely reviewed by Evans and Over (2004), has investigated whether 
conditionals in everyday speech are interpreted as truth-functional; that is, their 
truth value is determined entirely by their components. Other researchers have 
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investigated what factors determine whether a conditional is read as biconditional or 
not; that is, whether if p then q is understood as q if and only if p, or as equivalent to 
if q then p (Evans & Over, 2004). As a final example of the scope of the research on 
conditionals, there is also a large body of empirical work and philosophical debate 
which has focused on developing our understanding of how deontic, causal, and 
counterfactual conditionals are processed. The current chapter will consider the 
extent to which individuals rate inferences as ‘following’ from premises as a measure 
of the extent to which they endorse the inference. This allows an indication of 
whether the endorsement rates of valid and invalid inferences alter as a function of 
incidental mood, which in turn can be used to consider the mechanisms through 
which mood may have an effect on conditional reasoning as discussed below. 
6.1.2 Incidental Mood and Conditional Reasoning 
Although there is a growing body of work which has investigated the effects of 
content type on conditional reasoning (to be discussed in this section), very little has 
focussed on the impact of incidental emotion. The impact of integral emotion will 
form the basis of the subsequent chapters, whereas the current chapter focuses on 
incidental emotion. 
The most notable work on the relationship between incidental emotion and 
conditional reasoning has been conducted by Blanchette (2006), Blanchette and 
Richards (2004, 2010), and Blanchette and Leese (2011). Between them, these papers 
cover the most recent and only work specifically concerning incidental emotion and 
conditional reasoning. In their recent review of the literature on emotion and higher-
level cognition, Blanchette and Richards (2010) discuss work related to incidental 
emotions which has already been reviewed (Chapters  1 and  2 and elsewhere), yet 
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there is very limited research on the impact of incidental emotion on conditional 
reasoning tasks.  
One example of work investigating incidental emotion in conditional 
reasoning is presented by Chang and Wilson (2004) who had individuals write about 
autobiographical events where they had either been a victim of cheating or gotten 
angry, or had been happy or benefitted from someone else’s altruism prior to 
completing variants of the Wason selection task (outlined in Chapter  2). These were 
the ‘cheater detection’ and ‘altruist detection’ versions, where the instructions are 
altered such that the task is either to check if an individual has cheated the rule, or if 
an individual is a good candidate for a task. They found that those who had recalled 
being cheated performed better, that is, selected the correct cards (p and ¬q) more 
frequently, on the cheater variant than the altruism variant; although those who had 
recalled an altruistic act showed no benefit on the altruism detection variant. Chang 
and Wilson argue that the emotions generated by the writing task serve to ‘facilitate 
situation appropriate cognition’ (p267), or that emotions may serve as a source of 
information. This is consistent with the hypothesised information mechanisms 
discussed earlier in that they found better performance overall for the negative 
emotions (recalling episodes of cheating) than positive emotions (altruism 
recollection). Similar results were reported earlier by Badcock and Allen (2003) who 
used depressive and neutral mood inductions on similar variants of the task. 
Another such example is the work of Blanchette and Richards (2004), which 
examined individuals’ performance on a conditional reasoning task in which the 
terms were first substituted for ones with existing emotional connotations, and 
secondly in which the terms were replaced by originally neutral words that had been 
conditioned to elicit emotional responses.  This paper raises an important point to 
keep in mind when reviewing previous research in that whereas their Experiment 1 is 
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certainly investigating integral emotion, the focus of Experiment 2 is less clear. 
Although it could be argued that the conditioned words are part of the conditional 
statements, and as such the emotional element is integral, it could equally be argued 
that the conditioned words elicit an emotional state within the person prior to or 
during the reasoning process which is external to the problem itself. This second 
experiment thus lies somewhere between the manipulation of integral and incidental 
emotion. This issue was discussed in earlier chapters in relation to whether 
emotional content in syllogistic reasoning has its impact through the generation of 
mood states or whether the nature of the content directs attention, allocation of 
cognitive resources, or some other mechanism. However, the results can still be used 
to inform the current work. 
Replicating the work of Blanchette and Richards (2004), Blanchette (2006) 
found that in both cases, with existing and conditioned positive and negative 
emotional content, people made fewer normatively logical responses, in contrast to 
the findings of Chang and Wilson (2004) and Badcock and Allen (2003). In relation to 
how these effects might be generated, Blanchette argues that individuals do not 
interpret the emotive and neutral conditionals differently, based on similar ratings of 
necessity, sufficiency, plausibility, and causality across conditions, suggesting that 
emotional content does not have its effect by altering interpretation, and thus 
emotion must alter responses by another means. In relation to the expected impact 
of positive and negative incidental emotion on conditional reasoning, from these 
results, it might be expected that normative responding would be supressed by both 
positive and negatively valenced content, and furthermore, as emotion effects are 
not driven by changes in interpretation, similar effects might be expected with 
incidental emotion. Blanchette, in her discussion, reports that the reduction in logical 
responding in the emotive and conditioned materials is similar to effects of incidental 
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mood found elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Oaksford et al., 1996; and literature 
reviewed earlier). The current work will therefore either replicate the findings with 
incidental emotion, as opposed to conditioned integral content, or provide evidence 
to support differential effects of incidental and integral emotion; for example, the 
work discussed by Blanchette and Richards (2010) which has found incidental 
emotion to impair logical accuracy across a range of tasks versus the work which has 
found certain types of integral emotion can improve logical accuracy (e.g. Blanchette 
& Campbell, 2005). 
Following the 2010 review by Blanchette and Richards which concludes more 
work is needed which compares the effects of integral and incidental emotion, 
Blanchette and Leese (2011) report a series of experiments which investigated 
conditional reasoning with emotive content, though with a focus on the physiological 
relationship between skin-conductance and logical responding. Although using the 
same conditioning paradigm as earlier work to imbue formerly neutral words with a 
negative valence, the inclusion in these studies of skin-conductance responses 
suggests that integral manipulations are likely to create emotions which are to some 
extent comparable to those induced by manipulations of incidental emotion. 
Blanchette and Leese report a negative relationship between emotionally driven 
physiological arousal and logical responding, replicating the earlier findings with skin-
conductance measures, and supporting the hypothesised reduction in normative 
responses under negative mood states. 
One important omission from the Blanchette and Leese studies though is a 
positive emotion condition. The necessity of comparing positive and negative 
conditions in order to capture any differential impact has been outlined previously, 
and the current work builds on that of Blanchette and colleagues by extending the 
investigation not only to explicitly incidental emotion, but also to investigate positive, 
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negative, and control conditions. This is especially important given the contradictory 
findings of those studies which show that mood should supress logical accuracy, and 
those which suggest it facilitates it. 
6.1.3 Personality Variables: Meta-Mood and Open-Minded 
Thinking 
Previously, the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) was incorporated to evaluate the 
extent to which Attention, Clarity, and Repair are related to the effects of emotional 
content in syllogistic reasoning. In the current study, two other variables are 
considered which have been linked to variation in reasoning patterns. These are 
actively open-minded thinking, and the behavioural approach-inhibition scales. It has 
been suggested that actively open-minded thinking can improve critical thinking 
(Baron, 1991; Butchart et al., 2009). Actively open-minded thinking (AOMT) is 
typically defined as the ability to approach a problem aware of, and actively avoiding, 
biases such as my-side and confirmation bias (Baron, 1991). Interestingly, AOMT and 
the avoidance of biases such as belief- and my-side-bias appear to be independent of 
cognitive ability (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2007). In their 
work using a teaching syllabus which encouraged AOMT, Butchart et al. (2009) 
focused on strategies such as looking for alternative explanations and searching for 
counter-evidence. These are the types of strategies implicitly implied by mental-
models theories of reasoning. Similarly, a large amount of work on conditional 
reasoning focuses on the search for counter-examples, or alternative states of the 
world in the form of counterfactuals, as well as enabling and disabling conditions 
(e.g. Cummins et al., 1991). As such, the AOMT scale will be included in the current 
experiments.  
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The Behavioural Inhibition Scale - Behavioural Activation Scale (BIS-BAS) also 
provides a measure of traits which might be expected to influence an individual’s 
ability or willingness to seek alternative explanations, and in particular, determine 
how they engage with reasoning tasks when in an emotional state (Carver & White, 
1994). The BIS-BAS comprises four subscales. Three of these, related to behavioural 
activation, are Drive, Fun Seeking, and Reward Responsiveness. The fourth is a single 
subscale measuring Behavioural Inhibition. Drive is related to an individual’s 
willingness to engage with and succeed in an activity and is related to perseverance. 
Fun Seeking is the extent to which an individual attempts to engage in enjoyable 
activities, and Reward Responsiveness is a measure of the degree to which an 
individual’s behaviour is influenced by potential gains. Together they provide an 
overview of an individual’s responsiveness to positive outcomes. Finally, Behavioural 
Inhibition provides a measure of the extent to which an individual avoids outcomes 
which are undesirable or aversive (Carver & White, 1994). 
Given the many factors discussed in relation to emotion regulation 
throughout the psychological literature, it is interesting to investigate the BIS-BAS 
factors in particular given their relation to action potentials. Rather than variables 
such as whether an individual is oriented to emotion or problem-focused coping, the 
subscales of the BIS-BAS are more directly related to whether an individual might 
continue to search for counter examples, or abandon the enterprise given its 
perceived lack of reward for example. Marrero and colleagues (2008) provide 
evidence that BIS scores are positively related to strategies on the Wason selection 
task which are akin to adopting a falisificationist approach, whereas BAS scores are 
positively related to a tendency to seek affirmation of the rule. Similarly to the 
potential explanatory function of the AOMT measure, the BIS-BAS will be included in 
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order to investigate these findings in relation to emotions, and as very little work has 
investigated the BIS-BAS in relation to reasoning (Marrero et al., 2008). 
Selecting the p and q cards in the Wason selection task is a confirmatory 
response. In the current study, endorsing AC inferences at high levels, where p and q 
are presented as major premises, can be considered similar to the affirmation 
responses outlined by Marrero and colleagues (2008). Selecting the p and ¬q cards in 
the Wason selection task however is seen as the ideal falsification strategy. In the 
current study, this can be equated with high rates of endorsement for MP and MT 
inferences. Given that both strategies have selection of the p card in common, 
focussing on MT alone provides the clearest indication of a falsification strategy. 
Although the current study is not set up primarily to attempt a replication of Marrero 
and colleagues’ findings, if BIS and BAS are predictive of MT (falsification strategies) 
in the current task, and the differences are moderated by mood states, this will 
provide some clue as to the factors determining reasoning which are affected by 
emotions. 
In order to create a design which is directly comparable to the validity by 
believability design utilised with syllogistic reasoning in the preceding chapters, not 
only will the validity of the inferences be varied (MP and MT being valid, DA and AC 
being invalid), but the believability of the conditional statements will be varied 
between high and low. Previous work has suggested that participants in experimental 
studies treat conditional statements as graded beliefs rather than assuming them to 
be true without exception, even despite instructions to ‘assume the statement and 
premises as true’ (Evans & Over, 2004; Over & Evans, 2003; Over, Hadjichristidis, 
Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007). In addition, asking participants to assign 
probabilities to each inference provides more detailed information on the effects of 
validity and believability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2009). Previous work has 
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found that inferences are more likely to be drawn when the conditional is believable 
(Evans, 2007a), in much the same way that syllogism conclusions are more likely to 
be endorsed when they are believable than when they are unbelievable. The 
inclusion of believability in an experimental design with conditional statements 
therefore provides clear grounds for comparison of validity, believability, and 
emotion effects across these two types of reasoning. Furthermore, in relation to 
conditional reasoning tasks in which validity and believability are varied, dual-process 
accounts would argue that initial, heuristic responses will be based on the 
believability of the conclusions, whereas a careful consideration of alternatives 
would be considered analytic responding. A corollary of this is that individuals higher 
in AOMT ability would be expected to search for such alternatives, and exhibit higher 
levels of logical responding. 
It will therefore be interesting to investigate to what extent these individual 
dispositions and thinking styles interact with emotion and reasoning. If it is found 
that incidental emotion alters reasoning, but that this is mediated by approach, 
avoidance, or fun-seeking for example, future work might develop experimental 
designs to investigate how these factors alter reasoning which in turn will inform us 
about the factors which determine how and when emotions alter reasoning. 
However, it is first necessary to investigate the impact of incidental emotion on 
reasoning before speculating on potential mediators. The aims within this chapter 
are therefore to investigate whether conditional reasoning is affected by incidental 
emotion, and if so, in what way. This extends the work previously reported on the 
effects of emotional states and emotive content in syllogistic reasoning, with the aim 
of investigating the extent to which emotion effects are found in conditional 
reasoning. This allows not only a controlled comparison of incidental emotion effects 
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across reasoning tasks, but also develops earlier work on conditional reasoning by 
including incidental emotion as a factor. 
Based on the predictions of load and information theories, if emotions serve 
as load then logical performance would be suppressed, relative to control, by both 
positive and negative incidental emotions. Alternatively, if emotion serves as 
information, logical performance would be suppressed by positive, but improved by 
negative incidental emotion; again, relative to control. In addition, because the 
believability of the statements is manipulated alongside validity in the design, logic 
and belief indices can be compared across the experiments. In order to 
accommodate the finding that inferences are treated as graded beliefs participants 
will be required to indicate to what extent they think an inference follows rather 
than indicating categorically whether they think it follows, does not follow, or is 
indeterminate. Based on the research discussed above and in earlier chapters, valid 
inferences would be expected to be rated as more likely to follow than invalid ones, 
and inferences based on believable conditionals are expected to be rated as more 
likely to follow than inferences based on unbelievable conditionals. Whether the 
effects are similar to or different from those found with syllogistic reasoning will 
allow us to draw conclusions about the impact of emotion on different reasoning 
tasks.   
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants in the current study were 79 undergraduate psychology students (14 
male, 65 female) at Plymouth University aged between 18 and 43 years (M = 21 
years, SD = 4 years). All participated for course credit. 
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6.2.2 Materials 
Conditional Statements 
The conditional statements used in the current study were taken from previous work 
by Evans, Handley, Neilens and Over (2009). From these, four conditional statements 
were selected. Two statements were highly believable, and two had lower 
believability ratings, creating high and low believability conditionals. Each of these 
four statements was presented followed by major and minor premises in rotation 
such that MP, MT, DA and AC inferences were evaluated for each statement. This 
generates a total of 16 items to be completed by each participant. An example item 
is presented below (High Believability, MP example): 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If car ownership increases, then congestion will get worse 
and 
Car ownership increases 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Congestion will get worse 
 
 
 
For each of the sixteen premises, participants were asked to rate ‘to what extent 
does it follow that [conclusion]?’. These responses were made on scales ranging from 
0 (it definitely does not follow) to 100 (it definitely does follow). The premise-
conclusion pairs that were presented following each conditional statement are 
shown in Table  6.1. 
Statements were matched for length, with differences in believability being 
assessed based on previous work by Evans et al (2009). Presentation order 
randomised believability and inference types. Conditional statements, along with 
reasoning task instructions, can be found in Appendix  D. Overall, these procedures 
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create eight types of conditional conclusion. These are those which are highly 
believable and logically valid, as in MP and MT inferences (HMP and HMT); those 
which are highly believable but not logically valid, as in DA and AC inferences (HDA 
and HAC); those which are unbelievable but logically valid (LMP and LMT), and finally, 
those which are unbelievable and not logically valid (LDA and LAC). When referring to 
problem categories, the first letter denotes the level of believability, high and low; 
the final two the inference type. 
 
 
Table  6.1 Premise-Conclusion Pairs presented following the conditional statements 
Inference Premise Conclusion Responses 
MP p q? 0-100 
MT ¬q p? 0-100 
DA ¬p q? 0-100 
AC q p? 0-100 
 
 
Mood Manipulation 
The mood manipulation in this study was the same as in Experiment 1. For details, 
see Chapter  3. This manipulation task was completed prior to the reasoning items. 
Mood was measured using an analogue scale anchored at Very Happy and Very Sad. 
Responses were indicated by marking a cross on a line between these two anchor 
points. On the printed page, the line was 125mm in length. Scores have been 
standardised to range from 0 (Very Sad) to 100 (Very Happy), and the reported 
analyses are based on these standardised scores. This rating of mood was completed 
after the reasoning task in order to eliminate any cues to the purpose of the mood 
manipulation or the hypotheses of the study. 
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Measures of Reliance on Beliefs and Logic 
In the same way that validity and believability can be rotated when using syllogistic 
reasoning tasks, the validity and believability of inferences can be rotated in 
conditional reasoning. Because the materials include inferences which vary in their 
logical validity, as well as comprising believable and unbelievable items, the logic and 
belief indices outlined earlier can be adapted for the current study by substituting 
the VB, VU, IB and IU terms as follows, where the H and L prefixes indicate high- and 
low-believability inferences respectively; 
 
Logic Index =  
((HMP+HMT)end+(LMP+LMT)end)-( (HDA+HAC)end+(LDA+LAC)end) 
 
Belief Index =  
((HMP+HMT)end+(HDA+HAC)end)-( (LMP+LMT)end+(LDA+LAC)end) 
 
Interaction Index = 
 ((HDA+HAC)end+(LDA+LAC)end)-( (HMP+HMT)end+(LMP+LMT)end) 
 
These thus provide a metric that is consistent throughout studies in this thesis which 
cross validity and believability for the purpose of assessing the similarities and 
differences in reliance on logic and belief across emotional materials and mood 
states. 
Approach-Avoidance and Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scales 
AOMT was assessed using the scale presented by Stanovich (2000), as used by 
Stanovich  and West (2007). The scale consists of 41 items which are responded to 
using a six-point Likert scale anchored at Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree. 
Approach and avoidance were measured using the BIS-BAS developed by 
Carver and White (1994), which is a 24 item scale that provides measures of 
Inhibition, Drive, Fun-Seeking, and Reward Responsiveness. Each item is responded 
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to on a four point Likert scale anchored at Very True for Me and Very False for Me. All 
items and subscale compositions can be found in Appendix  D. Scores for each scale in 
total, and subscales of the BIS-BAS were summed and converted to percentages in 
order to facilitate comparisons within and across studies. Analyses reported in this 
chapter are based on these percentage scores. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
After being briefed and signing a consent form, individuals were provided with a 
booklet of reasoning problems and a response booklet. The response booklet 
contained instructions for the mood manipulation task along with space to write 
about their chosen life event, followed by instructions for the reasoning task along 
with a page of numbered boxes for recording their responses to each item. These 
pages were then followed by the mood rating task, the items of the AOMT and BIS-
BAS scales along with the relevant response scales. Upon completion of these tasks, 
participants were debriefed, thanked for their time and allowed to leave. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Mood Manipulation 
A univariate ANOVA of standardised mood ratings revealed no main effect of mood 
condition, [F (2,76) = 1.06, p = .35, 
 = .03]. However, the differences are in the 
direction expected, with individuals in the happy condition (M = 65.06, SD = 23.31) 
reporting more positive moods than those in the control condition (M = 59.64, SD = 
22.45, .d = .24), and those in the control condition reporting more positive moods 
than those in the negative condition (M = 56.94, SD = 19.50, d = .13); the different 
between positive and negative mood having an effect size of d = .38.  
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One possible explanation for these reduced emotion effects relative to 
previous use of this manipulation (Chapter  3) may be the position of the rating task 
after the reasoning task. Previous work has found that mood normalises over the 
duration of reasoning tasks similar to those used here (Zahra, 2008 unpublished). 
Whether this is due to the task, or a natural change over time, the ratings reported 
here are recorded as this normalisation occurs, and mood ratings begin to converge 
on pre-manipulation levels. As such, although the mood condition mood ratings 
differences do not reach statistical significance at this stage of the experiment, that 
small to medium effect sizes are still found is encouraging, and justifies to some 
extent the comparison of positive and negative moods, even if not lending strong 
justification to comparisons involving the control group. 
6.3.2 Reasoning 
An initial 3 Mood (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Believability (High, Low) x 4 
Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) ANOVA on mean rates of ‘following’ (which can be 
thought of as endorsement rates; see Table  6.2) shows a main effect of believability 
[F (1,76) = 4.33, p = .04, 
 = .05], and of inference type [F (3,228) = 173.19, p < .001, 

 = .70], as well as an interaction between the two [F (3,228) = 9.23, p < .001, 
 = 
.11]. Mood condition showed a marginal main effect on ‘following’ ratings [F (1,76) = 
1869.12, p = .07, 
 = .07], but did not interact with believability or inference type, 
nor was there a three-way interaction.  
Post-hoc comparisons of these differences between mood conditions reveal 
that control mood (M = 48.25, SD = 2.05) leads to higher rates of endorsement than 
positive mood (M = 45.84, SD = 1.65), and positive mood to higher rates of 
endorsement than negative mood (M = 42.15, SD = 1.73). The only difference which 
reached statistical significance was that between negative and control moods (p = 
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.026, d = 3.22). Thus it would appear that positive and control moods lead to similar 
endorsement rates, whereas negative mood reduces the ratings of following. This is 
interesting given the small effect sizes revealed in the mood ratings, but supports the 
assumption that differences in mood rating between conditions were larger after the 
manipulation but before the reasoning task.  
 
Table  6.2 Mean ‘Following’ ratings (%) including standard deviations  
for inference types by believability and mood condition 
 
 High Believability Low Believability 
Inference Positive Control Negative Positive Control Negative 
MP 
M 94.16 92.60 94.79 80.13 76.28 70.89 
SD 10.50 8.54 10.79 27.82 31.31 32.47 
MT 
M 14.40 23.63 16.64 17.35 24.60 15.20 
SD 15.22 20.32 24.07 19.27 24.48 22.21 
DA 
M 22.90 24.13 26.43 22.23 19.88 17.80 
SD 24.82 23.07 24.31 26.12 24.76 26.55 
AC 
M 53.81 62.98 40.79 61.74 61.93 54.64 
SD 32.48 26.42 34.42 28.46 28.29 35.53 
 
 
In relation to believability, highly believable (M = 47.27, SD = 1.30) conditionals were 
rated significantly more likely to follow than unbelievable ones (M = 43.56, SD = 1.46, 
p = .041, d = 2.68). Although this is an absolute difference of only a few percentage 
points, there is little variability within each condition, indicating the difference is 
relatively consistent. 
Across inference types, it appears MP inferences are rated as much more 
likely to follow (M = 84.81, SD = 1.98) than MT (M = 18.64, SD = 2.02), DA (M = 22.23, 
SD = 2.41) or AC (M = 55.98, SD = 2.72) inferences. All pairwise post-hoc comparisons 
were significant at p < .001 with the exception of the difference between MT and DA 
which was non-significant. The interaction between belief and inference type is 
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depicted in Figure  6.1; MT and DA inferences are rated as less likely to follow than 
MP and AC inferences, and although high-believability items are seen as more likely 
to follow for MP inferences, this pattern is less pronounced across other inference 
types, clearly reversing with AC inferences, though not significantly so.  
 
 
Figure  6.1 Ratings of ‘Following’ by Believability and Inference Type 
 
Considering differences between mood conditions across inference types and 
believability conditions, although the overall interaction was not statistically 
significant, it is interesting that the largest differences on average are found on the 
problems which typically show the lowest logical performance, MT and AC; this can 
be seen in Figure  6.2.  
 
dzahra 231 330974 
 
 
Figure  6.2 Ratings of Following by Mood, Believability, and Inference Type 
 
Univariate analyses showed no significant differences in endorsement rates between 
mood conditions within each inference type, with the exception of highly believable 
AC inferences. In this cell, the main effect of mood approaches statistical significance 
[F(2,76)=, p = .057, 
 = .073], and pairwise comparisons showed the difference in 
endorsement rates between control and negative conditions to be statistically 
significant (p = .002).  
The differences in index scores across mood conditions are shown in 
Figure  6.3. Broadly speaking, logic and belief indices increase across positive, control 
and negative mood conditions. This replicates the patterns found in Experiments 3 
and 4. However, none of the pair-wise comparisons between emotion conditions 
reach statistical significance. 
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Figure  6.3 Index scores by Mood Condition 
 
6.3.3 AOMT and BIS-BAS Analyses 
AOMT showed no relationship with any of the BIS-BAS subscales. All Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were found to be smaller than r = .15 with p > .18. The 
relationships between AOMT and each of the index scores were similarly small (all at 
r < .16 and p > .15). No relationships were found between the rates at which any 
inference was thought to follow and AOMT scores. 
The relationships between the BIS-BAS subscales and index scores were also 
small. Only reliance on belief appeared to be related, showing significant or 
marginally significant negative relationships with reward responsiveness [r (79) = -
.20, p = .08], fun seeking, [r (79) = -.28, p = .01], and inhibition [r (79) = -.22, p = .06]. 
This suggests that the more reward-driven, more fun-seeking, and more inhibited an 
individual is, the less they rely on beliefs when reasoning. These patterns are similar 
across mood conditions. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The current data would seem to suggest that incidental mood has very little effect on 
conditional reasoning. Although the differences in mood rating were small between 
the conditions the lower endorsement of AC-believable conditionals under negative 
mood relative to control, and small main effects of mood overall on endorsement 
rates may suggest that the manipulation was effective initially, but that mood 
normalised during the course of the reasoning task. The lack of any findings in 
relation to emotion is unlikely to be explained by any unusual properties of the 
materials as large effects of inference type and believability were found, which 
replicate previous findings in the literature and shows that individuals can distinguish 
between the different problem types. Furthermore, the same conditionals were 
given to participants in each condition. 
The lack of relationship between AOMT and the reasoning measures is 
interesting in that it appears to contradict a growing body of literature that suggests 
higher AOMT scores should result in more critical evaluation of problems (Butchart et 
al., 2009) such as conditional arguments. Furthermore, it fails to replicate findings 
from work which suggests that although thinking dispositions similar to AOMT do not 
directly predict increased logical performance, they do predict a reduced reliance on 
belief-based responses (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007). One reason for this may be 
that the sample was drawn from a student population. It might be expected that this 
population are largely very similar in their tendency to engage in AOMT, and that the 
measure lacks the sensitivity to assess small variations in AOMT. Another explanation 
may be that the literature the hypotheses were based on has investigated syllogistic 
reasoning (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007), and although belief-based reasoning was 
measured in the same way across tasks (this chapter’s investigation of conditional 
reasoning and previous experiments on syllogistic reasoning), the way that beliefs 
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and emotions are incorporated may differ between the tasks; for example, in easier 
tasks, more individuals may be capable of applying logical rules, and thus rely less on 
non-logical features such as believability. The argument could be made that the 
crossing of believability and validity in the current design is not entirely analogous to 
that in the traditional syllogistic belief-bias paradigm. One potential issue is that the 
levels of the belief factor discussed here are based on the believability of the 
conditional statement; high and low P(q|p), which may not map directly on to the 
believability of the conclusion. This may explain the relatively small, though 
statistically significant, effect of believability and the less clear pattern of believability 
effects across each inference type. However, that believable conditionals are rated as 
more likely to follow than unbelievable ones is in line with previous work. 
Future work which may develop the use of logic and belief indices should be 
careful to ensure that the believability of the conditional rule also reflects the 
believability of the inferences being evaluated. Although a conditional rule may be 
rated as believable (or unbelievable) in pre-testing, the inferences may not have the 
same level of believability. For example, although the conditional statement ‘If Sony 
releases a new console, then their profits will rise’ is believable, the believability of 
the inference ‘Sony release a new console’ given that their profits did not rise (MT) is 
less clear. As such, discussion of the effect of believability in this chapter should be 
understood as the believability of the conditional, and not the premises or 
conclusions; and the results relate to the presentation pairs shown in Table  6.1. 
The relationships found between the BIS-BAS subscale scores and 
endorsement rates suggest some association between reward responsiveness, fun-
seeking, and inhibition and reliance on beliefs. This supports earlier work which has 
shown the subscales are related to reasoning strategies similar in nature to 
falsification (Marrero et al., 2008). However, in relation to testing the relationship 
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between BIS sensitivity and MT endorsement as a proxy of a falsification strategy, no 
relationship was found. Though the effects of the mood manipulation were small, 
this may be taken to suggest that the constructs measured by the BIS-BAS do not 
mediate the effects of emotion on reasoning. Furthermore, as with the necessity-
possibility paradigm where the effects of syllogism type were much larger than those 
of incidental or integral emotion, in conditional reasoning it would appear that the 
effects of inference type are much greater than the effects of incidental mood.  
In summary, very few effects of incidental emotion were found in conditional 
reasoning. The mood manipulation was marginally effective, though the difference 
between conditions did not reach statistical significance. As the mood manipulation 
was found to be effective in other studies in the literature, and in Experiment 1, the 
effects may have been masked by the position of the mood rating in the current 
design, which is plausible given previous findings that mood normalises over the 
duration of the reasoning task. 
It is interesting that mood effects seem to be larger when the reasoning tasks 
are more difficult; as indicated by the larger differences in ratings between positive, 
control and negative conditions on AC inferences. This may be indicative of emotion 
having a larger impact on the consideration of alternative causes, as AC inferences 
have been shown to be affected by this variable (e.g. Cummins et al., 1991), but 
unfortunately the differences between mood conditions did not reach statistical 
significance, so no strong conclusions can be drawn. The one exception to this was 
negative emotion leading people to rate AC inferences as less likely to follow relative 
to the control group. In addition, mood condition and inference type showed no 
significant interaction effect which would have supported the suggestion that mood 
effects are more pronounced on the more difficult problems; difficult in the sense 
that they are typically responded to with lower rates of logical accuracy. In order to 
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investigate the impact of emotion on conditional reasoning further, and overcome 
the limited effectiveness of the incidental mood manipulation, Chapter  7 will 
investigate conditional reasoning with integral emotion. This builds on the current 
experiment by focusing on emotive content, and allows a comparison of incidental 
and integral emotion effects in conditional reasoning. Furthermore, a comparison of 
integral effects in conditional reasoning can be made with the integral effects in 
syllogistic reasoning reported in Experiments 2, 3, and 4.  
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Chapter Seven 
7. Conditionals, Emotive Content, and 
Emotional Images 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter  6 found that it was only ratings of how likely AC inferences were to follow 
that were affected by incidental negative emotion, such that negative emotion 
reduced how likely people thought it was that the inference followed. Very few other 
effects were found with incidental emotion, and the current chapter aims to 
investigate the impact of integral emotion on conditional reasoning. In the existing 
literature there is relatively little work on the effects of emotive content on 
conditional reasoning, as we have seen in Chapter  2. Almost all of the work published 
in this area has been conducted by Blanchette and colleagues (Blanchette, 2006; 
Blanchette & Leese, 2011; Blanchette & Richards, 2004), whose work has been 
detailed previously. The most common finding is that emotive content of any type 
reduces logical accuracy. In the case of Blanchette and Richards (2004), this is seen 
with happy, sad, and anxiety related content relative to neutral content. In the two 
studies reported in their paper however, they comment that their work says little 
about what might cause the effects they report and no mention is made of 
controlling for the believability of the conditional statements. This is particularly 
important as believability has been shown repeatedly to affect the inferences which 
are drawn or endorsed in conditional reasoning tasks, such that believable inferences 
are endorsed more frequently than unbelievable ones (e.g. Evans et al., 1983; 
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Morsanyi & Handley, 2011). Emotions, if they serve as load, may impact conditional 
reasoning through believability. It is therefore important to consider believability 
when investigating the impact of integral emotion on conditional reasoning. 
The experiments reported in this chapter build on the work of Blanchette 
and colleagues by including believability as a factor in the design of the conditional 
statements, which allows investigation of the impact of believability as well as logical 
validity, in the same way as in Experiment 5. This also allows a comparison of load 
and information theories of emotion, and provides a way to link the current work to 
previous studies on content effects within a dual-process framework, particularly the 
work on syllogisms discussed previously (Chapter  5). This is important as although 
dual-process theorists working in reasoning have not considered emotive content 
specifically, it provides a framework for assessing and explaining effects of belief and 
logic in light of any effects of integral emotion. 
A large body of work has considered content and context effects in 
conditional reasoning, though only a few investigate emotional content. For example, 
the work by Perham and Oaksford (2005) who compare the evolutionary and 
decision-theoretic models of decision making when the conditional rules are 
presented as social contracts or as relating to hazards, and the work of Chang and 
Wilson (2004) outlined earlier which has shown that when the content of a 
conditional statement relates to a concrete or familiar social situation, logical 
performance is improved. Whereas the work of researchers such as Chang and 
Wilson (2004) suggests content serves as a cue to which approaches to adopt in 
conditional reasoning tasks, although emotions may have a similar effect and be 
beneficial when appropriate to the context of the conditional rule, they would not 
provide any benefit when they are incompatible with or inappropriate to the 
situation.  
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Whilst this work is interesting in understanding the effect of specific 
contextual variables on the impact of emotions in conditional reasoning, it is 
primarily descriptive in its focus and not concerned with why or how emotion and 
reasoning interact to generate these effects. In the following experiments, as in 
relation to the emotion-based work of Blanchette and colleagues, by including 
believability as a variable, this factor can be controlled for, and its impact assessed 
alongside validity, as outlined above. This provides a way of learning something 
about how emotion might impact on reasoning, as discussed in earlier chapters, by 
contrasting load and information based theories. Although no explanatory models of 
how emotive content interacts with conditional reasoning have been assessed in 
detail, models have been developed to explain effects found with other content 
types, although not explicitly with respect to emotive content. As one example, if 
logical accuracy is suppressed by both positive and negative content relative to 
control, then this would provide support for load theories. Alternatively, if logical 
accuracy is suppressed by positive but facilitated by negative emotive content 
relative to control, this pattern would provide support for the information theories; 
the reasoning behind these predictions has been discussed previously (e.g. 
Chapter  1). 
In summary, the preceding studies in this thesis have considered integral and 
incidental emotion in syllogistic reasoning using a variety of paradigms; some 
investigating the level of high-effort processing, others comparing the use of high and 
low effort processing. The effects of incidental emotion were then investigated in 
conditional reasoning, and the current chapter considers the effects of integral 
emotion in conditional reasoning by adopting the same design as has been used in 
earlier chapters which varies believability, validity, and emotion. Based on the 
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previous findings, it would be expected that more valid inferences will be endorsed 
than invalid ones and that believable conditionals will also lead to higher rates of 
endorsement. In relation to the effects of integral positive and negative emotion 
compared to control items, if integral emotion has the same effect as incidental 
emotion, negative content might be expected to improve logical accuracy (lower 
endorsement rates), but only on believable AC inferences. The directional 
hypotheses outlined above in relation to load and information theories are the 
primary interest of the current experiments, and as such, rather than focussing on 
the rates at which each inference is endorsed, in line with previous work, analyses in 
this chapter will be concerned with rates of logical accuracy. 
7.2 Conditionals with Emotive Content: Within  
(Experiment 6) 
The first experiment reported here utilises the paradigm of Blanchette and Richards 
(2004), but using conditionals that vary in their believability as well as content 
valence. This is in addition to the conclusion validity being varied.  
7.2.1 Method and Materials 
Participants 
The sample comprised 42 (36 females) students at Plymouth University, participating 
voluntarily or for course credit. The sample had a mean age of 21 years (SD = 3 
years).  
Conditional Statements and Design 
A set of 48 conditional reasoning problems were constructed, 16 containing 
positively valenced terms, 16 containing negatively valenced terms, and 16 
containing control terms. Statement believability was also varied between high and 
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low based on previous work and pre-test data (Evans, Handley, Neilens, et al., 2009). 
MP, MT, DA and AC inferences were presented across all content types, generating a 
3 Content type (Positive, Control, Negative) x 2 Believability (High, Low) x 4 Inference 
Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) experimental design. Examples of positive, negative, and 
control items are shown below; a full list of items can be found in Appendix  D. 
 
High Believability Positive Item 
 
If you pass all of your exams then you will graduate 
 
MP You pass all of your exams. Do you graduate? 
MT You do not graduate. Did you pass all of your exams? 
DA You do not pass all of your exams. Do you graduate? 
AC You graduate. Did you pass all of your exams? 
 
High Believability Control Item 
 
If Sony releases a new console, then their profits will rise. 
 
MP  Sony releases a new console. Do their profits increase? 
MT Their profits do not rise. Did Sony release a new console? 
DA Sony do not release a new console. Do their profits increase? 
AC Their profits rise. Did Sony release a new console?  
 
 
Low Believability Negative Item 
 
If you start a fight then you will get stabbed to death 
 
MP You start a fight. Do you get stabbed to death? 
MT You do not get stabbed to death. Did you start a fight? 
DA You do not start a fight. Do you get stabbed to death? 
AC You get stabbed to death. Did you start a fight? 
 
 
 
Participants were required to indicate whether each inference followed (‘Yes’), did 
not follow (‘No’), or was indeterminate (‘Maybe’), in line with the procedure used by 
Blanchette and Richards (2004). This is different to the 0-100% likelihood of the 
conclusion ‘following’ which was used in Experiment 5, in order to force a response 
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which could be coded as logically accurate or not. Responses in the current 
experiment were therefore scored for the number of logically correct responses to 
each inference type across believability and content types. This presentation and 
response format is taken from Blanchette and Richards’ (2004) experiment one. The 
combinations of premises and conclusions are shown in Table  7.1. They are ‘non-
standard pairings’, relative to the typical combinations found in the reasoning 
research which has not considered emotional content, but have been used here to 
allow a conceptual replication of earlier work. Alternative presentations of premise-
conclusion pairings which are more consistent with the wider reasoning literature, 
and how they differ from the emotional literature, are considered in the following 
chapter. 
 
Table  7.1 Non-standard Premise-Conclusion pairs  
taken from Blanchette and Richards (2004) 
Inference Premise Conclusion* Responses 
MP P q? Y/N/Maybe 
MT ¬q p? (¬p?) Y/N/Maybe 
DA ¬p q? (¬q?) Y/N/Maybe 
AC q p? Y/N/Maybe 
*Where the conclusion is not that which would be typically presented in a reasoning study, the 
‘standard’ conclusion is shown in parentheses. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8  
 
 
Approach-Avoidance Measures 
In addition to the conditional reasoning task, participants were asked to complete 
the BIS-BAS scale in order to provide a measure of approach-avoidance behaviours. 
The items of this scale can be found in Appendix  D, and have been discussed 
previously (Section  6.1.3). 
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7.2.2 Results 
Reasoning Accuracy 
The means and standard deviations for each cell within a 3 Content (Positive, 
Control, Negative) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 4 Inference Type (MP, 
MT, AC, DA) repeated measures ANOVA can be seen in Table  7.2. This analysis 
showed significant main effects for content type [F(2,82) = 10.57, p < .001, 
 = .21], 
believability [F(1,41) = 7.30, p = .010 
 = .15], and problem type [F(3,123) = 134.10, 
p < .001 
 = .77].  
 
Table  7.2 Descriptive Statistics for participants' reasoning accuracy (mean %) on conditionals 
with emotive content (Content varied Within-participants) 
   Inference Type 
Content Believability  MP MT DA AC 
Positive High M 89.29 76.19 10.71 14.29 
  SD 20.76 31.70 23.52 25.39 
 Low M 86.90 83.33 19.05 25.00 
  SD 24.84 30.58 33.04 37.04 
Control High M 92.86 86.90 22.62 26.19 
  SD 17.71 29.34 35.27 35.33 
 Low M 88.10 67.86 14.29 17.86 
  SD 28.82 37.97 29.81 32.80 
Negative High M 88.10 85.71 44.05 27.38 
  SD 24.22 25.39 33.50 35.27 
 Low M 84.52 85.71 15.48 28.57 
  SD 32.17 29.81 32.17 38.48 
 
 
Across content type, positive items were responded to less accurately than control 
items, though this difference did not reach statistical significance. Control items were 
responded to significantly less accurately than negative items (p=.003), and positive 
items were responded to significantly less accurately than negative items (p<.001). 
These patterns suggest that positive content has no effect on logical performance 
whereas negative content increases logical accuracy relative to control content. 
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Logical accuracy was also higher for high-believability (M = 55.36, SD = 28.12) than 
low-believability conditionals (M = 51.39, SD = 32.29). 
Participants responded more accurately on MP and MT inferences than DA 
and AC inferences. In addition, overall accuracy was higher for MP than for MT 
(p=.002), DA (p<.001), or AC (p<.001) inferences, and higher for MT than DA (p<.001), 
or AC (p<.001). There was no difference in accuracy between DA and AC inferences. 
There was also a significant interaction between content type and believability, 
[F(3,123) = 13.42, p < .001 
 = .25], shown in Figure  7.1. This indicates that for high-
believability items, positive content lead to lower accuracy rates than control or 
negative content, though control and negative content showed only a marginal 
difference in accuracy rates (p = .07); when the items were low-believability 
however, positive and negative content showed little difference in accuracy rates, yet 
both resulted in higher accuracy rates than control content.  
 
 
Figure  7.1 Belieavbility by Content type Interaction based on Accuracy 
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The interaction between content type and inference type was only marginally 
significant [F(6,246) = 1.97, p = .07], but is shown in Figure  7.2 for comparison with 
the following experiments. 
 
 
Figure  7.2 Inference type by content type interactions based on accuracy 
 
 
 
Finally, a significant three-way interaction was found between content type, 
believability and problem type, [F(6,246) = 4.23, p < .001, 
 = .09]. This is depicted in 
Figure  7.3. With highly believable content, there seems to be some suggestion that 
negative content improves reasoning accuracy whereas positive content decreases 
reasoning accuracy relative to control content. This is generally in line with the 
information theories of emotion, with negative content cueing more caution and 
thus less reliance on believability, hence higher accuracy. The results of pairwise 
comparisons are shown in Table  7.3 
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Figure  7.3 Inference type by content type, by believability interactions 
 
 
Table  7.3 p-values for pairwise comparisons split by believability  
(P-Positive; C-Control; N-Negative) 
 Comparisons 
Believability Inference P-N P-C C-N 
High 
Believability 
MP .743 .262 .323 
MT .073
+
 .048* .812 
DA <.001** .049* .002** 
AC .020** .040* .822 
Low 
Believability 
MP .660 .710 .555 
MT .675 .008** .004** 
DA .519 .377 .785 
AC .412 .160 .060
+
 
 
 
Approach-Avoidance Measures 
The subscales of the BIS-BAS did not correlate significantly with any measures of 
reasoning accuracy. No further analyses were conducted on this portion of the data. 
7.2.3 Summary of Experiment 6 
The results reveal that valid inferences are responded to more accurately than invalid 
inferences, and inferences related to believable conditionals are responded to more 
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accurately than those related to less believable ones. Interestingly, believability and 
content interacted, such that when the conditional was believable, accuracy 
increased across positive to control to negative content; however, when the 
conditional was unbelievable, positive and negative content led to higher accuracy 
than control content. Approach-Avoidance measures showed no effects of interest to 
the hypotheses under investigation. Content showed a significant main effect such 
that accuracy increased from positive to control to negative content types, providing 
support for information theories of the impact of emotion on reasoning. Further 
analysis of this effect suggests that the impact of content is more pronounced for 
indeterminate (DA and AC) inferences, suggesting that the effect is perhaps more 
specific than the general information effect; negative content may cue more careful 
processing of the problem based on logical rules leading to increased accuracy, 
whereas positive content may lead to less careful processing and a reliance on 
strategies not based on logical rules, thus lower accuracy relative to negative 
content. Before considering these findings in more detail, the extent to which they 
occur in a between-participants design will be assessed.   
7.3 Conditionals with Emotive Content: Between  
(Experiment 7) 
In order to test the robustness of the content effects found in Experiment 6, the 
same materials and procedures were used as part of a between-participants 
replication. The rationale for this change to a between-participants design is based 
on the possibility that varying content within-participants will make it more salient. 
This in turn raises the possibilities that the impact of emotion will be discounted by 
the participant (Section  1.5.3), or that the participants may display demand 
characteristics if they begin to develop their own hypotheses about what the 
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experiment is investigating. Furthermore, although the presentation order of each 
content block was randomised in Experiment 6, switching from one content valence 
to another may ameliorate the effects of the second content type above what can be 
controlled for by randomisation. These possibilities may provide an explanation for 
the limited main effects of content found when varying content type in a within-
participants design, and is addressed by varying content-type between-participants. 
7.3.1 Method and Materials 
Participants, Design and Procedure 
The sample comprised 87 (63 female) volunteers and Plymouth University students 
participating for course credit, with a mean age of 21 years (SD = 4 years). The design 
and procedure were the same as in Experiment 6 in every detail except that each 
participant was only presented with one set of conditionals; positively valenced, 
negatively valenced, or the control set. 
7.3.2 Results 
Reasoning Accuracy 
A mixed 3 Content (Positive, Control, Negative) by 2 Believability (High Believability, 
Low Believability) by 4 Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) ANOVA was conducted on 
accuracy rate data. Means for each cell of the design can be found in Table  7.4. 
Comparisons of these means showed a main effect of believability [F(1,252) = 11.00, 
p = .001, 
 = .12], with high-believability conditionals being responded to more 
accurately (M = 66.27, SD = 32.36) than low-believability conditionals (M = 59.86, SD 
= 37.40); the same believability effect as was found in Experiment 6. There was also a 
significant main effect of inference type, which showed the same pattern as for the 
within-participant design (See section  7.2) [F(3,252) = 65.47, p < .001, 
 = .44]. There 
dzahra 249 330974 
 
was also a significant main effect of content type [F(2,84) = 12.26, p < .001, 
 = .23], 
with accuracy increasing across positive, to control, to negative content types. All 
pair-wise differences reached statistical significance at p < .03. 
   
Table  7.4 Descriptive Statistics for participants' reasoning accuracy (mean %)  
on conditionals with emotive content (Content varied Between-participants) 
   Inference Type 
Content Believability  MP MT DA AC 
Positive 
(N=33) 
High M 92.42 81.82 15.15 16.67 
 SD 22.08 27.44 31.83 32.27 
Low M 84.85 87.88 18.18 15.15 
  SD 36.41 33.14 39.17 36.41 
Control 
(N=22) 
High M 93.18 65.91 47.73 63.64 
 SD 17.56 41.94 39.27 41.35 
Low M 84.09 59.09 43.18 47.73 
  SD 32.32 42.64 44.44 39.27 
Negative 
(N=32) 
High M 96.88 93.75 50.00 78.13 
 SD 17.68 24.59 50.80 42.00 
Low M 89.06 84.38 43.75 60.94 
  SD 27.63 32.22 43.53 41.61 
 
 
There was also a significant interaction between content type and believability 
[F(2,252) = 3.10, p = .05, 
 = .07], suggesting that the effect of believability was 
greater for control and negative items than for positive items, accuracy on which 
showed relatively little effect of believability. This interaction is depicted in 
Figure  7.4. It can also be seen that accuracy increases across positive, to control, to 
negative content, and that these differences are greater when the content is 
believable than when it is unbelievable. The pattern for high-believability items is the 
same as that found in Experiment 6, and the relationship between control and 
negative content is the same as in Experiment 6 for low-believability conditionals, 
although positive content shows considerably lower accuracy in the current data 
than in Experiment 6. 
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Figure  7.4 Belieavbility by Content Type interactions based on accuracy 
 
Content and inference type showed a significant interaction effect [F(6,252) = 8.68, p 
< .001, 
 = .17]. This is depicted in Figure  7.5, and along with the pair-wise 
significance values. It would appear that the effect of content is most pronounced 
when the conclusions are invalid, and that it is primarily a decrease in accuracy on DA 
and AC problems when the content is positively valenced which is driving this effect. 
This is similar to the marginal inference type by content interaction found in 
Experiment 6. The effect seems to be driven by positive content, for which accuracy 
rates on DA and AC inferences are much lower than for control or negative content; 
control and negative content having broadly similar accuracy rates in DA and AC 
inferences.  
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Figure  7.5 Problem Type by Content Type interactions based on accuracy 
 
That the effect is more pronounced when content is varied between participants 
than it was for the within-participants manipulation supports to some extent the 
rationale of the current experiment, and provides some evidence that switching 
between content types may be subject to order effects or discounting. No other 
interaction effects were found in the data. 
Approach-Avoidance Measures 
The results from the BIS-BAS scale show that inhibition is positively correlated with 
reward responsiveness, drive is positively correlated with fun-seeking and reward 
responsiveness, and fun seeking is positively correlated with reward responsiveness. 
In relation to logical accuracy and content type, the BIS-BAS subscales show 
very few relationships with accuracy across the content types (Table  7.5). Fun-
seeking is positively correlated with logical accuracy with control content, but that 
this is the only relationship suggests further analysis is not warranted. It was thought 
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that increased BIS scores might reflect a more cautious approach to reasoning, and 
thus be related to higher accuracy scores across content types, whereas BAS scores 
may be expected to correlate negatively with accuracy scores if they reflect more 
impulsive, low-effort reasoning.  This does not seem to be the case in the coarse 
analysis shown in Table  7.5, and thus no further analysis is warranted here. 
 
Table  7.5 Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s-r) showing the relationships between BIS/BAS 
subscale and reasoning indices (Content varied Between-participants) 
  BAS Subscales (N=87) Reasoning Accuracy 
  Drive 
Fun 
Seeking 
Reward 
Responsiveness 
Positive 
(n=33) 
Control 
(n=22) 
Negative 
(n=32) 
BIS 
r -.016 .017 .254 -.23 .07 .29 
p .880 .877 .018 .20 .76 .21 
Drive 
r  .469 .428 .05 .25 -.12 
p  .000 .000 .78 .27 .52 
Fun-Seeking 
r   .308 .12 .46 .17 
p   .004 .52 .04 .36 
Reward-Resp. 
r    -.07 .24 .12 
p    .71 .28 .52 
 
7.3.3 Summary of Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 was conducted as a replication of Experiment 6, although varying the 
emotive content between-participants. This was done to minimise the possibility that 
content was noticed as a variable, and thus to reduce any demand characteristics or 
discounting effects. The results largely replicate the findings of Experiment 6, such 
that valid inferences are responded to more accurately than invalid inferences, and 
inferences related to believable conditionals are responded to more accurately than 
those related to less believable ones. This believability effect interacted with the 
content effect such that the effect of content was larger for believable than 
unbelievable conditionals. Approach-Avoidance measures again showed no effects of 
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interest to the hypotheses under investigation. Content showed a significant main 
effect such that accuracy increased from positive to control to negative content 
types. Further analysis of this effect suggests that the impact of content is more 
pronounced for indeterminate inferences, and provides further support for 
information theories of emotion’s impact on reasoning. 
7.4 Comparing the effects of Verbal and Visual 
Content (Experiment 8) 
Having considered a range of variations on verbal conditional reasoning problems, it 
is interesting to consider visual representations of conditionals. In the emotion 
literature, tasks based around emotive words have been used to induce different 
mood states, and the current series of studies has included emotive verbal content as 
a manipulation of the emotive valence of the conditionals themselves. However, 
emotive images have also been used to induce mood states. This raises the question 
of whether non-verbal emotive content may affect how people process conditional 
statements. To the author’s knowledge, replacing verbal markers for the p and q 
terms in conditional statements with images has not previously been investigated, 
and the current study is presented as a novel methodology. 
One large repository of emotive images commonly used in emotion research 
is the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). 
These images have all been rated for arousal and valence, and are available to 
researchers as colour images of reasonable quality. They have been used widely in a 
range of emotion research to induce mood states and gauge reactions to emotional 
stimuli (Schaefer, Pottage, & Rickart, 2011; Schimmack, 2005), though some recent 
efforts have been made to update their content as certain cultural elements in some 
of the images have become dated. IAPS images contain a range of scenarios and 
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scenes, from flowers and landscapes to injuries and warzones. This broad range of 
content makes them ideal for substituting into conditional statements as antecedent 
(p) and consequent (q) terms as coherent rules can be made which keeps the design 
much closer in nature to existing work on conditional reasoning. 
As this is a novel way of introducing content to conditional reasoning tasks, 
little is known about how the imagery may affect reasoning. As such, no specific 
hypotheses were constructed over and above the general questions investigated in 
the previous experiments; namely, a search for any effect of emotive content, and its 
interaction with validity and believability. However, to avoid overcomplicating the 
control of imagery valence and arousal, believability was held constant (based on 
pre-test ratings of the conditional statements) in the current study, and the 
investigation is limited to assessing the interaction of integral visual content across 
inference types. 
7.4.1 Method and Materials 
Pretesting of Imagery 
The pictures used in place of verbal markers were taken from the original IAPS 
collection. Although an updated set of images were available (Pottage, personal 
communication, 2010), they had not been rated for arousal and valence using the 
same system as the original set, so controlling for image properties would be open to 
criticism. The images chosen were pretested for valence and arousal based on 
published IAPS ratings (Lang et al., 2005). Mean valence differed significantly across 
content conditions [F(2,21)=153.19, p<.001 , 
 =.94], with all post-hoc comparisons 
between the positive (M=7.42, SD=.49), control (M=5.63, SD=.51) and negative 
(M=2.97, SD=.532) groups being significant at p<.001. No significant differences were 
found between mean arousal scores across content conditions [F(2,21)=1.14, p=.34 , 
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
 =.10]. Nor were any pair-wise comparisons between conditions statistically 
significant (Positive, M=4.86, SD=.95; Control, M=4.79, SD=.60; Negative, M=5.28, 
SD=.45). 
A small group of volunteers (N = 7) rated the conditional probabilities of each 
picture statement of the form “If [p-picture] then [q-picture]” on a 0%-100% scale, 
where 0 indicated that it was impossible for the second term to follow given the first, 
and 100 indicated it was certain that the second term would follow given the first. 
The same ratings were made for converse probabilities, with the statements 
presented in the form “If [q-picture] then [p-picture]” as a way of controlling for the 
perceived number of alternative possible antecedents. No significant differences in 
this converse, or the former conditional, probabilities were found as a function of the 
image valence, nor did any interactions between content conditions and conditional 
or converse probabilities reach statistical significance. Believability was not varied in 
this study. That the conditional probabilities are comparable across and within 
conditions suggests that all statements were comparably believable. A full list of the 
images used from the IAPS image set, which condition they were allocated to, along 
with published valence and arousal scores are shown in Table  7.6. Examples of 
positive, control, and negative pairs of images are show below. The presentation of 
each trial is discussed shortly under the design and procedure section. 
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Table  7.6 List of IAPS images used, along with brief descriptions, image identifiers (from IAPS), 
and their valence and arousal ratings, taken from the IAPS picture set data. 
  Valence Arousal 
 Brief Description IAPS# M SD M SD 
P
o
si
ti
ve
 
Ferrari                   8510 7.3 1.7 4.9 2.6 
Gold Bullion              8500 7.0 1.6 5.6 2.4 
Blue sky and clouds       5891 7.2 1.5 3.3 2.6 
Lake and greenery         5780 7.5 1.5 3.8 2.5 
Gymnast                   8470 7.7 1.5 6.1 2.2 
Olympic medallists        8540 7.5 1.5 5.2 2.4 
Puppies                   1710 8.3 1.1 5.4 2.3 
Woman and dog             2362 6.7 1.3 4.6 2.1 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Ship                      5395 5.3 1.2 4.2 2.0 
Ship propeller            2575 5.5 1.2 4.2 2.1 
Jet-fighter in flight     6900 4.8 2.1 5.6 2.2 
Jet-fighter firing        6910 5.3 2.3 5.6 2.5 
Whole pizza               7351 5.8 1.7 4.3 2.3 
Slice of pizza            7352 6.2 2.2 4.6 2.5 
Club Scene                2605 6.3 1.5 5.0 2.2 
Dancing Woman             2606 5.9 1.6 4.8 2.2 
N
e
ga
ti
ve
 
Rioter                    2691 3.0 1.7 5.9 2.0 
Prisoner in cell          2694 3.6 1.7 5.1 2.2 
Car-jacking               6571 2.9 2.1 5.6 2.5 
Officer with baton        2682 3.7 1.7 4.5 2.1 
Drink driver             2751 2.7 1.9 5.2 2.4 
Car wreck                 9903 2.4 1.4 5.7 2.3 
Bomb                      2692 3.4 1.6 5.4 2.2 
Dead Bodies                    9435 2.3 1.5 5.0 2.0 
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(Images adapted from IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) 
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Participants 
The participants in this study were 69 undergraduate psychology students at 
Plymouth University who participated for course credit. Age and gender were not 
recorded. 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure utilised in Experiment 8 were identical in nature to the 
previously described studies, with the exception of the layout of the reasoning task 
and examples. Content was varied between-participants. Reasoning problems were 
presented as shown in Figure  7.6. Response options were ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Maybe’, as 
can be seen in Figure  7.6. A copy of the instructions presented to participants prior to 
practice trials can be found in Appendix  D. 
 
 
Figure  7.6 Presentation of Visual Conditionals 
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7.4.2 Results 
In order to provide a consistent set of results for comparison across experiments, a 3 
Content (Positive, Control, Negative) x 4 Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) mixed 
ANOVAs was conducted on accuracy rates. Mean accuracy rates for each cell are 
shown in Table  7.7. 
 
Table  7.7 Mean accuracy rates (%) by inference and content type 
  Inference Type (Mean Accuracy, %) 
Content  MP MT DA AC 
Positive 
(N=24) 
M 91.67 65.63 11.46 16.67 
SD 15.93 28.37 22.09 21.70 
Control 
(N=18) 
M 95.83 72.22 22.22 18.06 
SD 9.59 29.57 33.09 20.66 
Negative 
(N=27) 
M 94.44 62.96 23.15 45.37 
SD 10.59 33.52 27.67 38.00 
 
The results from the accuracy data revealed a main effect of inference type [F(3,198) 
= 134.25, p < .001, 
 = .67], with all pairwise comparisons being significant at 
p<.001, except the difference between DA and AC which was still significant, but at 
p=.031. MP inferences were responded to most accurately (94%), followed by MT 
(67%) inferences. DA (27%) and AC (19%) were significantly lower than both MP and 
MT, with AC showing marginally higher accuracy rates than DA. 
There was also a significant inference by content interaction [F(6,198) = 2.95, 
p = .009, 
 = .08]. This interaction is driven primarily by a much higher rate of 
accuracy on AC problems (45%) when the terms were negatively valenced images, 
relative to positive and control images, which showed very little difference (17% and 
18% respectively). A univariate analysis of variance comparing content types within 
AC inferences showed a main effect of content type, positive-negative and negative-
control differences reaching statistical significance (p = .001 and p = .003 
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respectively). The control-positive difference was not statistically significant. 
Accuracy rates were comparable between positive, negative, and control conditions 
across MP, MT, and DA inferences. One-way ANOVAs showed no main effect of 
content for any inference type separately; neither did any pairwise comparisons 
within these groups reach statistical significance. This content by inference type 
interaction is depicted in Figure  7.7, from which a number of similarities can be seen 
with Experiments 6 and 7. For example, the larger differences between content 
conditions on DA and AC inferences and the increased accuracy on AC inferences 
when the content is negative. 
 
 
Figure  7.7 Problem Type by Content Type interactions with images, based on accuracy 
 
The analysis also showed a marginal main effect of content type [F(1,66) = 3.09, p = 
.05, 
 = .09]. This effect of content suggests that using negative images as terms 
leads to higher accuracy rates (56%) than control (52%) and positive images (46%). 
However, only the positive-negative comparison reached statistical significance (p = 
.016). 
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7.5 General Discussion 
The current chapter aimed to investigate the effects of integral, emotive content on 
conditional reasoning in order to compare the effects of integral emotion with the 
effects of incidental emotion reported in Experiment 5. The experiments reported 
here also allow a comparison of the effects of integral emotion on conditional 
reasoning tasks with those found in syllogistic reasoning (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
findings from the existing literature already discussed). Content was varied within- 
and then between-participants. This yielded results suggestive of the fact that 
positive content reduces logical accuracy relative to negative content, with control or 
neutral content resulting in accuracy rates somewhere between the two. However, 
the results also suggest that this is primarily the case for indeterminate inferences, 
DA and AC, with little effect of content being found on either MP or MT inferences. 
Negative content increasing logical accuracy on DA and AC inferences is in contrast to 
the findings of Blanchette and Richards (2004), who report higher numbers of 
logically inaccurate ‘No’ responses to DA inferences, and higher numbers of logically 
inaccurate ‘Yes’ responses to AC inference with any emotive content. Key features of 
the materials which may account for these inconsistencies, such as the believability 
of the conditionals, are controlled for in the current experiments, though no mention 
of them is made in the work of Blanchette and Richards. As the effects of emotion 
seem to vary across levels of belief in a number of the experiments reported here, 
this highlights the need for greater transparency and detail in published studies. 
 The results across all three studies show that negative content generally 
leads to higher accuracy than positive or control content on DA, and particularly AC 
inferences. One possible reason for this is that these are invalid inferences. Logical 
accuracy is typically lower for invalid inferences than valid ones, suggesting that they 
are more difficult. If this is the case, whether because additional rules need to be 
dzahra 262 330974 
 
applied or the number of alternative causes to be considered is greater, then 
emotion would be expected to have a larger impact on these inferences. If emotion 
served as cognitive load, accuracy would be expected to be suppressed for both 
positive and negative content. This is not the case. However, if emotion is used as an 
additional source of information when reasoning about more difficult items, positive 
content might be expected to lead individuals to affirmative responses or to go with 
their initial answers, whereas negative content might be expected to make people 
more cautious, and reason more carefully. 
That the effects are found primarily on DA and AC problems may be 
explained by the negative emotion cueing more motivated reasoning on these 
inferences. Alternatively, the increased demands of the indeterminate inferences 
may have led people to seek alternative cues about how to proceed. Finding this in 
the valence of the problem would then account for the differing levels of accuracy 
resulting from different amounts careful processing.  
Another possible explanation for this effect is the converse probability of the 
conditionals, as this was not initially controlled for in Experiments 6 and 7. As the 
majority of content effects were found in DA and AC inferences, and it has been 
previously shown that these inferences are most affected by the existence of 
alternative explanations (of which the converse probability is a proxy), the control of 
P(p|q) in Experiment 8 by pretesting for believability of the conditionals with images 
presented in both orders (p→q, q→p) may account for the reduced content effects, 
though overall they are consistent in their direction with the results of experiments 6 
and 7. The effects of content in this case were reduced, suggesting that the effects of 
emotive content may be in some way linked to converse probabilities, and is a topic 
considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
dzahra 263 330974 
 
Following the two variations on the study of integral emotive content in 
Experiments 6 and 7, in a novel approach to conditional reasoning, emotive imagery 
from the IAPS was combined with the conditional reasoning paradigm in Experiment 
8 in order to test the effect of replacing verbal terms in the conditionals with emotive 
images. The results showed that there was a small effect of emotive valence with 
visual content, such that people appeared to be more accurate when reasoning 
about negative imagery than about positive imagery. With the accuracy of the 
control imagery varying from Experiments 6 and 7 and within Experiment 8, it is 
difficult to say whether positive imagery decreases accuracy, negative imagery 
increases accuracy, or whether there is some interaction of the two, though the 
results are promising in terms of encouraging future work on reasoning with visual 
imagery. These findings are also interesting in that they provide a promising 
methodology for investigating aspects of emotion which are non-verbal, and thus 
open up an area of research into how integral as well as potentially incidental 
emotive imagery may affect decision making. On possible area in which this would be 
particularly relevant is warning signs which contain written as well as visual 
information. If the individual is required to draw inferences from the text, which is 
often presented in the form of conditional statements, then an understanding of how 
emotional imagery affects the inferences people draw is important. 
As a general point across Experiments 6, 7, and 8, unlike the conditionals 
used by Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011), the conclusions were not empirically 
true or false. They were based on graded beliefs, where the belief ratings were taken 
from a previous study or pretesting. This was included to replicate the design of 
Experiment 5, although responses were restricted here to categorical Yes, No, and 
Maybe options. However, based on previous findings, believable conditionals were 
expected to lead to more logical responding than unbelievable ones, and this was 
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found to be the case in Experiments 6 and 7. However, the effects of emotion were 
larger for high-believability as opposed to low-believability items. Although the 
increased logical accuracy on believable items may be explained by the increased 
cognitive effort required to process low-believability, counter-to-belief items, 
increased emotion effects on high-believability items appears closer to a fluency than 
a load effect. If an individual believes a statement, they may devote less effort to 
critically evaluating it, or the logical validity of the inference, and thus may rely on 
emotion as a cue to how to respond. 
The finding that emotion effects are larger on DA and AC inferences might be 
explained in a similar way. The indeterminate nature of these inferences may require 
greater cognitive effort to process, thus leaving less available resources to employ 
fully or correctly any logical rules, leading the individual to rely on the content 
valence to direct their reasoning. Although this may, in the case of negative content, 
lead to an attempt at employing more careful yet more effortful strategies, that 
positive content is used to justify low effort strategies leads to an overall reduction in 
load when the groups are considered together. These possibilities are tentative, and 
cannot be fully explored with the data available here, though they present a number 
of interesting avenues for future research. 
To summarise the findings, although integral emotion has relatively little 
main effect on conditional reasoning, it has a replicable and consistent effect on 
reasoning accuracy with DA and AC inferences. Although this is more pronounced for 
AC inferences, across Experiments 6, 7, and 8 it would appear that negative content 
increases logical accuracy on these indeterminate inferences relative to control and 
positive content. It is difficult to say whether negative content improves accuracy or 
positive content suppresses accurate responding given the accuracy on control 
content varies, being closer to negative content in Experiment 6 and closer to 
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positive content in Experiment 7, but the difference between positive and negative 
content would appear consistent. This is especially notable given that the same 
pattern is found when verbal terms are replaced with visual markers in the novel 
methodology of Experiment 8, and all of the experiments reported in this chapter 
provide support for the mood as information explanation of how (integral) emotions 
affect reasoning. Furthermore, this support for information theories is similar to that 
found with syllogistic reasoning under the Necessity-Possibility paradigm in 
Experiment 1, and to some extent in Experiment 2. The support for information 
theories in the current chapter is also similar to that found with syllogistic reasoning 
under the Belief-Bias paradigm in Experiments 3 and 4. Experiment 5, investigating 
incidental emotion and conditional reasoning however found little support for either 
information or load theories. Taken together, the previous experiments provide 
relatively weak support in favour of the information theories, whereas the current 
experiments (6, 7, and 8) provide much more consistent findings in support of the 
idea that emotion is used as a source of information when deciding which reasoning 
strategies to employ. 
In relation to previous work in the literature, these findings are inconsistent 
with the results of Blanchette and colleagues (Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Leese, 
2011; Blanchette & Richards, 2004). For example, Blanchette and Richards, whose 
work the current studies are based on, found that people were more likely to draw 
invalid inferences when the conditionals were emotive – either positive or negative – 
than when they were neutral; outlined above. Although this is not what was found 
here, they do report more pronounced effects of emotion on DA and AC inferences. 
This is an interesting discrepancy, especially given that Blanchette and Richards were 
able to replicate their reduction in logical accuracy using neutral terms which had 
been conditioned to be emotional. One possible explanation, as outlined above, may 
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be the believability of the conditionals; there is no mention of the believability being 
controlled, and if this varied systematically between emotive and neutral statements 
such that the neutral items were more believable than the emotive ones, they are 
likely to have been responded to more accurately in line with the consistently 
replicated belief effect. This was to some extent controlled in this chapter by 
manipulating the believability of the conditional statements, but alternative methods 
of controlling this will be considered in the following chapter. 
Having now compared the effects of incidental and integral emotion across 
syllogistic reasoning in the Necessity-Possibility and Belief-Bias paradigms, and 
conditional reasoning with both verbal and visual markers, the following chapter 
seeks to further our understanding of emotion and conditional reasoning by 
replicating the design of Experiments 6 and 7 whilst controlling directly for converse 
probability (a proxy of believability and alternative causes) and investigating the 
effect of presentation format. As mentioned above, DA and AC inferences are more 
prone to the effects of enabling and disabling conditions, and this can be controlled 
by taking into account P(p|q). Also discussed above is the presentation of the 
premises and the conclusions (e.g. Table  7.1). In Experiments 6, 7, and 8 the format 
used by Blanchette and Richards (2004) was adopted, yet this is not typical of the 
work in the reasoning literature. Whereas this chapter has aimed to develop the 
work on conditionals in the emotion literature, it is now important to consider how 
this programme of work relates to the designs found in the reasoning literature, and 
how the effects reported in Experiments 6, 7, and 8 relate to conditionals when the 
number of alternative causes, alluded to earlier, are controlled.  
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Chapter Eight 
8. Conditional Reasoning, Emotion, and 
Alternative Antecedents 
8.1 Introduction (Experiment 9) 
The results from the previous chapter suggest that positive content in conditional 
reasoning leads to lower accuracy rates than negative or control content. However, 
these effects are found primarily on DA and AC inferences. This was found when 
content valence was varied within (Experiment 6) and when it was varied between 
participants (Experiment 7), as well as when the verbal content was replaced with 
visual content (Experiment 8).  
One possible explanation for the effects being found only on DA and AC 
problems in Experiments 6 and 7 is that the number of alternative antecedents 
varied either across inference types or across content types. One way of assessing 
this is to take into account correlates of the number of alternative antecedents such 
as the converse probabilities of the conditionals. That is, the probability of p 
occurring given q, P(p|q). This suggestion that the results presented in Experiment 6 
and replicated in Experiment 7 may be due to differences in converse probability 
arises from research which has shown that the drawing of these inferences is more 
highly influenced by the availability of enabling and disabling factors, and the 
availability of alternatives than the drawing of MP and MT inferences (Cummins et 
al., 1991). The number of alternative causes and disabling factors is largely described 
by the converse probability of a conditional statement; if there is only one possible 
cause of q, and that is p, then the probability of p given q is high. If there are many 
possible causes of q, such as m, n, o and p, the probability of p having occurred given 
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q is lowered. Given the rule “If p then q”, the drawing of inferences (particularly DA 
and AC, as will be discussed below) is dependent not only on the conditional 
probability, P(q|p), but also on the converse probability, P(p|q).  
Although alternatives and disabling conditions have been described in 
published work (e.g. Cummins et al., 1991), Serpell (2011, unpublished thesis) 
provides perhaps the most clear illustration of the alternative causes. Taking the 
conditional statement “If the butter is heated, then the butter will melt”, it can be 
seen that there are relatively few alternative causes. What else would make butter 
melt besides heating it? This can be thought of as the converse probability being 
high; P(p|q)=High; If the butter has melted, it is highly probable that it was heated. 
Alternatively, given the conditional “If the stone is kicked, then the stone will move”, 
it can be seen that there are many alternative causes. The stone may have been 
thrown, or moved by an animal, or shaken by natural events. In this case, the 
converse probability is low; P(p|q)=Low. If the stone has moved, it is not very likely to 
be because it was kicked. 
 
Few alternative causes; P(p|q)=High 
If the butter is heated (p), the butter will melt (q). 
The butter was heated, the butter melted 
Many alternative causes; P(p|q)=Low 
If the stone is kicked (p), the stone will move (q) 
The stone was kicked, the stone moved 
The stone was thrown, the stone moved 
A dog picked up the stone, the stone moved 
There was an earth tremor, the stone moved 
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In relation to the impact of P(p|q) on endorsement rates of each inference type, 
Cummins and colleagues (1991) present data showing that the number of alternative 
causes affects the rate at which DA and AC inferences are accepted, but that 
alternative causes have little impact on the acceptance of MP and MT inferences. 
They show that when there are fewer alternative causes, DA and AC inferences are 
accepted at higher rates than if there are more alternative causes, and suggest this is 
possibly due to the limited number of alternatives leading the individuals to treat the 
rules as biconditional. That is, if p is the only cause of q, it would be extremely 
unlikely that q would occur if p hadn’t, which makes “if p, then q” almost equivalent 
to “if q, then p” – P(p|q) is high.   
In relation to emotion as load and emotion as information theories, converse 
probability is important to control as the number of alternative causes affects the 
number of situations which need to be considered in order to evaluate each 
inference. This search for alternatives, which is synonymous with a search for 
alternative models discussed in earlier chapters on syllogistic reasoning, is affected 
by cognitive ability, or available cognitive resources, which load theories argue will be 
affected by emotive content. Similarly, the search for alternatives will be affected, 
according to information theories, by positive emotions cueing the acceptance of 
initial models, and negative emotions cueing an extended search. This latter 
possibility is, given the support for information theories found in the previous 
chapter, the one which the current experiment will control for. If the results replicate 
the findings in Chapter  7 after controlling for the number of alternatives, this will 
provide stronger support for the information theory of emotion effects in reasoning. 
As in Experiments 6, 7, and 8 the aims of Experiment 9 are to investigate the 
impact of emotive content on conditional reasoning, and use any patterns revealed 
to further our understanding of how these effects occur by ruling out the possibility 
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that they can be accounted for by differences in converse probabilities. Experiment 9 
develops the previous work by controlling for converse probability, which, as 
outlined above, may account for some of the content effects found with DA and AC 
inferences if alternatives and content are assumed to have covaried, or if there was a 
possibility of this given that alternatives were not explicitly controlled. 
In addition to investigating the effects of emotive content on logical accuracy 
and rates at which the inferences are drawn, the current experiment will also include 
a variant of the mood measure used in Experiment 5. This is in order to assess the 
impact of the emotive content on experienced mood, and provide data to shed light 
on the question raised in Section  7.1 as to whether emotive content alters the 
experienced mood of individuals, or operates without altering subjective emotional 
states. 
In summary, the current chapter will replicate the design used in Experiment 
7, but using a set of conditional statements in which converse probability is 
controlled. If the increased accuracy of negative content relative to positive content 
found earlier is due to the content valence, accuracy would be expected to be higher 
for negative content than positive content again. If the effects can possibly be 
attributed to the availability of alternatives, as measured by the converse 
probabilities, and the availability of both alternative causes and disabling conditions, 
no difference between content types would be expected.   
8.1.1  Pre-Testing of Conditionals 
In order to obtain a selection of conditional statements with emotive content which 
were also matched for converse probability, a range of items and their converse were 
presented to a small group of volunteers. The volunteers were asked to rate the 
conditional statements for their positivity and probabilities on 100-point scales. 0 
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indicated negative and 0% probability, 100 represented positive and 100% certainty. 
The full pool of items and list of those selected for use can be found in Appendix  D. 
Probability and positivity ratings were analysed in a 3 Content (Positive, 
Control, Negative) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Direction 
(Conditional, Converse) design; whereby Direction indicates whether P(q|p) or P(p|q) 
was being rated. For example, given the statement “If the butter is heated, the butter 
will melt”, rating the conditional direction is rating the probability and positivity of 
the statement as presented above; whereas rating the converse direction is rating 
the probability and positivity of the statement “If the butter has melted, then the 
butter was heated”. Means for each cell in this design for probability and positivity 
ratings are shown in Table  8.1. 
 
Table  8.1 Possibility and Positivity ratings (%) for the conditional statements used in 
Experiments 9 and 10, by content type, believability, and direction 
Probability Ratings (%) 
  
Believable Unbelievable 
Content 
 
Conditional Converse Conditional Converse 
Positive M 70 75 46 49 
 
SD 10 4 14 5 
Control M 85 71 44 43 
 
SD 11 8 1 37 
Negative M 87 71 28 54 
 
SD 8 18 16 30 
Positivity Ratings (%) 
  
Believable Unbelievable 
Content 
 
Conditional Converse Conditional Converse 
Positive M 83 84 70 73 
 
SD 2 12 9 11 
Control M 48 46 48 51 
 
SD 12 10 1 2 
Negative M 6 9 7 5 
 
SD 8 6 2 2 
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As intended, probability ratings differed significantly as a function of believability 
[Believable; M = 76.54, SD = 3.46, Unbelievable M = 44.01, SD = 3.46, F(1,12) = 22.40, 
p < .001, 
 = .65], but not across content type or direction. Similarly, positivity 
ratings differed significantly as a function of content type [F(2,12) = 176.56, p < .001, 

 = .97]. All pairwise comparisons were statistically significant at p<.001; Positive (M 
= 77.43, SD = 7.54), Control (M = 48.40, SD = 7.55), Negative (M = 6.93, SD = 7.53). 
Positivity did not vary across levels of believability or direction. Content, Believability, 
and Direction showed no significant interactive effects on probability or positivity 
ratings. Controlling these properties rules out the possibility that any differences 
between content types found in this experiment are the result of confounded 
converse probabilities. 
8.1.2 Method and Results 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
The results reported here are based on a sample of 73 undergraduate Psychology 
students at Plymouth University who participated for course credit. Age and gender 
were not recorded. 
The current experiment, as in Experiment 7, adopts a 2 Believability (High, 
Low) x 3 Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) x 4 Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, 
AC) mixed-ANOVA, with content type being varied between-participants. The 
between-participants design was chosen for the development of the previous 
experiments, rather than the within-participants design of Experiment 6 to eliminate 
any potential reduction in content effects caused by switching between content 
types. The procedure for the current study followed exactly that of Experiment 7, 
with the only difference being the conditionals that were presented. Response times 
were also recorded in order to assess any impact of speed on accuracy, and a 
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measure of mood was included to assess change in experienced mood before and 
after the reasoning task. For this part of the current experiment, participants were 
asked to rate, on a ten-point Likert scale anchored at ‘Very Unhappy’ and ‘Very 
Happy’, their mood before and after completing the reasoning task. This allows some 
investigation of whether integral mood operates by creating an experienced mood as 
in incidental mood manipulations, or without directly altering the individuals’ mood 
(a question raised in Chapters  3,  4, and  7). 
Mood Ratings 
There was a main effect of time (pre-reasoning versus post-reasoning) on ratings of 
mood, which reached statistical significance, [F(1,70) = 10.94, p = .001, 
 = .14]. 
Mood pre-reasoning was significantly higher (M = 6.08, SD = 1.80) than mood post-
reasoning (M = 5.74, SD = 1.71). 
 
 
Figure  8.1 Pre- and Post-Reasoning mood ratings 
 
 
Although Time did not interact with Content, individual paired-comparison t-tests for 
each content type showed that the main effect of Time is driven by a larger decrease 
pre- (M = 6.20, SD = 1.71) to post-reasoning (M = 5.56, SD = 1.61) for negative 
content, [t(24) = 2.78, p = .01, d = 1.42], than for control [Pre M = 6.57, SD = 1.47; 
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Post M = 6.44, SD = 1.41, t(22) = 1.00, p = .33], or positive content [Pre M = 5.52, SD = 
2.06; Post M = 5.28, SD = 1.90, t(24) = 1.66, p = .11] ; see Figure  8.1. 
Within each level of Time, although no main effect of content was found for 
pre-reasoning ratings [F(2,70) = 2.17, p = .12, 
 = .06], post-hoc analyses showed 
that those in the positive condition reported significantly lower mood (M = 5.52, SD = 
2.06) than those in the control condition (M = 6.57, SD = 1.47, p = .05, d = .58), but 
their ratings were not significantly lower than those in the negative condition (M = 
6.20, SD = 1.80, p=.18). Individuals in the negative and control conditions did not 
show a significant difference in pre-reasoning mood ratings (p=.48). Post-reasoning, a 
main effect of content was found [F(2,70) = 3.12, p = .05, 
 = .08], in which the 
average mood of the positive content condition (M = 5.28, SD = 1.90) did not differ 
from that of the negative condition (M = 5.6, SD = 1.61, p = .55), the mood of the 
negative condition did not differ from that of the control condition, (M = 6.44, SD = 
1.41, p = .07), but the positive and control conditions differed significantly (p = .02, d 
= .70). 
Comparing the pre- and post-reasoning ratings using the RCI allows the 
variability of the mood rating scale to be taken into account, and provides a clearer 
estimate of mood change caused by the content of the problems. With an estimate 
of test-retest reliability of α = 0.93 based on the change across ratings for the entire 
sample, the percentage of participants within each content condition who showed a 
decrease, no-change, or increase, in their mood ratings are shown in Table  8.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
dzahra 275 330974 
 
Table  8.2 Change in Pre- to Post-Mood Ratings based on RCI scores 
 Direction of Reliable Change in Pre to Post Mood Ratings 
(% of Sample) 
Content Decreased No Change* Increased 
Positive 15 85 0 
Neutral 0 100 0 
Negative 16 84 0 
 
*No-change indicates either no difference between pre- and post-
reasoning ratings, or an unreliable change; that is, a change which is 
within the bounds expected by the variability of the measure 
  
 
These results, combined with those of the ANOVA on mood rating suggest that 
although the completion of the reasoning task appears to lower mood in a general 
sense, the specific valence of the content does not serve to generate positive or 
negative mood states in the participants. However, as the positivity ratings of each 
group of conditionals was shown to differ in the pre-test phase, we can rule out the 
possibility that any differences found in accuracy rates or rates of drawing the 
inference between content conditions is due to differences in experienced mood and 
is instead related to how the problem content is perceived and processed. The 
problem content is perceived as more or less positive depending on the content type, 
but this difference does not translate into differences in ratings of subjective mood.  
Reasoning Accuracy 
The mean accuracy rates, along with standard deviations, for each cell of a 2 
Believability (High, Low) x 4 Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) x 3 Content Type 
(Positive, Control, Negative) mixed-ANOVA are shown in Table  8.3. A main effect of 
Believability was found [F(1,70) = 5.82, p = .02, 
 = .08], whereby high-believability 
problems (M = 59.84, SD = 13.37) are responded to more accurately than low-
believability problems (M=54.93, SD = 17.86), replicating the effect of believability 
found in Chapter  7. 
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Table  8.3 Descriptive statistics for participants' mean reasoning accuracy (%) on conditionals 
with emotive content; P(q|p) controlled, content varied between-participants 
   Inference Type 
Content Believability  MP MT DA AC 
Positive 
N=23 
High M 84 70 56 38 
 SD 31 41 44 39 
Low M 78 42 42 34 
 SD 38 40 40 37 
Control 
N=25 
High M 98 63 33 33 
 SD 10 38 36 42 
Low M 91 57 54 37 
 SD 25 43 47 48 
Negative 
N=23 
High M 82 68 48 46 
 SD 32 38 44 48 
Low M 92 58 32 42 
 SD 24 40 38 40 
 
 
There was also a significant Believability by Content interaction [F(2,70) = 5.24, p = 
.008, 
 = .13] (Figure  8.2). Accuracy rates drop between high-believability and low-
believability when the content is negative and they drop more drastically when the 
content is positive; but accuracy increases between high-believability and low-
believability for control content. The difference between high- and low-believability 
items is statistically significant for positive content [t(24) = 3.32, p = .003, d = .33], but 
not for control, [t(22) = -1.24, p = .23], or negative content [t(24) = 1.33, p = .20]. This 
suggests that believability only has an effect when the content is positive, though 
may also be due to the limited difference in reported emotional experience between 
the negative and control conditions.  
The difference in accuracy rates for low-believability problems is significant 
between positive and neutral content (p = .04, d = .27), but not for positive-control 
and control-negative comparisons (p = .17 and p = .47 respectively). For high-
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believability content, none of the pair-wise comparisons across content types was 
significant. 
This is different from the patterns found in Experiments 6, 7, and 8 whereby 
accuracy typically increased across positive to control to negative content. The 
current results suggests that content valence has little effect when the items are 
believable, but when the items are unbelievable positive content leads to a decrease 
in accuracy. This is not due to differences in rates of drawing each inference between 
positive-believable and positive-unbelievable problems as no difference was found in 
the number of inferences drawn between these problem types [t(24) = -.30, p = .77]. 
However, the time spent considering positive-unbelievable problems was 
significantly longer (M = 8421ms, SD = 2811ms) than the time spent considering 
positive-believable problems [M = 7084ms, SD = 2837ms, t(24) = -3.54, p = .002, d = 
.49]; this increase in thinking time seems to have led to lower accuracy yet 
comparable rates of drawing each inference type. 
 
 
Figure  8.2 Beliebavility by Content-Type Interaction found in accuracy rates  
(Content varied between-participants, converse probability controlled) 
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A main effect of Inference type was also found [F(3,210) = 31.25, p < .001, 
 = .31]; 
whereby MP inferences (M = 87.33, SD = 26.06) are responded to more accurately 
than MT (M = 59.59, SD = 33.50, p < .001, d = .92), MT more than DA (M = 44.18, SD = 
34.99, p = .03, d = .45), and DA more than AC (M = 38.36, SD = 36.34, p = .06, d = .16). 
Although no main effect of Content (p = .77), no Believability by Inference interaction 
(p = .12), or any Content by Inference interactions (p = .67) were found, there was a 
marginal Believability by Inference by Content interaction [F(6,210) = 2.06, p = .06, 
 
= .06] (Figure  8.3).  
 
 
Figure  8.3 Marginal Inference by Believability by Content Interaction found within Accuracy 
Rates (Content varied between-participants, converse probability controlled) 
 
The pattern shown by this three-way interaction suggests that high-believability 
items are generally responded to more accurately than low-believability items, 
though this difference is larger and more consistent with positive content. Under 
Control content, MP and MT show little effect of believability, but low-believability 
DA and AC inferences are responded to more accurately. With negative content, it is 
broadly the high-believability inferences that are responded to more accurately, as 
with positive content. Of interest in this (marginal) interaction is the difference of the 
control content condition. If the panels of Figure  8.3 are viewed as believability by 
validity interactions, they represent a similar finding to Chapter  5, showing a belief-
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bias-like effect – the interaction between logical validity and believability – that was 
reduced by emotive content. However, this should be treated with caution as the 
interaction here is only marginal, and will be returned to when rates of drawing the 
inference are analysed. 
Rates of Drawing the Inference 
In order to assess the potential reduction in belief-by-logic interaction caused 
by emotive content, which was hinted at in the analysis of accuracy rates, a 2 
Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 3 Content type 
(Positive, Control, Negative) mixed-ANOVA was conducted on rates of drawing the 
inference. The mean percentage of times MP and MT inferences were drawn were 
collapsed to create the Valid category, and DA and AC were collapsed to create the 
Invalid category. Descriptive statistics for each cell in this design are shown in  
Table  8.4.  
 
Table  8.4 Descriptive statistics for rates at which participants draw valid believable, valid 
unbelievable, invalid believable and invalid unbelievable conclusions, by emotive content; 
P(q|p) controlled, content varied between participants 
  Valid Invalid 
Content Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Positive M 77 60 50 51 
N=25 SD 31 35 41 29 
Control M 80 74 66 53 
N=23 SD 18 28 36 44 
Negative M 75 75 49 55 
N=25 SD 29 25 44 31 
 
A main effect of validity was found [F(1,70) = 28.31, p < .001, 
 = .29], whereby valid 
inferences (M = 73.56, SD = 27.78) are drawn more frequently than invalid inferences 
(M = 54.09, SD = 37.62). This did not interact with content type or believability 
however. No main effect of believability was found, nor did believability interact with 
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content type. There was also no main effect of content type, although validity, 
believability and content did show a significant three-way interaction [F(2,70) = 3.10, 
p = .05, 
 = .08], depicted in Figure  8.4. The belief-bias effect, or conditional 
equivalent, only seems to be present to some extent in the positive and negative 
content conditions, and only insofar as the interaction represents differing effects of 
belief over levels of validity. The direction of the effect is almost reversed between 
positive and the negative conditions. Belief has a larger effect on valid problems 
when they contain positive content, but a larger effect on invalid problems when the 
content is negative. Though the overall increase in the validity by believability 
interaction for positive and negative content is the same as the effects found in 
Chapter  5 with syllogistic reasoning, that the directions differ suggesting that the 
finding is less robust than expected, and explanations for this will be considered in 
the summary of this experiment.  
 
 
Figure  8.4 Validity by Believability by Content type interaction in rates of drawing the 
inference; content between-paticipants, converse probability controlled 
 
8.1.3 Summary of Experiment 9 
Experiment 9 replicates the findings of Experiments 6, 7, and 8 in that the accuracy 
rate for valid inferences is higher than the accuracy rate for invalid inferences, and 
that accuracy broadly decreases across MP to MT to DA to AC inference. The 
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previous finding that inferences related to high-believability conditionals were 
responded to more accurately than those related to low-believability conditionals 
was also replicated. Although no main effect of content was found, content did 
interact significantly with inference type and believability, suggesting that the belief 
effects vary as a function of inference type, and that this relationship varies as a 
function of content type as described above. Of particular interest is the fact that 
believable DA and AC inferences are responded to much more accurately than 
unbelievable DA and AC inferences when the content is positive and negative, but 
unbelievable DA and AC inferences are responded to more accurately with control 
content. These results are similar to those found in Experiments 6, 7, and 8 in which 
content effects are most pronounced on DA and AC inferences. They are however 
smaller than the previous differences, suggesting that controlling for the number of 
alternative antecedents reduces content effects, which in turn suggests that content 
effects may be the results of content varying the use of or search for alternative 
causes. 
 When the rates at which each inference is drawn are considered, the main 
effect of validity is found again, though believability and content have little effect. 
However, of interest was the different effect of belief across levels of validity found 
for positive and negative content. The previous findings with syllogistic reasoning 
(Chapter  5) that belief-bias is reduced by emotive content does not seem to hold in 
conditional reasoning, although this may be due to the variability of believability 
within conditional statements and premises as they have been presented here. For 
example, although a conditional statement may have been rated as believable, such 
as “If it rains, then the roads will be wet”, the premises may have a different level of 
belief (“It rains”, “The roads are wet”, “It did not rain”, “The roads are not wet”), and 
it is unclear which ‘beliefs’ will be relied upon or ignored during the reasoning task. 
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However, controlling for converse probability (and alternative antecedents) goes 
some way to matching inference believability to conditional believability. 
Furthermore, the results still tell us about how inferences drawn from highly-
believable and less believable statements are affected by emotion, and this is useful 
in comparing the different effects of emotion across syllogistic and conditional 
reasoning. That different effects of belief are found highlights the need to consider 
not only the source of the believability when interpreting results from research on 
reasoning and emotion, but also serves to highlight the need to consider differences 
across types of reasoning task. 
  
8.2 Using a Standard Presentation Set  
(Experiment 10) 
Up to this point, the premise-conclusion pairings used by Blanchette and colleagues 
have been adopted in order to replicate the original designs as closely as possible 
whilst controlling for confounds in the original materials. These issues have been 
discussed previously. However, within the reasoning literature the pairings such as 
those presented earlier in Table  7.1 (reproduced below in the top portion of 
Table  8.5) are not commonly used, and as such, Experiment 10 uses premise-
conclusion pairings more typical of the reasoning, rather than emotion, literature. 
The conditionals were again controlled for converse probability, and content varied 
between participants.   
 The data reported here is derived using the same experimental procedure as 
in Experiment 9, with the same set of conditionals which control converse 
probability. However, it restricts the response options available to participants to Yes 
and No, as well as using more common pairings of premise-conclusion statements, 
rather than those used by Blanchette and Richards’ (2004). This brings the current 
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study’s methodology in line with methods more typically used in the thinking and 
reasoning literature whereby individuals are required to indicate whether an 
inference in valid or not. This enables the current experiment to evaluate content 
effects in relation to previous work on conditionals outside of the emotion literature, 
which has thus far been the focus of the work in Chapters  6 and  7, as well as allowing 
a more direct comparison with the work on syllogisms in which typical response 
options are valid (Y) and invalid (N). These differences can be seen in Table  8.5. 
 
Table  8.5 Non-standard Premise-Conclusion pairs taken from Blanchette and Richards (2004) 
compared with the more typical pairings used in the current study (Experiment 10) 
Inference Premise Conclusion Responses 
Blanchette and Richards (2004) 
MP P q? Y/N/Maybe 
MT ¬q p? Y/N/Maybe 
DA ¬p q? Y/N/Maybe 
AC q p? Y/N/Maybe 
Experiment 10 
MP p q? Y/N 
MT ¬q ¬p? Y/N 
DA ¬p ¬q? Y/N 
AC q p? Y/N 
 
8.2.1 Method and Results 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants recruited for this study were 90 students (30 male) from Plymouth 
University who participated for course credit. Their mean age was 23 years (SD = 
5.97). A 2 Believability (High, Low) x 3 Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) x 4 
Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) mixed-ANOVA was conducted, as in the previous 
experiments, on both logical accuracy and on the rates at which each inference type 
is drawn. Content type was varied between participants.  
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Reasoning Accuracy 
Means and standard deviations for each cell in the design, based on accuracy, are 
shown in Table  8.6. 
 
Table  8.6 Descriptive Statistics for participants' accuracy rates on conditionals with emotive 
content, usign a standard presentation pairing (Content varied Between-participants) 
   Inference Type 
Content Believability  MP MT DA AC 
Positive 
N=30 
High M 67 47 34 23 
 SD 48 41 32 37 
Low M 83 39 24 38 
 SD 27 40 35 41 
Control 
N=30 
High M 100 31 48 23 
 SD 0 36 45 39 
Low M 98 48 39 22 
 SD 9 43 38 36 
Negative 
N=30 
High M 94 31 36 28 
 SD 15 33 36 43 
Low M 90 41 38 40 
 SD 28 44 33 44 
 
 
The analysis of accuracy data showed a significant main effect of inference type 
[F(1,261) = 103.17, p < .001, 
 = .54], and a significant interaction between inference 
and content type [F(6,261) = 3.15, p = .005, 
 = .07]. There was also a significant 
three-way interaction between inference type, believability, and content type 
[F(6,261) = 3.02, p = .007, 
 = .07]. No other main or interaction effects reached 
statistical significance. 
The effect of inference type appeared to be that responses to MP inferences 
were much more accurate than responses to MT, DA or AC inferences (all pairwise 
comparisons p<.001). Accuracy rates on AC inferences were significantly lower than 
on MT inferences (p < .05), but MT-DA and DA-AC pairwise comparisons did not 
reach statistical significance. The interaction between believability and inference 
dzahra 285 330974 
 
type suggests that low-believability conditionals are responded to more accurately 
than high-believability conditionals when the inference is MP, MT or AC, but that for 
DA inferences high-believability conditionals are responded to more accurately than 
low-believability ones. 
The interaction between inference type and content type is shown in 
Figure  8.5 which also highlights the only statistically significant pairwise comparisons. 
These patterns suggest that content only has a significant effect on accuracy rates for 
MP inferences, such that positive content leads to lower accuracy rates, whereas 
there is no difference between control and negative content. 
 
 
Figure  8.5 Inference by Content Type interaction, standard presentation, converse probability 
controlled, content varied between-participants 
 
The three-way interaction between believability, inference type and content type 
shown in Figure  8.6 suggests that moving from high-believability to low-believability 
conditionals increases the rates at which MP and AC inferences are drawn, but 
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decreases the rates at which MT and DA inferences are drawn - when the content is 
positive. Moving from high-believability to low-believability conditionals has little 
effect on MP and DA rates but increase the drawing of MT and AC inferences – when 
the content is negative. Finally, the move from high-believability to low-believability 
shows little effect on MP and AC drawing but increases in MT and decreases in DA 
rates - when the control content is used. Although these patterns do not appear to 
be particularly robust, as indicated by their variability across experiments (compare, 
for example, Figure  8.6 with Figure  8.3), that content alters the effect of believability 
differently across inference types is interesting in that it provides some suggestion 
that content has its effect on reasoning by altering the reliance on beliefs. This 
relates back to the belief-bias like effect found in Experiment 9, in which the effect 
varies across content types, and supports the use of paradigms which incorporate 
believability as a factor in exploring the interaction between emotion and reasoning. 
 
 
Figure  8.6 Inference by Content Type by Believability interaction in accuracy rates; standard 
presentation, converse probability controlled, content varied between-participants 
 
Rates of Drawing the Inference 
Means and standard deviations for each cell in a 2 Believability (High, Low) x 2 
Inference Type (MP, MT, DA, AC) x 3 Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) 
design, based on the inferences drawn can be found in Table  8.7,  
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Table  8.7 Descriptive Statistics for participants' rates of drawing the inference; 2 Believability 
(Believable, Unbelievable) x 3 Content Type (Positive, Neutral, Negative) x 4 Inference Type 
(MP, MT, DA, AC) 
   Inference Type 
Content Believability  MP MT DA AC 
Positive 
N=30 
High M 98 47 66 77 
 SD 9 41 32 37 
Low M 83 39 76 63 
 SD 27 40 35 41 
Control 
N=30 
High M 100 31 52 77 
 SD 0 36 45 39 
Low M 98 48 61 78 
 SD 9 43 38 36 
Negative 
N=30 
High M 94 31 64 72 
 SD 15 33 36 43 
Low M 90 41 62 60 
 SD 28 44 33 44 
 
The analysis of rates at which inferences are drawn showed a significant effect of 
Inference Type [F(3,261) = 41.19, p < .001, 
 = .32], whereby MP inferences were 
drawn most frequently (M = 94.07, SD = 13.76), followed by AC (M = 70.97, SD = 
36.71), DA (M = 63.80, SD = 30.36), and finally MT inferences (M = 39.44, SD = 35.20). 
All pairwise comparisons were significant at p<.001, except the difference between 
DA and AC, which was not statistically significant. This pattern of results matches 
those found in Chapter  7. Believability also interacted with content type [F(2,87) = 
6.26, p = .003, 
 = .13].  
As can be seen from the depiction of this interaction in the upper panel of 
Figure  8.7, positive content leads to an overall higher rate of drawing the inferences 
than control or negative content. However, when the conditional is less believable, 
positive and negative content reduce the rates at which inferences are drawn relative 
to control content. This is a result which was not found in the inference rate data 
from Experiment 9, although for comparison, the non-significant content by 
believability interaction is shown in the lower panel of Figure  8.7. There was also a 
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believability by inference type interaction [F(3,261) = 4.55, p = .004, 
 = .05], such 
that people drew MP and AC inferences less when the conditional was low- than 
when it was high-believability, but people drew MT and DA inferences more 
frequently when the conditional was low- than when it was high-believability.  
 
 
Figure  8.7 Rates at which each inference is drawn by Belieavbility and Content Type; standard 
presentation, converse probability controlled, content varied between-participants 
 
For direct comparison with Experiment 9, a 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) 
x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 3 Content Type (Positive, Control, Negative) analysis was 
ran whereby the validity levels were created by collapsing inference type as in 
Section  8.1.2. Means for each cell are shown in Table  8.8. 
 
dzahra 289 330974 
 
Table  8.8 Descriptive statistics for rates at which participants draw valid believable, valid 
unbelievable, invalid believable and invalid unbelievable conclusions, by emotive content; 
P(q|p) controlled, content varied betweenparticipants, standrad presentation. 
  Valid Invalid 
Content Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Positive M 73 61 72 69 
 SD 22 19 27 32 
Control M 65 73 64 70 
 SD 18 23 31 32 
Negative M 63 66 68 61 
 SD 19 24 33 30 
 
The analysis revealed no main effect of validity, believability or content type; only a 
believability by condition interaction which is captured by the analysis above.  
8.3 Discussion of Experiments 9 and 10 
The results from Chapter  7 showed that positive content in conditional reasoning 
tasks leads to lower rates of logical accuracy than negative or control content, but 
that this effect was found mostly on DA and AC inferences. The current chapter 
tested whether differences in the availability of alternative antecedents across the 
experimental conditions could account for these patterns of responding, and as a 
result, provides a replication of the experiments in Chapter  7 with materials for 
which converse probability is controlled as a correlate of alternative antecedents. 
Experiment 9 is a direct replication of the design of Experiment 7 using the new 
materials, and Experiment 10 is a replication of the design, with the new materials, 
but using response options more typical of the conditional reasoning literature. 
Accuracy Rates and Drawing the Inference 
In both experiments, an effect of inference type was found whereby accuracy rates 
decreased across MP to MT to DA to AC inferences. The main effect of believability 
which has been found previously in this thesis, namely, that unbelievable 
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conditionals generally lead to lower accuracy rates then believable conditionals was 
only replicated in Experiment 9. The data from this experiment also showed 
believability to interact with content type, though in a different way to that found in 
earlier experiments. Rather than the increasing accuracy across positive to control to 
negative content found in Chapter  7, Experiment 9 shows only small effects 
suggestive of both positive and negative content increasing accuracy when the 
conditional is believable, but impairing logical accuracy when the conditional is less 
believable. No main effects of content were found on logical accuracy in either 
experiment reported in this chapter. There is however some suggestion that positive 
content leads to lower logical accuracy than control or negative content, though this 
is primarily found with MP inferences. Neither of these patterns is particularly strong, 
and neither is in line with current theories of how emotion might be expected to 
interact with reasoning.  
Rates of drawing the inference show few similarities between Experiments 9 
and 10. Experiment 9 found valid inferences to be drawn more than invalid ones, but 
this did not replicate in Experiment 10, although inference type did significantly 
affect rates of drawing the inference. In experiment 9, believability did not interact 
with content type as it did in Experiment 10, though these patterns of drawing the 
inference bear little relation to the way in which accuracy rates vary as a function of 
believability and content type in Chapter  7. Finally, the three-way interaction 
between believability, validity, and content found in experiment 9, showing 
increased believability by validity interactions with positive and negative, relative to 
control, content, was not found in Experiment 10. 
It is interesting that controlling for P(q|p) eliminates the differences in 
reasoning accuracy across content types, suggesting that they are a function of 
converse but not conditional probabilities. Either the differences in previous 
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experiments between content types was due to the differences in the availability of 
alternatives, although, not having been controlled it might be assumed that they 
didn’t vary systematically; or the emotional valence of content appears to act 
through the converse probability, at least to a small degree. Though this study did 
not set out to investigate this, it suggests a profitable avenue for future research in 
terms of which aspects of conditional statements are influenced by emotional 
valence. This has particular relevance when the number of alternatives is considered 
in terms of alternative models which need to be evaluated (Cummins, 1997; 
Cummins et al., 1991), and given that the effectiveness of such a search, or the 
inclination to begin such a search, may be determined by emotion. 
An additional avenue of research would be to consider in more detail the 
effect of changing the presentation from Yes-No-Maybe to Yes-No; forcing individuals 
to respond with yes or no forces them to guess if they are unsure which may reduce 
any effects of content by increasing the variability in each condition. Drawing on 
ideas from eye-witness testimony (e.g. Weber & Perfect, 2011), replacing the 
‘Maybe’ response with a ‘Don’t Know’ response might serve to clarify the effect of 
emotive content by removing extraneous variability from the dataset. By allowing the 
exclusion of cases where individuals would otherwise be forced to guess yes or no, 
valid or invalid, follows or does not, ‘noise’ created by such guessing would be 
removed and make any effects of emotive content clearer. 
In relation to the existing literature, the accuracy results from Experiments 9 
and 10 largely replicate the effects of inference type found by Blanchette and 
Richards (2004), though the effects of content do not – Blanchette and Richards 
found happy and sad content to reduce logical accuracy, whereas Experiments 9 and 
10 found no main effects. Experiment 10 found different results for accuracy; MP 
inferences were responded to much more accurately than MT, DA, and AC, all of 
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which were responded to with comparable accuracy; in relation to Blanchette and 
Richards’ results showing that accuracy decreased from MP to MT to AC to DA 
inferences. In terms of the interaction between content type and inference type 
found in Experiment 10, positive and negative content led to comparable accuracy 
rates on MT, DA and AC inference, but negative content leads to higher accuracy 
than positive content on MP inferences. This is contrary to Blanchette and Richards’ 
finding that positive and negative content both suppressed logical accuracy on MP 
inference relative to control content, and to similar degrees. 
Subjective Mood and Emotive Content 
The inclusion of a pre- and post-reasoning mood measure in Experiment 9 allowed 
and investigation of the extent to which emotive content altered subjective mood 
ratings. This element was included to address the questions raised previously as to 
whether content creates a subjective mood state or not, and whether this might be 
one way in which emotive content alters reasoning. In combination with the pre-test 
data, it was found that although content may be perceived and rated as more or less 
positive or negative, this did not result in changes in subjective mood ratings across 
the content conditions. The implications of this are that the few effects found in 
Experiments 9 and 10 that relate to content effects (integral emotion) cannot be 
attributed to ‘experienced’ emotion; content does not have its effect, with the 
current materials at least, by altering an individuals’ subjective emotional state. 
 In relation to information and load theories, if it is the generation and 
maintenance of an emotional state which is thought to be the source of cognitive 
load, this would explain the lack of support for load theories found in the current 
results. Similarly, it provides an explanation for the small amount of support found 
for the information theories; both integral and incidental emotion contain 
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information, so that content does not alter subjective mood does not undermine the 
information explanation.  
Summary 
In summary, differences in reasoning performance found between positive, negative, 
and control emotion on DA and AC inferences are removed or reduced when the 
converse probability is controlled in verbal conditionals. The patterns found in 
Experiments 6, 7, and 8 of support for information theories do not replicate clearly, 
and the suppression of logical accuracy by positive content is small. However, these 
findings lay the groundwork for developing more refined experimental designs in 
future work, highlighting the need to carefully control the availability of alternatives. 
In this sense they contribute to our understanding of emotion effects in reasoning by 
providing much more controlled studies than currently exist in the literature.  
Although controlling P(p|q) appears to eliminate content differences in 
verbal conditionals, converse probabilities were controlled in Experiment 8, with 
visual conditionals, and negative imagery led to higher accuracy rates than positive 
imagery. That content effects are more robust in visual tasks is interesting, and 
provides yet another avenue for future investigation. It might be hypothesised that 
the difference between moods across verbal and visual content is a result of 
familiarity with the (verbal) problem format, and a form of discounting. The extent to 
which individuals, especially student populations, have been exposed to both 
syllogistic and conditional reasoning and the extent to which they may have 
developed certain expectancies or schemas may be related to the extent to which 
they attend to their emotions. If an individual enters an experiment they perceive as 
a reasoning task, they may be cued to ignore (discount) emotion as a source of 
information. The visual conditionals used in Experiment 8 provide one possible 
dzahra 294 330974 
 
avenue for exploring emotion effects in a paradigm which is less familiar and thus 
likely to be less prone to this discounting effect than verbal conditional reasoning and 
syllogistic tasks. However, in the interest of exploring emotion effects across a 
broader range of paradigms, the following chapter will investigate the effect of 
incidental emotion on the Ratio-Bias task (e.g. Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). This task 
requires individuals to decide from which of two boxes of black and white ‘marbles’ 
they are more likely to select a black marble, and contrasts low-effort frequency-
based responding with higher-effort probability-based responding. As such, the use 
of the ratio-bias task develops the idea of comparing low- and high-effort processing 
of reasoning and decision making tasks in a way which is similar to the Belief-Bias 
paradigm but which is less reliant on formal logical rules.   
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Chapter Nine 
9. Ratio-Bias and Incidental Emotion 
9.1 Introduction 
In changing from the Necessity-Possibility paradigm to the Belief-Bias paradigm in 
Chapter  5, the fact that reasoning tasks may not necessarily measure the relative use 
of Type One versus Type Two processes, but rather the amount of Type Two 
processing was discussed (Section  2.2.4). Whereas the Necessity-Possibility paradigm 
seems likely to do the latter, the Belief-Bias paradigm, by putting logic and belief in 
conflict, provides a way of contrasting the relative use of the two systems. In the 
Necessity-Possibility paradigm differences in accuracy between emotion conditions 
may be seen as the result of differing levels of Type Two engagement, reflected in 
the number of models evaluated for each problem, rather than the difference 
between Type One and Type Two based responding (Chapter  4). In contrast, the 
Belief-Bias paradigm allows a measure of both the reliance on analytic processes and 
on prior beliefs, and it is this contrasting of the systems which is returned to in the 
current chapter.  
The studies reported so far have focused on typical reasoning problems in 
the form of syllogistic and conditional reasoning tasks, and they have investigated 
incidental and integral emotion, and, as outlined above, the effects of emotion have 
been considered in relation to increases in Type Two processing or relative use of 
Type One and Type Two processing. The findings from these studies have been 
mixed, though there is some consistent support for Information Theories (e.g. 
Chapter  7); those which posit positive mood will impair logical performance, but 
negative mood will increase logical performance. The focus of the current chapter is 
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an alternative paradigm to these tasks which provides another way of assessing the 
relative reliance on Type One and Type Two processing; The Ratio-Bias task. This 
complements the work on the Belief-Bias paradigm by comparing two different types 
of Type One and Type Two process other than belief and logic, using instead 
frequency-based and probability-based judgements. Such a paradigm allows the 
generalisability of the results from Chapter  5 to be investigated, whilst also allowing 
incidental emotion to be examined in a different type of task. 
In the typical ratio-bias task, a scenario is outlined whereby the individual is 
presented with two boxes, each containing a given number of black marbles and 
white marbles. These numbers, for each box, are given to the participant. They are 
then told that their task is to select the box from which they are most likely to draw a 
black marble should they reach in blindfolded and take one out at random. 
The properties of this task can be manipulated to contrast low versus high 
effort response strategies; for example the number of marbles of each colour in the 
boxes can be manipulated such that the frequency of black marbles and the 
probability of drawing a black marble are either congruent or incongruent. That is, 
the choice of a box based on the absolute number of black marbles (Frequency) can 
be made to coincide with the relative number of black marbles (Probability). For 
example, if Box A contains 5 black marbles, and 5 white marbles, and Box B contains 
2 black marbles and 8 white marbles, choosing based on Frequency and Probability 
yield the same selection: Box A. To extend this explanation; based on Frequency, 
there are more black marbles in Box A than in Box B. Thus Box A will be selected. 
Similarly, based on Probability, there is a 50% chance of selecting a black marble from 
Box A versus only a 20% chance of selecting a black marble from Box B. 
Consequently, Box A should be selected as the most likely to yield a black marble. In 
this case, Frequency and Probability are said to be ‘congruent’. 
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However, Frequency and Probability can also be made incongruent, such that 
each strategy leads to a different selection. For example, if Box A contains 5 black 
marbles and 5 white marbles, but Box B contains 10 black marbles and 30 white 
marbles. In this case, the frequency of black marbles is higher in Box B, whereas the 
probability of selecting a black marble is higher in Box A (Box A = 50%, Box B = 25%). 
If these two strategies, selecting based on frequency versus selecting based 
on probability are considered low-effort versus high-effort processing, then the ratio-
bias task presents a useful analogue to the syllogistic and conditional reasoning tasks 
in which believability and validity are manipulated. Furthermore, given recent work 
which has suggested that belief-based responding may not in fact be a Type One 
response (Handley et al., 2011), the Ratio-Bias task avoids this assumption by 
comparing frequency and probability based judgements rather than belief and logic 
based judgements. Although manipulation of integral emotion is somewhat 
problematic in this task, incidental emotion can be manipulated, and thus allows an 
investigation of the impact of incidental emotion on the use of frequency and 
probability based strategies. This is discussed below when considering the inclusion 
of emotion in the Ratio-Bias paradigm (Section  9.2). 
In summary, taking into account this evaluation of both Type One and Type 
Two processes the current chapter turns away from traditional reasoning tasks, and 
presents studies which utilise a ratio-bias task (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This task 
makes use of discrepancies between the probability of an outcome and the perceived 
frequency of an outcome in order to assess the relative use of frequency- and 
probability-based strategies in decision making. Given that probability based 
judgements are more effortful and require more cognitive processing than frequency 
based judgements, the ratio-bias task can be seen as a way of distinguishing between 
high- and low-effort strategies. This dichotomy, although potentially over-simplifying 
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the range of processes that may be involved in the task, provides a link to dual-
process theories of reasoning, and the different reasoning strategies which may be 
utilised. Thus the ratio-bias task provides a paradigm which fits well within the 
theoretical framework adopted for the investigation of syllogistic and conditional 
reasoning, but extending the investigation from logic and belief to frequency and 
probability. 
9.2 Experiment 11 
Previous research has shown that individuals tend to favour the higher frequency 
options (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998), even when the probability of the target 
outcome is worse (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).  It has also been found that the 
degree of difference in the probability of drawing a black marble between the 
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ options is related to the number of optimal responses 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). If there is a larger difference between the options in the 
absolute probability of selecting the desired coloured marble, people find it easier to 
make the correct selection. 
In the current study the incidental emotion (mood) of individuals will be 
varied between positive, control, and negative. Incidental as opposed to integral 
emotion was chosen for these studies in order to simplify the design of the study and 
aid interpretation of the results. If integral emotion had been varied, the items in 
each box would have been necessarily different to generate different emotions. This 
in turn is likely to have required less than perfect matching of size, shape, colour, and 
properties such as their ability to capture attention. Given that individuals have been 
shown to attend more to negative elements in verbal and visual arrays (Forgas, 2007; 
Pratto & John, 1991; Schimmack, 2005), it was deemed preferable to focus on 
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incidental emotion, and thus control for stimulus variables such as those listed above 
by using the same visual items (marbles) across conditions. 
The degree of difference in absolute probability of selecting the desired 
target from each box (Difficulty) will also be manipulated. It is expected that as in 
previous research, when the difference in probabilities is low (High Difficulty; Hard), 
people will make more incorrect, sub-optimal box choices than when the difference 
is large (Low Difficulty; Easy). Congruency will also be manipulated, and would be 
expected to impair performance. That is when the frequencies and probabilities lead 
to different box selections (Incongruent trials), higher numbers of incorrect choices 
would be expected than when both strategies lead to the same choice of box 
(Congruent trials), based on the assumption that individuals may be more reliant on 
frequency cues than probability cues as these require less effort to process; 
frequency computations do not require the relative frequencies of black and white 
marbles to be compared within and between boxes. 
Previous work in this thesis has used the conflict of logic and belief in the 
belief-bias paradigm to provide a test of the effects of emotion on Type One and 
Type Two processing. In the ratio-bias task, this idea of conflicting responses from 
each type of processing is achieved by varying the congruency of the responses from 
frequency and probability based processing. In the current design, it is incongruent 
trials which put frequency-based and probability-based responses in conflict 
alongside the manipulation of mood. When both frequency and probability lead to 
the same choice of box, both systems lead to the same response, and few effects of 
mood would be expected regardless of how emotion affects reasoning. Similarly, the 
effects described above and found in the previous work on the ratio-bias task would 
be expected in the control condition (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Pacini et al., 1998), 
namely a larger number of errors when frequency and probability indicate different 
dzahra 300 330974 
 
boxes, and a higher reliance on frequency when problems are more difficult; that is, 
when the difference in absolute frequency of selecting a black marble from each box 
is smaller as opposed to larger.  
However, in the positive and negative conditions, the effect of congruency 
and difficulty would be expected to differ from the control condition if emotion 
served as load or information. If mood serves as a source of cognitive load, the 
effects of difficulty and congruency would be expected to be more pronounced, with 
more individuals basing their decisions on frequency-based cues due to limited 
processing capacity. If the incidental emotion served as information, then negative 
mood would be expected to suppress the effects of congruency and difficulty, 
directing the individual to invest more effort in the calculation of probabilities than 
relying on frequency-based information. Positive mood on the other hand would be 
expected to increase the congruency and difficulty effects, directing individuals to 
accept the more easily accessible frequency-based responses. Details of how these 
factors will be varied are described in the methods sections, followed by the findings. 
9.2.1 Method and Materials 
Participants 
The participants in this study were 70 (9 male) undergraduate psychology students 
(Age; M = 24 years, SD = 8 years) at Plymouth University who participated for course 
credit. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three mood conditions, 
positive (N = 26), control (N = 22), and negative (N = 22). 
Mood Manipulation Task 
In order to manipulate participants’ moods, the writing task described in Chapter  3 
was used (Brand et al., 2007) in which participants were required to type about a 
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positive, control, or negative life event for ten minutes. This task was completed after 
participants had been briefed and signed consent forms. The instructions for this task 
were identical to those used for the manipulation of incidental emotion in 
Experiments 1 and 5. 
After completing this task but before beginning the ratio-bias task 
participants were asked to rate their current mood using a sliding scale ranging from 
0 (Very Sad) to 100 (Very Happy). They were also asked to complete this mood rating 
procedure after they had finished the ratio-bias task. After this final mood rating, 
prior to debriefing, participants were asked to read and rate a selection of jokes as in 
previous studies to neutralise any negative effects of the mood manipulation.  
Ratio-Bias Task 
The ratio-bias tasks consisted of a series of 56 pairs of boxes presented on screen to 
participants. Each box contained a selection of black and white marbles. Participants 
were instructed to indicate from which box they would be most likely to draw a black 
marble. The full text of the brief, instructions, and debrief can be found in 
Appendix  E. Decisions were indicated by clicking a button which was displayed below 
each box, and which were labelled Box One and Box Two for the left and right boxes 
respectively. An example trial screen is shown in Figure  9.1. 
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Figure  9.1 An example Ratio-Bias task trial 
 
Congruency and difficulty were crossed across the trials. Items could either be 
Congruent, whereby black marble frequency and probability were highest for the 
same box, or Incongruent, whereby black marble frequency and probability are 
highest in different boxes. Difficulty was varied by the discrepancy in the probability 
of drawing a black marble across the boxes. In high (Hard) difficulty trials, the 
difference in probabilities was between 5% and 20%. For example, if Box A has a 35% 
probability of drawing a marble, and Box B has a 40% chance of drawing a marble, 
the difference in probabilities in 5%, and the trial is classified as ‘hard’. In low 
difficulty (Easy) trials, the difference was between 25% and 40%. 
Trial items were created using R (Venables & Smith, 2010) in conjunction 
with a script designed by D. Trippas (personal communication, 2010) to plot black 
and white points at random.  After specifying the total number of marbles to be 
included in each ‘box’, and specifying the number of black marbles to be included, 
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the script generated two boxes with black and white marbles randomly distributed 
across the ‘boxes’, which are treated as graphical planes by the program. A variant of 
this script was used in Experiment 12 and is available from the author. This method 
of specifying the properties of the images and then plotting them was used to create 
all test trials in both experiments. 
The resulting design of this study was a 2 Difficulty (Easy, Hard) x 2 
Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) x 3 Mood (Positive, Control, Negative) mixed 
factorial ANOVA conducted on the number of optimal box choices (Accuracy); those 
for which the probability of drawing black marble is highest.  
Procedure 
The experimental procedure for this study broadly followed the previous studies. 
Participants were seated at computer terminals in a laboratory, and were presented 
with a brief and instructions on screen. Progression through the program was 
controlled by mouse-click responses. Following the brief and consent screens, 
participants completed the mood manipulation task, followed by a mood rating scale. 
This was followed by the ratio-bias trials, which were followed in turn by another 
mood rating scale. To conclude, a joke rating section was presented followed by the 
debrief.  
9.2.2 Results 
The mood ratings showed a significant main effect of condition [F(2,67) = 5.964, p = 
.004, 
 = .15], with mood ratings decreasing across positive (M = 68.08, SD = 13.83) 
to control (M = 62.68, SD = 14.56) to negative (M = 49.59, SD = 26.22). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed the difference between negative and control, and negative 
and positive to be the statistically significant (p = .024, d = .62 and p = .001, d = .92 
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respectively), with the positive-control difference not reaching statistical significance 
despite being medium in size and in the intended direction (p = .33, d = .38). 
The mean accuracy rates for each cell of the design are shown in Table  9.1. 
Accuracy is defined as the percentage of trials on which the participant selected the 
box with the highest probability of selecting a black marble. The results showed a 
significant main effect of congruency [F(1,67) = 49.55, p < .001, 
 = .43], and 
difficulty [F(1,67) = 338.81, p < .001, 
 = .84], suggesting that congruent items (88%) 
are responded to more accurately than incongruent items (82%), and easy items 
(92%) are responded to more accurately than hard items (78%). These results 
replicate those of previous work (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Pacini et al., 1998). 
 
Table  9.1 Mean accuracy rates (%) and SD’s for the ratio-bias task, for each mood condition, 
by congruency and difficulty condition (Experiment 11) 
Congruency Congruent 
Difficulty 
 
Easy Hard 
  
M SD M SD 
Mood Positive 93.13 1.40 82.97 9.71 
 
Control 91.88 3.34 85.06 11.00 
 
Negative 93.51 2.10 84.09 6.59 
 
Total 92.86 2.43 83.98 9.22 
Congruency Incongruent 
Difficulty 
 
Easy Hard 
  
M SD M SD 
Mood Positive 92.58 1.40 73.35 8.70 
 
Control 90.91 9.14 75.97 15.04 
 
Negative 92.86 9.68 68.83 9.99 
 
Total 92.14 5.18 72.76 11.62 
 
 
Congruency and difficulty also showed a significant interaction [F(1,67) = 33.09, p < 
.001, 
 = .34]. This suggests that congruency has a much larger impact when the 
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items are more difficult; such that both congruent and incongruent easy items were 
responded to equally accurately (M = 93% and M = 92% respectively), whereas 
difficult incongruent items were responded to much less accurately than difficult 
congruent items (M = 73% and M = 84% respectively).  
No main effect was found for mood condition [F(2,67) = 0.288, p = .75, 
 < 
.01], and mood did not interact with congruency, but showed a similar pattern to the 
significant interaction found between mood and difficulty [F(2,67) = 4.77, p = .012, 
 
= .13]. This interaction (Figure  9.2) suggests that the effects of mood are larger for 
more difficult items. The difficulty by mood interaction is driven by the change in the 
relative accuracy of each mood condition between easy and hard items. On easy 
items there is little effect of mood, yet on hard items positive and negative emotion 
leads to lower accuracy than the control condition; however, univariate ANOVAs 
revealed the mood effects within hard items to be non-significant.  
 
 
Figure  9.2 Difficulty by Mood Interaction (Experiment 11) 
 
These findings, and the lack of a significant congruency by condition interaction 
suggests that mood does not necessarily inhibit Type Two high-effort processing, but 
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rather reduces the effectiveness with which it is employed. If mood had an impact on 
the amount of Type Two processing, the congruency factor is the one which would 
be expected to show effects as the incongruent items put the responses from 
frequency- and probability-based processing in conflict. That mood only interacts 
with difficulty suggests that the effect is due to difficulty rather than conflict. 
 
Summary of Experiment 11 
The results of Experiment 11 replicate the findings of previous work (Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994; Pacini et al., 1998) in that accuracy is higher for congruent than 
incongruent items, and higher for easy than hard items. The interaction between 
difficulty and mood seems to suggest, similarly to the results of Chapter  7, that 
emotion effects are found primarily when the tasks are more difficult. However, 
whereas Experiments 6, 7, and 8 provided support for Information theories, with 
accuracy increasing across positive to control to negative emotions, the results of 
Experiment 11 show some suggestion of emotion operating in line with Load 
theories; positive and negative emotions reduced participants’ accuracy when the 
problems were hard. These results however did not reach statistical significance, 
even on the items (incongruent, hard) which showed the greatest mood effects. 
Harder problems increase the effect of mood relative to easier problems, and this 
interaction was found to be significant, although the main effect of mood within the 
harder conditions did not itself reach statistical significance. 
9.3 Experiment 12 
Given the findings above with respect to congruency and difficulty effects, which are 
consistent with previous research, the differences between the difficulty categories 
were increased. Whereas Easy problems in Experiment 11 had boxes whose 
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probabilities of drawing the target marble differed by between 25% and 40%, and the 
hard problems had boxes whose probabilities varied between 5% and 20%, in 
Experiment 12, Easy items had boxes whose probabilities differed by between 40% 
and 60%, whereas difficult items had boxes whose probabilities differed by between 
only 1% and 10%. This has the effect of making the easy problems easier, and the 
hard problems harder, and was done in order to attempt to increase the mood 
effects which were present in the incongruent and difficult problem conditions. The 
reasoning behind this adapted approach is that given the mood effects are small, and 
that they only result in slight differences between specific conditions, namely difficult 
problems; then by increasing the difference between high and low difficulty, for 
example, the impact of mood may have a more pronounced effect if it is replicated. 
In this regard, Experiment 12 aims to test the same hypotheses as Experiment 11. 
9.3.1 Method 
Participants 
The participants in this study were 68 (26 male, 42 female) undergraduate 
psychology students (Age; M = 21 years, SD = 3 years) at Plymouth University who 
participated for course credit. Participants were recruited through the university’s 
points manager system and emails to internal mailing lists. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the three mood conditions, positive (N=25), control 
(N=18), and negative (N=25). 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
The mood manipulation procedure used in Experiment 12 was identical to that used 
in Experiment 11. No changes were made to the task instructions or presentation. 
The ratio-bias task was identical to that described in Section  9.2.1, except that the 
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difficulty categories were altered to maximise the differences between conditions. As 
outlined above, Hard and Easy difficulty trials were defined as the difference in the 
absolute probability of drawing a black marble between the two boxes being 
between 1% and 10% (Hard) or between 40% and 60% (Easy). The design and 
procedure were identical to that used in Experiment 11.  
9.3.2 Results 
As with Experiment 11, the mood ratings showed a significant main effect of 
condition [F(2,651) = 9.11, p < .001, 
 = .22], with mood ratings decreasing across 
positive (M = 62.80, SD = 10.94) to control (M = 59.83, SD = 11.27) to negative (M = 
45.28, SD = 20.65). Pairwise comparisons revealed the difference between negative 
and control, and negative and positive to be the statistically significant (p < .001, d = 
1.11 and p = .003, d = .91 respectively), with the positive-control difference not 
reaching statistical significance despite being medium in size and in the intended 
direction (p = .53, d = .23). To assess mood effects on the ratio-bias task, a 2 Difficulty 
(Easy, Hard) x 2 Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) x 3 Mood (Positive, Control, 
Negative) mixed ANOVA was conducted on response accuracy, the cell means and 
standard deviations for which are shown in Table  9.2. 
Similarly to Experiment 11, the analysis showed main effects of Congruency 
[F(1,50) = 22.44, p < .001, 
 = .31] and Difficulty [F(1,50) = 83.35, p < .001, 
 = .63], 
such that congruent problems (97%) were responded to more accurately than 
incongruent ones (90%), and easy (99%) more accurately than hard (89%). There was 
no main effect of mood, and mood did not show any significant interaction with 
congruency.  
An interaction between congruency and difficulty [F(1,65) = 15.47, p < .001, 

 = .192] was also found, and, as in Experiment 11, suggests that the difference 
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between hard-congruent and hard-incongruent trials is larger than the difference 
between easy-congruent and easy-incongruent trials. This is depicted in Figure  9.3.  
 
Table  9.2 Mean accuracy rates (%) and SD’s for the ratio-bias task, for each mood condition, 
by congruency and difficulty condition (Experiment 12) 
 
Congruency Congruent 
Difficulty 
 
Easy Hard 
  
M SD M SD 
Mood Positive 98.86 3.95 92.85 7.33 
 
Control 99.21 2.31 92.85 7.72 
 
Negative 99.64 1.60 96.07 5.42 
 
Total 99.87 0.98 94.07 6.83 
Congruency Incongruent 
Difficulty 
 
Easy Hard 
  
M SD M SD 
Mood Positive 95.00 11.84 82.14 16.14 
 
Control 98.90 2.69 78.57 15.70 
 
Negative 97.86 4.08 89.64 8.18 
 
Total 97.03 7.85 84.10 14.05 
 
 
 
Figure  9.3 Congruency by Difficulty interaction (Experiment 12) 
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Also as in Experiment 11, the results of Experiment 12 reveal a significant interaction 
effect between Difficulty and Mood [F(2,50) = 4.18, p = .02, 
 = .14], which suggests 
that the effect of mood is larger for hard items than it is for easy items. This 
interaction is depicted in Figure  9.4. Furthermore, a Univariate ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of mood for easy items, but a significant main effect of mood for 
hard items [F(2,50) = 3.71, p = .03, 
 = .13]. Pairwise comparisons show that 
negative mood (92%) lead to higher accuracy than both the positive (87%, p = .04) 
and control conditions (86%, p = .02), but that the positive and control conditions did 
not differ significantly in their mean accuracies.  
 
 
Figure  9.4 Difficulty by Mood Interaction (Experiment 12) 
 
Summary of Experiment 12 
The results of Experiment 12 replicate the main effects found in Experiment 11. 
Congruent items are responded to more accurately than incongruent ones, and easy 
more accurately than hard ones. Similarly, the interactions suggest that in most cases 
the difficulty and congruency effects act as multipliers of each other; such that, for 
example, hard problems are responded to less accurately than easy ones when they 
are congruent, but hard problems are responded to even less accurately than easy 
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ones when they are incongruent. It was also found that when the problems were 
hard, negative mood lead to higher rates of accuracy than the positive or control 
conditions. This increased accuracy with negative emotion is in line with the 
experiments reported previously in Chapter  7, though is in contrast to the findings of 
lower accuracy for positive and negative mood conditions in Experiment 11. 
9.4 Discussion 
Both studies reported here replicate the effects of congruency and difficulty found in 
previous research such as that by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994); incongruency and 
increased difficulty led to higher reliance on frequency-based judgements. The 
current experiments move beyond these existing findings by including incidental 
emotion as a factor in the design. Although there were no main effects of mood, 
mood did interact with congruency and difficulty in both experiments. Though this 
suggests that the effects of mood are larger for incongruent and difficult items, the 
effects of mood varied across experiments. In Experiment 11, positive and negative 
moods reduced accuracy relative to the control condition on harder problems, 
whereas in Experiment 12 negative mood resulted in higher accuracy, relative to 
control, on more difficult problems. Positive emotion also resulted in an increase in 
accuracy on hard items in Experiment 12 relative to control, though this did not reach 
statistical significance. One possible explanation of this smaller effect is the strength 
of the mood manipulation, in which positive and control conditions were not found 
to differ in their reported moods; yet this is interesting in itself in that mood ratings 
were similar across conditions in both studies despite the effects of emotion 
condition differing within the difficult items across studies.  
In Experiment 11 accuracy varied as a function of mood on difficult problems 
such that control mood led to the highest accuracy rates, followed by positive mood, 
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with negative mood leading to the lowest accuracy rates. In terms of processing, this 
suggests that incidental emotion, particularly negative emotion, increases reliance on 
frequency-based judgements relative to the control condition when problems are 
more difficult. In Experiment 12, effects of mood were also found on the more 
difficult ‘hard’ items, but such that negative emotion resulted in higher accuracy than 
the positive or control conditions. 
Finding mood effects on the harder problem items is consistent with the 
results of Experiments 6, 7, and 8 where effects of integral emotion were found on 
the more difficult, indeterminate, DA and AC inferences but not on easier or 
determinate problems such as MP and MT inferences. However, that the pattern of 
emotion effects is different across Experiments 11 and 12 needs consideration. In 
Experiment 11, emotion appears to suppress the use of high-effort probability-based 
judgements in a manner more consistent with Load theories than Information 
theories. This is in contrast to Experiment 12 and the results from the conditional 
reasoning studies (Chapter  7) in which positive emotion suppresses logical accuracy 
whereas negative emotion improves it; results consistent with Information theories. 
These differences may be indicative of a variation in how emotion is integrated 
across different levels of difficulty, and may suggest that at moderate levels of 
difficulty, as in Experiment 11, emotion serves as load, whereas at higher levels of 
difficulty, as in Experiment 12 (and on more difficult conditional reasoning problems 
such as DA and AC inferences in Chapter  7), emotion is used as a source of 
information. It might be argued that if emotion serves as load in one situation then it 
should act as cognitive load in all situations based on the premise that emotional 
experience requires cognitive resources to generate and maintain (Chapter  2). 
However, although emotional experience may require some cognitive resources to 
generate initially, it may be the case that (as in Experiment 11) further resources are 
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then allocated to its maintenance, thus leading to patterns supportive of emotion-as-
load theories; or it may be the case that after this initial generation of an emotional 
state, if the task is acknowledged as difficult (as is suggested may occur in Experiment 
12), then no further resources are allocated to the maintenance of the emotional 
state, but the valence of the state is used to guide further processing of the problem, 
thus leading to results supportive of emotion-as-information.     
Another point which needs consideration in the results across Experiment 11 
and Experiment 12 in which the easy problems are made easier and the harder 
problems made harder, is that the overall accuracy was higher in this second 
experiment. Whilst the finding that accuracy is higher on the easier-easy problems 
seems self-explanatory, that accuracy was higher for the harder of the hard problems 
is counter intuitive. This pattern does however lend support to the above proposition 
that an overall increase in difficulty potentially increases the extent to which 
individuals apply themselves to the problem; if a person is aware that a task is 
difficult, they may perform better because they are more prepared and motivated to 
do so than if the task is only of moderate or low difficulty. Although this account 
appears relatively parsimonious, its accuracy cannot, unfortunately, be tested within 
the current studies, which did not record motivation or perceived difficulty in any 
way.  
An alternative explanation for the increased accuracy in Experiment 12 
would be differences between the samples tested. This seems unlikely given the 
identical recruitment methods, identical populations from which the samples were 
drawn, and both studies being conducted within the same month. 
To develop this discussion of the effects found in Experiments 11 - of positive 
and negative emotion reducing accuracy on hard problems, though not to a 
statistically significant degree - incidental mood requires cognitive resources to 
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process and maintain; this has been argued earlier as one possible mechanism of 
interaction between emotion and reasoning (Chapter  2). In Experiment 11, this 
additional load from problem difficulty and emotion would make it difficult for 
individuals to effectively base their decisions on probability calculations, and thus 
lead to lower accuracy when individuals are in the positive and negative conditions 
relative to the control condition. This would also explain the mood by difficulty 
interaction. When problems are easy, the difference in absolute probabilities for 
each box is larger and more easily perceptible than when the problem is difficult; so 
the comparison can be made whilst maintaining an emotion. When the problem is 
difficult, the difference between the probabilities is smaller, and the calculation of 
these may need to proceed further before one becomes apparent as the correct 
choice. This limits cognitive resources more than the easy condition, so will be 
hindered by the maintenance of a mood state. Such a process might also be thought 
of as individuals faced with a moderately difficult problem, because of the difficulty 
condition and additional load from the emotion relying on simple strategies because 
they either lack the resources or the motivation to engage fully with the task; the use 
of frequency as a basis for their judgement. 
The increase in accuracy for negative mood (on difficult problems) found in 
Experiment 12, however, suggests that when the problems are made even more 
difficult, individuals use their mood as a source of information rather than being 
hindered by it as a source of cognitive load, as discussed above. However, although 
seemingly intuitive, the existence and nature of a turning point at which an 
individual’s approach changes from simple heuristics due to a lack of resources to 
engaging effortful processing when they realise the problem is difficult is, with the 
current data, speculative; though it does present an interesting challenge for future 
research. One possible approach to investigating these contrasting results would be 
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to run a series of studies using the Ratio-Bias paradigm with differing levels of load 
generated by concurrent tasks and attempting to observe the hypothesised shift 
from Load- to Information-theory consistent results. 
With respect to the implications of these findings for dual-process theories 
and emotion and reasoning interaction, the results suggest that emotion has a larger 
impact on Type Two processing. In both experiments, there was a main effect of 
congruency and some suggestion of interactive effects with emotion – though none 
of these reached statistical significance. On congruent trials, low effort frequency 
based responses and higher effort probability based responses will lead to the same 
response. However, on incongruent trials, the application of a probability based 
response is necessary to reach the correct response. As accuracy was lower for 
incongruent trials relative to congruent ones in both experiments, this might be 
indicative of less effective use of Type Two, high effort, probability-based processing. 
Whether this is due to less attempted use of Type Two processing, or less effective 
use of Type Two processing when it is attempted is unclear from the current data, 
but would provide one interesting extension of the current work. The inclusion of 
protocol analysis into the design would provide a better understanding of what 
people are attempting to do when they make a decision on the ratio-bias task 
whereas the current methodology only records the accuracy of their responses.     
Although the use of the ratio-bias task is based on existing work in the 
literature, its combination with incidental emotion is novel, and adds to our 
understanding of how emotion interacts with Type One and Type Two processing. It 
also highlights a number of avenues for further work, the first of which should be an 
attempt at replicating the findings of Experiments 11 and 12, and a closer inspection 
of the conditions which lead to, or mask, the effects of difficulty, congruency, and 
emotion. It would be useful to establish the conditions under which mood effects are 
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found in order to aid future development of the paradigm as a means of investigating 
mood effects in reasoning. By narrowing down the range of problems on which 
effects are found, we can learn something about when emotion has an impact on 
Type One and Type Two processing, which may be informative for evaluating the 
‘turning point’ explanation of the results presented in this chapter.  
It would also be interesting to extend the current studies in a similar way to 
the extension of conditional reasoning tasks in the previous chapter by including 
integral emotion, or emotional images. Though difficult, investigation of whether and 
to what extent integral mood, and making decisions about boxes of snakes versus 
boxes of kittens for example, has on reasoning could develop our understanding of 
how attentional systems are involved and at what stage emotion has an effect on 
decision making. Up to this point, how cognitive resources are allocated to either 
generating and maintaining emotions, or for inclusion as information in reasoning 
has not been considered, yet attentional control systems might be involved in these 
processes, and are thus worth further investigation. This might be achieved by 
speeding the presentation of the boxes to better understand the time-course of 
emotion effects, or by using eye-tracking paradigms to explore how people’s 
engagement in the task varies as a function of emotion.  
In summary, mood effects in the ratio-bias task are most pronounced when 
the trials are more difficult. Although some evidence is found to suggest that 
incidental positive and negative emotion reduce accuracy on difficult problems 
(Experiment 11), evidence was also found which suggests that when the problems 
are made more difficult, incidental emotion may serve as a source of information 
(Experiment 12), and negative emotion improves the accuracy of participants’ 
responding relative to those in the positive emotion and control conditions.  
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Chapter Ten 
10. General Discussion 
The overall aim of the work presented in this thesis was to further our understanding 
of whether and how emotional experiences impact on reasoning processes. This 
chapter will consider the theories and data presented in the preceding chapters in 
relation to this aim, and provide discussion of the work in relation to the existing 
Load and Information theories of how emotion affects reasoning, and in relation to 
what it can tell us about dual process theories of reasoning with respect to emotion. 
The chapter concludes with a consideration of wider theoretical implications, and the 
methodological implications of the results for programmes of work investigating 
emotion and reasoning. 
Understanding the impact of emotion on reasoning was first approached 
here by exploring theories of emotion, and reviewing the work which tries to define 
emotion; from ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle through to contemporary 
psychologists such as LeDoux (1998) and Forgas (2001). This review, which 
constitutes the body of Chapter  1 also gave rise to a focus on the cognitive elements 
of emotion, and how these could be conceptualised in terms of ‘dimensions of 
emotion’, be they positive and negative affect (Watson et al., 1988), or pleasantness 
and activation (Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1999). 
Chapter  2 then reviewed the reasoning literature, introducing a range of 
theories of reasoning alongside types of reasoning before outlining how the work on 
emotion and reasoning could be integrated. It is here that Load and Information 
theories were first combined with models of reasoning, and the aim of this thesis is 
outlined in terms of testable hypotheses. If emotion serves as information, negative 
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emotion should lead to higher rates of logical accuracy than positive emotion as the 
former serves to cue a careful and analytical approach, whereas the latter serves to 
cue reliance on low-effort, initial, heuristic responses. If, however, emotion serves as 
load, with both positive and negative emotions requiring cognitive resources to be 
generated and maintained through activation of associated memories and appraisals 
of situations or redirection of attention to the properties of emotive stimuli, logical 
performance should be decreased by both. How these hypotheses were expected to 
manifest in each paradigm, from necessity and possibility within syllogistic reasoning 
through to frequency versus probability in the ratio-bias task was dealt with in detail 
within each chapter and for each experiment. 
The twelve experiments in this thesis can be grouped both by the problem 
types used or by whether it was the emotive valence of the content that was 
manipulated (integral emotion), or whether emotion was manipulated by using a 
task separate from the reasoning component (incidental emotion). This distinction 
between incidental and integral emotion was introduced in Experiments 1 and 2, 
adopting terminology used by Blanchette and Richards (2010). In Experiment 1, 
emotion was manipulated by having participants write about an emotive life event 
prior to completing the reasoning task; Experiment 2 varied integral emotion; the 
manipulation of emotion by varying the content of the reasoning tasks themselves, 
and in subsequent experiments, both integral and incidental emotion were 
investigated in syllogistic and conditional reasoning. The findings from the 
experiments which manipulate incidental emotion will be considered first, followed 
by those which manipulated integral emotion. Each of these sections will consider 
the degree to which the findings support Load and Information theories, as well as 
addressing the question of whether incidental and integral emotion have different 
effects on reasoning performance. 
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The findings will also be considered in relation to Dual Process Theory (DPT; 
Chapter  2). The conceptualisation of the reasoning system as being able to deploy 
two types of processing, either relatively low-effort heuristic or high-effort analytic 
reasoning, provides a framework for interpreting previous work on emotion and 
reasoning, as discussed in Chapter  2. As such, the results from the twelve studies will 
be considered in relation to dual-process theories and how they can help us to 
understand the impact of emotion on reasoning. This is followed by a discussion of 
the wider theoretical implications, and how the results relate to models of emotion 
and cognition considered in Chapter  2. Finally, consideration is given to the 
methodological implications of the findings in relation to improving mood 
manipulation and measurement when they are combined with reasoning tasks. 
In summary, this chapter will evaluate the evidence for Load and Information 
explanations of how emotion may impact reasoning, in relation to both incidental 
and integral emotion. The results will be discussed in relation to dual process 
theories, and the theoretical and methodological implications considered in light of 
potential future work.  
10.1 Incidental Emotion 
As outlined in Chapter  1, the work of theorists such as Barlow (1991) and Alloy (1991) 
can be interpreted as emotion acting as cognitive load. This may occur through the 
inappropriate activation of emotional systems and memories (Barlow, 1991), or 
stimuli priming associations or appraisals which load working memory (Blanchette, 
2006); ideas which have been supported by the work of researchers such as Richards 
et al (2000) and Oaksford et al (1996) who have shown reduced speed and logical 
accuracy as a result of anxiety and negative emotion. If emotion serves as cognitive 
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load, then individuals would be expected to show poorer performance on reasoning 
tasks under both positive and negative emotion conditions. 
This expected reduction in performance was tested by varying incidental 
emotion in Experiments 1, 5, 11, and 12. Experiment 1 investigated emotion effects 
in syllogistic reasoning using the necessity-possibility paradigm. This paradigm was 
utilised as it allows a measure of the extent to which individuals search for 
alternative models of the premises. This is important for investigating the impact of 
emotion on reasoning as increased load would be expected to reduce the number of 
models considered. The necessity-possibility paradigm investigates this by exploiting 
the distinction between possible-strong (PS) and possible-weak (PW) syllogisms 
(Evans et al., 2001; Evans et al., 1999). Individuals typically generate initial models 
that support the presented conclusion for PS syllogisms, but subsequent models will 
falsify this initial conclusion. PW syllogisms are the opposite, with initial models 
having invalid conclusions, but one or more subsequent models having valid 
conclusions. When asked to assess the necessity of conclusions, it is PS syllogisms 
which are of interest, as additional models are necessary to overrule the incorrect 
‘necessary’ response that would result from reliance on a single model, whereas 
when asked to assess the possibility of conclusions, it is PW syllogisms which are of 
interest; these require additional models to be formulated (with valid conclusions) in 
order to overrule the initial ‘not-possible’ response that would result from 
consideration of only the first model generated.  (See Chapter  3 for a detailed 
rationale).   
Although the written mood manipulation was effective, no statistically 
significant main effect of mood was found, nor was there a significant effect of mood 
on possible-strong syllogisms under necessity instructions. Under possibility 
instructions, a small effect of mood was found on possible-weak syllogisms, in which 
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people in the control condition performed less accurately than those in the negative 
condition, with the positive condition falling somewhere in between. These findings 
therefore lend little support to Load theories. 
Information theories on the other hand, suggest that emotions may serve as 
an additional source of information when making judgements. For example, when 
making judgements about life satisfaction, positive or negative moods induced by the 
weather at the time of questioning may affect self-reported life satisfaction, or 
positive and negative moods may alter the extent to which individuals rely on 
familiarity as a cue to judge the fame or otherwise of company names (Kitamura, 
2005). Chapters  1 and  2 make the case that emotions may also be used as 
information when reasoning, such that positive moods may be expected to cue less 
effortful processing and a reliance on heuristics, whereas negative emotion may 
serve to cue more careful, effortful processing. 
Considering Experiment 1 in light of information theories, the results were 
consistent with such an interpretation; yet the control condition showed 
performance below that of the positive group. The only difference reaching statistical 
significance here was where people in the negative condition responded more 
accurately than those in the control condition. This finding is consistent with work 
such as that by Chang and Wilson (2004), discussed earlier, which found increased 
logical performance on a cheater-detection variant of the Wason selection task 
relative to a positive condition. However, Chang and Wilson were using the selection 
task, and did not include a control condition. No work has investigated positive, 
negative, and control conditions using the necessity-possibility paradigm, and as 
such, the results from other paradigms may not necessarily generalise to necessity-
possibility studies, although the findings are relatively consistent across the 
experiments and paradigms reported in this thesis. 
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 In order to investigate whether mood effects are found with other types of 
reasoning task besides syllogisms, Experiment 5 investigated the effect of incidental 
mood on conditional reasoning. In Experiment 5, the mood manipulation was less 
effective than in Experiment 1; although mood ratings were in the directions 
expected, they did not reach statistical significance. Despite these smaller effects of 
the mood manipulation, analysis of endorsement rates for each type of inference 
that can be drawn from a conditional statement revealed a marginal main effect of 
mood, which post-hoc comparisons found to reflect negative mood leading to lower 
endorsements when averaged across all inference types than the control group. The 
work of Evans, Handley, and Bacon (2009) has found that using a speeded task leads 
to an overall reduction in endorsements of conditional inferences, which might 
suggest that negative moods lead individuals to spend more time considering the 
inferences, and thus make them less likely to endorse them. This also lends support 
to Information theories, in that more careful processing as would be expected with 
negative emotion should also take more time. In further support of this increase in 
careful reasoning is the higher confidence people reported in their decisions under 
negative mood in Experiment 1; a variable which might be considered in future work, 
along with a more careful consideration of response times and the responses which 
are made. 
Within each inference type, the only effect to reach statistical significance 
showed that negative mood, relative to control, reduced endorsement (increased 
logical accuracy) of highly-believable AC inferences. The accuracy level in the positive 
mood for highly believable AC inferences was comparable to the control condition. 
This contradicts load theories, and lends further support to information theories 
which would suggest negative emotion should lead to higher logical accuracy than 
positive emotion; but the difference was found in such a specific cases, and after a 
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mood manipulation of limited effectiveness, that the findings should be treated with 
caution. 
 Experiment 5 is much closer in nature to the Wason selection task, using 
conditional reasoning to investigate the impact of incidental emotion on reasoning. 
As outlined above, very few results within this study reached statistical significance. 
However, the finding outlined above, that negative mood resulted in higher logical 
accuracy on highly-believable AC inferences, relative to positive and control 
conditions which were comparable, provides some support for information theories, 
and in that one specific condition supports Chang and Wilson’s findings, providing 
increased support for information theories across varied reasoning paradigms. 
 Finally, Experiments 11 and 12 investigated the effect of incidental emotion 
on the ratio-bias task. This task presents individuals with two boxes, each containing 
a selection of black and white ‘marbles’, and their task is to select the box from which 
they would be most likely to draw a black marble if they drew a marble at random. 
By varying the numbers of black and white marbles in each box, the relative 
frequency of black marbles can be altered, as can the probability of drawing a black 
marble from each box. This allows trials to be devised whereby the box with the 
highest number of black marbles also has the highest probability of drawing a black 
marble; frequency and probability are congruent, or alternatively, the box with the 
highest number of black marbles may have the lowest probability of drawing a black 
marble; frequency and probability are incongruent. Furthermore, the difference in 
the absolute probability of drawing a black marble from each box may be large (Easy 
trials), or small (Hard trials).  
In both of these studies, the mood manipulation was partially effective, such 
that mood ratings were significantly lower for the negative condition than the control 
or positive conditions, though the difference between positive and control did not 
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reach statistical significance. The results of the ratio-bias task, which are designed to 
highlight the relative use of frequency-based (Type One) and probability-based (Type 
Two) processes in decision making showed mixed results. Experiment 11 found that 
both positive and negative mood suppressed selection of the box of marbles with the 
highest probability of selecting the desired target for difficult problems, which would 
appear to support load theories except that the differences did not reach statistical 
significance. In contrast to this pattern of findings, Experiment 12 found that negative 
mood increased selection of the box of marbles with the highest probability of 
selecting the desired target. The positive and control conditions showed lower rates 
of selection of the ‘correct’ box, but rates that were comparable. Furthermore, these 
mood effects were only found on the more difficult items. As no previous work has 
investigated the interactive effects of problem difficulty and emotion, a speculative 
discussion of the causes of this interaction was presented at the end of Chapter  9. 
The main ideas outlined in that chapter were that when the task is more difficult, 
such as a smaller difference in absolute probabilities between the options, processing 
of probabilities must proceed further, and thus requires more cognitive effort, which 
is already being consumed by the maintenance of emotion, whether that be through 
activation of ideas and memories associated with the episode chosen for the written 
manipulation task or through attention being directed towards these memories 
rather than the demands of the task (Chapter 1). This was suggested to alter as the 
problems were made even more difficult in Experiment 12; when the problems are 
extremely difficult, individuals may be forced to use emotion as information because 
they cannot effectively complete the probability comparison when the task is more 
difficult. This serves to highlight the need to develop the work presented here to 
consider a range of tasks, and a range of difficulties; issues discussed shortly. 
dzahra 325 330974 
 
In summary, Experiment 11 suggested marginal but not statistically 
significant suppression of accurate box choices by both positive and negative mood, 
in line with Load theories, whereas Experiment 12 found negative mood to increase 
the rate of correct choices relative to the positive and control conditions, in line with 
Information theories. Though these are findings from the ratio-bias task, Experiment 
12 shows patterns of negative mood improving analytical processing and attention to 
detail similar to those found in other work which has investigated the effects of 
emotion. For example, the work discussed in Chapter  2 by Schnall and colleagues 
(2008) showing negative mood to improve performance on the embedded figures 
task, or the work of Storbeck and Clore (2005) showing that induced negative mood 
reduces false-memory effects, as well as findings by Blanchette and Campbell (2005, 
2012) showing increased logical accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks when the 
content was related to relevant negative events. 
As outlined above, the results of Experiments 1, 5, 11, and 12 found relatively 
little support for load theories of the impact of emotion on reasoning. However, this 
does not mean that they supported information theories either. Although there is 
stronger support for information theories as explanations of how incidental emotion 
impacts reasoning, the effects found across the studies discussed above have been 
small, and often only found under very specific conditions. For example, emotion 
effects which follow the expected Information pattern are typically found on 
indeterminate inferences in conditional reasoning, and on the more difficult trials in 
the ratio-bias task. There is also general support from these patterns for more 
considered reasoning with negative emotion; as indicated by increased logical 
accuracy and higher confidence ratings, discussed above. 
In relation to the question raised above as to whether incidental and integral 
emotions have the same effect, the results from Experiment 12, and their similarity 
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to work such as that by Blanchette and Campbell (2005, 2012) which varies integral 
emotion, seems to suggest that the effects are indeed similar across emotion types. 
However, Estrada and colleagues (1997) found that physicians in a negative mood, 
rather than integrating information more effectively or accurately than those in a 
positive mood – as might be expected given the work showing the ‘benefits’ of 
negative emotions - actually performed worse than those in a positive mood. It was 
physicians in a positive mood that made more effective use of relevant information. 
This will be considered in more detail in the following section, after reviewing the 
experiments in the current work which manipulated integral emotion. 
From the results considered above, the manipulation of incidental emotion 
can be seen to have a range of effects on reasoning across the different paradigms 
studied here. This highlights potential issues such as the choice of scale or type of 
mood manipulation which impact both the strength and effectiveness of incidental 
emotion manipulations, and the measurement of reasoning in such studies. These 
are discussed below when reviewing the methodological implications of the work in 
this thesis, and cover consideration of the methods used in measuring emotional 
experience, and the need to carefully assess which reasoning processes are being 
measured by the task under investigation.  
10.2 Integral Emotion 
The following section considers the impact of manipulating integral emotion on 
reasoning in relation to Load and Information theories. By varying emotion within as 
well as external to the reasoning tasks, the similarities and differences between the 
effects of incidental and integral emotion on reasoning could also be assessed. 
Whereas Experiment 1 investigated incidental emotion in the necessity-
possibility paradigm, Experiment 2 made use of the same paradigm but varied 
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integral emotion. Under necessity instructions, no evidence was found to suggest 
that emotional content impacts upon performance. In light of the limited findings 
across incidental (Experiment 1) and integral emotion (Experiment 2) within the 
necessity-possibility paradigm, no clear conclusions can be drawn in relation to Load 
or Information theories. 
Although the necessity-possibility paradigm provides a good way of 
investigating the extent to which individuals search for alternative models this might 
be considered a measurement of the amount of Type Two processing engaged in. 
Given the interest of DPT in both Type One and Type Two processes, a paradigm 
which can more directly compare the relative use of each type of processing is useful 
for investigating the impact of emotion on Type One and Type Two processing. To 
this end, Experiments 3 and 4 adopted the Belief-Bias paradigm. This allowed a 
measure of both reliance on prior beliefs when reasoning and reliance on logical 
structure. 
 These experiments presented individuals with syllogisms whose conclusions 
varied believability and logical validity orthogonally, and used the rates at which 
participants endorsed each problem type (valid-believable, valid-unbelievable, 
invalid-believable, and invalid-unbelievable) to calculate an index of belief-based 
(Type One) and logic-based (Type Two) processing. These were presented in an 
online study (Experiment 3), and replicated in a laboratory setting (Experiment 4). 
The results, taken together, suggest that reliance on both beliefs and logical structure 
increases across positive to control to negative content. 
Considering only the increasing reliance on logic supports Information 
theories, and previous work in related fields showing increased attention to detail, 
structure, and source monitoring with negative emotion (Kitamura, 2005; Schnall et 
al., 2008). All of these processes which involve higher cognitive effort are increased 
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with negative emotion.  However, Goel and Vartanian (2011) found that negative 
content resulted in decreased reliance on beliefs relative to positive content; the 
pattern which might have been predicted by Information Theories, but the opposite 
of what was found in Experiments 3 and 4. The current findings also contradict those 
of Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk, and Lavda (2007) who found decreased logical 
accuracy for both positive and negative emotive content in syllogistic reasoning. 
Blanchette and her team, interestingly, found that when the content was negative 
and was of particular relevance to the individuals, logical accuracy improved and 
reliance on beliefs decreased. This is similar to the arguments made by Johnson-Laird 
and colleagues (2006), who found content specific to an individual’s condition was 
reasoned about more accurately by individuals diagnosed with psychological 
illnesses, and serves to highlight the need to consider personal relevance in designing 
materials for such studies (see also the discussion of subjectivity in Chapter  1). This 
may provide one explanation for why the current findings generally differ to those of 
Blanchette and Johnson-Laird and colleagues; the current results reflect the impact 
of emotive content rather than personally relevant emotive content, which may be 
processed differently. Future work might explore this area by grouping participants 
on some dimension of relevance and relating positive, control, and negatively 
valenced content to this dimension. 
In addition, the strength of emotions experienced in relation to specific 
content, such as the terror-related content used by Blanchette et al. (2007), needs to 
be taken into consideration. Experiments 11 and 12, varying incidental emotion, 
suggest that increasing the difficulty of the task alters how emotion is integrated in 
the reasoning process at different levels of difficulty. Increasing the intensity of the 
emotional content might have a similar effect on reasoning performance and the 
integration of emotion. It might be expected that moderately intense emotion still 
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leaves enough  cognitive resources available to attempt some level of effortful 
processing, and thus Load-effects would be found, whereas extremely intense 
emotional content may limit the availability of cognitive resources so severely that 
individuals resort to using emotion as a source of information. Up to this level of 
intensity (and cognitive load), an individual may continue to try and engage effortful 
processing. After this point, the individual may realise that their resources are too 
limited to process all problems with equally high effort strategies, at which point 
emotion is used to inform their choices about which problems to process in a more 
careful, effortful way or inform their choice of response. How this might be studied 
empirically was discussed in Chapter 9. 
At the far end of this emotional intensity dimension however, it may be the 
case that the only processes that an individual is left capable of engaging are low 
effort ones, and paradigms which can assess differing levels of Type One processes 
will be required to assess the impact of emotion on reasoning. It would be interesting 
to develop the ideas alluded to in the current work with respect to content of both 
varying emotional intensity and varying personal relevance in order to explore the 
relationship between emotional intensity and Load versus Information theories 
further: to develop our understanding of when emotions serve as load and when 
they serve as information, and if this is a function of intensity as well as task 
difficulty.   
The alignment between belief and logic and Type One versus Type Two 
processing has typically been accepted within the reasoning literature, but recent 
work suggests belief-based responding may not be characteristic of Type One 
processing as claimed by dual-process theorists. Handley, Newstead, and Trippas 
(2011) provide evidence that belief-based responding may actually take longer than 
logic-based responding in certain circumstances. This suggests that belief-based 
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responding in this paradigm may be more akin to Type Two processing, which 
undermines the aim of comparing the relative use of Type One and Type Two 
processes. However, if both are taken to be measures of effortful processing, this 
may account for the findings in Experiments 3 and 4 that both logic- and belief-based 
responding increase across the content conditions and provides clearer support for 
Information theories.   
Whereas Experiment 5 considered incidental emotion in conditional 
reasoning, Experiments 6 and 7 investigated the effects of integral emotion. By 
replacing the p and q terms in conditional statements of the form “if p then q” with 
emotively valenced words, the impact of integral emotion on participants’ 
judgements of whether MP, MT, DA, and AC inferences ‘follow’ or not could be 
evaluated. Valence was varied within and between participants respectively for 
Experiments 6 and 7 in order to investigate differences between the two 
methodologies, and to control for order effects, discounting, and thus the possibility 
that interspersing content types would reduce the effect of any given content type. 
Experiment 6 found clearer support for Information theories, with logical 
accuracy increasing across positive to control to negative content types, for AC and 
DA inferences. These differences were statistically significant between positive-
negative and control-negative content for DA inferences, and between positive-
negative content for AC inferences. Experiment 7 found the same pattern of results, 
with more pronounced differences between positive and negative content types. 
This increase in effect size for the between-participants version of the design 
supports the suggestion that within-participant presentation may reduce the impact 
of emotion content manipulations, potentially through participants discounting the 
stimuli valence, and both experiments support Information theories of how emotions 
impact reasoning. 
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It is interesting though that the content effects are found primarily on DA 
and AC inferences. As discussed in the summary of Chapter 7 and the introduction to 
Chapter 8, this may be due to the willingness to endorse DA and AC inferences being 
more related to the availability of alternative causes than MP and MT inferences 
(Cummins et al., 1991). How emotion may affect the extent to which individuals 
search for these alternatives is considered in Chapter  7 in relation to the difficulty of 
indeterminate problems leading people to rely on emotion as information, in which 
case negative emotion leads to a more careful consideration of the inferences. This 
explanation briefly considered the possibility that more alternative antecedents 
would need to be considered, which in turn formed the rationale for controlling the 
converse probability (and thereby the alternative antecedents) in Chapter  8, and the 
designs of Experiments 9 and 10. 
The availability of alternatives may have been confounded with emotion 
content as the number of alternatives was not assessed. If there were fewer 
alternative causes for q in any of the emotion conditions, then people may be more 
likely to draw AC and DA inferences. Given ‘If p then q’, if there are very few causes 
of q, then given q, it is more likely that p occurred than if there were many causes of 
q, and similarly, given ¬p, q appears less likely as there are few other causes of q 
besides p. Experiments 9 and 10 addressed this by controlling for P(p|q), a proxy for 
the number of alternative causes, in addition to varying the response options 
between those used by Blanchette and colleagues (Yes, No, Maybe; Experiment 9), 
and the Yes-No response options used more commonly in the reasoning literature 
(Experiment 10). The results of both experiments show that after controlling for 
alternative causes the effects found in experiments 6 and 7 were eliminated. There 
were very few effects of content type on the rates at which each inference was 
drawn, with the exception that overall, positive content tended to lead to lower 
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logical accuracy than negative or control content, but again primarily on DA and AC 
inferences. Other differences which reached statistical significance were not in line 
with either Load or Information theories, and only occurred in specific conditions not 
directly relevant to the testing of the experimental hypotheses. This suggests that the 
effects found previously in Experiments 6 and 7 may be dependent on the number of 
alternatives. However, the evidence for this comes from a lack of emotion effects 
being found when alternative causes are controlled for, suggesting that there may be 
an interaction between emotion and the number of possible alternatives; a potential 
area for future investigation. These results might imply that it may be the elaborated 
search for alternative causes which is most affected by integral emotion, which is 
supportive of the conclusions drawn from Experiments 6 and 7 that emotion appears 
to impact performance on harder problems; potentially suggesting that Type Two 
processes are more susceptible to any impact of emotion than Type One processes. It 
also lends support to the conclusions from Experiments 11 and 12; although these 
experiments used incidental emotion, the largest effects of emotion were found on 
the hardest problems: those which require effortful processing to respond to 
accurately.  
The results found with syllogistic reasoning in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 
conditional reasoning in Experiments 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 all came from verbal reasoning 
tasks. In order to investigate the impact of emotive imagery on reasoning, 
Experiment 8 introduced a novel variation on the traditional conditional reasoning 
paradigm: replacing the p and q terms not with emotive words, but with emotive 
images. The results of people’s reasoning about these ‘visual conditionals’ showed a 
strong resemblance to the findings of Experiments 6 and 7 with verbal conditionals. 
No effect of content type was found on MP and MT inferences, nor were any found 
on AC inferences; yet for DA inferences, negative images resulted in significantly 
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higher rates of logical accuracy than either positive or control images (which did not 
differ in the rates of accuracy they resulted in). 
These findings, taken together with the findings from the incidental emotion 
experiments discussed above, contrast with the earlier work of Blanchette and 
colleagues (Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Leese, 2011; Blanchette & Richards, 
2004). For example, whereas the work of Blanchette and Leese found that individuals 
in more negative moods made more logical errors when reasoning about negative, 
relative to neutral content, the current work seems to show that negative emotion 
(in any form) increases rates of logical accuracy. These disparities and possible 
explanations for them are considered below.   
A key strength of these experimental findings is the comparison of positive, 
control, and negative emotions within each paradigm. Previous work, as discussed in 
earlier chapters, has often neglected the neutral, control condition which makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the strengths of Load and Information theories due to 
the lack of a mid-point or baseline against which to compare the reasoning accuracy 
of positive and negative conditions. Including a control condition allows the effects of 
positive and negative emotion to be considered as increases or decreases relative to 
‘normal’. This programme of work has found little support for the idea that emotion 
serves as cognitive load, at least in so far as how its effects manifest across the 
reasoning tasks used here, but has found more support for the argument that 
emotion serves as a source of information, guiding people’s use of different types of 
reasoning process. 
 Furthermore, it is apparent across the majority of the experiments reported 
here that emotion has a larger impact when the task is more difficult. Although this 
may initially appear to support the Load theories, whereby more demanding tasks 
reduce already finite cognitive resources, which are then less able to absorb the 
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additional demands of emotion, it highlights the necessity of including both positive 
and negative, as well as control conditions. It is not that performance is impaired 
more and equally by positive and negative emotion relative to control conditions 
when the task is more difficult, but that the disparity in performance between 
positive and negative emotion increases on more difficult problems. A summary of 
the findings in each experiment is shown in Table  10.1.  
From this summary, and the preceding discussion, it can be seen that 
syllogistic reasoning provides some of the most mixed results, whereas the results 
from conditional reasoning are more consistent. This highlights the need to consider 
task properties such as the difficulty of the items when investigating whether 
emotion operates as Load or Information. Though provided these caveats are kept in 
mind, the overall body of work presented here provides stronger support for 
Information theories than Load theories. This comes from the increased logical 
accuracy found with negative emotion relative to positive emotion. Although there is 
little evidence that positive emotion decreases logical performance to levels 
significantly below the control group, which might be expected if positive emotion 
served as a cue to greater reliance on biased Type One processes, this might be 
explained by the control and positive emotion conditions being more similar than the 
control and negative groups. People are generally in relatively positive moods, and 
positive content may have a less drastic effect than negative content. These issues 
have been discussed in preceding chapters, but are also considered again below in 
relation to whether positive and negative emotion effects improve or suppress 
reasoning performance relative to ‘normal’. 
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Table  10.1 Summary Table of Experimental Findings (Emotion conditions are  
denoted by N, C and P for Negative, Control, and Positive respectively) 
Reasoning Paradigm Incidental Integral 
Syllogistic Necessity-
Possibility 
Exp1; Some support for 
information theories, logical 
responding N>P on PW-
Possibility items 
Exp2; No effect of emotion 
on the problem types 
relevant to the hypotheses 
 Belief-Bias  Exp3 (Online); Logical 
accuracy N>P, but both >C 
Exp4 (Lab); Logical accuracy 
N>P, but both >C. Both 
studies showed reliance on 
logic N>C>P, but also 
reliance on belief N>C>P, 
providing no clear support 
for either load or 
information theories. 
Conditional Verbal Exp5; Limited effectiveness 
of the mood manipulation. 
Few effects of emotion. 
Reliance on logic N>C>P, but 
also reliance on  beliefs 
(N=C)>P 
Exp6 (Within); Logical 
accuracy N>(P=C), on DA 
and N>P on AC inferences. 
Exp7 (Between); Logical 
responding (N=C)>P on AC 
and DA inferences, Support 
for information theories. 
 Visual  Exp8; Logical accuracy 
N>(C=P) on AC inferences, 
some support for 
information theories. 
 Controlled 
Antecedents 
 Exp9 and Exp10; few 
consistent effects of 
emotion. No support for 
either load or information 
theories 
Ratio-Bias  Exp11, (P=N)<C, but only on 
difficult problems. Exp12; 
Some indication that logical 
accuracy N>(C=P), but only 
on the more difficult 
problems; differences did 
not reach statistical 
significance.  
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10.3 The findings in relation to Dual Process Theory 
The findings from this thesis have been discussed in light of load and information 
theories in detail above, but they can also be considered in relation to Dual Process 
Theory, and what they can tell us about the effects of emotion on Type One and Type 
Two processing. As described throughout, the paradigms employed have allowed an 
assessment of the extent to which Type Two processes are engaged through 
examining logical accuracy on the reasoning tasks or selection of the appropriate box 
on the ratio-bias task. The Belief-Bias paradigm has allowed an assessment of the 
relative use of Type One and Type Two processing by contrasting people’s reliance on 
beliefs with their reliance on logical structure in syllogistic reasoning. If, however, the 
status of belief-based reasoning is in doubt with respect to which type of process it 
constitutes, the Ratio-Bias paradigm provides an alternative comparison in the form 
of frequency and probability based judgments. 
Perhaps the easiest way of considering emotion effects in relation to DPTs is 
to consider where the effects are found. The effects of emotion are most 
pronounced in the experiments using conditional reasoning, and on the harder ratio-
bias problems (Experiments 11 and 12). Focusing on the ratio-bias experiments, 
these results suggest that emotion is primarily impacting Type Two processing of 
probabilities, as it is on the incongruent items and problems where there is little 
difference between frequency and probability that careful, analytical processing has 
the largest impact on accuracy. There is also evidence that can be interpreted in 
support of this from the conditional reasoning experiments in which emotion has a 
larger effect on AC and DA inferences (Experiments 6, 7, and 8). These are those 
inferences to which responses are most affected by alternative causes (Experiments 
9 and 10), and assessment of these requires more effortful processing than the MP 
inferences in particular (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). 
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An issue introduced briefly here, and in more detail in previous chapters, is 
the unusual finding from the belief-bias studies. Initially conducted to compare and 
contrast the relative reliance on beliefs and logical structure in reasoning, the results 
show that negative content increases reliance on both logic and belief relative to 
positive content. Taking the increase in the use of logic alone, these results provide 
support for Information theories. However, the increase in reliance on prior beliefs 
does not fit with this explanation. In Chapter  5, this was considered in terms of 
individual differences in how emotion is incorporated into the reasoning process, and 
was supported by the reduced interaction between belief and logic indices with 
either type of emotive content; some people may use emotion as information, others 
may find it an additional drain on cognitive resources. However, if belief-based 
responding is in fact not a Type One process (Handley et al., 2011), and it is instead 
considered a Type Two process, the results from Experiments 3 and 4 provide 
consistent evidence in support of Information theories. It should however be 
considered that although belief-based responding may not be a Type One process, 
treating it as a cognitively demanding Type Two process in the same sense as Type 
Two processes are conceived in the other experiments may be a step too far without 
further work which directly considers this possibility. Recent work has started to 
directly investigate this idea (Handley et al., 2011; Morsanyi & Handley, 2011), but 
future work on the relationship of belief-based processing to more widely accepted 
Type Two processes in syllogistic reasoning and emotion might help to clarify this 
point further and distinguish between the two explanations. 
In summary, the work presented in this thesis suggests that emotions 
primarily impact Type Two processes, as evidenced by larger emotion effects on 
harder problems. The results also suggest that belief-based responding may not be a 
Type One process, in line with previous work already discussed; thus the processes 
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thought to belong to Type One and Type Two processing may need rethinking. 
Furthermore, the interaction of Type One and Type Two processes also needs 
refining in relation to emotion research at least. The reduced interaction index under 
both positive and negative emotion in Experiments 3 and 4, and the varying impact 
of emotion across difficulty types in later studies does not fit easily within DPT 
frameworks. However, the conceptualisation of reasoning processes as belonging to 
Type One or Type Two still provides a useful starting point for work investigating the 
impact of emotion on reasoning.  
10.4 Wider Theoretical Implications 
Whereas the previous sections have considered the results across Incidental and 
Integral manipulations of emotion in light of Load and Information theories, this 
section considers a number of more general implications for theories which try to 
explain how emotion and reasoning might interact. 
 One of the key ideas presented in this thesis is that emotion has a greater 
effect on more difficult problems. There is some support for this in the larger 
emotion effects found on the harder problems in the ratio-bias task, and the 
increased emotion effects on AC and DA problems. However, although the ratio-bias 
task is a relatively straightforward case, and difficulty, as defined in that paradigm, 
was built into the design, the difficulty of AC and DA inferences relative to MP and 
MT inferences is more open to debate. It may not be the case that AC and DA 
inferences are ‘more difficult’ in terms of cognitive demands, but that they require a 
greater search for alternative antecedents than MP and MT inferences in order to 
respond correctly. 
  This effect of problem difficulty and potential confounding of number-of-
alternatives with emotion or inference type which may have explained the results of 
dzahra 339 330974 
 
Experiments 6 and 7 was controlled for in Experiments 9 and 10. These experiments 
found that by controlling a proxy of alternative antecedents, the increased emotion 
effects on AC and DA inferences were eliminated. This may be because the 
availability of alternatives was indeed confounded across content types; or it may be 
that in controlling for the number of antecedents in the pre-test, the factor which 
creates the effect of negative mood, namely, its encouraging people to think of 
alternative possibilities, was ‘controlled out’. This latter explanation seems the most 
likely as similar patterns were found across Experiment 6, 7, and 8. It is unlikely that 
the number of antecedents would have been confounded across all three of these 
studies, especially given the change from verbal to visual conditionals. 
The work presented across the conditional reasoning studies, and to a lesser 
extent the syllogistic reasoning studies provides some evidence that negative 
emotions lead to better logical performance, but methodologically, the ‘correct’ 
response may not need to be ‘logical’ or ‘Type Two’. Though this distinction fits well 
within the dual process framework, and provides one way of distinguishing between 
Load and Information theories (the rationale for which is covered in Chapters  1 
and  2), it may be that negative mood affects reasoning by increasing the search for 
alternatives; not necessarily increasing the use of logical rules or other systematic 
Type Two processing. This relates to the work of Evans, Handley, and Bacon (2009) 
noted above, which might be taken to suggest that negative emotion leads to more 
time spent considering inferences and conclusions; considering alternative ‘states of 
the world’ may not necessarily be a Type Two process, and situations may 
conceivably arise where this extended search or broader view is in contrast to, or at 
least, not dependent on, ‘logical’ performance. 
It should also be noted that previous work has made the case that searching 
for alternatives is a Type Two process, although a low-effort, heuristic, Type One 
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search for alternatives might be plausible and would not necessarily contradict the 
work of Newstead et al (2004) given work suggestive of the fact that ‘logical’ and 
‘Type Two’ processing are not necessarily the same thing (e.g. Handley et al., 2011). 
In order to clarify these explanations of how and when reasoning tasks measure Type 
One and Type Two processes, we need to know more about what types of processing 
fall under each category.   
This might be one explanation for differences in reasoning between integral 
and incidental emotion. Emotion effects appear to be larger when integral rather 
than incidental emotion is manipulated, which may therefore suggest that integral 
emotive content makes people engage to a greater extent in a search for 
alternatives, whereas incidental emotion does not. As discussed above, given that 
the necessity-possibility paradigm might be considered one in which the amount of 
high-effort processing varies, and the belief-bias paradigm considering relative use of 
high and low-effort processing, there may be cases where emotion leads to different 
levels of low-effort processing, without any (or at least very little) high-effort 
processing. The current findings suggest that integral emotion has a larger effect on 
reasoning, and would appear to operate as information. It may be that incidental 
emotion affects lower-effort strategies more, and potentially leads to load effects, 
but the paradigms used in this thesis, which address high-effort or high- versus low-
effort processing fail to capture these effects. This seems likely to provide a fruitful 
avenue of further research: the differences between incidental and integral emotion. 
By furthering our understanding of these differences, possibly by developing the use 
of conditional reasoning paradigms to use more closely controlled statements (in 
terms of alternative antecedents), we may be able to distinguish between greater 
Type Two processing, and a more intuitive extended search for alternative situations. 
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Differences in the extent to which individuals search for counter examples as 
a result of different integral or incidental emotions might be considered in terms of 
effects on motivation or thinking dispositions. The current work found very few 
effects when considering attention to emotion (Experiment 2), approach-avoidance, 
and actively open minded thinking (Experiment 5). However, the current work does 
not consider any direct measures of motivation, instead considering the search for or 
use of alternatives and additional models as evidence of motivated reasoning. 
Including a measure of, or manipulating, an individual’s motivation to reason logically 
would provide an interesting addition to the work reported here. For example, if 
individuals were rewarded for logical accuracy, this might overcome the impact of 
emotion, cueing individuals to search for alternatives, encouraging more 
engagement with the logical structure of the task. 
In addition to the possibility that integral emotion leads to greater 
engagement than incidental emotion, which needs further investigation, there is the 
question of contrasting results within the literature. This point has been highlighted 
earlier, in the work of Blanchette and her work with a range of collaborators over the 
years. Although there are a range of results which seem to show a coherent picture 
(albeit inconsistent with the findings reported here), such as that both positive and 
negative emotions reduce logical accuracy (Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Blanchette 
et al., 2007), there is other work which suggests that negative content, particularly 
when relevant to the individual, can increase logical accuracy (Blanchette & 
Campbell, 2012; Johnson-Laird et al., 2006). These studies specifically focused on 
problem content; that is, integral emotion, so the variation cannot be attributed to a 
difference between incidental and integral effects. One factor to consider is the 
extent to which these studies have controlled for the availability and number of 
alternative antecedents when conditional statements are used, and controlling for 
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factors such as believability when syllogistic reasoning is used. Believability and the 
availability of alternatives have been shown to affect reasoning, and as such, if these 
are not controlled, or controlled for in different ways within the previous research, 
they may account for differences between the existing findings in the literature and 
those reported in this thesis. An additional factor to consider, introduced above, is 
the intensity of the emotion. Blanchette and Richards (2004) conditioned neutral 
words to be positively or negatively valenced, Johnson-Laird et al. (2006) had 
individuals high and low in obsessive compulsive tendencies reason about guilt-
related or neutral materials, whereas Blanchette et al. (2007) had individuals who 
had experienced terrorist attacks reason about terror-related material. No direct 
comparisons of these different intensities of emotion have been conducted, but the 
finding in the current experiment that task difficulty alters how emotions impact 
reasoning lends some support to the idea that the intensity of the integral or 
incidental emotion may also alter how problems are processed, an outline of which 
was presented in Section 10.2.    
The current work finds, in general, support for the idea that emotion – both 
integral and incidental – serves as information, even after controlling for believability 
and problem structure. However, a number of differences across the studies have 
been highlighted, along with potential explanations and ways of improving the study 
designs; discussed here and elsewhere in the thesis. In relation to the models 
considered in Chapters 1 and 2, activation models such as Barlow’s (1991) might be 
useful in guiding future research on attention and emotion (discussed above), but are 
limited in their ability to explain emotion effects which differ across studies. Similarly, 
though Dual Process Theory is valuable as a tool in designing studies to compare and 
contrast Type One and Type Two processing, also discussed above, it is heavily 
focused on reasoning processes. As such, it needs to be combined, as was attempted 
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in the earlier chapters, with models of emotion and cognition interaction, such as 
Load and Information theories in order to provide a framework which allows 
competing explanations of emotion effects in reasoning to be tested. The Affect 
Infusion Model, introduced in Chapter 2 combines DPT and the predictions of Load 
and Information theories and captures a range of salient factors identified in the 
preceding discussion such as an individual’s motivation to reason carefully, and task 
properties. These are broadly identified in the model as motivation or a specific goal, 
and the novelty of the task, though might reasonably be developed to consider 
different types of goals and task properties such as familiarity or believability. 
However, one limitation is its inability to help researchers characterise tasks in order 
to progress through the decision points (Figure  2.3). After the motivation to reason 
or make a judgment, and adequate cognitive capacity points have been passed in the 
model, affective state is considered (though this is largely left undefined),  and is 
expected to direct an individual towards ‘Substantive’ (related to Type Two) or 
‘Heuristic’ (Type One) processing.  
Further investigation of these elements will allow us to more clearly 
determine when the patterns found in this thesis – mostly supporting Information 
theories – will be present, and when they will be less clear or lead to other types of 
reasoning described in the AIM, such as Direct-Access and Motivated Strategies 
(Chapter  2). It would be useful to develop research designs which evaluate the 
impact of emotion at each decision point in the AIM model, for example, first 
contrasting high and low familiarity materials across emotional content to distinguish 
between ‘Direct Access’ (e.g. recall from memory) and ‘Motivated’ (guided, selective 
search) strategies; then secondly investigating the effects of cognitive capacity and 
the importance of accuracy across emotional content types to distinguish between 
the effects of emotion on ‘Heuristic’ and ‘Substantive’ processing (which broadly map 
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on to the Type One and Type Two distinctions used throughout this thesis). 
Evaluation of the decision point concerning the ‘affective state’ of the individual is 
addressed by the studies of incidental emotion reported in this thesis. 
10.5 Methodological Implications 
In endeavouring to fully investigate the impact of emotion on reasoning, a number of 
things have been learnt about effectively investigating the relationship between 
emotion and reasoning. This section brings together the most pertinent of these 
points, and considers the findings in relation to manipulation of incidental and 
integral emotion, and measuring reasoning and emotion.  
10.5.1 Incidental and Integral Emotion Manipulation 
In the studies reported here on incidental emotion, a written manipulation task was 
used, though to varying degrees of success. Writing about a positive, negative, or 
neutral life event (Brand et al., 2007) was found to be effective in inducing moods in 
Experiment 1, and partially effective in Experiments 11 and 12, though had little 
effect in Experiment 5, despite the task being administered in the same way each 
time. One possible explanation for the difference in apparent effectiveness may be 
how mood was recorded in order to check the effectiveness of the manipulation. 
In Experiment 1, both the PANAS and five-point Likert scale ratings of ‘happy’ 
and ‘sad’ were used and showed similar patterns for the effectiveness of the 
manipulation. Experiments 11 and 12 used a sliding scale ranging from 0 (Very Sad) 
to 100 (Very Happy), and appeared to show that in both cases the negative induction 
was more effective at altering participants’ subjective mood ratings than the positive 
or control manipulations. It is odd, then, that Experiment 5 in which the manipulation 
check used a similar response scale for the same manipulation showed no effects of 
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the writing task on people’s reported moods. Experiment 5 required participants to 
mark an X on a line labelled ‘Very Sad’ and ‘Very Happy’, the position of which was 
then standardised to a 0-to-100 point scale. 
If the similarity of scales between Experiments 5, 11, and 12 are taken to rule 
out the possibility of the scale used affecting the results in the manipulation checks, 
then other differences must be considered. A major difference between Experiment 
5 and all others is the placement of the manipulation check. Whereas the other 
experiments measured subjective mood ratings after the manipulation but prior to 
the reasoning task, the manipulation check in Experiment 5 was administered after 
the reasoning task. Thus the apparent lack of effectiveness may be a result of an 
ineffective mood manipulation, the dissipation of the induced emotional 
experiences, or a normalising effect of the reasoning task. Evidence in support of this 
latter hypothesis can be found in the work of Van Dillen and colleagues, which has 
shown that cognitively demanding tasks can reduce negative mood (Van Dillen, 
Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Future work should therefore 
ensure manipulation checks are administered prior to the tasks of interest, and aim 
to develop our understanding of the duration of induced emotion. In relation to the 
interpretation of the findings reported here, this dissipation of mood may suggest 
that alternative manipulations and manipulation checks may need to be considered. 
One possibility for manipulating mood which has been shown to provide lasting 
emotional states is the continuous music technique briefly described in Chapter  1 
(Eich & Macaulay, 2001). This involves having participants listen to a particular piece 
of music and chart their emotional experience on a grid labelled with axes of valence 
and arousal. This could overcome dissipation of mood issues if it was administered 
periodically throughout a study, and the reasoning tasks paused if the emotion fell 
below a certain threshold. 
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In relation to the work of Van Dillen and colleagues on reasoning tasks being 
used to reduce emotional experience, the current work suggests a bidrectionality to 
this relationship. That some effects of emotion have been found on reasoning tasks 
suggests that although reasoning tasks may have an effect on emotional experience, 
emotional experience can also have an effect on reasoning tasks. This does raise the 
question of how best to separate out these effects, or investigate one direction of 
effect only. If both effects occur simultaneously, then the instances of mood effects 
on reasoning reported in this thesis might be considered underestimates of the true 
effect; if completing a reasoning task reduces the experienced mood, and thus 
reduces the ‘amount’ of emotion left to serve as information (or load) in completing 
the reasoning tasks. It would be interesting to develop this idea by measuring both 
mood and reasoning over an extended period in order to learn more about the 
relationship between the two.    
 Related to these manipulation checks is the finding that emotion effects 
typically appear to be smaller when incidental emotion is manipulated. This may 
indicate that the emotions generated by the written manipulation are not ‘strong’ 
enough, or do not endure for long enough (if Experiment 5 is taken to suggest 
emotions reducing over time) to impact on the reasoning tasks, or, on occasion 
(Experiments 11 and 12), the measures of mood. Alternatively, it may indicate that 
integral and incidental emotion affect reasoning in different ways. One possible 
explanation for the larger effects with integral emotion is the salience of the 
emotional element. Integral emotion does not draw attention to the content valence 
in the same way as asking individuals to write about a happy or sad life event, and 
thus may be less prone to discounting effects, whether conscious or otherwise. Some 
evidence for this can be found in Experiments 6 and 7, in which varying integral 
emotion between participants led to larger effects than when the content was varied 
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between participants. Chapter 7 discusses the justification for exploring these two 
designs in relation to the salience of the content types being reduced when content 
varies between participants, and considers the reduced potential for discounting 
effects as an explanation of the larger effect sizes.  
It is curious that differences in mood ratings between the conditions can be 
accompanied by only minor effects in the reasoning task; partial differences in the 
mood ratings can be accompanied by consistent differences in the reasoning task; 
and simultaneously no effects be found in either as a result of the emotion 
manipulation. Future work, as well as investigating the intensity of emotional 
experiences over time more thoroughly might also investigate the effects of different 
‘strengths’ of emotion manipulation in relation to the impact of emotion on 
reasoning tasks. As discussed at the start of this thesis, few studies which use 
emotion manipulations report effect sizes in their manipulation checks. In addition, 
whereas the current body of work has investigated general positive as opposed to 
negative emotion relative to control conditions, ‘degrees’ of positive and negative 
emotion might be assessed in future work. This could be achieved by developing the 
use of imagery in conditional reasoning studies, making use of existing data on the 
valence and arousal of images in the IAPS picture set (Lang et al., 2005) to create 
conditions of increasing valence whilst controlling for arousal, or indeed, 
investigating the relative effect of valence in relation to the effect of arousal. Such a 
series of studies might help to further distinguish between Load and Information 
explanations, or whether emotion serves as information when it is ‘mild’, but load 
when it is ‘severe’, or vice versa. The differences in logical accuracy between positive 
and negative conditions as the ‘severity’ of the emotion increases may also be 
informative. It might be hypothesised for example that extremely graphic images 
would lead emotion to be used as information, whereas milder imagery may lead to 
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results congruent with Load theories where there is enough available capacity to 
attempt effortful processing, based on the findings of other experiments (e.g. 
Experiments 11 and 12) which show some suggestion of a Load-Information 
distinction between difficult and extremely difficult problem types.   
The question was raised earlier as to whether integral emotion 
manipulations affect subjective mood ratings in the same way as incidental emotion 
manipulations. This was tested by including a single-item measure of mood in 
Experiment 9. A main effect of content type was found for post-reasoning (but not 
pre-reasoning) ratings of mood. This effect was such that participants in both the 
positive and negative content conditions reported more negative moods than the 
control condition, although it was only the positive-control content comparison 
which reached statistical significance.  This is unlike the measures of mood in studies 
varying incidental emotion (e.g. Experiments 11 and 12) in which mood ratings 
typically follow the expected patterns, of positive higher than control higher than 
negative, even if they do not consistently reach levels that are statistically 
significantly different. 
Even if integral emotion doesn’t necessarily alter an individual’s subjective 
experience of mood (though whether this might be expected or not was a question 
raised in Chapter  8), the difference in the overall valence for the content used (as 
indicated by pre-testing of the materials) does still appear to have an impact on 
reasoning performance in the tasks used here. Furthermore, emotive content would 
seem to impact reasoning, though specifically on more difficult tasks, in a manner 
most often consistent with Information theories. This would suggest that the 
manipulation of integral emotion was effective, even though it does not necessarily 
register on measures of subjective emotional experience. There is also the possibility, 
mentioned above and earlier in the thesis, that integral and incidental emotion do 
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not both generate ‘emotional experiences’, and may thus affect reasoning in 
different ways.  
Furthermore, though integral emotion does not alter subjective ratings of 
experience in the same way as incidental emotion, they both show an impact on 
reasoning. In relation to Load and Information theories, the work presented here 
suggests that emotion more often serves as information which leads to a 
consideration of how both incidental and integral emotion could be informative. 
Considering significant differences in mood ratings are found between conditions 
when incidental emotion is manipulated, the emotional experience may be 
considered more salient. As this experience is self-reported, individuals might 
reasonably be considered aware of their emotions, and thus may try to integrate 
them into their reasoning processes. The case for integral emotion is less clear, as 
little or no ‘experienced’ emotion seems to be generated by emotive content. This 
could be due to a lack of extremely distressing (or extremely pleasant) content being 
used in the studies, and much more graphic content may have resulted in stronger 
emotional states which could be captured by the mood ratings. Alternatively, 
emotive content may serve as information but in a more local sense. Emotional 
responses to each individual reasoning item, which may not necessarily combine to 
an overall emotional experience, could nonetheless serve as information.     
Understanding more fully the relationship between incidental and integral 
emotion would be an important next step in research investigating the impact of 
emotion on reasoning and vice versa. This might be achieved by including both self-
report and physiological measures throughout the reasoning phases of the 
experiments. If integral and incidental emotions generate emotional experiences, 
some correlation might be expected between the measures. If integral emotion only 
operates through generating emotional responses to each individual item, then 
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continual monitoring of physiological responses and periodic self-report measures 
would be more likely to detect this than a single self-report measure. If, however, the 
effects of integral emotion are not caused by an emotional state, but some other 
mechanism, there might be less correlation between physiological measures 
(particularly of attention or other potential mechanisms through which integral 
emotion may have its effect) and self-reported measures of emotional experience. 
Thus although future research which varies integral emotion may proceed under the 
assumption that emotion is being varied if independent pre-testing of content 
valence shows significant differences between conditions, it would be worthwhile 
investigating the relationships between integral and incidental emotion further. 
Some ways of doing this and some initial steps, such as measuring emotional 
experience after reasoning about emotive content, have been taken in this thesis, 
but to do the comparison justice would entail its own programme of research which 
builds on the initial ideas discussed here. 
10.5.2 Measuring Emotion and Reasoning 
Related to the differences in incidental and integral emotion is the need to measure 
emotional experience. In this thesis, the PANAS, single item ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ ratings, 
and a single dichotomous happy-sad mood measure have been used. The theoretical 
basis for adopting these has been dealt with elsewhere (e.g. Chapter  1), but in 
practical terms, the results reported in Chapter  3 indicated that the PANAS and single 
item happy and sad measures showed the same results. It is thus recommended that 
unless positive and negative affect are of particular theoretical relevance to the 
work, future studies may benefit from the faster administration time, and limited 
distraction, of using a ‘happy’ and a ‘sad’ item. The five item Likert-scale response, 
covering ‘not at all’, ‘a little’, ‘moderately’, ‘quite a bit’, and ‘extremely’ for these 
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happy and sad items would seem to be sufficiently sensitive to changes in mood 
generated by the written manipulation task as to be comparable to the longer 
PANAS. Later experiments adopted analogue scales anchored at very happy and very 
sad requiring participants to indicate their mood with a cross (Experiment 5), or use a 
sliding scale (Experiments 11 and 12), which then converted these into scores ranging 
from 0 to 100, as described above. Although these scales were not directly compared 
to the PANAS, they appear to track changes in self-reported mood states well, and 
may also provide useful alternatives to longer scales. 
 In relation to the theoretical work on the structure of emotion, the similarity 
of responses from scales measuring single or multiple dimensions might be taken to 
show that the manipulations used affect ratings universally; both the positive and 
negative dimensions are affected by the manipulations. This would explain the 
similarity in Happy and Positive-Affect ratings, and the Sad and Negative-Affect 
ratings reported in Experiment 1. Unfortunately, this means that the current findings 
can say little about the structure of emotion, but the manipulations and 
manipulation checks can be used to make the case that ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ items can 
be used in research to map the positive and negative affective dimensions which 
frequently occur across different models of emotion. The methodological 
implications of this have been considered above; namely that they can be used to 
improve efficiency and reduce distraction in the collection of experimental data.   
 In relation to the need to measure reasoning in order to assess the impact of 
emotion, what has become clear throughout this thesis is the need to consider which 
reasoning processes are being measured. As outlined above, both the use of Type 
Two processing (using the search for additional models in the necessity-possibility 
paradigm) and the relative use of Type One and Type Two processing (using 
measures of reliance on belief, logic, frequency, and probability) have been the key 
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measures of the paradigms used in this thesis. This is important to consider in 
reasoning work which aims to compare Load and Information theories as the 
distinction between high and low effort processing is what allows the predictions of 
each class of theory to be evaluated. The findings reported here suggest that it is in 
the more effortful processing, on the more difficult tasks, where emotion has the 
greatest impact. Although relatively few effects of emotion have been found on 
‘easy’ tasks requiring only low-effort responses, it would be interesting to combine 
the above outline for a study on degrees of emotion and the impact of these 
emotions on Type One processing. It is possible that few effects were found on Type 
One processing in this thesis because of the comparison between general positive 
and general negative emotion.  
Extreme emotions might have more of an impact even on lower-effort reasoning 
tasks, and would serve to supplement the work in this thesis by extending the range 
and degree of emotions investigated. In addition, it has been shown that perceptual 
and processing fluency lead to small increases in positive affect (Topolinski & Strack, 
2009). If easy tasks are processed with more ease, and this generates positive affect, 
it is possible that easy tasks reduce the distinctions between the emotion conditions, 
thus eliminating any effects of the emotion manipulation. The effects on low-effort, 
Type One processes is thus another potential area of research and could be 
combined with the above mentioned work required to investigate the direction of 
effects in emotion and reasoning research; if emotions can impact on reasoning (this 
thesis) and reasoning can be used to reduce experienced emotion (e.g. Van Dillen et 
al., 2009), how and when each of these effects occur and how they interact are 
interesting questions to consider.  
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10.6 Closing Summary 
This thesis set out to investigate whether and how emotion affected reasoning, 
across a range of reasoning paradigms: syllogistic reasoning, conditional reasoning, 
and the ratio-bias-task, and for two different emotion manipulations: incidental and 
integral. These experiments were couched in terms of comparing Load theories; 
those which posit any emotion will serve as cognitive load, and Information theories; 
those which suggest positive and negative emotion serve as sources of information, 
the former cueing reliance on low-effort strategies, and the latter cueing reliance on 
higher effort strategies. 
The findings across the twelve studies reported in this thesis, including an 
experiment using novel visual conditionals, are more supportive, overall, of 
Information theories. However, the findings are not entirely consistent, and there 
have been a number of null findings which have led to the discussion of a range of 
theoretical and methodological implications. In addition, the impact of emotion has 
been found to be more pronounced on ‘difficult’ reasoning tasks: those which 
require Type Two processing to respond to in a logically accurate manner. 
Information based effects of mood are also found more consistently in conditional 
reasoning tasks than in syllogistic reasoning tasks, though even in these cases the 
availability of alternative antecedents moderates the effects of emotion.  
Overall, it would seem that emotion effects are highly dependent on a range 
of task specific properties, many of which have been investigated here. For example, 
the believability of conclusions, whether initial or subsequent models in syllogistic 
reasoning yield necessary conclusions, the number of alternative causes, and 
whether emotion is varied within or between participants. This complexity is 
reflected in the few main effects of emotion that are present in the studies reported 
here, and the relatively numerous interactive effects that have been discussed. It is 
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hoped that future work can build on these findings, and refine the methodologies 
used, either following the suggestions outlined in this final chapter, developing the 
use of imagery in reasoning tasks, or following new avenues of interest in the field. 
 In summary, there is some consistency in the effects of incidental and 
integral emotion across experiments and paradigms which can be most frequently 
explained by considering emotion a source of information. However, this is only a 
starting point, and the results presented here also raise a number of questions; 
namely, under what circumstances and in which reasoning tasks do emotions serve 
as information, and how might different emotions interact with the properties of the 
tasks involved.  
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Appendices 
A. Necessity-Possibility Paradigm 
Materials (Experiment 1) 
Instructions 
Brief 
 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. This experiment will consist of a 
series of sections intended to investigate different concepts in the shortest 
possible time. 
 
In the first section will be asked to describe a life event to provide materials 
for a future study. This may be emotionally distressing, but you should keep 
in mind your right to withdraw from the study at any point, and note the 
contact details of counselling services at the bottom of the debrief. 
 
After this short task, you will be presented with a series of reasoning 
problems which make up the main part of the current study. Each problem 
will require you to indicate whether a conclusion falls into one of two 
categories. You may work through the reasoning section at your own speed, 
and take breaks when you feel they are necessary.  
 
At the end of the study, you will be required to rate a short series of jokes so 
that they can be evaluated for future use.  
 
Your responses will be kept anonymous, and you have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time without incurring any penalty by asking to 
withdraw. Even after you have completed this experiment you can withdraw 
your data by contacting the experimenter and providing your participant ID 
number. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now before 
continuing 
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Mood manipulation instructions 
 
(All conditions) 
As part of a future study, researchers at the university intend to investigate 
how reading about people’s reactions to life events can influence 
judgements. To fill time in the current study, please complete the following 
task to provide the researchers with a selection of events to use in their 
study. 
(Positive and Negative conditions) 
Please try to recall a particularly [happy/sad] event in your life. It may be, for 
example, [receiving good results on a difficult test, an unusually fun and 
memorable night out with friends, or a joyful family occasion such as a 
birthday or wedding/ failing an important test, the death of a loved relative 
or pet, or the break up of a relationship] that made you [happy/sad]. When 
you have decided on a memory, please write in the box below everything you 
can remember about the event, describing the event briefly, and then 
focusing on your thoughts, feelings, and reactions. Please try to write for 
around 10 minutes before moving on to the next section. 
(Neutral condition) 
Please try to recall an occasion on which you used one of the library services; 
for example, book loaning, computing and printing facilities, or room 
booking. When you have decided on a memory, please write in the box 
below everything you can remember about the event, describing the event 
briefly, and then focusing on what you noticed about your surroundings. 
Please try to write for around 10 minutes before moving on to the next 
section.  
(All conditions) 
All responses will remain anonymous, and you may choose to withdraw your 
description at any time. If you have any questions about the task, contact the 
experimenter now. 
PANAS Instructions 
 
The following scale consists of a number of words that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Please read each item and then check the appropriate 
box next to that word.  Indicate to what extent you feel this way at this 
moment. 
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Necessity Reasoning Instructions 
 
From this point forwards, please work through all of the sections in order at 
your own speed.  
   
In the next section, you will be presented with a series of reasoning 
problems. 
  
Each problem consists of three lines; the first two are premises, the third a 
conclusion. Each problem will relate to the relationships between the 
occupations of three individuals. For each problem, assume that the 
premises are true. 
  
For each problem, please read the premises and the conclusion, and then 
indicate whether or not you think the conclusion necessarily follows; 
  
For example: 
 All Cats have tails  
Tabby is a Cat  
Therefore, Tabby has a tail  
  
If you think the conclusion shown must be true given that the premises are 
true, you should check the ‘Necessary’ box. In the case above, based on the 
premises, Tabby must have a tail, so you should indicate that the conclusion 
is necessary. 
  
A necessary conclusion is one that must be true when the premises are true  
 
Possibility Reasoning Instructions 
 
From this point forwards, please work through all of the sections in order at 
your own speed.  
   
In the next section, you will be presented with a series of reasoning 
problems. 
  
Each problem consists of three lines; the first two are premises, the third a 
conclusion. Each problem will relate to the relationships between the 
occupations of three individuals. For each problem, assume that the 
premises are true. 
  
For each problem, please read the premises and the conclusion, and then 
indicate whether or not you think the conclusion is possible; 
  
For example: 
 All Cats have tails  
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Tabby has a tail  
Therefore, Tabby is a cat  
  
If you think the conclusion shown could be true given that the premises are 
true, you should check the ‘Possible’ box. In the case above, based on the 
premises, Tabby may be a cat, so you should indicate that the conclusion is 
possible. 
  
A possible conclusion is one that could be true when the premises are true  
 
Debrief 
 
Thank you for completing the study. Your help is greatly appreciated. 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of mood on reasoning, in 
the hope of providing a better understanding of how emotions interact with 
heuristic and analytic reasoning systems. 
 
Specifically, whether positive and negative mood have the same, different, or 
no effect on the systems people use to reason. 
 
Although the life event exercise may be used to develop mood manipulations 
in future, in this experiment it also served to induce a particular mood, and 
the joke-rating task was included in order to neutralise any negative effects 
the writing task may have had on your mood. 
 
If you would like further information on this study, or wish for your data to 
be removed from subsequent analyses, please contact the experimenter 
(details below) 
 
If you feel emotionally distressed following this experiment, or feel you might 
like to talk to someone about any issues raised, please do not hesitate to 
contact the university’s counselling services (details below)  
 
Experimenter: Daniel Zahra, daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk 
First Supervisor: Professor Simon Handley, 
s.handley@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Counselling Services: studentcounselling@plymouth.ac.uk,  
01752 232254 
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Syllogisms 
Conclusion Structure 
A-B, B-C, A-C 
Mood Endorsement 
Rate (Evans et al 
1999) 
Necessary All Architects are Bankers 
All Bankers are Cooks 
All Architects are Cooks 
AAa 73 
 All Accountants are Builders 
No Builders are Cleaners 
No Accountants are Cleaners 
AEe 83 
 Some Taxi-drivers are Engineers 
All Engineers are Climbers 
Some Taxi-drivers are Climbers 
IAi 87 
 Some Lawyers are Priests 
No Priests are Students 
Some Lawyers are not Students 
IEo 83 
Impossible All Nurses are Runners 
No Runners are Lecturers 
All Nurses are Lecturers 
AEa 3 
 All Musicians are Babysitters 
No Babysitters are Surgeons 
Some Musicians are Surgeons 
AEi 7 
 Some Astronauts are Scientists 
All Scientists are Carpenters 
No Astronauts are Carpenters 
IAe 10 
 Some Chemists are Surfers 
No Surfers are Teachers 
All Chemists are Teachers 
IEa 0 
Possible-Strong All Journalists are Bus-drivers 
Some Bus-drivers are not Professors 
Some Journalists are not Professors 
AOo 90 
 Some Canoeists are Zoo-keepers 
Some Zoo-keepers are Policemen 
Some Canoeists are Policemen 
IIi 80 
 Some Clowns are not Sailors 
All Sailors are Judges 
Some Clowns are not Judges 
OAo 83 
 Some Soldiers are not Magicians 
Some Magicians are not Electricians 
Some Soldiers are not Electricians 
OOo 87 
Possible-Weak Some Waiters are Managers 
Some Managers are Caterers 
No Waiters are Caterers 
IIe 3 
 Some Pilots are not Divers 
Some Divers are Painters 
No Pilots are Painters 
OIe 3 
 Some Plumbers are not Writers 
No Writers are Bikers 
All Plumbers are Bikers 
OEa 3 
 Some Artists are not Salesmen 
Some Salesmen are Cobblers 
All Artists are Cobblers 
OO 7 
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Screenshots from Experiment 1 
 
Appendix Figure 1 Condition selection screen 
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Appendix Figure 2 Demographic information screen 
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Appendix Figure 3 Mood manipulation task screen 
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Appendix Figure 4 PANAS screen 
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Appendix Figure 5 Reasoning Task Judgement screen 
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Appendix Figure 6 Reasoning Task Confidence Rating screen 
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Appendix Figure 7 Joke Rating Task screen 
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B. Necessity-Possibility Paradigm 
Materials (Experiment 2) 
Online Recruitment Sources 
Note: Subscription numbers are as of 29th June 2009   
Staff@psy.plymouth.ac.uk : University of Plymouth mailing list covering 
Department of Psychology staff (40 subscribers) 
Pg@psy.plymouth.ac.uk: University of Plymouth mailing list covering School 
of Psychology MPhil and PhD students (39 subscribers). 
Msc@psy.plymouth.ac.uk: University of Plymouth mailing list covering School 
of Psychology MSc Psychological Research Methods and Psychology 
conversion students (27 subscribers). 
Neuroscience@plymouth.ac.uk: University of Plymouth mailing list covering 
members of the neuroscience department (approx. 20 subscribers). 
Psy-net-research@jiscmail.ac.uk: Jiscmail mailing list covering psychologists 
interested in research using the internet (152 subscribers). 
Psych-postgrads@jiscmail.co.uk: Jiscmail mailing list dedicated to 
psychology postgraduates (510 subscribers). 
Cog-sci-rel-l@jiscmail.co.uk: Jiscmail mailing lists covering psychologists 
interested in cognitive science and religion (128 subscribers). 
Criticalthinking@jiscmail.co.uk: Jiscmail mailing lists covering psychologists 
interested in critical thinking research (75 subscribers). 
www.facebook.com: Social networking site allowing posting to friends, 
colleagues, family, and acquaintances from all social and educational areas 
and backgrounds. 
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html: a website listing online 
psychology studies by topic area maintained by John H. Krantz 
(krantzj@hanover.edu) with the Hanover College Psychology Department 
http://www.w-lab.de/lab-united/submit.php a website maintained by Anja 
Berger and Mirko Wendland, based at The University of Potsdam, which 
provides a directory of online psychology studies as well as research news.  
http://www.in-mind.org/online-research/index.php: the website of the 
magazine Inquisitive Mind, hosted by One.com, and dedicated to social 
psychology, and which maintains a directory of online psychology studies. 
Anthro-sciences@jiscmail.co.uk : This list supports an international 
special interest group for anthropological sciences and the development of 
anthropological research methods and theory (353 subscribers). 
Neuromeg@jiscmail.co.uk : Mailing list for academic researchers using 
Magnetoencephalography (75 subscribers) 
Psychologynetwork-neuro@jiscmail.co.uk : This list provides a forum for 
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discussing issues related to the learning and teaching of neuropsychology 
(106 subscribers) 
SWSBC@jiscmail.co.uk: A place to discuss collaborative research in 
structural biology in theSouth West (12 subscribers) 
UOBvisiongroup@jiscmail.co.uk: This list is used by the University of Bristol 
and affiliated membersvision science group to organise meetings and events 
(40 subscribers) 
Biology-teaching@jiscmail.co.uk : Mailing list for those teaching biological 
sciences in higher-education (115 subscribers) 
Embodiment@jiscmail.co.uk : Mailing list for Embodiment research from a 
philosophical perspective (212 subscribers). 
All-active@jiscmail.co.uk: Information and discussion list for all branches, 
networks and activists within the philosophy jiscmail lists (27 subscribers) 
Process-philosophy@jiscmail.co.uk: Open forum mailing list covering 
Process Thought. Whitehead's Metaphysics and Hartshorne's Theology (206 
subscribers).  
BCS-HCI@jiscmail.co.uk : British Computer Society Human-Computer 
Interaction Group mailing list (1,576 subscribers). 
 
Used for TMMS/ATT/BIS-BAS SEM study questionnaire 
POSTGRAD@JISCMAIL.AC.UK (560) 
STUDENT-RETENTION-AND-SUCCESS@JISCMAIL.AC.UK (422) 
 
Instructions 
Brief (with consent/no consent question) 
 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. This experiment will consist of a 
series of sections intended to investigate different concepts in the shortest 
possible time. 
 
Firstly, you will be presented with a series of reasoning problems which make 
up the main part of the current study. Each problem will require you to 
indicate whether a conclusion falls into one of two categories. You may work 
through the reasoning section at your own speed, and take breaks when you 
feel they are necessary.  
 
Following this, you will be required to complete a short questionnaire. 
Your responses will be kept anonymous, and you have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time without incurring any penalty by closing your 
browser window. Even after you have completed this experiment you can 
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withdraw your data by contacting the experimenter and providing your 
participant ID number. 
 
Demographic Instructions 
 
Please complete the fields below. 
For your participant ID number, please ender a memorable date in the 
MMDDYYYY format. 
 
Necessity Reasoning Instructions 
 
In the next section, you will be presented with a series of reasoning 
problems. 
 
Each problem consists of three lines; the first two are premises, the third a 
conclusion. Each problem will relate to the relationships between the 
occupations of three individuals. For each problem, assume that the 
premises are true. 
 
For each problem, please read the premises and the conclusion, and then 
indicate whether or not you think the conclusion necessarily follows; 
 or example: 
 
All Cats have tails  
Tabby is a Cat  
Therefore, Tabby has a tail  
  
If you think the conclusion shown must be true given that the premises are 
true, you should check the ‘Necessary’ box. In the case above, based on the 
premises, Tabby must have a tail, so you should indicate that the conclusion 
is necessary. 
 
A necessary conclusion is one that must be true when the premises are true. 
 
After indicating whether you think each conclusion is necessary or not 
necessary, you will then be required to indicate how confident you are in 
your response. Please indicate your level of confidence by selecting the 
appropriate option. 
 
Possibility Reasoning Instructions 
 
In the next section, you will be presented with a series of reasoning 
problems. 
  
Each problem consists of three lines; the first two are premises, the third a 
conclusion. Each problem will relate to the relationships between the 
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occupations of three individuals. For each problem, assume that the 
premises are true. 
  
For each problem, please read the premises and the conclusion, and then 
indicate whether or not you think the conclusion is possible; 
  
For example: 
All Cats have tails  
Tabby has a tail  
Therefore, Tabby has is a cat  
  
If you think the conclusion shown could be true given that the premises are 
true, you should check the ‘Possible’ box. In the case above, based on the 
premises, Tabby may be a cat, so you should indicate that the conclusion is 
possible. 
  
A possible conclusion is one that could be true when the premises are true. 
 
After indicating whether you think each conclusion is possible or not 
possible, you will then be required to indicate how confident you are in your 
response. Please indicate your level of confidence by selecting the 
appropriate option.  
 
TMMS instructions 
 
The following section is designed to measure a range of factors related to 
reasoning. 
 
Please read each item in turn, and indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each.  
 
Debrief  
 
Thank you for completing the study. Your help is greatly appreciated. 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of mood on reasoning, in 
the hope of providing a better understanding of how emotions interact with 
heuristic and analytic reasoning systems. 
 
Specifically, whether positive and negative mood have the same, different, or 
no effect on the systems people use to reason. This was manipulated in the 
current study by varying problem content. 
 
The questionnaire was designed to measure the extent to which you attend 
to your emotions and will be used to investigate the link between attention 
to emotions and the effects of problem content. 
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If you would like further information on this study, or wish for your data to 
be removed from subsequent analyses, please contact the experimenter 
(details below) 
 
If you have any questions, please type them in the box below along with your 
email address and the experimenter will contact you as soon as possible. 
If you feel emotionally distressed following this experiment, or feel you might 
like to talk to someone about any issues raised, please do not hesitate to 
contact the university’s counselling services (details below)  
 
Experimenter: Daniel Zahra, daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk 
First Supervisor: Professor Simon Handley, s.handley@plymouth.ac.uk 
Counselling Services: studentcounselling@plymouth.ac.uk, 01752 232254 
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Syllogisms 
Note: A, B, C, and D denote Necessary, Possible-Strong, Possible-Weak and 
Impossible categories respectively. 
 
Positive Condition 
 
Problem Code 
Some generous people are not compassionate 
All compassionate people are saints 
Some generous people are not saints 
C1.3 
Some cute things are kittens 
All cute things are babies 
No kittens are babies 
B1.3 
Some holidays are not soothing 
No soothing things are breaks from work 
All holidays are breaks from work 
D1.3 
All puppies are fluffy 
All fluffy things are cute 
All puppies are cute 
A1.1 
All weddings are celebrations 
No celebrations are really memorable 
Some weddings are really memorable 
B1.2 
All bunnies are friendly 
Some friendly animals are not fluffy 
Some bunnies are not fluffy 
C1.1 
Some exciting things are adventurous 
Some adventurous things are relaxing 
No exciting things are relaxing 
D1.1 
Some generous people are rich 
No rich people are millionaires 
Some generous people are not millionaires 
A1.4 
All successes are good 
No good things are worthwhile 
All successes are worthwhile 
B1.1 
Some chocolate things are tasty 
All tasty things are cakes 
Some chocolate things are cakes 
A1.3 
All friends are cheerful people 
No cheerful people are lovers 
No friends are lovers 
A1.2 
Some winners are not successful 
Some successful people are not gold 
medallists 
C1.4 
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Some winners are not gold medallists 
Some beaches are not fantastic 
Some fantastic things are exhilarating 
No beaches are exhilarating 
D1.2 
Some comedians are kind 
No kind people are funny 
All comedians are funny 
B1.4 
Some birthdays are celebrations 
Some celebrations are enjoyable 
Some birthdays are enjoyable 
C1.2 
Some spa breaks are not cheerful 
Some cheerful things are peaceful 
All spa breaks are peaceful 
D1.4 
 
 
Control Condition 
 
Problem Code 
Some Clowns are not Sailors 
All Sailors are Judges 
Some Clowns are not Judges 
C1.3 
Some Astronauts are Scientists 
All Scientists are Carpenters 
No Astronauts are Carpenters 
B1.3 
Some Plumbers are not Writers 
No Writers are Bikers 
All Plumbers are Bikers 
D1.3 
All Architects are Bankers 
All Bankers are Cooks 
All Architects are Cooks 
A1.1 
All Musicians are Babysitters 
No Babysitters are Surgeons 
Some Musicians are Surgeons 
B1.2 
All Journalists are Bus-drivers 
Some Bus-drivers are not Professors 
Some Journalists are not Professors 
C1.1 
Some Waiters are Managers 
Some Managers are Caterers 
No Waiters are Caterers 
D1.1 
Some Lawyers are Priests 
No Priests are Students 
Some Lawyers are not Students 
A1.4 
All Nurses are Runners 
No Runners are Lecturers 
All Nurses are Lecturers 
B1.1 
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Some Taxi-drivers are Engineers 
All Engineers are Climbers 
Some Taxi-drivers are Climbers 
A1.3 
All Accountants are Builders 
No Builders are Cleaners 
No Accountants are Cleaners 
A1.2 
Some Soldiers are not Magicians 
Some Magicians are not Electricians 
Some Soldiers are not Electricians 
C1.4 
Some Pilots are not Divers 
Some Divers are Painters 
No Pilots are Painters 
D1.2 
Some Chemists are Surfers 
No Surfers are Teachers 
All Chemists are Teachers 
B1.4 
Some Canoeists are Zoo-keepers 
Some Zoo-keepers are Policemen 
Some Canoeists are Policemen 
C1.2 
Some Artists are not Salesmen 
Some Salesmen are Cobblers 
All Artists are Cobblers 
D1.4 
 
 
Negative Condition 
 
Problem Code 
Some deaths are not violent 
All violent things are painful 
Some deaths are not painful 
C1.3 
Some rats are rapists 
All rapists are terrorists 
No rats are terrorists 
B1.3 
Some used diapers are not vile 
No vile things are soiled 
All used diapers are soiled 
D1.3 
All cancers are terrifying 
All terrifying things are deadly 
All cancers are deadly 
A1.1 
All prisoners are criminals 
No criminals are drug addicts 
Some prisoners are drug addicts 
B1.2 
All bloody things are stab wounds 
Some stab wounds are not injuries 
Some bloody things are not injuries 
C1.1 
Some infections are irritants 
Some irritants are contaminated 
D1.1 
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No infections are contaminated 
Some tumours are fatal 
No fatal things are treatable 
Some tumours are not treatable 
A1.4 
All criminals are murderers 
No murderers are violent 
All criminals are violent 
B1.1 
Some murderers are terrorists 
All terrorists are dishonest 
Some murderers are dishonest 
A1.3 
All poisons are toxic 
No toxic are cancerous 
No poisons are cancerous 
A1.2 
Some rotten fruits are not mouldy 
Some mouldy things are not putrid 
Some rotten fruits are not putrid 
C1.4 
Some festering wounds are poisonous 
Some poisons are clean 
No festering wounds are clean 
D1.2 
Some radioactive things are toxic 
No toxins are dangerous 
All radioactive things are dangerous 
B1.4 
Some mutilations are extremely violent 
Some extremely violent acts are horrific 
Some mutilations are horrific 
C1.2 
Some blemishes are not puss-filled 
Some puss-filled wounds are ugly 
All blemishes are ugly 
D1.4 
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TMMS Items 
Items adapted from Salovey, Mayer and Goldman, in Pennebaker, J.W. 1995 
Emotion, Disclosure and Health. 
 
5= agree, 4= somewhat agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 
1= disagree 
 
Ss column denotes subscales: R for Repair, C for Clarity, A for Attention 
 
Sc column indicates items that need to be reverse scored 
 
Items recommended for the 30-item short form of the TMMS are in bold 
 
# Ss Sc Item Rating 
01   The variety of human feelings makes life more interesting   
02 R  I try to think good thoughts no matter how badly I’m feeling  
03   I don’t have much energy when I am happy  
04 A r People would be better off if they felt less and thought more  
05   I usually don’t have much energy when I’m sad  
06   When I’m angry, I usually let myself feel that way  
07 A r I don’t think it’s worth paying attention to your emotions or moods  
08 A r I don’t usually care much about what I’m feeling  
09 C r Sometimes I can’t tell what my feelings are  
10   If I find myself getting mad, I try to calm myself down  
11   I have lots of energy when I feel sad  
12 C  I am rarely confused about how I feel  
13   I think about my mood constantly  
14   I don’t let my feelings interfere with what I am thinking  
15 A  Feelings give direction to life  
16 R  Although I am sometimes sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook  
17 R r When I am upset I realise that ‘the good things in life’ are illusions  
18 A  I believe in acting from the heart  
19 C r I can never tell how I feel  
20   When I am happy I realise how foolish most of my worries are   
21   I believe it’s healthy to feel whatever emotion you feel  
22 A  The best way for me to handle my feelings is to experience them to the fullest  
23 R  When I become upset I remind myself of all the pleasures in life  
24 C r My belief and opinions always seem to change depending on how I feel  
25   I usually have lots of energy when I’m happy  
26 C  I am often aware of my feelings on a matter  
27   When I’m depressed, I can’t help but think bad thoughts  
28 C r I am usually confused about how I feel  
29 A r One should never be guided by emotions  
30   If I’m in too good a mood, I remind myself of reality to bring myself down  
31 A r I never give in to my emotions  
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32 R r Although I am sometimes happy, I have a mostly pessimistic outlook  
33 C  I feel at ease about my emotions  
34   It’s important to block out some feelings in order to preserve your sanity  
35 A  I pay a lot of attention to how I feel  
36   When I’m in a good mood, I’m optimistic about the future  
37 C r I can’t make sense out of my feelings  
38 A r I don’t pay much attention to my feelings   
39   Whenever I’m in a bad mood, I’m pessimistic about the future  
40   I never worry about being in too good a mood  
41 A  I often think about my feelings  
42 C  I am usually very clear about my feelings  
43 R  No matter how badly I feel, I try to think about pleasant things  
44 A r Feelings are a weakness humans have  
45 C  I usually know my feelings bout a matter  
46 A r It is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions  
47   When I am happy I sometimes remind myself of everything that could go wrong  
48 C  I almost always know exactly how I am feeling  
 
  
dzahra 394 330974 
 
C. Belief-Bias Materials  
(Experiment 3) 
Instructions 
Brief 
 
This study aims to investigate factors that affect reasoning. During this study 
you will be required to complete a short series of reasoning problems. Your 
responses will remain anonymous, will only be used for the purposes of the 
current study, and will only be seen by the experimenter. 
 
If you wish to withdraw from the study, you may do so without consequence 
at any point by closing this form. If you wish to withdraw your data after it 
has been submitted, please email daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk stating your 
memorable number. 
 
Reasoning task instructions for all conditions 
 
After entering a memorable date and confirming your consent to participate, 
you will be required to respond to a short series of reasoning problems. 
 
Each sentence is broken up into three sections. Please read the whole 
sentence, and then indicate whether or not you think that the final part (that 
following 'therefore') follows logically from the first two. 
 
Please assume that the first parts of each sentence are true. 
 
If you think the final part follows logically, then select Valid. 
If you think the final part does not follow logically, the select Invalid. 
 
If you have any questions, please email daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk before 
completing this form. 
 
Thank you. 
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Debrief 
 
Thank you for your help with that. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of emotional content 
on reasoning, which is why different participants received problems with 
different words in. 
 
If you have any questions, would like to know more about the study, or 
would like to withdraw your data or receive details of the university 
counselling services if you found the content traumatic, please email 
daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you, 
 
-Daniel 
 
Your data has been submitted and you can now close this window. 
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Syllogisms 
Abstract Forms 
 
Valid Believable Valid Unbelievable Invalid Believable Invalid Unbelievable 
 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
 
 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
 
 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some C are not A 
 
 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some C are not A 
 
 
Positive Content 
 
VB01 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No cute things are fluffy,  
Some fluffy things are puppies, therefore  
Some puppies are not cute 
VB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some friends are cheerful, No cheerful people are 
lovers, therefore Some friends are not lovers 
IB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some chocolate things are tasty, No tasty things are 
cakes, therefore Some cakes are not chocolate 
VU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No generous people are rich, Some millionaires are 
generous, therefore Some millionaires are not rich 
IU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No personal successes are happy, Some happy 
things are cause for celebration, therefore Some 
personal successes are not cause for celebration 
VU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
No cute things are cheerful, Some cheerful things 
are babies, therefore Some babies are not cute 
VU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
Some friendly animals are puppies, No playful 
animals are friendly animals, therefore Some 
puppies are not playful 
VB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
No happy people are genuine, Some smiles are 
happy, therefore Some smiles are not genuine 
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Some C are not A 
IU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No parties are graduation ceremonies, Some 
celebrations of success are parties, therefore Some 
graduation ceremonies are not celebrations of 
success 
VU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some people with good friends are lucky, No lucky 
people are fortunate, therefore Some people with 
good friends are not fortunate 
IB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No happy people are friends, Some relations are 
happy, therefore Some friends are not related 
IB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some C are not A 
Some unlucky people are considerate,  
No lucky people are unlucky, therefore  
Some lucky people are not considerate 
VB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C  
Some bright things are presents,  
No surprises are bright, therefore  
Some presents are not surprises 
IU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some happy occasions are birthdays, No birthdays 
are weddings, therefore Some weddings are not 
happy occasions 
IU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
Some family occasions are births,  
No happy occasions are family occasions, therefore 
Some births are not happy occasions 
IB01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No happy people are boring, Some boring people 
are cheerful, therefore Some happy people are not 
cheerful 
 
 
Control Content 
 
VB01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
No silver things are mechanical,  
Some mechanical things are cars, therefore  
Some cars are silver  
VB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some shops are open 24/7, No shops open 24/7 are 
clothes shops, therefore Some shops are not 
clothes shops 
IB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some orange things are metal, No metal things are 
vegetables, therefore Some vegetables are not 
orange 
VU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No edible things are aquatic, Some fish are edible, 
therefore Some fish are not aquatic 
IU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No cats are dogs, Some dogs are mammals, 
therefore Some cats are not mammals 
VU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
No vehicles are blue, Some blue things are cars, 
therefore Some cars are not vehicles 
VU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some blue things are drinks, No liquids are blue 
things, therefore Some drinks are not liquid 
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Some A are not C 
VB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No things with gelatine in are vegetarian, Some 
sweets are gelatine based, therefore Some sweets 
are not vegetarian 
IU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No rubber things are wheels, Some round things are 
rubber, therefore Some wheels are not round 
VU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some Seagulls are quiet, No quiet things are birds, 
therefore Some Seagulls are not birds 
IB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No t-shirts are animals, Some spotted things are t-
shirts, therefore Some animals are not spotted 
IB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some C are not A 
Some teas are fair trade, No coffees are teas, 
therefore Some coffees are not fairtrade 
VB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C  
Some yellow things are flowers, No red things are 
yellow things, therefore Some flowers are not red 
IU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some vegetarian things are healthy, No healthy 
things are carrots, therefore Some carrots are not 
vegetarian 
IU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
Some alligators are reptiles, No snakes are 
alligators, therefore Some snakes are not reptiles 
IB01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No trains are planes, Some planes are owned by 
Virgin, therefore Some trains are not owned by 
Virgin 
 
 
Negative Content 
 
VB01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
No deadly things are treatable,  
Some treatable things are infectious, therefore  
Some infections are not deadly 
VB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some diseases are disabling, No disabling things are 
curable, therefore Some diseases are not curable 
IB02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some harmless things are pleasant, No pleasant 
things are injuries, therefore Some injuries are not 
harmless 
VU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No loud things are aggressive, Some muggings are 
loud, therefore Some muggings are not aggressive 
IU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No tumours are cancerous, Some cancers are 
worrying, therefore Some tumours are not 
worrying 
VU01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
No dangerous things are metal, Some metal things 
are guns, therefore Some guns are not dangerous
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VU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
Some terrorists are violent people, No threatening 
people are terrorists, therefore Some violent 
people are not threatening 
VB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
No stressful things are easy, Some exams are 
stressful, therefore Some exams are not easy 
IU03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No car accident injuries are brain injuries, Some 
serious injuries are car accident injuries, therefore 
Some brain injuries are not serious 
VU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
Some types of nuclear radiation are deadly, No 
deadly things are dangerous, therefore Some types 
of nuclear radiation are not dangerous 
IB03 
No B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are not C 
No things available in shops are chemicals, Some 
safe things are available in shops, therefore Some 
chemicals are not safe 
IB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some C are not A 
Some criminals are friendly, No murderers are 
criminals, therefore Some murderers are not 
friendly 
VB04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C  
Some medicines are drugs, No safe things are 
medicines, therefore Some drugs are not safe 
IU02 
Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
Some drug addicts are schizophrenic, No 
schizophrenics are heroin users, therefore Some 
heroin users are not drug addicts 
IU04 
Some B are A 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
Some major injuries are painful, No stab wounds 
are major injuries, therefore Some stab wounds are 
not painful 
IB01 
No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
No hospices are clean, Some clean places are nice 
places, therefore Some hospices are not nice places 
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D. Conditional Reasoning Materials 
 
Instructions and Response Table 
For the following section please work through the booklet of reasoning problems. 
On each page you will be presented two statements, and then asked to what extent a 
third follows given the previous two. 
 
Please read each set of statements carefully, and then write a number between 0 
and 100 for each question in the boxes below to indicate to what extent you feel the 
third statement follows, where 0 represents “does not follow at all”, and 100 
represents “definitely follows” 
 
 
Question 
Number 
Response  Question 
Number 
Response 
01 
 
 
 
09 
 
02 
 
 
 
10 
 
03 
 
 
 
11 
 
04 
 
 
 
12 
 
05 
 
 
 
13 
 
06 
 
 
 
14 
 
07 
 
 
 
15 
 
08 
 
 
 
16 
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Conditional Statements (Ch6) 
The believability ratings of each of the six statements (High believability; A,B,C, and 
low Believability; X,Y,Z) are taken from Evans et al (2009). 
 
High Believability: A 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 87% 
Question  HBAMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If oil prices continue to rise, then UK petrol prices will rise 
and 
Oil prices rise 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
UK petrol prices will rise 
 
 
Question  HBAMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If oil prices continue to rise, then UK petrol prices will rise 
and 
UK petrol prices will not rise 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Oil prices rise 
 
 
Question  HBAAC 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If oil prices continue to rise, then UK petrol prices will rise 
and 
UK petrol prices rise 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Oil prices will have risen 
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Question  HBADA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If oil prices continue to rise, then UK petrol prices will rise 
and 
Oil prices will not rise 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
UK petrol prices will rise 
 
 
High Believability: B 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 82% 
Question  HBBMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If car ownership increases, then congestion will get worse 
and 
Car ownership increases 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Congestion will increase 
 
 
Question  HBBMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If car ownership increases, then congestion will get worse 
and 
Congestion does not get worse 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Car ownership will increase 
 
 
Question  HBBAC 
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Supposing the following: 
 
If car ownership increases, then congestion will get worse 
and 
Congestion gets worse 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Car ownership will increase 
 
 
Question  HBBDA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If car ownership increases, then congestion will get worse 
and 
Car ownership does not increase 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Congestion will get worse 
 
 
High Believability: C 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 79% 
Question  HBCMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If Nurse’s salaries are improved, the recruitment of nurses will increase  
and 
Nurses salaries improve 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Recruitment of Nurses will increase 
 
 
Question  HBCMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If Nurse’s salaries are improved, the recruitment of nurses will increase  
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and 
Recruitment of Nurses does not increase 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Nurse’s salaries will have improved 
 
 
Question  HBCAC 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If Nurse’s salaries are improved, the recruitment of nurses will increase  
and 
Recruitment of nurses increases 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Nurse’s salaries will have improved 
 
 
Question  HBCDA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If Nurse’s salaries are improved, the recruitment of nurses will increase  
and 
Nurse’s salaries have not improved 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Recruitment of Nurses will increase 
 
 
Low Believability: X 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 19% 
Question  LBXMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If UK quarantine laws are strengthened, then rabies will spread to the UK 
and 
UK quarantine laws are strengthened 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
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Rabies will spread to the UK 
 
 
Question  LBXMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If UK quarantine laws are strengthened, then rabies will spread to the UK 
and 
Rabies has not spread to the UK 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
UK quarantine laws will have been strengthened 
 
 
Question  LBXAC 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If UK quarantine laws are strengthened, then rabies will spread to the UK 
and 
Rabies has spread to the UK 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
UK quarantine laws will have been strengthened 
 
 
Question  LBXDA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If UK quarantine laws are strengthened, then rabies will spread to the UK 
and 
UK quarantine laws are not strengthened 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Rabies will spread to the UK 
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Low Believability: Y 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 25% 
Question LBYMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If fast food is taxed, then childhood obesity will increase 
and 
Fast food is taxed 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Childhood obesity will increase 
 
 
Question  LBYMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If fast food is taxed, then childhood obesity will increase 
and 
Childhood obesity does not increase 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Fast food will be taxed 
 
 
Question  LBYAC 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If fast food is taxed, then childhood obesity will increase 
and 
Childhood obesity increases 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Fast food will be taxed 
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Question  LBYDA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If fast food is taxed, then childhood obesity will increase 
and 
Fast food is not taxed 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Childhood obesity will increase 
 
 
Low Believability: Z 
Belief in the conditional statement rated as 29% 
Question  LBZMP 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If parenting is taught in schools, then juvenile crime will increase  
and 
Parenting is being taught in school 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Juvenile crime will increase 
 
 
Question  LBZMT 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If parenting is taught in schools, then juvenile crime will increase  
and 
Juvenile crime does not increase 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Parenting is being taught in school 
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Question  LBZAC 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If parenting is taught in schools, then juvenile crime will increase  
and 
Juvenile crime increases  
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Parenting is being taught in school 
 
 
Question  LBZDA 
 
Supposing the following: 
 
If parenting is taught in schools, then juvenile crime will increase  
and 
Parenting is not taught in schools 
 
To what extent does it follow that: 
Juvenile crime will increase 
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The BIS/BAS Scale 
The following BIS/BAS scale is adapted from that used by Carver and White (1994), 
which is available online at: 
http://www.psy.miami.edu/faculty/ccarver/sclBISBAS.html 
 
Instructions 
 
The following items are statements that a person may either agree with or disagree 
with. For each item, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the 
item says by writing the appropriate number in the each box. Please respond to all 
the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one response to each 
statement.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond to each item as 
if it were the only item. That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in your 
responses.  Choose from the following four response options:  
 
1 = very true for me  
  2 = somewhat true for me  
  3 = somewhat false for me  
  4 = very false for me  
 
01 A person's family is the most important thing in life  
02 Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness 
 
03 I go out of my way to get things I want  
04 When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it  
   
05 I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun  
06 How I dress is important to me  
07 When I get something I want, I feel excited and energised  
08 Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit  
   
09 When I want something I usually go all-out to get it  
10 I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun  
11 It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut  
12 If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away  
   
13 I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me  
14 When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away  
15 I often act on the spur of the moment  
16 If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked 
up" 
 
   
17 I often wonder why people act the way they do  
18 When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly  
19 I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important  
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20 I crave excitement and new sensations  
   
21 When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach  
22 I have very few fears compared to my friends  
23 It would excite me to win a contest  
24 I worry about making mistakes  
 
Scoring 
 
Of the 24 items, all are reverse-scored except for items 2 and 22. Scores can then be 
summed to give four subscales; BAS Drive:  3, 9, 12, 21; BAS Fun Seeking:  5, 10, 15, 
20; BAS Reward Responsiveness:  4, 7, 14, 18, 23; and BIS:  2, 8, 13, 16, 19, 22, 24. 
Items 1, 6, 11, 17, are filler items (Carver & White, 1994)  
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AOMT Scale 
Instructions 
 
This questionnaire lists a series of statements about various topics. Read each 
statement and decide whether you agree or disagree with each statement as follows: 
  
6 - Agree strongly 
5 - Agree moderately 
4 - Agree slightly 
3 - Disagree slightly 
2 - Disagree moderately 
1 - Disagree strongly 
 
Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or wrong 
answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that 
comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer 
sheet corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. 
There is no time limit, but work as quickly as possible. 
 
# Item Rating 
01 Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is 
unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups 
 
02 What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than 
the experiences that may have given rise to them 
 
03 I tend to classify people as either for me or against me  
04 A person should always consider new possibilities  
05 There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those 
who are against the truth 
 
06 Changing your mind is a sign of weakness  
07 I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues  
08 I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything  
09 It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that 
I do 
 
10 Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than 
through waiting for good fortune 
 
11 There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they 
stand for 
 
12 Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character  
13 No one can talk me out of something I know is right  
14 Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life  
15 It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear 
against them 
 
16 Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions  
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17 There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad  
18 I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles  
19 Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can 
be made against them 
 
20 Most people just don't know what's good for them  
21 . It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents  
22 Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom  
23 I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-
mindedness 
 
24 Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only 
one which is correct 
 
25 My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different 
set of parents 
 
26 If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it  
27 I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies 
have may be valid for them 
 
28 Even if my environment (family, neighbourhood, schools) had been different, I 
probably would have the same religious views 
 
29 There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues  
30 I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a 
changing world 
 
31 My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong  
32 I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all  
33 One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs  
34 Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally  
35 A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members 
cannot exist for long 
 
36 Often, when people criticise me, they don't have their facts straight  
37 Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence  
38 I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, 
there's something wrong with them 
 
39 I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and 
mislead them 
 
40 Intuition is the best guide in making decisions  
41 People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their 
beliefs 
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Conditional Statements (Ch7) 
High Believability, Positive 
 
If you enjoy work, then you will do well at your job. 
 
X01 MP You enjoy work. Do you do well at your job? 
X02 DA You do not enjoy your work. Do you do well at your job? 
X03 AC You do well at your job. Do you enjoy your work? 
X04 MT You do not do well at your job. Do you enjoy your work? 
 
If you pass all of your exams then you will graduate 
 
X05 MP You pass all of your exams. Do you graduate? 
X06 DA You do not pass all of your exams. Do you graduate? 
X07 AC You graduate. Did you pass all of your exams? 
X08 MT You do not graduate. Did you pass all of your exams? 
 
Low Believability, Positive 
 
If you do well on the test then you will win the lottery 
 
X09 MP You do well on the test. Do you win the lottery? 
X10 DA You do not do well on the test. Do you win the lottery? 
X11 AC You win the lottery. Did you do well on the test? 
X12 MT You do not win the lottery. Did you do well on the test? 
 
If you eat fruit and vegetables then you will be clever 
 
X13 MP You eat fruit and vegetables. Are you clever? 
X14 DA You do not eat fruit and vegetables. Are you clever? 
X15 AC You are clever. Do you eat fruit and vegetables? 
X16 MT You are not clever. Do you eat fruit and vegetables? 
 
High Believability, Negative 
 
If you get bitten by a venomous snake then you will be in pain 
 
X17 MP You get bitten by a venomous snake. Will you be in pain? 
X18 DA You do not get bitten by a venomous snake. Will you be in pain? 
X19 AC You are in pain. Did you get bitten by a venomous snake? 
X20 MT You are not in pain. Did you get bitten by a venomous snake? 
 
If you are morbidly obese then you will have clogged arteries 
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X21 MP You are morbidly obese. Do you have clogged arteries? 
X22 DA You are not morbidly obese. Do you have clogged arteries? 
X23 AC You have clogged arteries. Are you morbidly obese? 
X24 MT You do not have clogged arteries. Are you morbidly obese 
 
Low Believability, Negative 
 
If you commit murder then you will be electrocuted 
 
X25 MP You commit murder. Do you get electrocuted? 
X26 DA You do not commit murder. Do you get electrocuted? 
X27 AC You get electrocuted. Did you commit murder? 
X28 MT You do not get electrocuted. Did you commit murder? 
 
If you start a fight then you will get stabbed to death 
 
X29 MP You start a fight. Do you get stabbed to death? 
X30 DA You do not start a fight. Do you get stabbed to death? 
X31 AC You get stabbed to death. Did you start a fight? 
X32 MT You do not get stabbed to death. Did you start a fight? 
 
High Believability, Neutral (mean belief ratings shown in brackets*) 
 
If Sony releases a new console, then their profits will rise (79) 
 
X33 MP  Sony releases a new console. Do their profits increase? 
X34 DA Sony do not release a new console. Do their profits increase? 
X35 AC Their profits rise. Did Sony release a new console?  
X36 MT Their profits do not rise. Did Sony release a new console? 
 
If fertility treatment improves, then the population will rise (65) 
 
X37 MP Fertility treatment improves. Does the population rise? 
X38 DA Fertility treatment does not improve. Does the population rise? 
X39 AC The population rises. Did fertility treatment improve?   
X40 MT The population does not rise. Did fertility treatment improve? 
 
Low Believability, Neutral 
 
If space exploration continues, then aliens will be discovered (42) 
 
X41 MP Space exploration continues. Are aliens discovered? 
X42 DA Space exploration does not continue. Are aliens discovered?  
X43 AC Aliens are discovered. Did space exploration continue? 
X44 MT Aliens are not discovered. Did space exploration continue? 
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If grammar schools are reintroduced, then applications to university will decrease (33) 
 
X45 MP Grammar school are reintroduced. Do university applications decrease? 
X46 DA Grammar schools are not reintroduced. Do university applications decrease? 
X47 AC University applications decrease. Did grammar schools get reintroduced? 
X48 MT University applications do not decrease. Did grammar schools get 
reintroduced? 
 
*Based on Evans et al 2009 paper. 
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Visual Conditionals (Experiment 8) 
Instructions 
 
On each screen you will be presented with a statement made up of words and 
pictures, such as ‘If (picture A), then (picture B)’. Following this will be another piece 
of information, for example, '(Picture A)', and a question, 'Does it follow that (Picture 
B)?’ 
 
Your task is to answer Yes, No, or Maybe to each of the questions. 
For each problem, please assume that the statements preceding each question are 
true 
 
At random intervals, you will be asked to rate your mood. Please follow the 
instructions presented on the screen when these sections occur. 
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Conditionals and their Converse 
(Chapter 8) 
Conditional statements and their converse, with emotive content, presented for pre-
testing in order to obtain a selection which were matched for conditional and 
converse probabilities. Those selected for use in the study described in Chapter  8 are 
in grey.   
 
01 Assuming you enjoy your work, what is the probability that you will do well at 
your job? 
02 Assuming you do well at your job, what is the probability that you will enjoy your 
work? 
03 Assuming you pass all of your exams, what is the probability that you will 
graduate? 
04 Assuming you graduate, what is the probability that you will have passed all of 
your exams? 
05 Assuming you are smiling, what is the probability that you are happy? 
06 Assuming you are happy, what is the probability that you are smiling? 
07 Assuming you are in love, what is the probability that someone cares about you? 
08 Assuming someone cares about you, what is the probability that you are loved? 
09 Assuming you find a cure for cancer, what is the probability that you will save 
thousands of lives? 
10 Assuming you save thousands of lives, what is the probability that you will have 
found a cure for cancer? 
11 Assuming you do well on the test what is the probability that you will win the 
lottery? 
12 Assuming you win the lottery, what is the probability that you will have done well 
on the test? 
13 Assuming world peace is achieved, what is the probability that all fighting will 
have stopped? 
14 Assuming that all fighting is stopped, what is the probability that world peace will 
be achieved? 
15 Assuming you eat fruit and vegetables what is the probability that you will be 
clever? 
16 Assuming you are clever, what is the probability that you will eat fruit and 
vegetables? 
17 Assuming you are a famous scientist, what is the probability that you will be a 
brilliant sportsperson? 
18 Assuming you are a brilliant sportsperson, what is the probability that you will be 
a famous scientist? 
19 Assuming world hunger is solved, what is the probability that AIDS will be 
eliminated? 
20 Assuming AIDS is eliminated, what is the probability that world hunger will be 
solved? 
21 Assuming you are healthy, what is the probability that you will have lots of 
friends? 
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22 Assuming you have lots of friends, what is the probability that you will be healthy? 
23 Assuming you have lots of money, what is the probability that you will do well on 
your course? 
24 Assuming you do well on your course, what is the probability that you will have 
lots of money? 
25 Assuming you get bitten by a venomous snake what is the probability that you will 
be in pain? 
26 Assuming you are in pain, what is the probability that you will have been bitten by 
a venomous snake? 
27 Assuming you are morbidly obese what is the probability that you will have 
clogged arteries? 
28 Assuming you have clogged arteries, what is the probability that you will be 
morbidly obese? 
29 Assuming a nuclear bomb is dropped on Plymouth, what is the probability that 
everyone in Plymouth will die? 
30 Assuming that everyone in Plymouth has died, what is the probability that a 
nuclear bomb was dropped on Plymouth? 
31 Assuming you get shot in the chest, what is the probability that you will be 
seriously injured? 
32 Assuming you are seriously injured, what is the probability that you will have been 
shot in the chest? 
33 Assuming you are a nasty person, what is the probability that no-one will like you? 
34 Assuming that no-one likes you, what is the probability that you are a nasty 
person? 
35 Assuming you are a failure, what is the probability that you will have few friends? 
36 Assuming you have few friends, what is the probability that you are a failure? 
37 Assuming you commit murder what is the probability that you will be sentenced 
to death? 
 
38 
 
Assuming you are sentenced to death, what is the probability that you will have 
committed murder? 
39 Assuming you start a fight then what is the probability that will get stabbed to 
death? 
40 Assuming you are stabbed to death, what is the probability that you started a 
fight? 
41 Assuming you eat mouldy meat, what is the probability that you will be tortured 
by kidnappers? 
42 Assuming you are tortured by kidnappers, what is the probability that you will 
have eaten mouldy meat? 
43 Assuming a loved one dies, what is the probability that you will be ran over by a 
car? 
44 Assuming you are ran over by a car, what is the probability that a loved one dies? 
45 Assuming you break a kitten’s neck, what is the probability that you will contract 
leprosy? 
46 Assuming you have leprosy, what is the probability that you will break a kitten’s 
neck? 
47 Assuming you are violently sick, what is the probability that you will be murdered? 
48 Assuming you are murdered, what is the probability that you will have been 
violently sick? 
49 Assuming Sony releases a new console, what is the probability that their profits 
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will rise? 
50 Assuming Sony’s profits rise, what is the probability that they will have released a 
new console? 
51 Assuming fertility treatment improves, what is the probability that the population 
will rise? 
52 Assuming the population rises, what is the probability that the fertility treatments 
will have been improved? 
53 Assuming it rains, what is the probability that the clouds will be grey? 
 
54 Assuming the clouds are grey, what is the probability that it will rain? 
 
55 Assuming you don’t water a plant, what is the probability that it will die? 
56 Assuming a plant dies, what is the probability that you didn’t water it? 
57 Assuming you don’t eat, what is the probability that you will be hungry? 
58 Assuming you are hungry, what is the probability that you don’t eat? 
59 Assuming a light is lit, what is the probability that the light-switch will be on? 
60 Assuming a light-switch is on, what is the probability that the light will be lit? 
61 Assuming space exploration continues, what is the probability that aliens will be 
discovered? 
62 Assuming aliens are discovered, what is the probability that space exploration will 
have continued? 
63 Assuming grammar schools are reintroduced, what is the probability that 
applications to university will decrease? 
64 Assuming applications to university will decrease, what is the probability that 
grammar schools have been reintroduced? 
65 Assuming something is alive, what is the probability that it is metal? 
66 Assuming something is metal, what is the probability that it is alive? 
67 Assuming something is a mammal, what is the probability that it is an alligator? 
68 Assuming something is an alligator, what is the probability that it is a mammal? 
69 Assuming you go outside, what is the probability that you will wear a jacket? 
70 Assuming you are wearing a jacket, what is the probability that you will go 
outside? 
71 Assuming you are reading a book, what is the probability that you will be in the 
library? 
72 Assuming you are in the library, what is the probability that you will be reading a 
book? 
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E.  Ratio-Bias Materials 
Brief Text 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. The aim of the current research is to 
investigate factors affecting decision making, and as such, you will be required to 
complete a series of decision tasks and a selection of short written tasks. 
 
The decision tasks require you to choose between a set of alternatives based on 
probabilities. 
 
The writing tasks require you to describe your feeling towards a life event. These 
tasks may be distressing and personal, but you should keep in mind that you have the 
right-to withdraw without penalty at any time, and your data will be stored 
anonymously. You can also choose to withdraw your data at any time between 
completing the study and the time the data is analysed by contacting the 
experimenter at daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign the consent form, click the consent box below, 
enter your gender, age and participant ID (the number you signed next to on the 
consent for), and then click continue. 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
Instruction Text 
 
The main part of this experiment if a series of decision tasks, interspersed 
with short writing tasks. 
 
Instructions for the writing tasks will be given when they appear. 
 
This page focuses on the decision task. 
 
In the experiment you will be presented with sets of two boxes. Each box 
contains a certain amount of black and white marbles like in the example 
below: 
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Your job is to decide whether the left or the right box has the highest 
probability of picking a black marble. In other words, if you were to pick a 
marble at random from either of these boxes, for which box would you have 
the highest chance of drawing out a black one?  
 
In this particular example the correct answer would be the right box. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact the experimenter now. Otherwise, 
if you are happy to begin, please click continue. 
 
Mood Manipulation Instruction Text 
 
Positive Condition: 
 
As part of a future study, researchers at the university intend to investigate 
how reading about people’s reactions to life events can influence 
judgements. To fill time in the current study, please complete the following 
task to provide the researchers with a selection of events to use in their 
study. 
 
Please try to recall a particularly happy event in your life. It may be, for 
example, receiving good results on a difficult test, an unusually fun and 
memorable night out with friends, or a joyful family occasion such as a 
birthday or wedding that made you happy. When you have decided on a 
memory, please write in the box below everything you can remember about 
the event, describing the event briefly, and then focusing on your thoughts, 
feelings, and reactions. Please try to write for around 10 minutes before 
moving on to the next section. 
 
All responses will remain anonymous, and you may choose to withdraw your 
description at any time. If you have any questions about the task, contact the 
experimenter now. 
 
When you have finished or the time has elapsed, click continue to proceed. 
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Negative Condition: 
 
As part of a future study, researchers at the university intend to investigate 
how reading about people’s reactions to life events can influence 
judgements. To fill time in the current study, please complete the following 
task to provide the researchers with a selection of events to use in their 
study. 
 
Please try to recall a particularly sad event in your life. It may be, for 
example, failing an important test, the death of a loved relative or pet, or the 
break up of a relationship that made you sad. When you have decided on a 
memory, please write in the box below everything you can remember about 
the event, describing the event briefly, and then focusing on your thoughts, 
feelings, and reactions. Please try to write for around 10 minutes before 
moving on to the next section. 
 
All responses will remain anonymous, and you may choose to withdraw your 
description at any time. If you have any questions about the task, contact the 
experimenter now. 
 
When you have finished or the time has elapsed, click continue to proceed. 
 
Control Condition: 
 
As part of a future study, researchers at the university intend to investigate 
how reading about people’s reactions to life events can influence 
judgements. To fill time in the current study, please complete the following 
task to provide the researchers with a selection of events to use in their 
study. 
 
Please try to recall an occasion on which you used one of the library services; 
for example, book loaning, computing and printing facilities, or room 
booking. When you have decided on a memory, please write in the box 
below everything you can remember about the event, describing the event 
briefly, and then focusing on what you noticed about your surroundings. 
Please try to write for around 10 minutes before moving on to the next 
section.  
 
All responses will remain anonymous, and you may choose to withdraw your 
description at any time. If you have any questions about the task, contact the 
experimenter now. 
 
When you have finished or the time has elapsed, click continue to proceed. 
 
 
 
dzahra 423 330974 
 
Debrief Text 
 
Thank you for completing the study. Your help is greatly appreciated. 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of mood on reasoning, in 
the hope of providing a better understanding of how emotions interact with 
heuristic and analytic reasoning systems. 
 
Specifically, whether positive and negative mood have the same, different, or 
no effect on the systems people use to reason. 
 
Although the life event exercise may be used to develop mood manipulations 
in future, in this experiment it also served to induce a particular mood. 
 
If you would like further information on this study, or wish for your data to 
be removed from subsequent analyses, please contact the experimenter 
(details below) 
 
If you feel emotionally distressed following this experiment, or feel you might 
like to talk to someone about any issues raised, please do not hesitate to 
contact the university’s counselling services (details below)  
 
Experimenter:  Daniel Zahra, daniel.zahra@plymouth.ac.uk 
First Supervisor: Professor Simon Handley, 
s.handley@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Counselling Services:  studentcounselling@plymouth.ac.uk,  
01752 232254 
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Example Mood Manipulation Screen 
 
 
 
Example Mood Rating Screen 
 
 
 
Example Trial Screen 
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F. Equations 
Cohen’s d: 
  = ̅ − ̅

 − 

	/2 
 
 
Hedges’ ĝ, which corrects d for sample size: 
 
 =  ̅ − ̅

 − 

	/2 /
 ! 
 
 
Hedges’ ĝ for groups of different sizes: 
 
 = " #$
	
	 % 
 
 
Hedges’ g*, which corrects g for small sample bias when estimating population effect 
size: 
 
∗ = ̅ − ̅
/ − 1	
 + 
 − 1	

 ()(*+ − 2	 !,1 − 34 + 
	 − 90 
 
 
or alternatively: 
 
∗ = 1 ̅ − ̅

 − 

	/2/
 !2 ,1 − 34 + 
	 − 90 
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Comparison of independent regression models using t: 
 
" = 3 − 3
	43 − 3
	 
 
Where b1 and b2 are regression coefficients of the models being compared. 
 
43 − 3
	 = 56789:*+
  15
  − 1	 +  15

 
 − 1	 
 
Where 5
 and 5

 are predictor variable variances from each regression model. 
 
56789:*+
 = SS<=>?@ABC + SS<=>?@ABC
	N − 2	 + N
 − 2		  
 
Degrees of freedom for use in comparing regression models with the above 
equations:  =  + 
	 =   − 2	 +  
 − 2	 
 
 
Spearman-Brown Correction Formula: 
 EF	1 + E − 1	F 
 
Where j is the number of judges or raters, and i is the intraclass correlation coefficient 
 
 
 
 
The Reliable Change Index (RCI): 
 GHI = 
 − J2K51− LMMN
 
 
Where s1 is the standard deviations for the pre-test groups; rxx is the test-retest reliability of measure used; and x1 
and x2 are the pre- and post-test scores of the participants for whom you’re calculating the RCI. 
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Norms. Social Psychological Review, xx(xx), xx-xx. 
 
A paper written to explain in more detail the application of the Reliable Change Index 
in academic psychology which came about as a result of exploring its potential for 
use in the current work: 
 
Zahra, D., & Hedge, C. (2010). The reliable change index: Why isn't it more 
popular in academic psychology? Psychology Postgraduate Affairs Group 
Quarterly, 76, 14-19. 
